



WAR AND THE CITY



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War and the City: The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Urban Space and Population

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La guerre et la ville: Les effets des conflits armés sur l'espace urbain et la population

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La Bataille de Jadotville Dans la Crise Congolaise et ses Conséquences Politiques, Diplomatiques et Militaires

Aby Tine (Senegal)

L'histoire du monde entier a été particulièrement marquée par des périodes de tensions qui ont vu opposé plusieurs nations. En effet, l'Afrique est le continent le plus touché durant ces conflits et plus particulièrement au Congo avec ses nombreuses crises dont la bataille de Jadotville dans la crise congolaise en septembre 1961. Ainsi, Ce draft à communication entre dans une logique d'analyse des facteurs à l'origine de cette bataille et les conséquences politiques, diplomatiques et militaires. Mais aussi de montrer comment faire face à un mouvement sécessionniste, appuyé par des mercenaires et des puissances extérieures (par exemple l'organisation des Etats unies ayant pour rôle le « maintien ou le rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationale ») aux fins de recouvrer l'intégrité territoriale du Congo Léopoldville.

Après sa création en 1945, l'ONU envoie en 1960 l'armée irlandaise pour effectuer sa deuxième mission de maintien de la paix, l'opération des nations unies au Congo (O.N.U.C). A leur création, les Forces de maintien de la paix ne devaient utiliser la force que dans des cas de légitime défense et non pour imposer la paix. La mission au Katanga est la seule exception notable d'usage effective de la force par les casques bleus. Par la suite, cette limitation de la force a été revue, pour donner plus de marge de manoeuvre aux casques bleus.

Depuis le 4 septembre 1961 était basée à Jadotville la compagnie A du 35th infantry Bataillon irlandais, sous les ordres du commandant Quinlan. 155 irlandais occupaient quelques maisons de la route Jadotville-Elisabethville.¹

La province du Katanga déclare unilatéralement son indépendance de la République démocratique du Congo le 11 juillet 1960, moins de deux semaines après l'indépendance du Congo-Kinshasa par rapport à sa métropole belge. Moïse Tshombe proclame l'indépendance du Katanga avec l'appui de l'union

¹ [Http ://www.isd.sorbonneu.fr/blog/le-siege-de-jadotville-lechec-de-la-premiere-grande-mission-demaintien-de-la-paix-de-lonu/](http://www.isd.sorbonneu.fr/blog/le-siege-de-jadotville-lechec-de-la-premiere-grande-mission-demaintien-de-la-paix-de-lonu/)

minière du Haut Katanga et demande l'aide militaire et logistique belge. Mais l'Etat du Katanga ne sera jamais reconnu par l'ONU, notamment du fait du refus net du bloc de l'Est de reconnaître cette indépendance. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies répond d'ailleurs à l'appel du premier ministre congolais de demander le retrait des Belges.

Sans l'aide des Belges, le Katanga doit donc faire appel à des mercenaires (les Affreux) pour créer une Gendarmerie Katangaise. Ce sont ces mercenaires qui s'opposent aux casques bleus de l'ONU. En effet, la compagnie de l'armée irlandaise est assiégée par l'armée Katangaise à Jadotville du 13 septembre au 17 septembre 1961. A cette, l'ONU déclenchait au Katanga² l'opération Morthor visant à mettre fin par la force à la sécession de l'Etat du Katanga.

Comme toute guerre ou bataille les conséquences seront rudes et pleins d'enseignement, il en est ainsi de la bataille de Jadotville qui a eu des conséquences sur tous les plans.

Le siège de Jadotville a suivi après les tensions diplomatiques durant les réunions de l'ONU à New York et au déploiement de soldats afin de protéger les colons belges face au risque de massacres pouvant être perpétrés par la tribu Baluba notamment. Cependant, tout cela est à présent vu comme manipulation afin de pousser l'ONU à envoyer ses troupes dans les régions où elles n'étaient pas les bienvenues. Les soldats de la paix tombaient en embuscade et servaient d'otages où d'outils de propagande.

The battle of Jadotville in the Congolese Crisis and its Political, Diplomatic and Military Consequences

After the independence of Congo-Kinshasa from its Belgian metropolis, Moïse Tshombe proclaims the independence of Katanga with the support of the mining union of Haut Katanga and requests Belgian military and logistical aid. But the State of Katanga will never be recognized by the UN, because of the refusal of the Eastern bloc to recognize this independence. The Security Council

² Etait la région la plus riche du pays, principale foyer de minéraux grâce à son industrie minière. Le Katanga fournissait 70 à 80% des richesses du Congo

of the United Nations responds to the appeal of the Congolese Prime Minister for the withdrawal of the Belgians. Without the help of the Belgians, Katanga must therefore call on mercenaries to create a Katangan Gendarmerie. It is these mercenaries who oppose the UN blue helmets. The Irish army company was besieged by the Katangan army in Jadotville from September 13 to September 17, 1961. It was under these conditions that the UN launched Operation Morthor in Katanga aimed at putting an end to the secession of the State of Katanga.

The purpose of this communication is to present the factors which are at the origin, the course of the operations of the battle and to study the political, diplomatic and military consequences.

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Napoleon's First Defeat - the Siege of St-Jean-d'Acre (1799)

Allon Klebanoff (Israel)

The strategic port of St-Jean-D'Acre was attacked and besieged many times in its turbulent history. Many a general and conqueror raised his flag above its walls, either after a political settlement and bloodless surrender, or after a violent siege and/or wholesale massacre.

Young General Bonaparte achieved breath-taking successes in his first campaign, proving himself to be one of the greatest military geniuses the world had seen. How and why did this brilliant general suffer defeat, frustration and humiliation in front of the walls which were breached so many times before him?

The French Revolution erupted in 1789. Hostile European response led to the formation of a coalition which was to defeat the revolution and return order to France. The war began in 1792 and coalition armies marched into France, only to be defeated and repulsed. The revolution survived, and the war carried on, inconclusively. In 1796 a young general of Corsican descent, named Napoleon Bonaparte, stunned the coalition by a string of brilliant victories in Northern Italy. Furthermore, after defeating no less than six Austrian armies, General Bonaparte invaded Austrian territory and advanced to within less than a hundred miles from Vienna, knocking Austria out of the war and putting an end to the First Coalition. The young general was hailed as the saviour of the republic.

Even the most famous painter of the period painted his image. What is the young maverick going to do now? Egypt. Egypt?? The reasons for the Egyptian campaign are beyond the scope of this paper, but the facts are indisputable. A total political and strategic surprise. The 1571 decisive Christian victory of Lepanto, removed the Ottoman threat to the region of the Western Mediterranean. The two centuries and a quarter since, had seen very few western forays into the area of the Eastern Mediterranean, an area which dwindled into insignificance and was effectively of no strategic importance almost for anyone. A large flotilla and a 40000 strong army embarked for the eastern Mediterranean, evaded the Royal Navy, and landed in Egypt on July 1, 1798. Egypt, which was conquered by the Ottomans in 1517, was in 1798 only nominally part of the Ottoman empire, which gradually declined as a leading power. Large parts of this empire, including Egypt and Palestine/Syria, were practically out of direct

Ottoman control. The real rulers of Egypt were the Mamluks, the descendants of the very entity from which the province was wrested. After capturing Alexandria and crossing the desert, General Bonaparte, displaying his usual tactical brilliance, decisively defeated the Mamluk army on July 21 and became, effectively, the ruler of Egypt. Unfortunately for General Bonaparte, his tactical genius was more than matched by Britain's trump card - the naval prowess of Rear Admiral Horatio Nelson. The entire battleship flotilla was wiped out by one of the most astounding naval victories to date, Aboukir Bay, or the Battle of the Nile on August 2, 1798, which transformed the Mediterranean into a British lake.

General Bonaparte's force was stranded. He consolidated his power in Egypt, suppressing repeated nationalist uprisings, and sent his savants on researches and studies. Militarily, his situation became more and more precarious. Ottoman army units started massing on the island of Rhodes. They were to be transported by Turkish and / or British ships and landed around Alexandria. Simultaneously, one of the local chieftains who was on relatively good terms with Istanbul, The Pasha of Damascus, started raising and organizing an army which was to march and threaten the French army from the east. A general of General Bonaparte's stature, was not to wait passively for the pincer movement to materialize. Countless times in the First Italian Campaign he retained the initiative, keeping his enemies on their toes. The path was clear. Rhodes was not an option, thanks to Nelson. The only alternative was "taking out" the threat from the east. Many a historian failed in the analysis of the "Syrian campaign". In a stark contrast to the relatively unclear goals of the entire expedition – here it is a clear-cut military logic. No Roman style imperial expansion nor Crusader style religious fervour. General Bonaparte organized a "task force", which comprised of exactly a third of his entire force: 13000 out of 40000. On February 6, 1799, the advance guard starting marching north. The Sinai desert was crossed, famously also with the use of camels. The first encounter took place just two days later. General Bonaparte was taken by complete surprise by the very existence of the El Arish fortress, and even more so by its staunch defence.

The unexpected need to besiege El Arish was the first crisis of the campaign and the 11 days delay threw the entire planned schedule into chaos. Gaza was next, but it fell swiftly. The French marched north, on the coastal road, the very Roman Via Maritima or Crusader Via Maris, a road that had seen so many armies throughout history, into the Holy Land. 508 years had passed since the last Europeans were kicked out after the 1291 siege of Acre. The Holy Land,

which had seen 283 years of Ottoman rule, an empire which gradually descended into political dissolution and economic ruin, ruled by weak sultans, controlled by harem favourites and eunuchs. The power vacuum gave rise to local sheikdoms and governorships throughout the country, which was very sparsely populated. Another siege followed. This time it was the ancient city of Jaffa, mentioned in Ancient Egyptian documents as well as in the bible. The French army arrived on March 3, 1799, and Bonaparte prepared the siege meticulously. On March 7 the city fell, after not only refusing to surrender, but also butchering the officer and the trumpeter who were sent with the proposal, and raising their freshly severed heads on the wall. The French soldiers went on a terrible rampage after the fall of the city, and furthermore, Bonaparte executed all the defenders in one of his most controversial acts. Clearly, he wanted to send a signal. Three fatal blows followed. The French soldiers were afflicted with "the Plague". Was it indeed the plague? Problematic. After a short pause, the French continued their march north, along the coastal road.

The goal was Acre. On March 15, Commodore Sir Sidney Smith appeared of Acre with two British Ships of the line. This was indeed a fateful moment. Within three days, the price was to be exacted. On March 18, Smith ambushed a small flotilla of nine light transport ships, which carried the French heavy siege artillery. They were sent by ship to avoid the flimsy bridges along the way, which could collapse under their weight. Six ships were captured and three escaped all the way back to Toulon. This was a severe blow indeed, but General Bonaparte was undaunted. He believed Acre's walls were as ramshackle as the walls of Jaffa. The French army arrived in Acre on March 19, 1799. The oldest settlement at the site of modern Acre dates about 3000 BC. The city underwent a stormy and turbulent history. In the 260's BC Ptolemy II renamed the city Ptolemais in his own and his father's honour. The city became an important political and military centre, going through many sieges and development stages during the Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine and Early Moslem periods. A major siege of Acre took place in May 1104, crucial for the consolidation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which had been founded only a few years earlier. The city became known from now on as Saint-Jean-d'Acre, after the patron saint of the Knights Hospitaller. It became an important port, serving the Crusader Kingdom, but it fell to Saladin after the decisive victory at Hattin and the subsequent Muslim capture of Jerusalem.

Only two years later, the city became the site of one of the most momentous and dramatic sieges in history, lasting from 1189 to 1191, such stuff legends of glory are made off, becoming famous for some of the most enduring feats of arms of king Richard the Lionheart. The failure to recapture Jerusalem made Saint-Jean-d'Acre the capital of the Crusader kingdom for the next century, becoming the final major stronghold of the Crusader states, until it fell to the Mamluk Sultan Al-Ashraf Khalil in 1291. The Ottomans arrived in 1516, but the city remained small and insignificant, until a huge leap under an autonomous sheikdom of a local chieftain, called Daher el-Omar, who openly defied the ailing Ottoman empire by creating for himself a mini-empire in the Galilee, fortifying many towns, including Acre. Murdered in 1775, he was succeeded by a person no less formidable, Ahmed Pasha, famous for his nickname – Al Djezzar, the butcher, who, among other achievements, continued with the complete makeover of the city, undertaking many ambitious architectural projects - mosques, public baths, covered markets, caravanserais and other structures. This was the city which faced General Bonaparte. One glance at the walls of Acre must have clarified for the young Corsican military genius the enormity of the task. The walls of Acre were of completely different league than the obsolete and dilapidated walls of Jaffa. The French possessed no siege guns, but the situation was much worse than Bonaparte imagined. A team of extraordinary individuals became an illustrious quartet who would together inflict humiliation and defeat upon one of the greatest military geniuses of all times. A Jew, an Englishman, a Frenchman and a Turk (actually a Bosnian).

Sounds like a beginning of a joke. Napoleon was not to laugh at this one. Let me introduce them: 1. The Jew - Haim Farhi was a chief advisor to Al Djezzar, whose whims included blinding Farhi in one eye, and mutilating him even further on other occasions. Farhi played a key role in the city's defense. As al-Djezzar's adviser and right-hand man, he directly supervised the city during the siege, the distribution of supplies, the allocation of manpower, even printing currency to combat economic chaos. 2. The Englishman – Commodore Sir Sidney Smith was an extremely colourful British naval and intelligence officer. Following Nelson's overwhelming victory at the Battle of the Nile, Smith was sent to the Mediterranean on a delicate and controversial appointment, to take British ships under his command as required in the Levant. He became one of the central figures in the campaign. His capture of the French siege guns denied General Bonaparte's from using the necessary siege tool. Smith's contribution to the siege was crucial. He reinforced the defences by cannons manned by sailors and Royal Marines from his ships, he anchored his ships near the shore, so their

broadships could assist the defence, and crucially, at one of the worst crisis moments of the siege, he negotiated the landing of Ottoman troops in Acre, the "coup de grâce" to Bonaparte's hopes. 3. The Frenchman - Antoine de Phélippeaux was an extremely colourful and adventurous French émigré, who studied with Napoleon Bonaparte in the Ecole Militaire, specializing in military engineering.

He left France in 1791, but returned on a string of hair-raising adventures, some of which make the wildest 007 escapades pale in comparison, including a particularly daring and successful plan to smuggle Sidney Smith from captivity in France. Brought by Smith to Acre, Djezzar entrusted him with upgrading and reinforcing Acre's walls, a task he performed remarkably and brilliantly, directing the gangs of labourers provided to him by Haim Farhi. His expertise in siege techniques made sure every trick employed by the French army was immediately countermanded by the defenders. 4. The Turk - Ahmed Pervan was born in Bosnia sometime in the 1720's-1730's, but left it early for a military career in Egypt, gaining quickly the nickname "Al Djezzar", "the butcher" for his ruthlessness and brutality. He served Daher el Omar and after his assassination, he quickly took advantage of the power vacuum, and became the strongman of the region. His relationship with Istanbul were more complex and varied than his predecessor. He took over Daher's mini-empire, expanding and strengthening it. He became very adept at employing a combination of intrigues, bribes and threats. His unbelievable brutality spread terror and served him well. He would execute people by himself, or command a bodyguard to either do it or mutilate any individual - on the slightest pretext. Djezzar's willpower and inspired leadership became the primary reason for Bonaparte's failure. There are many contributing factors, but here was the crux. Napoleon Bonaparte under-estimated Djezzar, which he regarded as just another old Pasha, failing to fully grasp how tough and determined he was.

This was the main reason for his failure. Here the shining steel smashed against the rock, and broke. The first large scale assault on the city took place on March 28. As the French used only field guns, a very small and narrow breach was created in the wall, insufficient for an efficient attack. The result was a total failure and heavy losses. A battle of attrition ensued. Small scale attacks, probes, sorties, mining operations etc. Several successful field operations were carried out to consolidate the French position in the region, some of which culminating in victories in engagements against local forces. The large army amassed by the Pasha of Damascus, up to 35000 strong by some estimates, was on the move.

Dividing into two forces, it crossed the river Jordan and marched eastwards. The smaller of the two forces, was defeated by General Junot on April 8. The main force marched into the Galilee, aiming at cutting the French line of communication to Egypt. In one of his most daring and most extraordinary feats of arms, General Bonaparte sent one of his four infantry divisions to intercept the enemy force. As this vastly outnumbered division became surrounded and almost annihilated, Napoleon appeared, and in superb timing attacked the enemy from the rear, completely dispersing them and eliminating them as a fighting force. The victory was decisive, and the battle named "Mont Thabor". The threat from the east was no more, the strategic goal achieved. Acre was the perfect bait, but the victory eliminated the necessity to continue the siege. General Bonaparte failed twice. His pride did not allow him to simply abandon the siege.

Several costly failed attacks followed, with terrible casualties. The attrition was horrendous, with disease and hunger as contributing factors for the erosion of the morale and combat effectiveness of the French soldiers. The arrival of the Turkish reinforcements finally forced General Bonaparte to admit the inevitable, to accept defeat, to raise the siege and beat a hasty retreat to Egypt. The failure of Napoleon's siege of Acre in 1799 was the result of a complex interplay of factors. Geographical challenges, resource limitations, resilient adversaries, miscalculated timing, and environmental conditions - all played a role in thwarting Napoleon's ambitions. This setback served as a valuable lesson for Napoleon, reminding him that even the most skilled military commanders are not immune to the realities of warfare. While the Siege of Acre may have been a failure for Napoleon, it was also a testament to the resilience of those who stood in his way and the complexities inherent in achieving military conquest. However, the Middle East was absolved from its isolation, and from 1799 until 2023, holds centre stage in world politics. The "Weltgeist zu Pferde", as Hegel nicknamed Napoleon, left his mark. So, in a way, he did not fail, after all.

Numantia

Amalio de Marichalar y Sáenz de Tejada (Spain)

Numancia is the history of resistance to the domination of Rome of the Iberian Peninsula.

It began in the year 153 BC, and after almost two centuries of Celt-Iberian wars and adamant resistance to the Roman invasions, the people of the Iberian Peninsula finally succumbed to Rome. This great battle lasted more than 20 years.

Over this long period of time, several Roman generals and consuls had attempted to conquer Numancia by any means, all without success. The first was the **Consul Nobilior in 153 BC** that brought elephants gifted by King Masinissa of Numibia, a friend of the Romans and of General Scipio. Elephants were first used in India by Alexander the Great. Afterward, they were used by the successors of Alexander, the Carthaginians and later by the Romans. Despite this show of force, however, Numancia resisted but lost great leaders such as Caros, Ambon, and Leucon.

The battle began sometime in mid-September of 153BC, with skirmishes between the Romans the Numantines. In one of those attacks, the Numantines responded out to the plains. The elephants were behind the Romans, surprising the Numantines. In the beginning, this surprise strategy favored the Romans until suddenly an elephant was speared from one of the Numantine wall towers. The elephant's fright sent a panic to the rest of the elephant troop causing a rout in the Roman ranks and crushing many of them in the pursuant stampede. This was a resounding victory for the Numantines and an embarrassing defeat for Nobilior. Yet, despite the numerous defeats and casualties, he continued the attacks. Appian writes about these events and mentions as well, the hardships the Romans had to endure in the winter of 153- 152, whipped by icy winds from the north.

The campaign of Consul Marcelo 152 BC

After receiving news of the disastrous events in Hispania, the Roman Senate replaced Nobilior with one of Rome's best Generals, Claudio Marcelo.

Marcelo reaches Hispania around April of 152 BC, taking over the Nobilior's army and recapturing Ocilis. Traces of the camp Nobilior built north of Numancia were still present at the time of his arrival. However, instead of resuming the war, Marcelo disregarded the orders of the Senate and made pacts with the Numantines which the Senate finally had to accept in contravention of its own laws. According to Polybius, Marcelo's conduct was heavily censored in Rome.

Lucullus's campaign in 151 BC.

When Lucullus arrived in Hispania, he found a temporary peace, which did not please him since he was more interested in taking advantage of the generous reserves of silver common to this part of the country. He, therefore, launched attacks on the Vacceos and initiating campaigns in Lusitania, against Viriato. In the years 147-146 BC, he conquered the praetors Vetilio and Claudio, yet was rebuffed by Fabio Maximus, brother of Scipio.

Between 143 and 149 BC, the Celt-Iberian and Lusitanian wars, occur in parallel, which was the case in many parts of the Roman Empire. In these other areas, however, the Romans helped each other.

Metellus' campaign in 143-142 BC

Rome had several active fronts with Lusitania and Hispania maintaining consular armies of 30,000 men each. The African War that Scipio led in 146 BC terminated with the destruction of Carthage. And since this conflict had severely reduced Scipio's power and influence, Numancia was entrusted to Consul Cecilio Metellus, who had conquered Macedonia. Metellus, the Macedonian, received an army of 30,000-foot soldiers and 2000 horses. He decided to destroy crops first before starting the war against Numancia. However, having arrived late in the year to Hispania, he was not able to effectively carry out his strategy and ultimately had to relinquish control to his successor.

Pompey's campaign in 141-140 BC.

Pompey reached the peninsula in the spring of 141 BC. He followed the usual Almazan path towards Numancia and placed his camp on the hill of Castillejo. When Pompey initiated an offensive, the Numantines employed the technique of simulated retreat and counter-attack. After a short resistance, the Numantines returned to the city pursued by the Romans through narrow trails of sharp stones causing havoc to the Roman troops. It was the same place where Nobilior had attacked the Numantines. Appian writes: "Numancia is located in a strong strategic location situated between two rivers and valleys, and there is only one way down to the plain, defended with ditches and sharp stones".

Pompey, suspended attacks on Numancia and headed to Termancia where he erroneously thought victory would be easier.

In the spring of 140 BC, Pompey returned to Numancia seeking to surround it but the Numantines maintained a permanent state of attacks, causing heavy casualties amongst the Roman ranks. And because of the difficulties and hardships of winter, Pompey decided to abandon the camp built on the hill of Castillejo. He tried to offer the Numantines a pact by having them surrender to the Roman Senate and in return, secretly guaranteeing them peace. He then handed command over to Popilio Lenas in the spring of 139 BC.

Lenas Popilio campaign of 138 C.

The Senate gave Popilio strict orders to resume the war with the sole and unique objective, the total extermination of the Celts. Polybius describes Pompey's peace plan as shameful and allies himself with the Senate. Scipio was of the same opinion. Seeing that the Numantine walls had no defenses, Popilio made the mistake of trying to take Numancia. This stratagem allowed Numantines to surprise the Romans and infer heavy losses, forcing Popilio to abandon his fight against Numancia and instead engaging the Lusons.

Mancino's campaign in 137 BC

General Hostilio Mancino, took command of the army in the spring of 137 BC, arriving from the Jalon Valley in Almazan and from there to Numancia.

Mancino provoked several battles in the plains East of Numancia and always lost. He retreated to his camp on the hill of Castillejo when he received news that Cantabrian reinforcements were coming to assist the Numantines. When he tried to flee, the Numantines captured him and offered him the honor to die with all of his troops.

Campaign Lepidus in 136 BC

The new general was of old Roman nobility but was as clumsy as Mancino, and a political opponent of Scipio. He lost 6,000 men against the Numantines and would have been decimated if it was not for an eclipse of the moon that occurred on the night of March 31 of 136 BC. The Numantines were moon worshipers and it was a moment of repentance.

Filo Furio's campaign in 136 BC

Consul Furio was ordered to inform the Numantines that Rome would not honor the peace agreements made with Mancino. Wearing a robe, Consul Furio approached the walls of Numancia but was refused an audience. He remained there all day, disgraced. He returned back to Rome after his inept army was soundly defeated by the Numantines.

His successor in 133 BC, Consul Calpurnius Piso was not successful either.

After successive defeats in the Iberian Peninsula since 141 BC, the Roman people demanded the intervention of a great general. In response, the Roman Senate called upon its most prestigious leader, **General Scipio Africanus**.

Scipio name was on everyone's lips since he had dealt with a similar struggle twelve years earlier in 147 BC, in the war against Carthage. Caton said: "Only he has intelligence. All the others are shadows".

To prepare for the campaign he organized 4000 volunteers sent by princes such as Antiochus of Syria, Attalus of Pergamum, and Micipsa of Numidia, as they had done so earlier during the war of Carthage. This is how he built his army and established a level of confidence.

Scipio was accompanied by an entourage of allies that who would later become very influential: Gaius Marius, Jugurtha, C. Graco Memmio, the poet Lucilius, Rutilius Rufus, Sempronio Asellio and Polybius, who through Appian narrates the events and their involvement. Appian was Greek, but very influential with Scipio both politically and militarily.

His older brother Emiliano Fabius Maximus, was a great support for him and marched with him as his league. Fabio Buteo, son of Fabius Maximus served Scipio as Quaestor.

Before accepting the challenge, General Scipio carefully studied the evolution of war and the strategy of their predecessors. He had come to understand that the Numantines were tough people and that hard winter weather was an added obstacle to the success of the Roman army.

He, therefore, requested that the Senate advance the beginning of the calendar year, which was then March 15th (the Ides of March), to January 1st. This strategy would allow Scipio and his legions sufficient time to begin and complete the journey towards Hispania by spring, coinciding with better weather for battle and giving them a climate advantage. The Senate accepted and conceded this one-time exception to General Scipio. Later, in honor of his eventual victory over Numantia, the Roman Senate ruled to make this change permanent in the Roman calendar year. So, thanks to Numancia's sacrifice, today we begin the new year still on January 1.

Scipio Africanus also considered it very necessary to reorganize his army, morally drained after over 20 years of successive defeats. This was essential to restore the morale of an army that was always accustomed to winning.

Once he arrived on the peninsula and Numancia, he had the opportunity to get used to the hostile terrain that he had come to know from the accounts of his predecessors.

Scipio surveyed the land around Numancia and provoked several skirmishes with the Numantines to gauge the strength of his opposition. He quickly learned that the reports of the fierceness of these people were true. Even

under the best conditions, Scipio realized that his task was not going to be an easy one.

After much scrutiny, he devised an innovative plan to encircle Numancia with a wall which would serve to deny the city of any reinforcements, food supplies, and water. In a famous statement transmitted to Appian and Plutarch (in his collection of Scipio's decisions), Polybius recounts: "The incompetent General is the one who launches an attack before it is necessary. In contrast, a good General only fights when it is necessary, just as a doctor does not use fire or knife before applying medical care..." and in another statement, "He did not consider it reasonable to confront desperate men. Instead, he preferred to surround them and force them to submit by hunger".

One may think that this was a cautious strategy that General Scipio devised, however, considering that his army had a history of defeats and was battle weary, it made sense to have it concentrate on building walls rather than launch attacks.

He thus decided to surround the city with seven army camps, all connected with a nine-kilometer-long wall. To create the element of surprise, the priority was to first build the wall, and several meters behind it, a field of stakes.

As soon as they saw the Numantines observed this threat, they tried to undo the work but Scipio had foreseen this eventuality and continued building the fortifications. This was the most dangerous moment for Scipio, who had established two previous camps, one at Castillejo and the other at Peña Renda to begin the defense of the entire enclosure of the stockade.

The wall was 4 meters thick and was interrupted with several watchtowers to prevent any hostile movement or escape.

The seven camps kept a watchful eye on the city that was surrounded by three rivers: the Duero, the Tera, and Merdancho. To close the Duero, which according to historians, was then navigable,

Scipio decided to build two coastal castles including gates that prevented navigability and any form of escape through the Duero. Scipio decided to put this

new strategy in place in order to avoid any mistakes, knowing that time would play in his favor.

Once the enclosure completed, Scipio's army was 60,000 legionaries strong and the Numancian resistance totaled 8,000 people, 4,000 of which were women, elderly and children, and the other 4,000 were warriors.

Numancia until then, had not known this kind of strategy, but still, and as in many other occasions before, they were not afraid of battle.

Historians recount many attempts to breach the wall by the Numantines but one of the best known was the attempt by Megara and later by Retógenes who, along with a hundred soldiers, attempted to cross the Roman lines and call in reinforcements. This desperate attempt was almost successful but ultimately, the Roman defensive lines disrupted it. Retógenes successfully penetrated the lines with five men and reached Lulia's warriors who wanted to come to his aid.

Numancia could only resist like this for 11 months. And having reached the limit of their resistance, they resorted to eating the flesh of their own dead.

In a last desperate attempt to defend their freedom and dignity they decided not to surrender their city but to torch it and commit mass suicide so that Rome would not reap any rewards.

Scipio was finally able to declare an end to the war by capturing the last 50 survivors and taking them with him to Rome to show proof of his triumph.

In recognition of his triumphal entry into Rome, the Senate set from that time forward, the new Roman calendar to begin on January 1st of each year.

After so many years, the end of the war was so valued for its importance that Rome recognized the deep and extraordinary value and valor of the Numantines despite their defeat.

From that moment on, even though they were the victors, Rome praised the courage of the Numantines, their strength, their dignity, and their courage, honoring them to the status of epic myth and legend and bestowing upon them all of the virtues of a proud people.

The recognition of this epic moment in history has survived over the centuries and is very much alive today.

Numancia: Paradigm of Values and Universal Symbol of Freedom of Humanity

From 2150 years ago Numancia contemplates us today from the perspective of a tragic moment in time 22 Centuries ago that historically became the greatest heroic feat of a people who died in defense of freedom: A remarkable military feat of such historic magnitude that it established the foundation of Europe itself.

This epic legend has been inscribed with gold letters as one of the most outstanding examples of human valor. For 22 centuries this legend has been chiseled from generation to generation. An historical treasure cherished and guarded by classical historians such as Polybius, Appian, Sallust, Cicero, Estrabon, Horacio, Tito Livio, Petronius, Veleyo, Paterculo, Seneca, Plinio, Plutarch, Frontino, Floro, Valerio Maximo, Orosio, and modern as thinkers such as Mosquera De Barnuevo, Nebrija, Miguel de Cervantes, Ambrosio de Morales, Azorin, Goethe, Scopenhauer, Becker, Machado, Gerardo Diego, etc...

All this makes Numancia, a universal historical event of the first magnitude and an acknowledgement of the value of a people who before subjugation preferred to fight for their freedom, dignity, honor, and nobility with the greatest of sacrifice, resistance, and courage known to mankind in defense of their homeland, of independence, and of peace.

The knowledge and wisdom of Numancia passes through the fog of centuries and gifts us with imperishable values that represent a true eternal treasure celebrated by the best guardians of culture that we can imagine. Today this means upholding the highest goals that we can aspire towards in our modern society, which must urgently rediscover the best of itself within itself.

We cannot imagine until we visit Numancia, hidden in the cloud of time, what this city means. Only by walking through its streets and by being beaten

by its winds, do we hear the whisper of its lessons allowing its wisdom to pervade our consciences, and dictating the best virtues to our souls.

Numancia is a historical diamond with many facets. If we close our eyes for a moment we can only imagine what twenty years of siege by the most important army in the world meant for a simple village of the peninsular Celtiberia with such unequal defenses. And that this little village was able to successively caused Rome to lose battle after battle, decimating its massive legions, and to nobly offer peace and forgiveness only to be rejected. Then again, to begin the battle over and over again with even greater losing odds. Perhaps we can start to understand the extraordinary, patriotic value of a people that defended the purest essence of freedom as the maximum expression of the dignity of humanity. This is where the strength and unmatched faith of this people lies; in the extraordinary defense of the supreme virtue of freedom and of the most essential values of humanity.

Rome knew how to recognize such a remarkable feat and so the greatest classical authors have preserved for eternity this illustrious epic that is a maximum universal symbol of the freedom of humanity.

We are celebrating the 2150 anniversary of Numancia, and we are discussing the recognition of a new eternal city, separate yet alongside the eternal city of Rome.

Numancia transmits to us the best of human values, such as freedom, dignity, honor, unity of efforts, solidarity, sacrifice, nobility, independence and peace. Rome contributed to us their language, religion, law, cities, citizenship, infrastructure, communications, the backbone of an empire, and the Greco-Roman and Christian cultures. And so together, Numancia and Rome, Rome and Numancia, established the origin of common European history and culture.

As was said recently in the European Parliament; the Numantinos were the first people to die in Europe in defense of freedom. This accomplishment, along with the efforts of the people who followed in their footsteps, with the heritage of Rome, establishes the most solid origins and roots of the creation of human rights and democracy in Europe.

As the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union upholds, the Union is founded upon the universal and indivisible values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity, supported by the principles of democracy and the rule of law that places the individual at the center of these actions. Hence, the two pillars of Europe, for so many years torn apart by wars, are human rights and freedom. The same could be said of the Founding Fathers of the United States, authors of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, who stated that all men are created equal and are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

2150 years ago, the law and freedom in Numancia were intertwined, first through struggle and after through coexistence. The law is the greatest contribution of Rome. Freedom of the people, outside the scope of Rome, is that of Numancia. Numancia defended this value while defending their community even at the risk of annihilation, meaning that they fought not only in defense of their own existence but ultimately in vindication of human dignity and freedom.

In this way, Rome and Numancia unite and become universal entities as eternal cities; transcending the local to become timeless and global.

Numantinos and Romans, without even knowing it, created the roots of today's Europe, which together with Greco-Roman and Christian culture, formed the Europe of values, the Europe that conjoins law and freedom. "Cives Romanus Sum " is now transformed into "I am a European Citizen ".

On the occasion of this 2150 anniversary, Numancia and Rome together want to make an explicit declaration of their union throughout the ages in an effort to express the supreme value of freedom bound to the sovereign value of law. By looking back to the earliest history of Europe we allow the spirit of Europe to shine like a beacon of civilization and coexistence in the aim of creating the best present and most solid future for the next generations.

Numancia: Culture “Fourth Pillar” Of Intelligent Sustainable Development

32 years ago, we began working on Sustainable Development and on putting into place a viable plan of action. We proposed Numancia as a paradigmatic example of sustainable cultural tourism in preparation for our participation in the celebrated Rio ‘92 United Nations Earth Summit.

After completing this work, we carried out the Local Agenda 21 proposed in Rio92 throughout the whole of the province of Soria closely following the guidelines agreed upon by all countries participating in this chapter of the Earth Summit. Our success distinguishing our project at the international level as the first province of a nation to reach consensus on the implementation of the Local Agenda 21; an accomplishment distinguished at the Universal Expo Hannover 2000, pushing the project forward as a pioneering initiative in Sustainable Development on an international level.

In March 2001, we were able to communicate this accomplishment in an international conference held in Soria, Spain, headed by HRH the Prince of Asturias, in which relevant national and international personalities linked to many different sectors, and scholars from many disciplines convened for discussions on the topic of Sustainable Development.

I must pause here to honor the memory of Mr. Maurice Strong to whom I had the privilege of paying homage during the Climate Change Summit in Paris in 2015. It was Maurice Strong who contributed so much to the establishment and success of this first important United Nations International Climate Change Summit and Treaty. Mr. Strong always found time to encourage and support us in our work and it was he who proposed the creation of a United Nations Agency for Sustainable Development headquartered in Soria, Spain in honor of Soria’s long-term dedication to sustainable development and its successful implementation of a sustainability action plan including that of Local Agenda 21.

Likewise, we are tremendously grateful to Mr. Ricardo Diez-Hocheleitner, and I honor his memory too, champion of the value of education as a necessity for sustainable development for all of humanity. Mr. Diez-Hocheleitner was our main advocate and source of inspiration. He is forever

encouraged and advised us in our work. Our 32 years of success and all that I say here today at this Congress is indebted to his contributions to our cause.

Our activity in favor of sustainability departing from the critical proposal put forth by Maurice Strong in 2001, has been celebrated throughout the years in eleven major international meetings and related debates.

Sixteen years ago, we also began collaborating with and working inside Portugal to advance a real “Sustainability Action Plan,” dealing with issues such as water, energy, innovation, intelligent cities, rural environments, health, infrastructure, communication, biodiversity, migratory movements, technologies, childhood, and poverty, among other topics.

But, by and large, if there is something that we have learned during all these years of work and discussion it is that humanity, having advanced as never before and having developed a world that is global with many, at the same time has created massive breaches of global and local importance and imbalances that are right now of real and urgent concern for the whole planet.

From our work in Portugal, we went one step deeper into the advancement of the understanding of intelligent sustainable development as an absolute necessity in society today. We proposed to link the meaning of sustainability with culture; defining culture as the “best moral heritage of society” - a definition that we have distilled and refined over many long years of discussion- . Later we established this concept of culture as the “Fourth Pillar” of sustainable development, standing as the principal pillar, acting as the cornerstone of other three pillars of sustainability; economic progress, social progress, environmental preservation.

This definition of culture as our best collective moral heritage, and as the “Fourth” and main pillar of sustainability, we now put forth as an innovative and progressive strategical advancement and as one of the main objectives of Intelligent Sustainable Development, so that, hand in hand with peace & security, and human rights Intelligent Sustainable Development can also be established as a fundamental pillar of democracy in the 21st Century. We cannot reach an understanding of this overall concept without the wisdom of culture which frames the principles and values that mankind has forged over its many centuries of civilization.

Perhaps, along with Rome, Numancia can be said to be the cradle of our Western European cultural legacy. We know how much history has taught us through all the human tragedies, but it has taught us many valuable and profound lessons also through our best deeds and moral conducts. It is up to us to learn from the greatest of these teachings and to apply these for the benefit of all society.

On January 29, 2018, we inaugurated the celebration of the European Year of Cultural Heritage with the joint visit to Numancia by the Ambassadors of Italy, Portugal, and Germany. The declarations that these made on this occasion have been essential in placing Numancia at the origin of the idea of freedom for all; communal European history and culture; origin and as the seed of our common European Civilization. There is no need to say any more than this...

We also had the privilege of having Maestro Placido Domingo reciting the tragic "La Numancia", and singing "Ode to Joy" from the final movement of Beethoven's 9th Symphony, appealing to the supreme value of freedom, the unity of Spain, and of European cohesion.

We have also been visited during the past few years by the Royal Academy of Doctors of Spain, and by maximum authorities in history including Dr. Martin Almagro Gorbea. Experts in landscape history such as Dr. José María Ballester. Maximum experts from the International Council on Monuments and Sites, including Dr. María Rosa Suárez Inclán, Dra, Angela Rojas, Drs. García de Miguel, Valhonrat, Rodríguez – Villasante. Dr. Antonio Bascones and Dr. Emilio de Diego who organized an important academic event held at the Royal Academy of Doctors (RAED, Spain) in Madrid. And another event at the Lisbon Geographic Society in Portugal. We have had been honored by Dra. María Rosa Calvo Manzano, and Drs. Juan Ignacio Tello, and Jesus García Calero, maximum experts of the Institute of Military History and Culture, the visit of San Marcial Division of the army with General Antonio Ruiz Olmos, the visit to Numancia last 2021 of the Spanish Militar History Commision presided by General Francisco Bisbal, etc., all of these experts convey, from their different disciplines, their knowledge and views of what the "Numancia of the Twenty-First Century" signifies, discussing the deep wisdom that its lessons impart to us all.

We also held in the heroic city of Numancia two historic military tributes presided by Spain's Military Chief of Staff, General Don Francisco Javier Varela, in which we raised the flag of Spain over Numancia on the solemn occasion the 175th anniversary of its adoption by HRM [Her Royal Majesty] Queen Isabel-II for the whole of Spain. This was one of the most moving events in Numancia's 22 centuries of history as it brought the oldest origins of Spain together with its 175 years of modern history under this symbol representing the best of Spain's cultural-historical patrimony and the transcendental contributions it has offered to the world. These can include independence in the United States, the discovery of the new world, the first known circumnavigation of the world, a global language, religion, arts and culture, etc.... Moreover, this symbol represents our deep dedication towards achieving the universal good for mankind and wellbeing for our homeland.

We also held in Numancia and had the privilege of having the President of the Portuguese Academy of History, Dra. Manuela Mendosa, to speak in Numancia. She offered her important perspective on the value of Numancia for Portugal as the last stronghold of resistance to Rome on the Iberian Peninsula; something that is also important for the birth of the Portuguese identity. She stressed the relevance of Spain and Portugal as the two first nations of Europe and the significance of Numancia for Portugal as a symbol a universal historical inheritance; a world heritage that belongs to all mankind under every flag.

For sixteen years, Numancia has worked towards achieving denomination as UNESCO World Heritage Site for all of humanity, garnishing national and international support that gathered more than 14,000 signatures. In this effort, we continue the work of my grandfather, the Vizconde de Eza, who originally donated the site of Numancia to Spain in 1907, that once formed part of our family estate where two Roman military outposts of the siege of Roman General Scipio on Numancia are still situated. From the 12th century, our family roots can be traced to the origins of this noble city from Warlord Megara from generation to generation linked to this heroic city.

We have celebrated the centenary of the Numantino Museum, which was opened in 1919 by His Majesty King Alfonso XIII. On this occasion, the King himself came to sleep in our House of Soria where we continue to hold many events. The museum is the most important Celtiberian Museum in existence and

is therefore direct homage to the people who once occupied the greater part of the Iberian Peninsula prior to its conquest by Rome.

On this occasion, I would like to invite all of you here today in this International Congress, and all others to visit Numancia and come to Soria, a province that holds an unmatched wealth of Romanesque art, historic landscape, and unique local culture.

Speaking again of my campaign begun 32 years ago, dedicated to sustainable development, offering Numancia as an example of sustainable tourism, it is remarkable that today I am submitting Numancia once again as an example of progressive innovation in the achievement of sustainability. One which demonstrates a successfully executed action plan showing that culture and sustainable development can come together both in theory and in practice.

All of this presented here today has been expounded upon many times in many different global forums, including the many climate change summits that I have attended. In each, I have found many supporters welcoming with great enthusiasm the positioning of culture as the new and main pillar of sustainable development, and as a critical strategic goal within our innovated sustainability objectives.

It is easy to see after a few minutes of reflection that this new strategic objective wishes to call upon the best consciousness of our global decision-makers at a time of massive global concerns. This urgent call to raising the consciousness of our leaders to the importance of sustainability in society is vital. Far beyond tacitly agreeing with or the act of signing onto the Paris Agreement, it must be the unwavering, deep personal commitment of each of our leaders to enact the terms of this agreement, which is now even more than ever a critical urgency for all. A commitment on the part of our leaders to make the proposals of this agreement a reality must be felt profoundly inside their consciousness as the personal duty of all those entrusted with responsibility for global or local decision making.

As the President of the Portuguese Historical Academy said, Numancia is an authentic treasure that is not private but belongs to all because its significance is transcendental, offering the best cultural heritage to all of humanity – a heritage that is not private but collectively belongs to all of us.

Furthermore, rather than asking anything of us today, Numancia is a gift of civilization that fills us with its imperishable values for the benefit of all of society. This gift of wisdom can help us to achieve the moral equilibrium that we so urgently need to lead our decisions towards the creation of the best possible world today leading towards a better world for tomorrow.

I digress back to a time when I visited with Mr. Maurice Strong the Palace of the Hurtado de Mendoza family in 2001. He was astounded to tell to us that in an amazing historical correlation he coincidentally was holding in his collection in Colorado a 16th century letter written in America by Doña Inés Hurtado de Mendoza herself. To his mind, this incredible coincidence demonstrated the true unity between our two Atlantic shores. After our visit, Mr. Strong said to us: “Here you have the true story. Now we are building a new story. Let’s build this new story upon these ancient stones...” There can be no greater reflection than this to guide us to make good decisions and to not make mistakes.

I want to thank the many people in Portugal who have helped us to take the necessary step of uniting culture and sustainability as the “Fourth Pillar” of Intelligent Sustainable Development. And also, for having been the place where it was proposed to establish Numancia as a universal example of this achievement. In the Geographical Society of Lisbon in 2011, we again recalled that Portugal and Spain together discovered the new world and that we were again together in a new journey of discovery in our global world of information, knowledge, and technology. We uphold that it is our responsibility to design this new world with culture acting as its supporting framework made up of the essential principles and values that consolidate the best of our moral heritage. We propose that our plan of action should be to let this heritage act as a roadmap to guide our decision making down a clear path of sustainable development toward the bright horizon of a place where we can resolve as one the many difficult and urgent problems facing the world today.

Finally, I would like to thank this International Congress again for the honor of being here today with my wife and that we are able to engage in this new discovery together. I would also like to say a few humble words of thanks devoted to my honorable mentor Don Ricardo Diez-Hocheleitner and his family in Madrid, without whom none of what we have accomplished over these years

could have become a reality. From him comes the main teaching of the value of the person. We strive to uphold this lesson in our work and also our belief that Numancia, from 22 centuries ago, gives us the greatest proof of the worth and nobility of the human struggle for dignity, honesty, truth, and freedom in the fight to gain the supreme good for each person in society.

Lisbon and the Larvae Civil War of the 1st Portuguese Republic (1910-1933)

António Paulo Duarte (Portugal)

Introduction

Portugal has had a Republican Regime for almost one hundred and thirteen years. The Portuguese 1st Republic had revolutionary origins. It was proclaimed on the 5th October 1910, after a brief armed fighting in the centre of the Portuguese Capital, Lisbon, that lasted for three nights and two days. As one of the revolutionaries said, in the rest of the country, the Republic was instituted by the telegraph. Even if indeed it was easy to create the Portuguese Republic, its life was very hard and brief. The Portuguese 1st Republic lasted for only fifteen years, and died, as has lived, by the use of armed force. A revolutionary regime, as the majority of the founders believed, was born, as such, by armed revolution, echoing another much more famous revolution, born one hundred and twenty-one years before the Portuguese 1st Republic, the French Revolution. and as it happened with the French Revolution, the Portuguese Revolutionary Republic was also permeated till the end by inherent political violence. Indeed, the Portuguese 1st Republic, as has been said one by of the most outstanding Portuguese poets and writers, who lived all the drama of the Portuguese 1st Republic, was never more than an interregnum. This poet and writer was Fernando Pessoa.

The text will present the political evolution of the Portuguese 1st Republic, beginning with the opposing ideologies and revolutionary violence and ending in the larvae civil war and the intermittent civil war. After that, it will continue with the long list of battles for the Portuguese 1st Republic – from the monarchic incursions to the Madeira Island insurgency, from 1911 to 1931, with spasms yet in 1932. In that presentation, the role of the Portuguese Capital, Lisbon, will be highlighted. In the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war, World War One would mark a peak in the political violence and in the sequence of intermittent small civil wars. Indeed, in 1917, the crisis of the Portuguese Republic was so intense that the republican regime was thought at the time, to be

in jeopardy. Some time will be dedicated to understanding that particular period in the chronology of the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war. In the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war Lisbon was the most relevant epicentre of the battles for the Portuguese 1st Republic. As the main topic of the text, the role of Lisbon will be explained before entering the “modus operandi” of the warring parties for conquering the political power by subjugating the city to its armed power.

In the end, the conclusion would discuss the characteristics of the Portuguese 1st Republic larvae civil war, questioning if that political period was more a revolutionary moment than a true political regime.

The Origins of the Portuguese 1st Republic –

The *Partido Republicano Português* (The Portuguese Republican Party) was created in 1879. Two of the main thoughts of the republican’s view, was its older regard to the revolutionary vision of the 22 (1822) Portuguese Constitution, indeed the first Portuguese Constitution, and its democratic principles, as its immersion in the myths of the French Revolution. The party gained support in the main cities of Portugal, among the new middle class of tertiary professions and in the recently urban proletarian class.

The crisis of the Regeneration (*Regeneração*) and of the Oligarchic liberal Monarchic Portuguese Regime strengthened the Portuguese Republican Party.

In the late nineteen century, Portugal’s intent to occupy the territories between Angola and Mozambique, gaining the opposition of the British Empire and the outbreak of the colonial crisis – the English Ultimatum and the loss of the territories between Angola and Mozambique – helped the growth of the Portuguese Republican Party, given the impact the crisis had on the image of the Portuguese Monarchy of the crisis.

By the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the political reformist view of the Portuguese Republican Party gives way to a revolutionary option – throwing off the power, by a revolution, by force, of the Portuguese Monarchy.

The first conspiracy in 1908 ended in the Regicide – the assassination of King Carlos I (the first). Instead of a strong reaction by the Portuguese Monarchy, all assisted the enfeeblement of the monarchic institutions.

So, in 1910, an armed revolt, mixing civilians and militaries, in general from sergeant ranks, mobilized by the secret organization named *Carbonária*, with officers from the *Maçonaria* (Masonry) adherent to the Republican ideology, dominated the capital of Portugal, Lisbon, in two days armed fighting and laid down the last Portuguese King, D. Manuel II (the second), which was only twenty years of age, who started a long exile in the lands of its Majesty, the King of Great Britain, from where he never returned alive to Portugal.

The Institution of the Portuguese 1st Republic

The Republicans, conquering the political power in Lisbon, informed the rest of the country of the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic by telegraph.

However, the easy conquest of power in Lisbon was illusive, and indeed, what happened from 1910 – Proclamation of the Portuguese 1st Republic to the Institution of the 1933 Portuguese Estado Novo (New State) Constitution was an Intermittent Civil War (Fernando Rosas; António Telo); or more precise, a Larvae Civil War in which erupted bursts of civil war (the Intermittent Civil War), in what indeed was a very long Revolutionary Process; a long political turmoil, the end of nineteenth century Portuguese Liberalism – in the search for a stable orderly political regime. A set of multiple crises (social, national – the political community, political, revolutionary and war). Indeed, violence, social, diffuse social, and political violence, as in the top, war, civil war, characterized the existence of the Portuguese 1st Republic. From top to bottom, from the end to the beginning, from the superstructure to the infrastructure (in a Marxist sense):

- Armed Violence – War – Civil War – To achieve Political breakthroughs; To reimpose some political order;
- Revolutionary Violence (Transformative violence) – – reduced access to the Portuguese Parliament – only republican parties; Catholics and monarchists banned from access to the Parliament; Electoral system

– restricted representation, vote controlled by Caciques (voter's chieftains);

- Political Violence – the political party system is incapable of consensus and of political and societal reforms; Strong opposing and divisive ideological perspectives – Republicans versus Monarchists and Catholics; and between liberal-conservative and radical Republicans;
- National – Community Violence – social violence transformed in violent grievances demonstrations against violent police and military repression of civil demonstrations;
- Popular and Social Violence – poverty and analphabetism – (Thomas Hobbes – a war of all against all) – diffuse social violence – familiar, social and criminal.

In a very systematic view, appeared two distinct identities and visions of Portugal, two Confronting Ideologies:

- Republicans
Republic (República)
Revolution (Revolução)
Democracy (Democracia)
Fatherland (Pátria)
Patriotism (Patriotismo)
Equality (igualdade) and Citizenship (Cidadão)
Secularism (Secularismo)
Anticlericalism (Anticlericalismo)
Positivism and Scientism (Positivismo e cientismo);

- Monarchists and Catholics

Monarchy (Monarquia)

Religion (Religião)

Catholicism (Catolicismo)

Counter-Revolution (Contra-revolução)

Conservative Liberalism (Liberalismo Conservador)

Anti-Jacobins (Anti-Jacobinos)

Tradition (Tradição)

Order (Ordem)

Hierarchy (Hierarquia)

Submission (Submissão) and Subject (Súbdito)

Their opposition give way to continuous political violence and civil war battling, as we will see.

From political violence to civil war – the battles for the Republic:

3/5 October 1910, Lisbon – The foundation of the Portuguese 1st Republic;

5-16/10/1911, North Border of Portugal (Vinhais e Montalegre), First Monarchic Incursion, end in failure;

6-8/7/1912, North Border of Portugal (Chaves), Second Monarchic Incursion, end in failure;

14/15 May 1915, Lisbon – The triumph of the radical republicans and the total belligerency war project;

19-21/5/1917, “A Revolta da Batata” – Potato Revolt, Lisbon – Popular uprising with de assault to general stores in Lisbon by hungry and angered proletarian population – the assaults kept on for the rest of the summer;

3/8 December 1918, Lisbon – the defeat of the radical republicans – and an attempt to revive the Portuguese 1st Republic;

19/1-13/2/1919, Lisbon and Oporto – The “Monarquia do Norte” Monarchy of the North and the last monarchist attempt to restore the Monarchic Regime in Portugal. The “Nova Velha República” (The New Old Republic) survives;

19/10/1921, Lisbon – The “A Camioneta Fantasma” (ghost-truck) and the “Noite Sangrenta” (Bloody Night), after a failed Coup, the assassination of three famous republican political leaders – António Granjo, Carlos da Maia, Machado dos Santos (the hero of the Rotunda, which assured the victory of the Republican Revolution in 1910);

18/4/1925, Lisbon – A failed “Military Coup” attempt to end the Portuguese 1st Republic;

26/5/1926 – Starting in the North, the city of Braga, a military movement and a progressive massive concentration of troops, come down to Lisbon, ending the Portuguese 1st Republic. It starts the “Ditadura Militar” – Military Dictatorship, an “interregno” (interregnum) which would lead to the Estado Novo;

Two failed attempts to restore the Portuguese 1st Republic are smashed with a high degree of determination and violence:

3-9/2/1927, Oporto and Lisbon, The February 1927 Revolt;

The Madeira Revolt, from 4/4 to 2/5/1931, with sequels in the Azores and Portuguese Guinea.

In 1933, with the consolidation of the Estado Novo Regime, even if it is plausible to assume that this regime was no more than a long interregnum, the intense violence of the Portuguese 1st Republic gave way to a more stable and orderly political situation.

The Portuguese 1st Republic and World War One

The First World War intensifies the Portuguese political crisis:

To the dichotomy Monarchists/Catholics – Republicans (and of course, between liberal conservatives and radical republicans) another was added – guerristas (pro-war belligerents) and antiguerristas (antiwar belligerents). The Guerristas were basically the radical Republicans; the Antiguerristas were, by the contrary, a vast sum of distinct, even opposed, political perspectives, from pacifists to moderate interventionists, from anarchists to ultra-conservative Catholics, all united against the radical republicans, the Portuguese belligerency and the military intervention in the Europeans Theatres of War, even more if in France, in Flanders. The more cohesive radical republicans achieved their intentions and in 1917 a Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (60.000 troops) was sent to Flanders in France.

However, that was not the end of the story and the World War sees the apex of the first phase of the Portuguese 1st Republic (1910-1919) and its more deadly and violent years, an intensification of the larvae civil war and of the intermittent civil war:

20 and 25 January 1915 – “Movimento ou Golpe das Espadas” – Movement or Coup of Swords – a military officers protest that forced the President of the Republic to dismiss the republican radical government and the associated military preparation for the war;

14/15 May 1915, Lisbon – a strong and violent armed revolution that marked the triumph of the radical republicans and the total belligerency war project;

19-21/5/1917, Potato Revolt, Lisbon – Popular uprising with de assault to general stores in Lisbon by hungry and angered proletarian population – the assaults kept on for the rest of the summer; along that year the republican radical war project enters in progressive and profound crisis;

3/8 December 1917 Lisbon – Another armed revolution, to defeat of the radical republicans – and to attempt to revive in another way the Portuguese 1st Republic;

19/1-13/2/1919, Lisbon and Oporto – The “Monarquia do Norte” Monarchy of the North and the last monarchist attempt to restore the Monarchic Regime in Portugal. The “Nova Velha República” (The New Old Republic) survives;

The Larvae Civil War and the Centrality of Lisbon

Lisbon, and in lesser way, Oporto, were the epicentre in the Battles for the Republic – all real changes in the political situation resulted from the armed battles that decided the fate of the republican governments and almost all were fought in the streets of the Capital, as we can see:

3/5 October 1910, Lisbon – The foundation of the Portuguese 1st Republic;

14/15 May 1915, Lisbon – The triumph of the radical republicans and the total belligerency war project;

19-21/5/1917, “A Revolta da Batata” – Potato Revolt, Lisbon – Popular uprising with de assault to general stores in Lisbon by hungry and anger proletarian population – the assaults keep on for the rest of the summer;

3/8 December 1918, Lisbon – the defeat of the radical republicans – and an attempt to revive the Portuguese 1st Republic;

19/1-13/2/1919, Lisbon and Oporto – The “Monarquia do Norte” Monarchy of the North and the last monarchist attempt to restore the Monarchic Regime in Portugal. The “Nova Velha República” (The New Old Republic) survives;

19/10/1921, Lisbon – The “A Camioneta Fantasma” (ghost-truck) and the “Noite Sangrenta” (Bloody Night), after a failed Coup, the assassination of three famous republican political leaders – António Granjo, Carlos da Maia, Machado dos Santos (the hero of the Rotunda, which assures the victory of the Republican Revolution in 1910);

18/4/1925, Lisbon – A failed “Military Coup” attempt to end the Portuguese 1st Republic.

So, Lisbon was central to achieving political dominance in Portugal. Of course, Lisbon was the Capital of Portugal for almost seven thousand years, but even more than this, it was virtually the only urban modern and proletarian city in the midst of an “ocean of rurality” (Fernando Rosas).

Lisbon with 450.000 habitants and Oporto with 200.000 habitants (some other small cities around them) were the only contemporary industrialized urban societies in a country where the majority of the inhabitants were still left with the Ancient Regime patterns. Indeed, after these two great urban, for Portugal, cities, the third city was very small. With a population of 25.000 habitants, Setúbal, which was near Lisbon, was also a proletarian urbanisation, closely linked to the Portuguese Capital, Lisbon. All other Portuguese towns, were yet Old *Ancien Regime* cities. And Urban proletarian means organized and disciplined political parties and from them political armed bands.


The Fate of the Portuguese 1st Republic Armed Forces

In the Liberal Monarchy, as in the Portuguese 1st Republic, the Portuguese professional elites were profoundly intertwined. It was usual to see militaries in politics, as deputies, members of the cabinet or even, party leaders, as in technical state services. The Army and the Navy had several dozens of Republican officers, from general and admiral grade (like one of the most important leaders of the Republican revolution –Admiral Cândido dos Reis), to lower ranks officers. In the army, there was even an organization of Republican Officers, the “Young Turks”, clearly related to the Republicans. Carbonária, on the other side, had a strong presence in the sergeant’s ranks. The conspicuous presence of politics in the army and in the navy created the perfect storm in their discipline and hierarchy. It was impossible to assure discipline and respect for the hierarchy in a politized and ideologized armed forces, even more, when both, more the army than the navy, were very porous to the civilian political element. Added to that already disruptive situation, was the persecution of officers who were political and ideological opponents of the Republicans, and after some time, also, of other officers who were Republican opponents of the dominant Republican party, who control the government. The armed forces started to be mobilized by the political parties to stand on their side, in the intermittent civil war. What happened was the division of the armed forces and one of the most

conspicuous idiosyncrasies of the fighting in that period, each side mobilized a mixed force of civilian-military battle forces. Only by the end of the Republican Regime the army and the navy, reorganized internally, started to work as cohesive corporations, and assured the control of the armed power, then, of the country, The Military dictatorship.

The Battlefield of the First Republic – Win the Political Power in the Battles of Lisbon

To understand the technical mechanics of the Lisbon Battleground, it's better to start with a simpler scheme, as presented above:



The city was born around Lisbon Castle, in the East Higher Ground of the actual downtown. The maritime expansion and empire gave ground to the downtown (“A Baixa”, in the Portuguese language, below). And then the city expanded to the west higher ground (The “Bairro Alto”, in the Portuguese

language, the High Neighbourhood). The names are very significant in Lisbon's geography and geostrategy.

At the end of the ninetieth century, the city expanded to the north higher ground, the Rotunda, the Roundabout, encircling the downtown, the centre of the city by three higher grounds. The fourth square of the encirclement was the river Tajo. The downtown was the centre of political power, where were situated the government buildings and institutions.

Basically, all military strategies to overthrow by force the political power implied wedging government-armed defenders into a crossfire. In that sense, all military strategy implied encase one of the battling parties in the downtown, being beaten by the other, which controls all, or almost all de heights of Lisbon. The party that controls the Rotunda and the Tajo, and encases the enemy in downtown space, beat the adversary and won. It was the case of the Republicans in 1910 and the opponents of the radical and belligerent Republican government in 1917. The big difference between 1910 and 1918 resulted from the forces positioned in River Tajo, the Portuguese Navy, which in its military intervention supported the Republican Revolution and haven't act in the 1917 military-civilian coup. The failure of the Military Coup in 1925 resulted, in its military part, from the incapacity of the rebellious army to control the river Tajo and mainly, the Lisbon Castle, and its heights, from where they were shelled in the Rotunda. The decision of the government to fight the military coup however was helped by the failure of the military strategy to control Lisbon by force. The fight in the May 1915 revolution was centred in the river Tajo and the dominance by the rebellious force of the river – the Armada was with the revolutionaries – decide who would win the fight. It is relevant for winning to have the Lisbon urban proletariat with the battling party. They control the street with the “a artilharia civil”, “civilian artillery” civilians armed with makeshift bombs, for throwing them at the opponent's armed forces. They constricted the opponent's manoeuvre and created one more condition for its defeat. Given that the Lisbon East and West heights were in general proletariat boroughs land, the side that assured the proletariat support, in general, won the fight. Trying to defeat who controls the Rotunda was in that situation difficult. If the proletariat was on the side of the armed band which was situated in the Rotunda, their opponents have had to cross enemy land, suffering from disruptive civilian fire and bombs, never

assuring any surprise effect, after having to try to assault a fortified position. As such, in 1910 and in 1915 and in 1917 and in 1918, the proletarians were with the winners and helped them to win the intermittent civil war.

On the contrary, like a traditional challenge, the rebellious who occupied the Rotunda, had no need any more to make offensive operations. They could be positioned defensively and wait for the action of the government who needed to show that it had control of the city. To assault the Rotunda means trying to make an involving manoeuvre, assaulting on several sides the very strong defensive position. It never worked. The civilian artillery constricted the assailants, and the terrain, consisting yet of rural paths and farms, diffculted the manoeuvre and the liaison between the involved forces. Besides, the attacker was also shelled by the rebellious artillery situated in the Rotunda.

In sum, the party that controlled the Rotunda and the river Tajo and had with them the proletarian population of Lisbon won that particular intermittent civilian war battle. In the end, it was the country that assured the control of Lisbon. On 28 May 1926, the army started a march in Braga, in the north of Portugal, and came down to Lisbon. Other forces join the military column from Braga, and in the end, almost all Portuguese army was marching to the Capital 15.000 men. On arrival they simple closed the Parliament and replaced the President of the Republic. The Portuguese 1st Republic ended on that day.

Conclusion

In 1910, an armed rebellion, mixing civilians and militaries, mostly from sergeant ranks, mobilized by the secret organization named Carbonária, with officers from the Maçonaria (Masonry) adherent to the Republican ideology, dominated the capital of Portugal, Lisbon, in two days of armed fighting and laid down the last Portuguese King, D. Manuel II (the second).

The Republicans, conquering the political power in Lisbon, informed the rest of the country of the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic by telegraph.

However, the easy conquest of power in Lisbon was illusive, and indeed, what happened from 1910 – Proclamation of the Portuguese 1st Republic to the Institution of the 1933 Portuguese Estado Novo (New State) Constitution was an Intermittent Civil War; or more precisely, a Larvae Civil War in which erupted

bursts of civil war (the Intermittent Civil War), in truth, a very long Revolutionary Process; a long political turmoil, the end of nineteenth century Portuguese Liberalism – in the search for a stable orderly political regime. A set of multiple crises (social, national – the political community, political, revolutionary and war).

Lisbon, and in a lesser way, Oporto, were the epicentre in the Battles for the Republic – all real changes in the political situation resulted from the armed battles that decided the fate of the republican governments and almost all were fought in the streets of the Capital.

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Lisbon: The Town, the World and Defense

António Telo (Portugal)

Genesis

The Tagus estuary is the best natural harbour on the Peninsula, capable of sheltering the largest fleets, protecting them from winds and storms, without even requiring significant work to enable such protection. In addition, its position is particularly favourable during the sailing era. Lisbon is located in the middle of the western coast of the Peninsula, which makes this city an ideal support harbour for navigation along the coast.

In the 16th century, when the great Atlantic routes opened, Lisbon was the ideal port in Europe, as the winds and currents facilitated the journey of ships coming from the Azores, the point where the routes from Brazil, the Gulf of Guinea, of the Indian and the Pacific came together. The capital of the kingdom received the wealth of three continents. Ships from Northern Europe and the Italian republics made their distribution across the huge European market, that was growing quickly in 1300-1600.

Added to this, Lisbon was also in an ideal position for Portugal's internal trade routes, whether those following the Tagus or overland. This points to the first and foremost factor that shapes Lisbon: trade, both by land, inland waterway or sea. The sea trade with an overwhelming weight. From early, the powers linked to maritime trade realized the importance of Lisbon.

For this reason, we find traces of the occupation of Lisbon since the Neolithic and, from 1200 BC, we can speak of a Celtic city (Olisipo). The Phoenicians settled in Olisipo, with traces of trade from 1100 BC onwards. At that time, the Tagus invaded the entire lower area of current Lisbon, and so the port naturally occupied the base of Colina do Castelo (Castle Hill), a high area, ideal for defence, where fortifications were built early on. The entire Lisbon downtown of today (Baixa de Lisboa) was then under water.

This means that, since its origins, more than three thousand years ago, the city of Lisbon has been shaped by two interconnected concerns: maritime trade and defence. For almost two thousand years, defence was fundamentally centred on the Castle Hill, a high spot that was ideal for protecting the port. Phoenicians and Greeks settled therein for commercial purposes, mixing with the local Celtic population, in what would be the first of many miscegenations that gave rise to the Portuguese people.

Rome conquers Olisipo in 139 BC. The first concern of the Roman Empire was to strengthen the walls of the Castle Hill, to defend against hostile tribes that for a long time resisted the Roman occupation. Olisipo was integrated into the Roman province of Lusitania, which had its capital in Emerita Augusta (present-day Mérida). Olisipo was its main seaport, even if sea trade was minimal at the time.

The fall of the Roman Empire, accompanied by the fall of maritime trade, implied a decline in the Visigothic Ulisibuna (the roman Olisipo). In the 7th century, the city was falling apart and smaller than in Roman times.

In 714, Lisbon is occupied by the Moors that come from North Africa, who promoted the development of the city for the cabotage trade. The Moorish Hedge or *Cerca Velha* is then built, which defends the entire urban boundary of the city. On Castle Hill, in the uptown area, the old fortified bastion is transformed into a castle. *Cerca Velha* will be for many centuries the limit of the city with its twelve gates, which extend from the castle area to the edge of the Tagus in the current Campo das Cebolas / Alfama. It represents an important expansion of the urban area, enhancing the size and importance of Lisbon. The defensive wall now comes down to the riverside area. From the 8th century on, the main concern for the defence of Arab Lisbon was the Viking incursions, which justifies the reinforcement of the city's defences against threats coming from the sea. Over time, suburbs grow both west and east of the walls, with houses that no longer fit in the Moorish Wall and take advantage of the retreat of the river. The first construction axis in Lisbon heads North to South, extending from Castle Hill to the Tagus.

The Arab Defences and the Christian Conquest

Portugal was born in the context of the reconquest of the Peninsula by the Christian powers that developed since the 8th century.

When Portugal became independent (a process that took place between 1128 and 1143), its territory was limited by the Minho River Valley (to the north) and the Mondego Valley (to the south). Afonso Henriques, the first king, had the strategic objective of extending the territory to the Tagus Valley, which implied the conquest of the fortified complex of Lisbon.

Moorish Lisbon was the centre of a system of fortifications. Around Moorish Lisbon one could find some of the best castles of the Peninsula, with Sintra, Mafra, Arruda and Vila Franca de Xira to the north; to the south, Lisbon was supported by the castles of Almada, Palmela and Alcácer do Sal, which extended the fortified area to the Sado River. What was at stake were the navigable estuaries of the Tagus and Sado rivers, in which Lisbon was the central and most important point, surrounded by a set of important castles. Afonso Henriques knew that this area had to be the core of his kingdom to come, and so his future would be decided by the ability to conquer the Lisbon defensive network.

The major problem was that the young kingdom of Portugal did not have the means to reconquer the vast fortified region, either in terms of land or sea forces. The first attack on Lisbon is launched in 1142, with a Portuguese force supported by 80 ships, one of the largest fleets ever set up by Portugal at the time. The siege fails, proving the effectiveness of Al-Ushbuna's (Arab Lisbon) defences.


The international context favours the Portuguese plan. In 1147 Pope Eugene III called for the Second Crusade authorizing the Crusade to help King Alfonso VII of León and Castile to regain the Peninsula. The main force of the Crusade departs from Devon (in England), made up of English, Scots, Flemings, Germans, Bretons and Normans, all aboard 164 ships.

The fleet skirted the Peninsula on its way to the Mediterranean, halting in the city of Porto, in June 1147. The Bishop of Porto followed up on previous contacts established by Afonso Henriques and tried to convince the Crusaders to

help in the conquest of Lisbon, claiming that the city was rich and the time was right. In fact, Santarém had been taken by the Portuguese on the 15th of March of that year, with the Moors still recovering from the loss of that fortress, which was important for the defence of the upper Tagus. At the time, Lisbon had more than 150 thousand inhabitants, which made it one of the most important cities of the Peninsula and its main port. The agreement, which ended up convincing the Crusaders, was that they could keep all the loot, as well as the ransoms obtained.

The Christian force would have approximately 14,000 men, of which about 10,000 were Crusaders (4,500 Anglo-Normans), heading to Lisbon by sea. Afonso Henriques commands a Portuguese force of around 4,000 men, which moves by land from Santarém. The Portuguese halted in the north of the city, on Monte de Santa Ana (near present-day Martin Moniz); the larger force of Crusaders (Anglo-Normans) halted to the west, on Monte Fragoso (today Carmo Hill); the siege was completed in the east by the Flemings and Germans, who occupied Monte de S. Vicente (in the current district of the same name); the Crusader Squadron dominates the Tagus, from where the Moorish ships had previously withdrawn to avoid destruction. At the beginning of July, the first battles take place.

The siege lasted for four months, until October 25th, much longer than the Crusaders expected, which shows the effectiveness of the city's fortifications. The Taifa fleet of Badajoz, to which Lisbon was connected, withdrew before the arrival of the superior Christian force, leaving the city without defence on the side of the Tagus and the sea. Its garrison (at least 15,000 men-at-arms) resists firmly, supported by a strong militia, finding protection on the high walls, where ballistae, inspired by Roman technology, and trebuchets were installed. The besiegers also had numerous trebuchets, which fustigated the area of the wall gates, mainly on the eastern side (it was said that they managed to launch 5 thousand balls in 10 hours, a number that João Gouveia Monteiro considers an overstatement). The besieged threw incendiary material using their trebuchets, with which they managed to destroy some of the siege equipment, mainly a 20 m high assault tower, which tried to approach the city from the western side, along the riverside area.



Lisbon in 1147, a city contained by the Arab Wall (on the left, in yellow), with suburbs outside the walls. The whole of current *Baixa* was occupied by the Tagus River. The three Christian siege camps were set on the main hills around the city, with the Tagus dominated by the Navy. Author's assembly of an aerial photograph of Lisbon in 1917, published by *Ilustração Portuguesa*.

Christian attacks followed one another from July to September, while supplies and water ran out in a completely encircled city. The garrison repels all the attacks, yet with major casualties. The final attack was launched on the 19th of October, supported by a second siege tower (25 m high), which moved from the Tagus, where it is nowadays the eastern part of Terreiro do Paço. At the same time, the Germans and Flemings launched a strong offensive in the eastern part, directed against Porta do Sol, in the current Alfama area. The final attack lasts for five days. Christians are able to penetrate the defences at the two points mentioned. On the 24th of October, the city surrendered, an agreement having been concluded that allowed controlled looting and the withdrawal of the large Muslim population. The agreement would end up not being respected by the plunder-hungry Crusaders, despite the efforts of king Afonso Henriques and the Portuguese bishops to contain them.

The fall of Lisbon drags with it the fall of the Tagus line, in an offensive that lasted for several weeks. The Crusaders occupy the Castle of Almada, landing in September, and giving Portugal essential control of the south bank of the Tagus. Palmela, the main castle to the south, falls in October, while Sintra, the strongest Moorish castle on the north bank remains unconquered, but eventually surrenders after the fall of Lisbon. Afonso Henriques still tries to continue the offensive after the departure of the Crusaders, but the attempt to conquer the important castle of Alcácer do Sal fails, which would also have given the Portuguese the Sado line (it would only be conquered 11 years later, in 1158).

In just five months, the Portuguese advanced from Santarém to the Sado line and obtained the central area of the Atlantic coast of the Peninsula, which holds the best natural harbour. This would become the centre of Portugal, a notable advantage for the sea trade, the base of wealth of the State.

The conquest of Lisbon was what today we would call a joint and combined operation, carried out by a multinational force both from land and sea, innovative in terms of amphibious operations, with multiple landings, in Lisbon, Almada and Vila Franca, which allows to bypass the strong defences of Sintra, with its magnificent castle. It was a dangerous operation, only possible because the Crusader fleet achieved total control of the sea and the river. The major difficulty was the coordination of the operations, without a clear command on the side of the Crusaders, with numerous nationalities involved. King Afonso I tried to maintain control of the operations, but the Crusaders (especially the Germans and Flemings) were suspicious of his intentions and launched several uncoordinated operations, particularly when sacking.

The fall of Lisbon brings with it the collapse of the entire defensive system that it coordinated, particularly the castles of Sintra and Palmela, the best fortifications at the time, which surrendered. The defences of Lisbon, with its highly located *Cerca Velha* encircling the city, proved to be effective and difficult to take by storm, forcing the Crusaders to use the most advanced siege technology back then, mainly with the construction of the two huge assault towers engaged on the western side, as well as catapults and trebuchets. The castle of S. Jorge, which occupied the highest point of the defensive perimeter, was practically impregnable, but, as the great garrison committed to the defence of *Cerca Velha* over many weeks, by the time of the final assault, it was smaller

and worn out. The besieged thought that the continuation of the fight would only serve to sacrifice the numerous population that was outside the castle, so they surrendered, upon promises of acceptance of withdrawal.

This was a lesson that the Portuguese confirmed over the centuries: no matter how effective the defences were for assaults and sieges launched from land, only control of the Tagus River and the sea could allow Lisbon to resist effectively. The siege of Lisbon could only be successfully carried out by those who dominated land and sea (river). Whoever did not have a superior naval force was doomed to encircle by land a city that could be supplied by sea, as it happened in several failed sieges.

Fernandine Walls – 1373 the Strategic Change of the Portuguese Role

After the 13th century, Europe experienced a process of growth in trade, which multiplied several times, causing the birth of many cities and the development of others. The surge is based on both local trade and intercontinental connections. From Africa come the products of the camel caravans from the Sahara, which cross the desert to the ports of North Africa. From there they are channelled through the Arab trade and Italian republics networks to southern Europe, both by land and by sea, using Lisbon as a connection between south and north networks. The Italian republics will also seek the products of the silk route from the Middle East and the Black Sea, promoting their introduction into the European trade networks. Through the rivers of Ukraine and Russia, Asian products reach the Baltic, where they feed the trades of the Hanseatic League and the North Sea.

Lisbon increases in importance and grows with this commercial boom, becoming a significant link between the south and the north of Europe. The city became a trading post, due to its importance in cabotage navigation (along the coast) that allowed the exchange between products from the Mediterranean and those from northern Europe. Ships from the Arab commercial networks in North Africa, those from the Italian republics and those from the northern commercial networks (Gascony/Aragon, France, the North Sea and the Hanseatic League) came to Lisbon. These products are normally unloaded in Lisbon, where they are exchanged, and then sent to their final destinations. One of the reasons for this practice is that ships adapted for sailing in the Mediterranean were not suitable

for sailing in Gascony and the North Sea and vice versa. The best procedure was to unload the products in Lisbon, where commercial warehouses were maintained (*entrepostos*), which allowed them to be sold; then the journey continued in adapted ships, allowing the Mediterranean galleys to return, loaded with northern products, while the carracks and barges continued to the North Sea, with southern products.

Through this procedure, the new Portugal consolidates relations with three entities that would be essential for its future: the Kingdom of Aragon, the second largest Christian kingdom on the Peninsula, after neighbouring Castile; the Italian republic of Genoa, with which the kings of Portugal would sign multiple agreements for the development of its navy, namely by D. Dinis; the kingdom of England, which becomes Portugal's main link with the commercial networks of the North Sea and the Baltic.


Lisbon then expanded westwards, taking advantage of the retreat of the waters and the conquest of a large piece of land where the old branch of the river was located in the area that is today the city downtown (*Baixa*). This was the place where the great commercial houses and, from the 14th century onwards, also the financial houses of Europe were installed, creating large warehouses in the riverside area, recently conquered from the river. The new Lisbon far exceeds *Cerca Velha* and for many years it did not have particular defence concerns, due to the absence of a concrete threat.

It will be King Fernando, the last king of the 1st dynasty, to revive concerns about the defence of Lisbon, from the moment he decides to get involved in the Castilian Succession wars, the main Christian power of the Peninsula, the only one on the borderland of Portugal. King Fernando takes two important strategic decisions for the future of Portugal, which are closely linked and only make sense when analysed together, although they are normally considered independently.

The first one was to sign a treaty of alliance with King Edward III of England in 1373, which provided for “a perpetual friendship”, in which the two kingdoms would be “friends of their friends and enemies of their enemies”, maintaining the freedom to decide on the form of support on a case-by-case basis. It would become the oldest alliance in the world, which still officially stands,

renewed and reaffirmed countless times over the centuries. The second decision is taken at the same time (1373) and is the logical conclusion of the first: king Fernando decides to surround the new Lisbon with a wide set of walls, which would be known as Fernandine Walls.

Its layout takes advantage of *Cerca Velha*, yet wider, with 5.35 km in length, 77 towers and 38 gates. The defended area of Lisbon increased to 103.6 km², which corresponds to almost 7 times the 15.68 km² defended by *Cerca Velha* – in two centuries Lisbon increased to seven times more. Altogether, it was Portugal's greatest defence project since its founding and took several years to complete.



Base photograph: one of the first aerial photographs of Lisbon, published in 1917 by *Ilustração Portuguesa*. Therein, the author demarcated, in general lines, the *Cerca Velha* or *Cerca Moura* (Moorish Hedge, in red) and its wide extension in the Fernandine Walls or Old City Walls (in blue and yellow). The Fernandine Walls extend the area of Lisbon by 6.6 times, in land conquered from the river.

The link between these two strategic decisions is clear. The new wall protected the trade centre of Lisbon along the river, where the moorings and warehouses of the multiple commercial networks that used Portugal, namely the English ones, were located.

The Treaty of 1373 created what would come to be known as the “secular alliance”, giving Portugal the strength to resist pressure from Castile on the land border by its sea alliance. The link between the two was Lisbon, much larger than the one existing in 1147, which became the guarantee of Portugal's future connection to the sea and trade, consolidated by the long-term understanding with England (Atlantic trade), as well as with Aragon and Genoa (Mediterranean trade). Lisbon was the centre of all strategic decisions and took a new role: it had been the essential link in the reconquest of Portugal, achieved due to an understanding with the Crusaders of northern Europe for its conquest; it became the essential link in Portugal's maritime future, its main connection to the European commercial networks, now defended on the landward side by Cerca Fernandina.

In the coming decades, Fernandine Walls would be put to the test, allowing to defend the capital against several sieges carried out by Castile. The most important siege was that of 1384, which lasted almost four months. The Castilians only withdrawing after their camp was devastated by the plague. Lisbon, which was the centre from which the new dynasty of Portugal emerged (the 2nd dynasty or Joanine, with the acclamation of the Master of Avis as king of Portugal by the population of Lisbon), would also be the strategic focus of Portugal's new role in the creation of what would be the 1st world system (15th-16th centuries).

The 19th Century – The Role of Lisbon in the French Invasions

Early in the 19th century, between 1807 and 1814, Portugal experienced a new strong change in its global strategic role.

Portugal had lost its global role with the fall of the 1st world system (after 1580), when control of the main ocean routes was transferred from Portugal/Spain to the Netherlands/England, i.e. from southern Europe to northern Europe. This represented a substantial decline in the role of Lisbon, which had

been, together with Seville, the main port of the 1st world system, an essential link between Europe's trade networks and products from other continents. After 1588, this role was assumed by the ports of the Netherlands and England, which developed the main world navies. Lisbon becomes a secondary port in the new European commercial network, largely due to the disastrous link between its strategic destination and that of Spain, unavoidable since 1580, when Filipe II of Spain also becomes Filipe I of Portugal, a dual monarchy that intended to be the new heart of the world system, but that failed completely.

From 1640 onwards, with the separation between the monarchies of Portugal and Spain, Lisbon reinvented its role, which continued to be linked to the Atlantic trade. The capital becomes the connection between products from Brazil and Europe. The new Portuguese dynasty regains control of Brazil, expelling the Dutch and the French. The Empire of Brazil is the Portuguese version of the new empires of the Atlantic, which are based on plantations and slave labour, while the empires of the 1st world system were almost exclusively commercial, without the European powers getting involved in production. Portugal continues to have a State of India, but the trade is very reduced, representing less than 5% of the trade with Brazil. This grew over time and, in the 18th century, it was between 6% and 9% of total Atlantic trade. The new Portuguese dynasty (the Braganças) decreed that the commercial link between Portugal and Brazil was a monopoly of the crown, handed over to Portuguese ships, as the basis for the rebirth of the navy. Lisbon became the heart of this trade, which was a great source of income for the Old Regime. Between 6% and 9% of Atlantic trade gets through the city, with Brazil's products being re-exported to Europe from there, in a global agreement guaranteed by the alliance with England.

In 1807, this agreement changes on one single day, with the withdrawal of the royal family to Brazil, while all of mainland Portugal is occupied by the armies of France and Spain. The withdrawal to Brazil was decided jointly with England, in the secret convention of October 22, 1807, with the withdrawal taking place on November 29 of that year, Lisbon being occupied by the French a few hours later. The royal family was followed by 15,000 Portuguese people, who were the social elite at the time, which included almost all of the navy and nobility; they carried with them approximately a third of the national wealth,

mainly in the form of tons of gold, silver and jewels. On one single day, Lisbon loses its important role in the Atlantic trade, as England demands payment for its support of Portugal during the French invasions. The main price is the end of the crown's trade monopoly. Products from Brazil are now sent to London and not to Lisbon, something that will never change (even after the end of the Napoleonic wars) and which is the basis of Brazil's declaration of independence in 1822. Lisbon is no longer the centre of a substantial part of the Atlantic trade, a role it never recovered.

However, Lisbon will be the core of the fight against the French invasions, carried out jointly with England, in a strategy coordinated by General Wellington, who commanded the joint Anglo-Portuguese army and presided over the Council of Regency, the true government of Portugal in these years, while the Court remains in Brazil. I remind you that the round trip between Portugal and Brazil lasted about 5 to 6 months, so it was impossible to govern Portugal from Brazil.


From the English strategic view, it was clear that the key to Portugal was Lisbon, its best natural harbour and the centre of the trade networks, the heart of political and military power. It was, moreover, the guarantee of a connection to England. As long as Lisbon was in Anglo-Portuguese hands, the French invader would not dominate Portugal and the army could always be resupplied and/or withdrawn from the sea. In these years (1808/12), the English army in Portugal did not exceed 40,000 men, while France had more than 200,000 men in Spain.

The most important French invasion was the 3rd, when Massena entered from the North at the head of 60,000 men, with orders to quickly occupy Lisbon. For France, the 200,000 men on the Peninsula were only 1/5 of an army of more than 1 million individuals in 1810. As for England, the 40,000 men in Portugal were very relevant, an important part of the British small Army, very well trained and equipped, but tiny. France, in short, could afford to take heavy casualties, but England could not. France's strategy in Portugal was to occupy Lisbon in order to sever connections with England, as well as to surround and destroy its army in the Peninsula, so they were looking for the "decisive battle". England did the opposite: avoided the battle in the open field and only fought in very strong defensive positions, where it was certain to suffer few casualties.

Wellington applies this reasoning with great mastery in the so-called “Lines of Torres”, about 40 km long, built approximately 30 km north of the capital. They were the greatest works of military engineering in Portugal, with more than 60 bastions and fortified positions, manned by more than 600 guns.

Wellington withdrew with his precious army behind the Lines of Torres, which were essentially manned by Portuguese militias and soldiers, inviting the French to attack. If they did and managed to break the first defensive line (there were two), they would still have to face the Anglo-Portuguese army, concentrated behind the lines, and Wellington could choose between fighting or withdrawing to the ships that would take him to England. To this end, the third defensive line was organized around the São Julião da Barra Fort, an ideal position to allow the troops to embark. Finally, a fourth defensive line, rarely mentioned, was placed in Almada, on the south bank of the Tagus. Its mission was to cross fire with those of the north bank, preventing the use of the port of Lisbon by the French, even if they conquered the capital. Finally, the anglo-portuguese created the “Tagus Navy” operated on the river, with large dozens of armed and reinforced barges, that could go up to Santarém and harass the French; on the west side, there was the Royal Navy, in the Atlantic, with total control of this ocean, where French ships did not sail. Lisbon was a kind of island, surrounded by water on three sides and defended on the other by double lines wisely built by military engineering.

It was this articulated force that made Lines of Torres impregnable. Massena did not even attempt a forceful assault, predicting crushing defeat if he did so. Deciding to withdraw to Santarém, where he installed the winter headquarters. In that terrible winter, marked by the action of Portuguese guerrillas, cold, hunger and disease, the French lost about half of their army, and so they withdrew hastily as soon as spring arrived. The Anglo-Portuguese army, sheltered behind the Lines of Torres and supplied from Lisbon by sea, suffers minimal losses and is strong and ready for combat (now in numerical superiority) as soon as spring arrives. It was one of the most crushing defeats of the French in the Peninsula.




Lines of Torres on a map of the time. The two main lines ran from the Tagus to the Atlantic; the third defended São Julião da Barra, essential to guarantee the withdrawal by sea, if necessary; the fourth, which does not appear on this map, placed numerous Artillery pieces in Almada, on the south bank of the Tagus, in order to prevent the use of the port of Lisbon by the French, even if they would occupy the city.

Lisbon's Entrenched Field– 19th and 20th Centuries

The huge success of Lines of Torres influenced the Portuguese military view until 1945. Portugal's military defence against a larger force that invaded from the land border became focused on the defence of the capital, protected by fortified works. The possibility of an invasion from the sea did not even arise, because the alliance with England would always be enough to prevent it, at a time when the Royal Navy alone corresponded to the combined naval power of the rest of the world. The problem was that the defence of Lines of Torres, with its 40 km of extension and dozens of bastions and forts, required at least 40 thousand men, which was more than the entire Portuguese army in peacetime. Therefore, it was not possible to consider the defence of Lisbon as a modern version of Lines of Torres far north of the capital. Another concept was needed.

The answer would come during the long civil war between liberals and absolutists, which began in 1823 and lasted for a long period of internecine wars until 1850. In these wars, liberals are expelled from the continent, but with the support of England and France, manage to keep the Azores in their possession. From there, they create an expeditionary force, which ends up landing on the mainland (in Porto). In 1835, the liberals ended up conquering Lisbon, in a movement by sea, where they were also surrounded by absolutist forces in superior numbers. In a short time, the liberals improvised Lisbon's defence lines, which completely surrounded the urban perimeter of the city, but were much smaller in length than the Lines of Torres.

On these improvised lines, a smaller liberal force succeeded to defend the capital against the absolutist assault. It was an immense success of liberal military engineering, a weapon where the liberals had a clear technical superiority over the absolutists – in simple terms, the liberals proved to have a technical advantage in engineering and artillery, where academic training was more important, while the absolutists had better cavalry.



with a force of 30 to 40 thousand men, after a first and quick enrolment. Lisbon was expected to withstand a siege by a superior force for at least 3 to 6 months. This would be enough time for the ally (England) to send an expeditionary force by sea. When this arrived, it would be possible to move on to the counterattack and regain the ceded territory.

It was the strategic manoeuvre of Lines of Torres, however in a version in which the defence of Lisbon would have to be guaranteed only by Portuguese forces in the early months. Therefore, the size of the perimeter was much smaller. This concept is facilitated by the evolution of artillery in the second half of the 19th century. Then, steel artillery became popular, with explosive howitzers and ranges that quickly went from just over 1.5 km in 1835, to 6 to 10 km, or more in 1860. This allows the main forts to be more widely spaced, maintaining the possibility of cross fire. As the forts become better defended, strongly underground built and more expensive, with few large calibre pieces (like the 220 mm from Krupp) and greater ranges, a half dozen forts, with some auxiliary bastions, are enough to defend the entire Lisbon's Entrenched Field. The layout of the Field, as well as the layout of the forts, underwent a very rapid evolution between 1850 and 1914, which we will not go into further¹.

The concept of an Entrenched Field in Lisbon constrains the evolution of the capital for almost a hundred years (between 1850 and 1949). The field includes many kilometres of military roads and even railway lines, which are the only ones that follow an east-west route, while the others radiate from the centre of Lisbon, like the spokes of a circle. The growth of the urban area of Lisbon is limited by the planning of the Entrenched Field. Constructions that jeopardize the firing ranges, or that are too exposed to enemy artillery, are not allowed. This was one of the reasons why, for example, the modest industrial development of

¹ As a whole, the defences of the northern accesses follow a line from Sacavém to Caxias, marked by four large forts (Monte Cintra, in Sacavém; D. Carlos, in Ameixoeira; Sá da Bandeira, in Monsanto; D. Luís I, in Caxias). The defence of the north bank of the Tagus was centred on two forts with heavy Krupp artillery: Bom Sucesso and Alto do Duque. This set was completed by São Julião da Barra fort, which defended the mouth of the Tagus River, crossing fires with the Fort of Almada (south bank). From the end of the 19th century, the Navy concluded the defences of the Tagus setting up submerged torpedoes in the riverbed or on the river banks, supported by 4 small torpedo boats and by a single battleship for coastal defence (the Vasco da Gama, with the same artillery pieces of the forts).

Lisbon was concentrated along the Tagus outside the Entrenched Field, or transferred to the south bank, in places that were born out of nowhere, such as Barreiro. The cities in the vicinity of Lisbon (like Amadora) only developed in the 20th century, as the concept of defence of the capital did not allow them to grow earlier. The industrialization of the south bank of the Tagus, important on a national scale, is a direct consequence of the Entrenched Field.

In summary, as it happened with the Moorish Hedge, the urban development of Lisbon depended on the general strategic environment (now affected by the alliance with England) and on the military strategy. The urban perimeter was larger and the constraints were different, but the reasoning continued to be the same as in the days of Afonso Henriques. Lisbon had lost much of the commercial importance of previous centuries, but continued to be at the centre of national defence doctrine, which, in turn, strongly conditioned the development of the urban perimeter. The main concept was that in order to defend Portugal you need to defend Lisbon, and wait for the help that would come from the sea.

Lisbon in the New 20th-Century – Defende and Politics

For reasons not to be covered in this presentation, the monarchy entered a crisis in 1891 and was overthrown in the so-called republican revolution of October 5, 1910. It was the beginning of a period of great instability, with the frequent use of armed force, both by regular units, as well as military security forces and, above all, armed civilians. Armed civilians are private armies with a semi-legal existence, initially linked to radical republican governments, later also associated with other political groups, from trade unions, monarchists or moderate republicans. Almost all of the many revolutions and coups, with violent street fighting, took place in Lisbon. It was the application of a principle proclaimed in 1910: power is conquered in the capital and the rest of the country adheres by telegram.


This means that, between 1910 and 1926, power depends on the fights in the streets of Lisbon. The first problem that this raises is the fact that the numerous heavy artillery surrounding the capital cannot interfere with these battles. One of the specifications for the construction of the forts of the Entrenched Field was that their pieces could not rotate in order to hit targets in

the urban area, so that an enemy coming from abroad, who would conquer a fort, could not use their artillery against Lisbon. The fight in Lisbon therefore depended on infantry units, machine gun battalions, lighter field artillery (up to 75 mm) and, above all, on groups of armed civilians, who were acquainted with the back alleys and made use of the roofs with great efficiency, launching improvised grenades into the street from high spots. The cavalry units (almost all monarchists or conservative republicans) were of poor employment in these fights, as the explosion of a grenade thrown from the roof into the middle of a cavalry force was enough to disperse it, turning it an easy target for the snipers placed on high spots. On the 5th of October, for example, the cavalry of Belém, considered the monarchical elite, was defeated by about 50 armed civilians set on roofs in the narrow streets of Alcântara and had to withdraw in a disorderly manner. In the streets of Lisbon, cavalry could not attack improvised barricades, and was merely employed as couriers or in small reconnaissance units.

The new reality of urban development in Lisbon facilitates this fight. In the 19th century, the main axis of expansion of the city started from the old *Baixa*, going beyond the already demolished Fernandine Walls to the North, through a wide avenue inspired by Paris “boulevards”, named Avenida da Liberdade. This ended in a high area, from which you could see the Tagus and dominate the whole city, called *Rotunda* (later, Marques de Pombal Square and Eduardo VII Park). Whoever controlled the *Rotunda* had the city at their feet. It was enough to place a few quick-fire pieces therein to dominate any spot in the city, while the accesses were controlled by machine guns, set in improvised barricades. Any attack on this position would have to come from wide, straight avenues, with unobstructed fields of fire, where machine guns and rapid fire guns would wipe out the attacking force before contact. The only possible alternative would be for the attacking forces to be able to count on strong artillery, with whose support they could overcome the high position of the *Rotunda*. This, however, could not be assigned to the artillery of the Entrenched Field. In addition, the ships in the Tagus River had a very difficult fire range, while, on the other hand, they were easy targets for the artillery placed in the high ground of the *Rotunda*.

It turns out that, by pure chance, the two ideal weapons to take advantage of Lisbon's new military potential had arrived in Portugal shortly before the republican revolution. One was the Vickers-Maxim machine guns, delivered to

independent machine gun battalions. The other was the revolutionary piece Schneider TR 75, a secret French weapon, which arrived in Portugal in 1908, by commitment and direct request of King Carlos. It was the first gun in which the recoil was completely absorbed by a hydro-pneumatic system, which meant that it could aim once and fire 12 shots per minute (the breech was closed by an interrupted screw system, simply activating a lever to open), using a complete grenade with many variants (explosive, light, shrapnel, etc.). A military force installed in the *Rotunda*, equipped with machine guns and TR 75 guns, was very difficult to dislodge.




The Schneider TR75 set in the *Rotunda* in the October Revolution of 1910. The artillerymen are from the Artillery 1 barracks, the only artillery unit in Lisbon and one of the only two units in the Army that supports the republicans. They are surrounded by armed civilians from the Carbonária, the private army of the republicans. Photograph of *Ilustração Portuguesa*, October 1910.



Vickers-Maxim was the other weapon that allowed the republicans to gain power. This had been placed in the *Rotunda* in order to cover the accesses by Av. da Liberdade, the largest avenue in Lisbon in 1910. Photograph of *Ilustração Portuguesa*, October 1910.

The republican military art, improvised by Machado Santos on the 5th of October, was to take a very small force of regular soldiers (about 200) positioned at the *Rotunda*. In addition, near the *Rotunda* was the Artillery 1 barracks, the only artillery unit in the capital, so the approximately 6 Republican TR 75 guns mounted in the upper zone had ample ammunition. The manoeuvre was completed by armed civilians from *Carbonária*, linked to the Republican Party, who dominated the streets of the city, preventing the displacement of monarchical forces through the narrow and tortuous streets of old Lisbon. The numerous military forces that supported the monarchy (about 6,000 men at the beginning of the revolution) were forced to move in large numbers across the widest and straightest streets, avoiding confrontations with armed civilians, who acted in very small groups (5 to 20 men) and were perfectly acquainted with the alleys, byways and accesses to the roofs.

As a result of this manoeuvre, the small force concentrated at the *Rotunda* served as a fatal attraction for the enemy, in a larger number, but unable to launch an assault on the high and well-defended spot. Meanwhile, the streets were given over to armed civilians, who carried out discouraging actions upon the opposing forces, while unarmed civilians were trying to mix with the military personnel, persuading them to change camp and causing the disruption of enemy units. This was so heartily felt, that the monarchical command gave orders to concentrate all forces in Rossio square, closing all access streets, so that unarmed civilians could not get in contact with the faithful units. The Republicans were able to win precisely when a monarchical garrison that guarded one of the access streets to Rossio was distracted, letting in a crowd of unarmed civilians who mixed up with the units in the square, breaking discipline and causing many to change sides. It was the end of the large monarchical military force.



Aerial photograph of Lisbon in 1917 (*Ilustração Portuguesa*), which permits to understand the republican military manoeuvre in the revolution. The approximately 200 regular Army soldiers who support the Republic (without a single Army officer) are concentrated at the *Rotunda* (in red, to the north), where they set 6 Schneider TR 75 pieces in a high spot. Rossio is in blue. In the riverside, the Arsenal da Marinha was a republican strongpoint, also in red.

In the riverside area, the Republicans dominate two units of the Navy: the sailors' barracks and the Navy Arsenal (represented in red, next to Praça do Comércio). The numerous forces of the monarchy are concentrated in Rossio (in blue, in the middle). All attacks launched against the *Rotunda* have to follow wide avenues and fail due to the action of artillery and the fire of the Republican barricades. The small streets of Lisbon are dominated by civilians, some of them armed, others unarmed, who oppose the monarchical forces. After 24 hours of such procedure, the Republicans won.

The same manoeuvre was adopted again in several later revolutions. The military centre of Lisbon had moved to the *Rotunda* area and to the new avenues (Liberdade and Fontes Pereira de Melo), which was possible due to the new urban layout and the new weapons.

Added to this is the fact that the Republicans, who only had the support of a very small part of the Army officers (less than 3%), had greater influence in the Navy, as a result of which the Navy Arsenal and the Sailors' Barracks, both located in the riverside area of the city, join the movement, as well as two small Navy cruisers. From that moment on, the Republicans dominated the river line, preventing the movement of monarchical units in the wider streets of the riverside area. The concentration of monarchical forces in Rossio is between two fires (the pieces at the *Rotunda* and the ships in the Tagus), while the artillery of the ships defends the sailors' facilities on the banks of the Tagus.

One day of fighting in Lisbon under these conditions was enough for the 400 Republican soldiers (supported by about 2 to 3 thousand armed civilians) to achieve the surrender of the approximately 6000 soldiers loyal to the Monarchy, which seemed impossible for a "normal" operation.

Lisbon takes a new military role after 1910: the role of a centre of military power, backed by armed civilians, without which political power could not stand. The Republic was a fragile regime, dominated by the Republicans' most radical party, whose support centre was located in the capital, far from the majority of the rural population of Portugal. The main concern was to keep power, which was intended to be carried out from Lisbon, with a new military system that included private armies of armed civilians, in addition to the new military security force created in 1911 (the GNR – Guarda Nacional Republicana).

All major revolutions and coups of the next 16 years (1910-1926) repeat the 1910 model, with some variants. Most of these movements are victorious (as in 1915, 1917 and 1921), led by various political forces, some radical and others moderate, all of them using military violence to seize power.

The new military manoeuvre, which allowed a small urban force to take power, was only possible due to the urban development of Lisbon from 1850 onwards, with the opening of Avenida da Liberdade and Avenidas Novas. It is curious to note that the Lisbon area where all this is happening surpasses the Fernandine Walls, yet remains within the defence lines of Lisbon's Entrenched Field. The capital is at the centre of political and social life in Portugal, however linked to strong internal instability and an original military manoeuvre, which conjugates the traditional with the new and that is only possible in a modernized Lisbon after the Regeneration (1851)².

² The democratic revolution of April 25, 1974, also started in Lisbon, with a similar manoeuvre. As Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho (the author of the plan for the revolution) told the author of these lines, he intended to concentrate the main rebel military unit (the armoured force of Santarém) in Terreiro de Paço, to serve as a fatal attraction to the forces that supported the dictatorship, while the main targets (television, radio, airports, arsenals, communications) were occupied by small detachments, which did not encounter resistance. It was the same idea as the *Rotunda's* fatal attraction in 1910, applied to new circumstances. I might add that, as early as 1910, one of the Republicans' first concerns was to occupy the submarine cable centre in Carcavelos and the telegraph stations, which meant that internal and international communications were in their hands.

³ In its final version, the batteries, delivered to the Coastal Defence Regiment, were:

Cascais – Alcabideche – 234 mm pieces by Vickers

Oeiras – RAC – Vickers 152 mm parts

Oeiras – Lage – Krupp 150 mm pieces

Fort of Bom Sucesso – Belém

Raposeira - Trafaria


Raposa – Fonte da Telha – 234 mm Vickers

Outão – Serra da Arrábida – 150 mm Krupp

Albarquel – Serra da Arrábida – 152 mm Vickers.

⁴ The first plane shot down in Portugal crashes in December 1917, during the Sidónio Pais revolution.

It was a small biplane that decided to fly at low altitude over the Camp of *Rotunda* to take some photographs, believing it was unbeatable. The revolutionaries of Sidónio Pais open fire with their Mauser-Vergueiro rifles and the plane is shot down.



Aerial photograph of Avenidas Novas in 1917 (*Ilustração Portuguesa*). On the left, we find the *Rotunda*, a high area, without trees and with wide accesses. On the right, the two main new avenues: Fontes Pereira de Melo, which ends in Saldanha, and Av. da República, which ends in Campo Grande, then a suburb of Lisbon. The capital of 1910 was contained within the liberal lines of defence of Lisbon in 1835, which served as the base for the Entrenched Field. All revolutions and coups took place in this small area, where the three main avenues and the *Rotunda* conditioned military manoeuvres and the strong artillery of the Entrenched Field could not be used.

⁵ The two main ones were the 94 mm Vickers heavyweight 3.7 inch (QF 3.7 inch) and the medium 40mm Bofors, of Swedish origin but manufactured in England. Both were in service for more than half a century.

⁶ There were other plans later, but prepared only by Portugal, without the cooperation or England's agreement, so it can be said that the 1943 would be the last international plan. The subject was studied by the author in Portugal, and World War II and later Lisbon defence plans to 1943 are developed in the work of Jorge Rocha.

⁷ I recall that Spain was not a member of NATO at this time, because the main European states did not accept the Franco regime in the new organization. This forced Portugal to have two plans independent parties: one with Spain and the other with NATO.

World War II and the Changes of the Cold War

The last expression of the concept of Entrenched Field appears during World War II, in which Portugal remained neutral. On that occasion, the Plan Barron for the defence of the capital was developed, named after the English officer who conceived it, based on the existing forts. The plan had two important innovations: Anti-aircraft for defence of the capital was for the first time used and the network of coastal batteries was extended, in order to cover the peninsula of Setúbal, beyond the Tagus bar. The justification was that the ships' heavy artillery had ranges of more than 25 km, so a battleship in the Sado estuary (Setúbal) could reach Lisbon with its pieces, without the defence artillery on the Tagus coast being able to fire back. Therefore, to defend Lisbon, it was necessary to fortify the Sado estuary and not just the Tagus.

The Plan Barron provided for 8 coastal defence batteries, which could be deployed from Cascais to Setúbal, equipped with pieces of more than 20 km in range, with 4 on the north bank and the same number on the south³. The AA artillery was born at this time and concentrated on the defence of Lisbon, with modern English pieces⁴. According to the plan developed with England in 1943 (when Lages Air Base/Azores was occupied by England), in the event of an attack on the Spanish border, the Portuguese had to ensure the defence of the Lisbon-Setúbal area, for at least three months. They had the support of the coastal defence batteries, the old batteries of the Entrenched Field and the modern AA defence network that has been developed since 1938. In an early phase, England only committed to sending naval units and some fighter squadrons of the RAF for the air defence of the capital. The expedition of a land expeditionary force remained open, without England committing as to the composition of such force or estimated date of arrival. The 1943 plan was the last version of the Lines of Torres defence concept, centred in Lisbon and updated with long-range artillery and the anti-aircraft component⁵.

When Portugal joined NATO as a founding member (1949), the whole concept of defence of Portugal changes, assuming a multilateral context, different from the past. Two defence plans were drawn up in 1949/1960: one with Spain, for the Portuguese participation of a force of three divisions in the defence of the Pyrenees line; another with NATO, to send a Portuguese expeditionary force to the Bordeaux area, in the south of France in the case of a

Russian lightning offensive that would bring Russian tanks to the south of France in just three months.

For the first time since 1147, Lisbon was no longer the core of Portugal's defence, which was secured many hundreds of kilometres from the capital. This means that only after 1949 the capital would be free from the constraints of the defence plans conceived for its development and could be able to carry out an urban planning that would follow different criteria.

Conclusions

Three frameworks characterized the development of Lisbon: trade, defence and international strategic context.

Trade was the main reason for being birth in the Tagus estuary, the best natural harbour on the Peninsula, capable of hosting the largest fleets. The Phoenician and Greek presence in Lisbon reveals the importance of the city as a terminus of Mediterranean trade networks, which would be reinforced by the long colonization of Rome, responsible for transforming the city into the most important port of the province of Lusitania.

The Moorish presence for more than four centuries (711-1147) reinforces this role and, for the first time, the city is surrounded by a continuous wall, becoming the centre of the defence system of the Tagus and Sado estuaries, with a network of a dozen castles.

In the following two centuries (1147-1415), Lisbon would undergo another strategic role. It becomes the hub where the commercial networks of the Mediterranean meet those of northern Europe, an essential element for the development of trade and of the European cities. This allowed Portugal to create strong ties with three of the main Christian commercial entities at the time: the Kingdom of Aragon, the Republic of Genoa and, above all, England, with which the secular alliance was signed in 1373. In terms of defence this would be evidenced by the creation of the ambitious Fernandine Walls and the expansion of Lisbon to an area 7 times larger.

After the 15th century, Lisbon takes on a new strategic role: the terminal point of the main ocean routes of three continents (Africa, America and Asia). In

these centuries, the Portuguese navy was one of the most important ocean navies in the world, constituting the major defence of Lisbon, while the Fernandine Walls fell into disrepair, particularly as it turned out to be too small for a city that was expanding rapidly. Lisbon would then grow mainly towards the west, along the river, in the continuation of *Ribeira das Naus*, the main shipyard in Portugal and in the world back then.

With the fall of the 1st world system (end of the 16th century), Lisbon's worldwide importance is reduced. The city then acquires a new limited function: the commercial centre of the 2nd Empire, the Empire of Brazil, which could only exist with the naval support of England, ensured by the secular alliance. Lisbon remains at the centre of the Portuguese system, but it is no longer the heart of the world's trade. Nevertheless, around 6% to 9% of the Atlantic trade is carried out through the capital of Portugal, which is the main source of revenue for the monarchy.

With the Napoleonic wars (beginning of the 19th century), Lisbon suffered a further decline with regard to the city's relative power and ceased to be the mandatory crossing point for trade with Brazil. The capital began to feel again the threats of a land invasion and Portugal understood that its defence could only be ensured within the framework of the Secular Alliance. This leads to the building of the Lines of Torres.

In the liberal period of the 19th century, and until 1975, Lisbon becomes the centre of the 3rd Empire, the empire of Africa, gradually built over decades. The defence of the city is ensured by Lisbon's Entrenched Field, always within the notion of an understanding with England, but with a smaller dimension than the Lines of Torres.

From 1910 onwards, in the unstable period that would then begin, Lisbon got a new role. It becomes the centre, not only political, but political/military of Portugal. It is in Lisbon here it is decided, arms in hand, who governs. This would result in multiple uprisings, coups and riots, all in the capital. The military manoeuvre that was then developed was only possible due to the change in urban plans since 1851, with the new city expanding to the north, characterized by large avenues, which opened up other military possibilities. The plans for Lisbon's Entrenched Field then developed, prevented the capital from becoming directly

an industrial centre, with the modest national industries sent to the south bank or beyond the defensive perimeter.

World War II essentially maintained the concept of defending Portugal having Lisbon as the basis, therefore developing, in conjugation with England, plans in this regard. The emerging air power and the greater range of artillery brought two innovations to the defence plans: they began to cover the airspace, with a modern AA system, which was created in 1938, while the coast defence artillery has a longer range; the plans now include the joint defence of Lisbon/Setúbal. It is a defensive system that, as it had already happened in 1810, needed the collaboration of England to be effective.

With NATO (1949), a new defence doctrine emerged for Portugal. For the first time, Portugal would be defended far from Lisbon and based on multilateral cooperation that encompassed the North Atlantic. In this concept, the Portuguese military force is projected towards the south of France and towards the north of Spain. Portugal's defence lines are now very far from Lisbon, although it maintained the main forts of the Entrenched Field until quite late, namely those of the coastal artillery (many still active in 1974).

A cycle is then completed. For the first time since the Phoenician colonization, three thousand years before, the development of Lisbon is no longer conditioned mainly by concerns related to defence. In the same way, the defence of Portugal is no longer centred on Lisbon.

To note that Portugal is not a “natural” entity, dictated by geography. It is a political product, the result of strategic decisions taken over three millennia, since Phoenician times. In this long process, Lisbon was at the centre. Therefore, it was normal that it was also at the heart of Portugal's defence.

This study, even if rather summarized, proves that there is an intimate relationship between four vectors, which determine the evolution of Lisbon:

- 1) The long-distance trade networks that are at their origin; first linked to the Mediterranean, then to the Mediterranean/Atlantic and, finally, to the world. Lisbon is not only determined by these networks, but plays an important role in its evolution, especially from the 12th to the 20th century.

- 2) The international strategic and political system, which gives Lisbon a particular mission at each stage. The city allows an agreement of Portugal with maritime powers, the basis of the economy and national independence.
- 3) The national political system, centred in Lisbon and dependent until very late on income channelled to the city.
- 4) The capital's defensive system, which changes and expands over the centuries, but was the heart of Portugal's defence until the country joins NATO (1949). The defensive system, on the other hand, is highly constrained by technological conditions, mainly the evolution of military engineering and artillery, either gunpowder or earlier.

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The Wrath of the Allies: The Bombing of Dresden

Atasay Özdemir (Türkiye)

Abstract

The Guernica Bombardment (Operation Rügen) carried out by the German Luftwaffe and Italian Aviazione Legionaria on 26 April 1937 during the Spanish Civil War, which was considered as the rehearsal of World War II, caused great destruction, and also brought the concept of “strategic bombing” into the literature. Especially in the interwar period, there occurred a universal consensus that, apart from the military targets, the bombing of cities populated intensely by civilians was unethical. On 4 September 1939 (the very first days of World War II), the President of the United States of America (USA) Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared his country’s neutrality and also made his famous call to all warring parties not to resort to strategic bombing. However, the German Luftwaffe started to attack cities, especially Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade, and London from the very first day of the war. Thus, the British Royal Air Forces (RAF) changed their strategy, bombed at first Wilhemshaven on 4 September 1939 and continued to target many German cities starting from 1940. After the USA entered into war on 8 December 1941, the German cities started to be bombed by US Army Air Force (USAAF) during the day and by RAF at night.

The Bombing of Dresden started on 13th February 1945 caused 25,000 people to lose their lives and thus ranks as the second big bombing in terms of the number of dead after the Hamburg Bombardment, which caused 75.000 dead in July 1943. The Bombing of Dresden also ranks third in terms of city destruction rate with a rate of 59%, following the Hamburg Bombardment (75%) and Dusseldorf Bombardment (64%). What makes the bombing of Dresden important to us is that USAAF and RAF forces resumed their strategic bombing of the big cities after a break of about five months following the Darmstadt attack in September 1944. In other words, with the Dresden Bombardment, German cities were targeted by USAAF during the day and by RAF at night until Germany surrendered unconditionally at the end of the war. In this context, the paper will analyze whether the Dresden Bombardment carried out with the use

of phosphorus bombs between 13 and 15 February 1945 was a military necessity or not and will use the English and German resources and documents for the analysis.

Introduction

War is continuation of the diplomacy by other means. It uses a different *lingua franca*, different codes of ethics, and different understandings. It was defined by Clausewitz simply as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (2007: 13). In order to so, for centuries armies sought for advances to become the glorious party of the ongoing war. Coupled with the technologic developments, it was beyond imagination where human beings reached within almost two centuries. Especially with the introduction of aircrafts, the war gained an enormous ground and enhanced into three dimensions, the sky and ultimately the space. The invention of the airplanes changed the definition and strategies of war. The first-time airplanes used by Italians in the Turco-Italian War (also known as Tripoli War) mostly for reconnaissance purposes and also for transport, artillery spotting and even bombing roles. During the World War I (WWI) the same tradition continued as the airplanes were not capable of carrying bombs. Nonetheless, Italians together with Germans started utilizing aerial bombings in the Spanish Civil War, which later labeled as the rehearsal of the World War II (WWII). Another impact of this war is that ‘strategic bombing’ arose as a new concept.

Starting with the interwar period, German and Italian air forces initiated the examination of their air force ammunition and capabilities, they continued using these advances in the WWII. Especially German Luftwaffe started strategic bombings at the very first day of the war. Their targets included many cities such as Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade, and London. London attack was the milestone that changed the mind and understanding of the British. British RAF started to bomb the German cities after London bombings. When United States (US) joined the war, US and British Forces established Combined Air Forces and began their targeted attacks on German cities. They conducted several strategic bombings nevertheless; the bombing of Dresden must be isolated from the others. It was assumed as brutal since it directly targeted the civilian populations, which was accepted as a legal code at the end of 19th century. Hence, among all bombings, Dresden was the one that questioned for many years, even today. For that reason,

this study will examine the bombing of Dresden particularly with regards to necessity of the bombing, tonnage of bombs, number of casualties, and the impact spread from the day of bombings until today.

In order to reach that end, this study primarily focused on the definitions of strategic bombing, area bombings, and other bombing related concepts used to describe this concept. Afterwards, the perspectives of the either specifically the nations or more general, public opinion was discussed in association with the rules of law defined by these very own nations. Later on, the arguments of both parties namely, the Allied Air Forces members USAAF and RAF, and German authorities examined and analyzed. The findings of the study supports the unnecessary of Dresden bombings.

1. Definitions and Perspectives: Strategic Bombing

1.1. Definitions

It was no later than the end of 19th century that the introduction of new aircrafts. The invention of airplane specifically was a milestone, in many ways though its usage within the war changed the course of war history. To begin with, it introduced the third dimension, in other words the war gained another eye from above. With the advances it provided for the warring party, strategies and tactics changed the courses of accordingly. Either for reconnaissance purposes or later with the proper applications for bombing operations it became a powerful and indispensable tool for those who want to compel their enemies to do their will.

The first ones to use airplanes in war were Italians during the Turco-Italian War against Ottoman Empire (1911-1912). Back then, the airplanes were used to gather reconnaissance and to bomb lands. (Egeli, 2021: 611). Following that, during World War I (WWI), airplanes mostly used for reconnaissance; however, Germany and Italy began to use airplanes for offensive attacks. (Britannica b). During the interwar period, Spanish Civil War, which was assumed as a “military laboratory”, was considered a test for new military weaponry and a rehearsal for the World War II (WWII). German and Italian aerial bombings particularly in Guernica region on 26 April 1937 was associated with emergence of ‘strategic bombing’ concept.

Strategic bombing has been defined variously by different authorities to serve their objectives. Therefore, there are many diverse definitions though most of them share some common emphasis. Giulio Douhet, an Italian general who was a key proponent of strategic bombing in aerial warfare, identified the five basic target types as; industry, transport infrastructure, communications, government and the will of the people. The Douhet model rests on the belief that in a conflict the infliction of high costs from aerial bombing can shatter civilian morale. This would unravel the social basis of resistance and pressure citizens into asking their government to surrender. By smothering the enemy's civilian centers with bombs Douhet argued the war would become so terrible that the common people would rise against their government. In short; as terrible as the bombings as shorter as the wars will.

Strategic bombing is defined in Britannica as “aerial bombardment designed to destroy a country's ability to wage war by demoralizing civilians and targeting features of an enemy's infrastructure -such as factories, railways, and refineries- that are essential for the production and supply of war materials” (Britannica b). Although this definition may seem to be restricted to only functional areas that could serve to the war, demoralizing civilians is not explicitly explained. It must be kept in mind that another strategy aimed at reducing the morale of civilians is nothing but terrorism. Many strategic bombing campaigns and individual raids of aerial warfare have been described as terror bombing by commentators and historians by the end of WWII. At a SHAEF press conference on 16th February 1945, only two days after the bombing of Dresden, British Air Commodore Colin McKay Grierson replied to a question by one of the journalists that the primary target of the bombing had been on communications to prevent Germans from moving military supplies and to stop movement in all directions if possible. He then added in an offhand remark that the raid also helped destroying what is left of German morale.(Frederick, 2005).

The issue of morale is given in another definition which also blurred the location: “aerial bombing done well beyond the battlefield for the purpose of destroying or undermining the enemy's ability to fight, and will to fight” (Biddle, 2008:91). Beyond the battlefield could be interpreted as both city areas where civilians live and other military installations as well as critical infrastructures. Some other definition emphasized the refrainment from attacking armed forces:

“strategic bombing involves employing bombers to strike directly at key industrial, economic or political targets within an enemy’s country which may affect its capacity to wage war, rather than attacking their armed forces” (Australian War Memorial). Final definition, taken from the US Department of Defense, puts it very simple: “strategic bombing [is] destroying enemy military and infrastructure targets and lowering their morale” (Vergun, 2019).

As it is clear in these definitions that the main purpose to initiate strategic bombing could be assumed as (1) firstly to demolish military, economic, and political targets; (2) then causing demoralization among the population, including civilians and military members; (3) accordingly destroy their capability and will to fight and (4) ultimately compel own will. It was a method used by the Allied Forces to finalize the WWII.

1.2. Perspectives

The definition of the strategic bombing clarified the purposes though, how to engage these attacks remained blurred. During the war, conduct of strategic bombings may require attacking some strategic infrastructures within the cities populated by civilians. Therefore, strategic bombing concept raises the issue of ethics and humanitarian law within the war, *jus in bello*. First discussed by Grotius, the rules of war gained utmost importance with regard to differentiation between the combatant and non-combatants, the treatment of prisoners of war, and so forth. Since the late 19th century, specifically after the Battle of Solferino, with the initiatives of Henry Dunant, Red Cross/Red Crescent was founded to help the sick and wounded in the battle grounds (Britannica a). Foundation of such a humanitarian aid organization led the way to determination of the humanitarian acts in the course of war. Hague (1899-1907) and Geneva Conventions (1864) were held to define the law of war. Simultaneously, in the American continent it was a German immigrant, Francis Lieber, who codified the rules with regard to the conduct of war (Lieber, 1898). In his work, Lieber pointed out in Article 21 that the citizen of a hostile country is an enemy, therefore is ‘subjected to the hardships of the war’ (Lieber, 1898: 9). However, in the Article 22, he emphasized the distinction between the “private individual” and the “men in arms” and remarked sparing noncombatants in person and their property. (Lieber, 1898: 9). These developments occurred

many decades before the WWII, hence it was assumed that the Americans had already adopted such legal codes. Nonetheless, the history proved wrong.

Guernica Bombardment in 1937 during Spanish Civil War, changed the direction of modern warfare. Strategic bombings proved to be a powerful instrument used in accordance with the land operations. Starting from Guernica, German Luftwaffe continued its aerial bombing assaults on Polish cities during the invasion of Poland, and on British cities especially on London in the Battle of London (Webb, 2019). As a response, British RAF changed their strategy, firstly bombed Wilhelmshaven on 4 September 1939 and continued to target many German cities starting from 1940. Later on, USA joined the war and adopted strategic bombing concept.

2. The Case of the Bombing of Dresden

Dresden was a city of splendor, ‘Florence on Elbe’, a historical treasure which attracted tourists all the time. It was a home for the paintings of many renowned artists, its streets were full of Baroque style buildings, opera house, churches, and so forth (Dawsey 2020, Biddle 2005). Dresden was the seventh largest city in Germany with a population of approximately 600.000 citizens. Before the aerial raids, refugees escaping from the battle fronts, mostly women, children, and older people, those who could not fight in the ongoing war (noncombatant civilians) migrated to Dresden. Dresden was serving as a communication juncture, helping the movement of the refugees to safer areas. However, at the night of the Dresden bombings some refugees were still in the city and had nowhere to go or hide (Biddle, 2005).

The original attack plan was supposed to begin with the USAAF daylight precision bombings on 13th February yet, due to the inappropriate weather conditions USAAF could not realized the initial plan. Therefore, RAF started bombing the city areas by night on the very same night, 13th February. Taken by surprise in addition to the inappropriate weather conditions, RAF bombings wreaked havoc in Dresden (Dawsey, 2020). RAF dropped 1477,7 tons of high explosives and 1181,6 tons of incendiary bombs with a total of 2659,3 tons of bombs (USAF, 1953) which caused fires and firestorms that sucked the oxygen and eventually resulted in mass suffocation of the people inside and outside. Although these uncontrollable fires were seen in many wars, “firestorms required

just the right combination of weather, weight of attack, ordnance mix, timing, and architecture”; and all was present during the attacks on Dresden (Biddle, 2005: 61-62).

Dresden Bombings raised many questions with special regard to legality to necessity. Many politicians, academics, military members, and civilians. Correspondingly, USAF prepared a report, which remained secret for decades. With the recent accessibility to the report, it enlightened the American perspective in terms of frequently asked questions. The report titled “Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February Bombing of Dresden” was issued in 1953 with a top-secret clearance. The report includes an introduction, questions, and a conclusion. Introduction part gives information about why USAF needed to issue such a report. In a response to that it was underlined that Dresden bombings were often became a very “subject of official and semi-official inquiries [as well as] rumor and exaggeration” (USAF, 1953: 1). In order to give detailed information on the reasons for and the consequences of the Dresden bombings, the report provided answers to these specific questions:

- a. Was Dresden a legitimate military target?*
- b. What strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and to the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden?*
- c. Did the Russians request that Dresden be bombed by Allied air forces?*
- d. On whose recommendation, whether by an individual or by a committee, and by what authority were Allied air forces ordered to bomb Dresden?*
- e. Were the Russians officially informed by the Allies concerning the intended date of and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden?*
- f. With what forces and with what means did the Allied forces bomb Dresden?*
- g. What were the specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings?*

h. What were the immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings on the physical structure and the populace of the city?

i. Were the Dresden bombings in any way a deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives?

j. Were the specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings similar to or different from the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany?

k. In what specific ways and to what degree did the bombings of Dresden achieve or support the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians?” (USAF, 1953: 1-2).

a. Was Dresden a legitimate military target?

According to the report, Dresden was assumed as a military target particularly in terms of its strategic and geographical location, and topography. It is also stated as a commercial and transportation center and an industrial base which were assessed contributing to the conditions of a military target.

b. What strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and to the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden?

As it is elaborated in the report, Dresden was among the cities which were determined to be bombed for the sake of German defeat. In the report, with regard to particular reference to Tehran Conference (28 November-11 December 1943), it was decided by three leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, that Russian ground operations must be supported by the Allied bombardment from the air. Moreover, it was assessed that movement of German forces from west to east would create a threat to the success of the Russian operations. Therefore, as it is reported “attack of Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and associated cities where heavy attack will ... hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts” (USAF, 1953: 10). Since there is a consensus between American, British and Russian counterparts, “the decision was founded on basic and explicit exchange of

information ... and was clearly a strategic decision of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians” (USAF, 1953: 11).

c. Did the Russians request that Dresden be bombed by Allied Air Forces?

It is explicitly shown in the Argonaut Conference Minutes that the Russians requested the Allied air forces to bomb the Eastern front (1945). Considering the shifting of German troops from the Western front, Norway, and Italy, and specifically the Berlin and Leipzig route, the Russians asked for paralyzing the junction points as well as communication lines in the first half of February. Thus, it was reported as a “Russian request for bombing communications, coupled with the emphasis on forcing troops to shift from west to east through communication centers, that led to the Allied bombings of Dresden” (USAF, 1953: 11).

Dresden bombings became a necessity in order to:

“(1) implement strategic objectives of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, and

(2) respond to the specific Russian request to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig (USAF, 1953: 11).

d. On whose recommendation, whether by an individual or by a committee, and by what authority were Allied air forces ordered to bomb Dresden?

Allied Strategic Air Forces in Europe, which includes The Supreme Allied Commander, Deputy Supreme Commander, and key British and American operational air authorities, issued CCS Directive No. 3. This Directive included the order to initiate the bombing in Dresden. (USAF, 1953: 13-14, 34).

e. Were the Russians officially informed by the Allies concerning the intended date of and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden?

Prior to the attacks it was reported that the liaison between the Russian and Allied forces were in effect. On 8th February Russians were informed that Dresden was among the designated targets. They were also notified that USAF

8th Air Force “intended to attack Dresden Marshalling Yards with a force of 1200 to 1400 bomber planes on 13th February”. 24-hour advance notice procedure was pursued, though due to the weather conditions the attack was prolonged. (USAF, 1953: 14-16).

f. With what forces and with what means did the Allied forces bomb Dresden?

During 14-15 February, the RAF employed 772 heavy bombers, 1477.7 tons of high explosive, 1131.6 tons of incendiary bombs, and USAF employed 527 heavy bombers, 953.3 tons of high explosive and 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs (USAF, 1953: 17, 35).

g. What were the specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings?

Specific target objectives regarding Dresden, as a military target, are detailed as:

- “(1) a primary communications center in the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex;
- (2) an important industrial and manufacturing center associated with the production of aircraft components and other military items; and
- (3) an area containing specific military installations” (USAF, 1953: 17-18).

In accordance with these objectives, the night raid by the RAF Bomber Command was aimed to devastate the city area, halt communications within the city and disrupt normal civilian life including the larger communications activities and the dependency on the manufacturing enterprises, while the Eighth force raids, which were by daylight and following the night raid of the British on the 14th and 15th February, were directed against railways in the city (USAF, 1953: 18).

h. What were the immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings on the physical structure and the populace of the city?

RAF bombings resulted in fires which damaged the buildings especially the older and densely built-up areas, and approximately 85% of these areas were destroyed. (USAF, 1953: 18).

Physical structure included;

- Major public buildings,
- Public utilities, and facilities (slaughterhouses, warehouses, distribution centers)
- Industrial facilities (23% seriously damaged)
- Dwelling units (78.000 demolished, 27.700 temporarily uninhabitable, 64.500 minor damage).

All in all, 80 % city's housing units damaged, and 50 % demolished or seriously damaged. As it was planned, the air raid attacks paralyzed the communications. Those include "passenger terminals, major freight stations, warehouses, storage sheds, roundhouses, railway repair and workshops, coal stations, and other operating facilities". Especially railway bridges on the Elbe River were severely damaged not be used for many weeks after the raid attacks. (USAF, 1953: 19-20).

Casualties;

It was assumed that numbers are appropriate with regard to other bombings in Germany, though the number of migrants were usually neglected. It is widely accepted that approximately 25.000 were killed and 30.000 were wounded together with fire storm caused by the incendiary bombs. (USAF, 1953: 20).

Apart from that, the report emphasized American complaint about the "terroristic aspects of the Dresden Bombings", by associating these claims with the Communist propaganda against the Allies, particularly the Americans. (USAF, 1953: 21).

i. Were the Dresden bombings in any way a deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives?

According to the report, American and British Strategic Air Forces established the principle that defines the primary efforts as; mass destruction of important German industrial areas and population centers by night area bombing by RAF, daylight precision bombing of key installations within the larger industrial and population centers by the American Eighth Force. (USAF, 1953: 23). In accordance with this principle, six points were emphasized by the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe:

- (1) Civilian targets were never not suitable military targets for the American forces,
- (2) There is no change in American policy of precision bombing,
- (3) Attacks against German communications well listed as secondary priority objectives in CCS Directive No. 3,
- (4) Russian advance on the ground constituted the greatest strategic factor employing strategic bombing,
- (5) For the sake of the Eastern Front, it deemed significant to attack the communication centers like Dresden
- (6) The attacks on other communication cities as well as Dresden was appreciated by the Russians. (USAF, 1953: 27). Owing to these specific points, it was stated that there was no “deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives” in the Dresden Bombings. (USAF, 1953: 35).

j. Were the specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings similar to or different from the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany?

In order to explain the forces and the means employed in the Dresden Bombings, firstly the definition of area attacks was stated as “intentionally directed against the city area by more than 100 bombers with a bomb weight in excess of 100 tons, which destroyed more than 2% of the residential buildings in

the city attacked”. Later on, the principal characteristics of area attacks were elaborated as; (1) generally made at night, (2) against large cities, (3) designed to spread destruction over a wide area, and (4) intended to destroy morale of the industrial workers specifically (USAF, 1953: 29). Besides, it was underlined that Dresden Bombings were relatively smaller when compared to the other attacks against German cities in terms of forces and means used (USAF, 1953: 31).

ALLIED BOMBINGS OF DRESDEN							
NO	DATE	Actual Target and Aiming Point	Force	Number of Aircraft Attacking	Bomb Tonnage on Target		TOTAL
					High Explosives	Incendiary Bombs	
1	7 Oct 1944	Marshalling Yards	8th AF	30	72,5	-	72,5
2	16 Jan 1945	Marshalling Yards	8th AF	133	279,8	41,6	321,4
3	14 Feb 1945	City Area	RAF BC	772	1477,7	1181,6	2659,3
4	14 Feb 1945	Marshalling Yards	8th AF	316	487,7	294,3	782
5	15 Feb 1945	Marshalling Yards	8th AF	211	465,6	-	465,6
6	2 Mar 1945	Marshalling Yards	8th AF	406	940,3	140,5	1080,8
7	17 Apr 1945	Marshalling Yards	8th AF	572	1526,4	164,5	1690,9
		Industrial Area	8th AF	8	28	-	28
GRAND TOTALS				2448	5278	1822,5	7100,5

k. In what specific ways and to what degree did the bombings of Dresden achieve or support the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians?

In the report it was stated that bombings of Dresden achieve or support the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians by detailing the objectives as follows:

- (1) Necessity of aerial bombings as a supporting action for Russian operations on the Eastern Germany,

- (2) A specific Russian request,
- (3) Preventing the war to prolong,
- (4) Halting the production of the military goods,
- (5) Weakening of the will of German people to resist by RAF area raids on the city.

All of these led to the ultimate objective: to bring about the final defeat of Germany. (USAF, 1953: 31-34).

3. Analysis

Dresden was the seventh largest city in Germany back in 1945. According to the USAF Report, Dresden ranked the seventh place among the other German cities exposed to the Allied aerial bombardments.

ALLIED AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS OF THE SEVEN LARGEST GERMAN CITIES				
Cities	Population	American Tonnage	British Tonnage	Total Tonnage
Berlin	4.339.000	22.090,9	45.517	67.607,3
Hamburg	1.129.000	17.104,6	22.583	39.687,6
Munich	841.000	11.470,4	7.858	27.110,9
Cologne	772.000	10.211,2	34.712	44.923,2
Leipzig	707.000	5.410,4	6.206	11.616,4
Essen	667.000	1.518,0	36.420	37.938.0
Dresden	642.000	4.441,2	2659,3	7.100,5

It would be incorrect to assume that since tonnage of bombs used in Dresden were the least, therefore Dresden Bombings were not significant compared to the other bombings. On the contrary, Dresden Bombings differs from the other in terms of the objectives, timing, city choice, and motives. Other German cities were targeted in the course of ongoing war and in accordance with the military necessities to fulfil military objectives. However, Dresden Bombings

were nothing alike. They were totally different, aimed at forcing the Germans to surrender. Janssen (2023) expressed the very same idea that Dresden bombings were intended to terrorize this the civilian population, and thereby to make Germany surrender. Since Dresden Bombings were to bring about the closure to the war in Europe, its resemblance with Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings were essential. Even though not any nuclear bomb was dropped on the proper of Germany, these attacks resemble to each other: they were initiated to force a nation by aerial attacks intended to harm and terrorize the civilian population.

Considering the refugees present during the bombardments, it could be implied that the was full of the civilians who were unable to fight. Biddle (2005) also reached the same conclusion. He argued that the most important perspective of the Dresden Bombings was not emphasized enough. It was the existence of the high number of refugees consist of mostly women, children, and older people. Keeping in mind that these people have nowhere to go they were the direct victims of the first area raids. Supporting this idea, Tino Chrupalla, the spokesman of the Alternative for Germany party stated that “The suffering was immeasurable. The Allied attack on a city full of refugees is a war crime” (Eddy, 2020).

On the other hand, in his work Maier supported that two different perspectives occur with regard to aerial bombings. First one suggests that it is like an act of terrorism since it targets civilians, however, it is not as simple as this. Because terrorism intends to kill innocents, not as a cause of some attack. On contrary, second one points out the “evil regime” engaged in this brutal war deemed as responsible for the death of these innocent civilians (Maier, 2005).

In an effort to comprehend two diverse understandings, one must look through each perspective. Nonetheless, the compass must direct the right path. In other words, since the war made us to compel our will to our enemies, we must do so in accordance with the established rules, legal restrictions, and humanitarian concerns.

Conclusion

Strategic bombing is indeed a cornerstone in the war history, which is still questioned by many. Since it is a concept that is justified with the perspective of one nation, party, or ally; it could be deemed as a contested concept. Throughout the history, strategic bombing became an instrument by German *Luftwaffe* by the application of *Blitzkrieg*. Germany conducted aerial bombings to several European cities before and during the WWII. Nevertheless, Germany was hit by its very own weapon and strategy a couple of times towards the end of WWII. Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Leipzig, Cologne, Essen were all suffered from the strategic bombings and some of even the fire storms caused by the attack, though Dresden Bombings was stand-alone.

Even though Allied Forces has been looking for some arguments or excuses to justify the Dresden Bombings, they were always insufficient to convince the greater public. Dresden was never a military target, but a commercial one. It was a communications center, on the route of Berlin and Leipzig, but a military center. It was a political target with a commercial and industrial background and hosting the refugees and migrants escaping from the conflict sites. Besides, Dresden was a cultural center, with respect to arts and specific architecture, never touched by the filthy hands of war. The 'Florence on Elbe' was extremely precious yet, forced to pay the debts of the war and the Nazi war crimes associated with the German identity.

Dresden is often commemorated with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although it cannot be compared with cities hit by a nuclear bomb. However, it is not the reason why their names are spoken together. Dresden was the last resort to make Germany surrender and it was done extremely brutally, and in a terroristic way, to end the war in Europe with an unconditional. surrender. In the light of all these findings and assumptions, it could be said that bombing Dresden was nothing related to a necessity, but an atonement for the eyes of the victory holders at the end of WWII.

The Fight over the ‘Key Areas’: Urban Warfare in the Indonesian War of Independence

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Abstract

In the public eye, the Indonesian war of independence (1945-1945) was a typical irregular conflict, in which lightly armed Indonesian guerrillas fought against the Japanese, British, and especially the Dutch professional armies, supported by naval and air forces. However, reality was more complex. At times, the war was much more regular – conventional if you will – than is often believed, especially in the violent battles that took place in the major cities of Java and Sumatra early in the conflict. In this paper, I will discuss several aspects of urban warfare in the war of independence, in which the fighting often resulted in enormous amounts of casualties among Indonesian freedom fighters. Why did the Indonesian National Army and other fighting groups pursue these battles, and how were they fought? What typified the response of the Japanese, British, and Dutch armed forces, and how did this bloody phase influence the course of the Indonesian war of independence? I argue that the fight over control in the cities had a major and lasting impact on later fighting, both in equipment, modes of warfare, and military thinking on the solution to the conflict.

Introduction

This paper will deal with several key episodes of urban fighting in the Indonesian war of independence. It starts with analyzing the early struggles that arose around the transfer of Japanese arms to the newly established Indonesian army in September, 1945, in the north Javanese port city of Semarang. In November of that same year, the largest battle of the entire war was fought out between British and Indonesian forces in another port city, Surabaya. This event formed a turning point in the war, shaping both strategic planning and tactical conduct on all sides. In the year that followed, Indonesian troops fought another urban battle in Semarang, this time against the Dutch, who had by then taken over positions in several so-called ‘key areas’. The fighting here was

characterized by large-scale and indiscriminate naval gunfire support by several Dutch destroyers, who compensated for a lack of air support in this phase of the war. The paper ends where the war ended: in the last urban battle of the war in the royal city of Surakarta (Solo), where a massive attack by thousands of guerrillas formed the final chord of more than four years of fighting over control in the Indonesian archipelago.

Five-day struggle in Semarang

On August 17, 1945, only two days after imperial Japan surrendered, Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno read the following text to a crowd gathered in Jakarta: ‘We the people of Indonesia hereby declare the independence of Indonesia. Matters which concern the transfer of power and other things will be executed by careful means and in the shortest possible time.’¹

Some of the more pressing ‘other things’ Sukarno referred to were the establishment of an army and the subsequent acquisition of arms to defend the newly proclaimed independence against foreign intervention. In many places in the archipelago the nationalists managed to obtain large stocks of weapons from the Japanese military without much bloodshed, but in several instances it came to violent clashes on a considerable scale. Typical of the fighting between Japanese and Indonesian troops in the early days of the independence struggle (between August and October, 1945) were urban battles between relatively lightly armed Japanese units and hastily organized Indonesian troops. The Japanese did have artillery and other support weapons at their disposal, but were generally hesitant to use these as they were not at war with the Indonesian people.² Instead, they were tasked with maintaining order until allied troops would take over control over the main cities of the Indonesian archipelago to organize evacuation of prisoners of war and internees. Another reason may have been the limited tactical value of heavy, indirect fire in the close-quarter urban combat environment of many cities on the two main islands of Java and Sumatra. Nonetheless, casualties on the Indonesian side were often high, being mainly

¹ Translation by George McT. Kahin in idem, ‘Sukarno’s proclamation of Indonesian independence’, *Indonesia* 69 (2000) 1-3, there 2.

² Sadao Oba, ‘Recollections of Indonesia, 1944-1947’, in Ian Nish (ed.), *Indonesian experience: the role of Japan and Britain, 1943-1948* (London, 1979), 1-34, there 27.

caused by machine gun fire against inexperienced Indonesian *pemuda* (litt: youth) fighters, who exposed themselves too often to deadly enemy fire. Reports of summary executions with handguns, bamboo spears and even bayonets, by both sides, are also numerous.³

The fighting that took place over arms acquisition in the north Javanese port city of Semarang between October 14 and 19, known in Indonesia as *pertempuran lima hari*, ('the struggle of five days'), occupies an important place in Indonesian collective memory of the revolutionary years.⁴ In much of the literature, the actions of the Japanese troops during the battle is portrayed as an act of revenge for the execution of 100-150 Japanese civil and army workers that were held captive in a prison. But as one author has pointed out, Japanese operations had already begun before the massacre. It is likely, however, that the ferocity of Japanese operations increased after the discovery of the bodies on October 16, as many accounts report mass executions of captured *pemuda* fighters by Japanese forces after that date. In part, these harsh methods can also be explained by the Japanese code of war, which stipulated that a soldier fight to death and never surrender, leading to contempt for prisoners of war.⁵

Indonesian troops that took part in the battle overall had little firepower, although there were major differences between units. On the one hand, an Indonesian special police unit was relatively well armed due to the fact that the Japanese police had transferred some of its weapons to it. Most *pemuda* fighters, on the other hand, hardly possessed any guns, a situation that also applied to many units of the recently established *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (TKR or People's Security Army, the predecessor of the later national army, the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI). After reports of the Japanese violence spread,

³ Rémy Limpach, *De brandende kampongs van generaal Spoor* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016), 244-45.

⁴ See, among others, Panitia Penyusunan Sejarah Pertempuran Lima Hari di Semarang, *Sejarah pertempuran lima hari di Semarang* (Semarang 1977); Syamsur Said, *Pertempuran lima hari di Semarang* (Jakarta, 1984); Moerwanto, *Jiwa Patriot. Pertempuran lima hari di Semarang* (Jakarta 1992); Moehkardi, *Revolusi nasional 1945 di Semarang* (Jakarta 2012); Amrin Imran and Ariwadi (eds.), *Peranan Pelajar dalam perang kemerdekaan* (Jakarta, 1985).

⁵ Han Bing Siong, 'The secret of Major Kido: the battle of Semarang, 15-19 October 1945', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 152:3 (1996) 382-428, there 391.

groups of freedom fighters from all over Central Java moved to Semarang to contribute to the struggle. According to the Indonesian historian Moehkardi, who experienced the battle as a child, many of these *pemuda* fought without command, without coordination and without organization, but with high morale. During the fighting, TKR units managed to get hold of some Japanese machine guns and equipped snipers with them. In reaction, Japanese soldiers perched on the roofs of tall buildings shot anyone who dared to move on the thoroughfares.⁶

Casualties were high on both sides, ranging from more than four hundred Japanese to several thousand Indonesians. Although much lower than the Indonesian death toll, Japanese losses amounted to almost half of all casualties suffered during their invasion of Java in 1942.⁷ According to Han Bing Siong, who bore witness to the events, this too could be attributed to the *bushidō*, the Japanese code of honor. He quotes military historian Alvin Coox, who states that ‘risk, as a correlation of strategic objectives, interests and consequences, is not a word that can be found in the general vocabulary of the Japanese army.’⁸ T.S. Tull, a British wing commander who arrived at the scene on September 18, writes with some pathos that the Japanese ‘swept through the town, regardless of dangers or their own losses like one of the Mongolian hordes of Genghiz Khan or Tamerlane’.⁹ From their part, the Indonesian fighters also proved themselves time and again ready to accept extremely high losses in battles with superiorly armed and well-trained opponents. In the light of subsequent events, this is a relevant observation, as the British and Dutch forces adopted a fundamentally different attitude to risk. To a lesser extent, the Indonesian forces would eventually do the same, but not everywhere, and not consistently.

⁶ Moehkardi, *Revolusi nasional 1945 di Semarang*, 208-216.

⁷ Ken’ichi Goto, ‘Caught in the middle: Japanese attitude toward Indonesian independence in 1945’, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 27:1 (1996) 37-48.

⁸ Han Bing Siong, ‘The secret of Major Kido’, 421-422. According to Japanese reports their losses amounted to 42 killed, 43 wounded and 213 missing.

⁹ Petra Groen, “‘Patience and bluff’: de bevrijding van de Nederlandse burgergeïnterneerden op Midden-Java (augustus-december 1945)”, *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis van de Landmachstaf* 8 (1985) 91-154, there 117.

The Battle of Surabaya, 10 November 1945

Had the fighting in the early months been characterized by fanatical battles fought by lightly armed opponents, in Surabaya a different type of urban battle would take place, one that would have a lasting impact on all warring parties and the way the war was fought. On October 1st, *pemuda* fighters stormed the headquarters of the *kempetai*, the dreaded Japanese police and intelligence unit. Japanese security forces on the spot fired their machine guns at the attacking crowd until they ran out of ammunition, then evacuated the building and retreated. According to an official Indonesian army publication, the captured arsenal in this and other attacks in Surabaya together made up half of the armament of the later TNI. The author lists 700 light and heavy machine guns, 148 grenade launchers, 17 infantry guns, 20 field and mountain guns from the prewar Dutch colonial army, 63 heavy mortars, 20 pieces of anti-tank guns, 140 anti-aircraft guns, 4 howitzers, 16 tanks and many hundreds of vehicles and firearms.¹⁰ Although other authors mention different numbers¹¹, they are all of the same order of magnitude, and it were these weapons that made the difference in the urban battle that would later unfold. Indonesian army historian Nugroho Notosusanto even claims that, should the Indonesian armed forces (numbering more than 100,000 at that point) have been able to make optimal use of this equipment, the British would not have been able to drive them out of Surabaya with only one division. The fact that, as an Indonesian participant in the fighting observed, none of the *pemuda* had ever sat in a tank, let alone driven one, illustrates that the reality was far from that optimal situation.¹²

The already tense atmosphere in Surabaya heated up further in the following weeks when British forces landed in the harbor. Indonesians suspected

¹⁰ Cited in H. Th. Bussemaker, *Bersiap! Opstand in het paradijs: de bersiap-periode op Java en Sumatra 1945-1946* (Zutphen 2005), 208.

¹¹ Miyamoto Shizuo, *Jawa shusen shoriki* (Tokyo, 1973), 347, cited in W.G.J. Rummelink, 'The emergence of the new situation: the Japanese army on Java after the surrender', *Militaire Spectator* 147 (1978) 49-66, there 60; Nugroho Notosusanto, *The Battle of Surabaya* (Jakarta, 1970), 14; Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950* (Hawthorn, Vic., 1974), 51; H. Wagner, 'Hoe kwamen de Indonesische strijdkrachten in de jaren '40 aan wapens?', *Militaire Spectator* 156:11 (1987), 488-495, there 489.

¹² Notosusanto, *The Battle of Surabaya*, 14; Suhario Padmodiwiryo, *Revolution in the city of heroes: a memoir of the battle that sparked Indonesia's National Revolution*, translated by Frank Palmos (Singapore, 2016), 52.

them of helping the former Dutch colonizer return to Java, and on October 28 ‘all hell broke loose’ when thousands of Indonesian fighters stormed British positions in the city, which at that time was only one brigade strong. Several posts were completely overwhelmed when they ran out of ammunition, and losses were high on both sides. Sukarno was flown in to broker a cease-fire on the 29th, but one day later British Brigadier A.W.S. Mallaby, commander of the 49th Indian Brigade, got killed in a chaotic skirmish. His death shocked British ranks. British historian Richard McMillan writes that while it ignited a resolute fighting spirit among British troops on the one hand, in the long run it strengthened their resolve to leave Indonesia and get out of a war that wasn’t theirs in the first place.¹³

After an ultimatum issued by Sir Philip Christison, commander of allied troops in the Indonesian archipelago, in which he famously threatened to ‘bring the whole weight of my sea, land and air forces and all the weapons of modern war against them until they are crushed’ expired without any Indonesian forces surrendering, it was acted upon on November 10. For many Indonesian authors who have written on the battle that followed, in which British forces employed fighter-bombers, naval destroyers, heavy mortars and field artillery on a considerable scale, killing thousands, the operation was, in the words of Sukarno, no less than ‘a great massacre of women, children, and men’. Others have gone so far as to call the whole operation a war crime and an act of aggression.¹⁴ Many British authors, however, are surprisingly mild in their assessment of the operation. S. Woodburn Kirby states in an official history that air support was only used sparingly and only against well-marked Indonesian military targets. In addition, David Jordan points out that concerns for the safety of internees as well as rumors over high losses among own troops, akin to those suffered on October 28, were equally important reasons for the British to employ their ‘weapons of

¹³ Peter Dennis, *Troubled days of peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46* (Manchester, 1987), 123; The National Archives of the UK, CAB 106/165, Monograph on the Re-occupation of the Netherlands East Indies 1945, by General Sir Philip Christison, Bart, GBE., CB., DSO., MC., D.L., Formerly Allied Commander NEI; Bussemaker, *Bersiap!*, 227.

¹⁴ Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Koesalah Soebagyo Toer and Ediati Kamil, *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia. Jil. 1: 1945* (Jakarta 1999) 139; Batara Hutagalung, *10 November '45: mengapa Inggris membom Surabaya? Analisis latar belakang agresi militer Inggris* (Jakarta 2001) ix, 357-58, 438-42.

modern war'. In his view, the use of artillery, naval gunfire and air support was no sign of overreaction, but of a 'cautious advance against a well-equipped foe'.¹⁵

One explanation for this divergence of conception of the violence is, of course, the difference in viewing the events from the perspective of those who fired the weapons versus those at the receiving end of the violence. Although British authors can with some right be accused of skimming all too easily over the suffering of thousands of civilian inhabitants of Surabaya, qualifying it as a great massacre or a war crime also does not do full justice to the circumstances at the time. The horror of British units that were completely wiped out after running out of ammunition was still fresh in the minds of the soldiers of the 5th Indian Division arriving in the harbor. Moreover, Indonesian troops were heavily armed, and although they made many tactical errors, there were successes as well. Guns placed on a strategic hill post in the south of the city caused the British much trouble, and RAF bombers had great difficulty in taking them out.¹⁶ Suicide squads stormed British tanks in the streets and destroyed them with improvised explosives and Molotov cocktails.¹⁷ The difficult urban terrain played an important role in the decision to employ heavy fire support weapons, thereby limiting risks for soldiers who had to fight for every street.¹⁸

However, Woodburn Kirby's claim that air support was only used against carefully selected targets is not supported by the facts. On November 14 and 15, RAF pilots were given a free hand to track down enemy trains and, in their own words, had 'good sport' in strafing and bombing locomotives and carriages. The results on the ground were disastrous. Suhario Padmodiwiryo, an Indonesian fighter at the time, mentions a raid on a train in the area of Gedangan that killed many civilian passengers. Military strategist and historian A.H. Nasution

¹⁵ S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War against Japan, Vol. V: The surrender of Japan* (History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1969), 331; David Jordan, "'A particularly exacting operation": British forces and the Battle of Surabaya, November 1945', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 11:3 (2000), pp. 89-114, there 108. See also W. Meelhuijsen, *Revolutie in Soerabaja* (Zutphen, 2000), 241.

¹⁶ Moehkardi, *Akademi Militer Yogya dalam perjuangan fisik 1945-1949* (Yogyakarta 2019) 52-59; Suratmin, *Perjuangan Laskar Hizbullah dalam pertempuran Surabaya 10 November 1945* (Yogyakarta, 2017), 132; A.H. Nasution, *10 Nopember 1945* (Bandung 1976) 44-47.

¹⁷ Suratmin, *Perjuangan Laskar Hizbullah*, 115-17.

¹⁸ Petra Groen, *Marsroutes en dwaalsporen: het Nederlands militair-strategisch beleid in Indonesië 1945-1950* ('s-Gravenhage 1991), 41.

describes a number of air attacks, including the bombing of a carriage full of refugees at Sidoarjo, south of the city. These attacks, ‘so terrible’, were aimed at frustrating logistic efforts.¹⁹ British command limited the use of air support after these incidents, not only out of prudence but also because of the limited value of air support in the dense urban environment, and the risk of hitting own troops.²⁰ As artillery and naval gunfire caused less outcry than air attacks, these weapons were employed on a larger scale, sometimes with devastating effect: in at least one case internees were hit by shells falling in the wrong place.²¹ In fact, at a conference in 2000 the British ambassador to Indonesia made a statement of apology towards the Indonesian people for the tragic loss of live during the battle.²²

Large-scale fighting ended around the time the strategic hill of Gunungsari was captured, on November 28. While British losses ran into the hundreds, Indonesian casualties were estimated by some authors as numbering more than 16,000, of whom up to fifty percent were civilians.²³ The city remained eerily silent after the battle, with many buildings heavily damaged.²⁴ Besides these immediate consequences, the battle had a lasting impact on both the Indonesian and British forces as well as Dutch troops, who started to arrive in the archipelago a few months after ‘Surabaya’.

Indonesian *pemuda* fighters, as well as the newly established army, experienced the devastating effects of carrying out massed attacks without proper protection or preparation. Conventional style fighting against modern armies like the British (or the Japanese and the Dutch) resulted in enormous amounts of losses, both in human lives and in materiel. ‘How many of our boys died in vain’,

¹⁹ Nasution, *10 Nopember 1945*, 43; Padmodiwiryo, *Revolution in the city of heroes*, 186.

²⁰ Oey Hong Lee, *War and diplomacy in Indonesia, 1945-50* (Townsville, Qld. 1981), 46; Meelhuijsen, *Revolutie in Soerabaja*, 159.

²¹ McMillan, *The British occupation*, 56.

²² Chris Bayly and Tim Harper, *Forgotten wars: freedom and revolution in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 181.

²³ Meelhuijsen, *Revolutie in Soerabaja*, 262; Jordan, “‘A particularly exacting operation’”, 108; Adrian Vickers, *A history of modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, 2005), 103.

²⁴ Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH), Collection Helfrich, inv.no. 24, Notulen vergadering zaterdag 15 december 1945; similar observations in C.B. Nicolas, *De Mariniersbrigade te kiek* (Amsterdam, 1986); Meelhuijsen, *Revolutie in Soerabaja*, 236; K’Tut Tantri, *Revolt in paradise* (Londen, 1960), 194-95.

writes Nasution in his classic treatise *Fundamentals of guerrilla warfare*, ‘because of the mistakes of our commanders who urged them to go on hopeless attacks, to fight with bamboo sticks against tanks, to fight with grenades against artillery, etc.’²⁵ It sparked the first ideas on switching to less risky hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, although it would take until mid-1947 until these tactics were adopted on a large scale. More importantly, the battle sparked a fighting spirit in Indonesian society that strengthened and deepened support for the armed struggle for independence. November 10 became Heroes Day, and *pemuda* fighters armed with bamboo spears became its symbol.

The British realized they wanted to get rid of ‘the burdens of occupation’ sooner rather than later. Until that time however, they were keen to prevent a repetition of the events that took place in Surabaya – in other words, risks to own soldiers would have to be mitigated. Should troops get involved in heavy fighting again, a training instruction issued by the British command reads, ‘the maximum use of all weapons must be made from the outset’. Indeed, from the month of November onwards, air attacks on Indonesian targets soared.²⁶

The Dutch, who were rebuilding their national and colonial armies after the Second World War, understood that the government and army commanders had greatly underestimated the power of the Indonesian revolutionary resolve. While the fighting in Surabaya was still ongoing, the high command of the Dutch armed forces ordered the establishment of as much armored support units, artillery batteries, and air force squadrons as the country could muster in a short time, to support and strengthen the light infantry battalions that were already being trained.²⁷ The hardline perspective many Dutch officers had towards the independence movement is illustrated by the comments of colonel J.P.H. Perks, liaison officer at the Allied command in Southeast Asia, in a memorandum dated

²⁵ A.H. Nasution, *Fundamentals of guerilla warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 31.

²⁶ TNA, WO 203, 2255, Netherlands East Indies: situation reports, 1945, Oct-Dec; idem, ADM 199: Admiralty: War History, 2325, War diary summaries: situation reports, November 1945; AIR 27, 465-35, Squadron 47, November 1945; idem, 679-6 Squadron 81; idem, 697-13 Squadron 84, November 1945.

²⁷ Groen, *Marsroutes en dwaalsporen*, 55-60; S. L. van der Wal, *Officiële bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen, 1945-1950* (hereafter NIB), *Tweede deel*, No. 82 and 245; M.R.H. Calmeyer, *Herinneringen: memoires van een christen, militair en politicus. Ingeleid en bewerkt door J. Hoffenaar* (Den Haag, 1997) 111-14.

November 30: ‘Considering the mentality of the Indonesian races, the use of the most frightening weapons is recommended such as whistling bombs, flame throwers, rockets etc. [...] It is better to have to kill thousands of terrorists (and probably some innocent spectators) now, than to kill millions of frightened and innocent people later (although without bullets)’.²⁸ Although Perks’ comments are rather extreme, belief in a violent solution to the Indonesian national revolution was widespread, both in the Dutch military and in government circles.

Semarang revisited

While the five-day war in Semarang was still raging, British forces landed in the harbor of the city and quickly became involved in armed clashes with *pemuda* too. After the Japanese repatriated, the British tried to secure the town in the months that followed, but found themselves in a hostile environment surrounded by Indonesian armed fighters.²⁹ Dutch troops (the T- or Tiger Brigade) were allowed to disembark in April, 1946, and soon were handed over control of the territory within the city’s perimeter. Indonesian fighters then began to increase their attacks on the city (which had never actually let up); the Tiger Brigade retaliated in the villages outside the perimeter, which quickly emptied of civilians and became a no man’s land controlled by *pemuda* fighters. Semarang felt like a prison in which the Dutch were trapped.³⁰

According to historian Widodo, the situation among the displaced inhabitants of the villages around the city became so dire that the *pemuda* sought revenge and decided to try and drive the Dutch into the sea and liberate Semarang.³¹ On August 4, 1946, fifteen hundred Indonesian fighters stormed the

²⁸ NIB, *Tweede deel*, No. 114, Nederlandse stafsectie bij het geallieerd oppercommando in Zuid-Oost Azië aan de chef staf van de geallieerde opperbevelhebber in Zuid-Oost Azië (Browning), 30 nov. 1945.

²⁹ Rosihan Anwar, *Sejarah kecil, petite histoire Indonesia jilid 7: kisah-kisah zaman Revolusi Kemerdekaan* (Jakarta 2015) 107-108.

³⁰ A.M. Brouwer and M.F.A. Brok, *Tussen sawahs en bergen. Het leven van de soldaat in de Tijgerbrigade* (Semarang, 1948) 8-9; Jot Polman, *De brutale reis. De eerste tocht naar een nieuwe wereld* (Meppel, 1947), 104, 122; Wiyono, *Sejarah revolusi kemerdekaan 1945-1949 Daerah Jawa Tengah* (Jakarta, 1991), 90; A.H. Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Jilid 3: Diplomasi sambil Bertempur* (Bandung, 1977), 532.

³¹ Widodo, *Sejarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro. Sirnaning Jakso katon gapuraning Ratu* (Semarang, 1968), 74; Ny. Rr. Soedjarah Notohamidjojo, ‘Kehidupanku dan keluarga dalam

perimeter, screaming *merdeka* (freedom) as they attacked. The assault shocked the Tiger Brigade but was quickly repelled by machine gun and mortar fire. A minor Indonesian success was that the fighters managed to down a B-25 'Mitchell' bomber and damage the airfield of Semarang, effectively shutting down Dutch air operations in the area. That same day, the Dutch carried out a counterattack, supported by Stuart tanks, 3 inch mortars and artillery.³²

Meanwhile, the headquarters of the Tiger Brigade had called in assistance from navy destroyers to compensate for the lack of air support. From the 8th of August onwards, these ships shelled numerous targets outside the perimeter. Most of the shelling was rather inaccurate, as proper means of observation were lacking. Not only was air observation off limits, most targets were too far inland to be observed from Semarang – let alone from the roadstead where the destroyers anchored – and so-called bombardment maps were missing on board. In these circumstances, it was nearly impossible to effectively target Indonesian positions, with indiscriminate shelling as a result. Indeed, the main reason that those directly involved cited was the perceived two-folded moral effect of the shelling – not only damaging the morale of the opponent but raising that of own troops. The Indonesian attacks – a second one occurred on the 11th – scared the trapped Tiger Brigade, and according to navy commander vice admiral A.S. Pinke a sigh of relief went through the ranks when the first destroyer appeared on the coast.

The *pemuda* fighters and army units that took part in the attacks suffered heavy losses, both during the mass assault and the subsequent counterattacks, just as they had done in the previous urban battles in Semarang and Surabaya. The same pattern repeated itself in other key areas on Java and Sumatra, the principal cities that the British handed over to the Dutch in 1946. On every occasion, the fighting was intense, but apart from scoring moral victories, the Indonesian troops were forced to retreat to the hinterland in all instances. Dutch troops consolidated their positions in the cities, and when troop build-up had reached the desired level (around 140,000 soldiers, supported by attack aircraft,

masa perjuangan 45', in: Angkatan 45, Dewan Harian Nasional, *Letusan di balik buku* (Jakarta: Pusat Dokumentasi Sejarah Perjuangan 45, 1976), 135-156, there 141-142.

³² Historische Collectie Korps Veldartillerie (HCKVA), inv.no. 9-2, Bekendmaking over den vijandelijke aanval op Semarang op 4 Augustus 1946.

artillery and armored units), they launched a major offensive and conquered substantial parts of Java and Sumatra in July and August, 1947.

The TNI, defeated in open battle and driven out of many urban areas, finally felt forced to abandon their aspirations to drive the Dutch into the sea, at least in the short term. By decree of Nasution, the armed forces adopted guerrilla tactics. Gradually, the fighting moved away from cities and towns to more rural areas, and, especially on Sumatra, mountainous jungle terrain. Demarcation lines were officially implemented, as were several cease-fire agreements brokered by the United Nations, but small Indonesian units infiltrated in Dutch-occupied areas and carried out attacks there too. The bulk of the attacks, however, occurred at the demarcation lines. Dutch troops in return regularly went on patrols across the line in search for guerrilla strongholds, resulting in several highly violent and politically contested operations.³³

After a second large-scale offensive in December, 1948, in which Dutch forces not only conquered large swaths of Java and Sumatra but also captured Sukarno and other political leaders, an intensive and widespread phase of guerrilla war ensued, making the first half of 1949 the most deadly phase of the war. Guerrilla bands attacked their opponents from all sides, and the Dutch organized violent ‘sweeps’ to try and secure occupied areas. Gradually, the two sides reached a deadlock, as neither party was able to defeat the other definitively.³⁴ This paved the way for a political outcome, and a date was set for a final cease fire: on the night from August 10 to 11, 1949, hostilities would end. But not before a last bloody battle was fought in the heartland of the Indonesian Republic.

Solo: the final battle

Dutch tank commander Jan Eshuis of the *6e Eskadron Vecht wagens* (6th tank squadron) wrote in his diary at the beginning of August how hopeless the situation had been in Surakarta (Solo) for the past months. His tank platoon had been involved in many extremely violent situations for months, almost on a daily

³³ A.H. Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Jilid 6, Perang Gerilya Semesta I* (Bandung: Angkasa, 1977), 140, 164.

³⁴ Groen, *Marsroutes en dwaalsporen*, 232.

basis. ‘It is almost unbearable’, he wrote on August 4, ‘your nerves are exhausted.’³⁵ Battery officer Frans Hazekamp was also in Solo with his artillery unit at the time of the attack. On August 7, they had just moved the guns into the shed, as the armistice was due to take effect a few days later. Then came the attack. After the Dutch troops had recovered from the initial shock, they responded with whatever means they could. Hazekamp: ‘The Spitfires bomb and machine gun and we fire at everything our observers see. [...] Everywhere the machine guns crackle and the 37 mm cannon of the tanks and armored cars rumble. Everything and everyone is shot off the street.’³⁶

Not surprisingly, all this fire resulted in large numbers of casualties. According to the Indonesian historians Imran Amrin and Ariwadi, 223 soldiers were killed. The number of civilian deaths is unknown. On August 11, the first day of the cease fire, Indonesian Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi, commander of regional guerrilla unit *Wehrkreis I*, visited the Dutch commander Colonel J. Ohl. The latter was ‘devilish’ and gave Riyadi an ultimatum that is reminiscent of that of Mansergh in Surabaya, almost four years earlier. ‘He is clear’, says Hazekamp: ‘out before four o’clock tomorrow afternoon, otherwise the full force of the Dutch army will be used to turn Solo “into a graveyard”.’³⁷

And so the war ended as it had begun: with massive attacks by Indonesian freedom fighters, heavy artillery as a counter-reaction, and a civilian population between two fires. That the guerrillas once again carried out such a dangerous mass attack on a well-defended city, after so many bloody experiences, commanded to Dutch troops both astonishment and respect. The main reasons for the attack seem to have been that the Dutch continued their violent mopping up operations after a political agreement had already been reached, as well as an effort to increase the Indonesian bargaining position at the negotiation table. In any case, this final battle illustrates that, although the TNI and *pemuda* fighters clearly learned from their early experiences in urban warfare, slowly but

³⁵ NIMH, 545 Collection Sweep, inv. No. 597, Dagboek van J. Eshuis, 6^e Eskadron Vechtwagens, 4 augustus 1949.

³⁶ Frans Hazekamp, *Twee broers, twee luitenants in Indië* (Baarn, 2008), 176-178.

³⁷ Frans Hazekamp, *Het laatste grote gevecht in Indië. Tweeduizend guerrilla's vallen Solo aan, 7-10 augustus 1949* (Soesterberg 2011); Murdijo Djungkung, *Mengenang pertempuran empat hari di kota Solo Agustus 1949: dengan semboyan "gugur satu tumbuh seribu"* (Solo, 1988) 31-32.

gradually switching to more risk averse, small scale guerrilla tactics, the desire to defeat and drive out the Dutch decisively was never far away, now and then taking the upper hand.

When army commander General Sudirman issued orders for a total guerrilla war in 1948, he remarked that ‘as long as the technical equipment of the TNI is still extremely simple, the defense of the Republican side will have to remain based on the total people’s defense.’³⁸ This caveat about incomplete armament reflects the line of thinking that lead strategist Nasution also held. In Nasution’s view, ultimate victory in an irregular war could only be achieved with a regular army in conventional battle – a generalization that, according to guerrilla chronologist Walter Laqueur, is ‘of doubtful value’. However, this conventional thinking does help explain why the TNI continued to carry out massive, often catastrophic attacks until the end of the Indonesian war of independence, as witnessed by the battle of Solo that ended the day before the final armistice.

Nonetheless, while the war of 1945-1949 is generally viewed as a guerrilla war, the cases analyzed above show that urban, conventional battles played a major role in the fighting, not only during the famous battles at the beginning of the conflict, but until the very end. The deadly battle of Surabaya was a turning point that not only ignited the revolutionary spirit in Indonesian freedom fighters, but changed the course of the war in more than one way – notwithstanding the fact that in the long run, small-scale guerrilla tactics proved much more effective in wearing out the Dutch.

³⁸ Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Arsip Kementerian Pertahanan, inv. no. 1791, Perintah Siasat No.1/48.

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Beirut Campaign 1982

Benny Michelsohn (Israel)

Humans have fought in cities since before Joshua and the Israelites breached Jericho's walls. Cities are important, to people, governments and, therefore, armies.

The Israeli Défense Force (IDF) 1982 during Lebanese campaign is a historical example. This campaign pitted a mechanized, technologically advanced, casualty sensitive army against conventional and unconventional opponents in a media-saturated, urban environment. Throughout the campaign, the IDF faced a paradox: move rapidly through urban and mountainous terrain to conform to a political timeline, yet inflict minimal casualties, minimize collateral damage, and sustain few casualties. These constraints affected how the IDF would conduct the campaign and especially in urban terrain. Multi-Casualties battles, like Jerusalem during the Six Day War (1967) or Suez during 1973 (War of Atonement) would not be acceptable.

To achieve its objectives within the parameters, the IDF would use a combination of surprise, mass, and tactical flexibility. Generally, this approach proved successful. In this campaign, the IDF fought the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) and the Syrian Army.

The PLO was a well-financed and armed terrorist/guerrilla organization. It was equipped with a variety of Western and Soviet Bloc small arms, anti-tank weapons, and various artillery pieces, mortars, and even tanks. The Syrian Army was a relatively modern army equipped with Soviet equipment. The IDF's goal was to drive the PLO out of Lebanon and neutralize Syria's influence in Lebanon. To accomplish this, 8 (eight) IDF divisions would advance into Lebanon. These units would move rapidly. The advance elements would bypass resistance and follow-on forces would reduce bypassed enemy strongpoints. In the course of this drive north, the IDF would fight in three significant urban areas: Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut.

In August 1982, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was firmly rooted in Beirut, but under siege by Israeli forces. The PLO had been entrenched in south Lebanon, abutting Israel's northern border, for years, launching cross-border attacks, and firing artillery shells and Katyusha rockets at northern Israel towns and villages.

On June 6, Israeli troops crossed the border, ostensibly to push the PLO back 40 km, so its fire means could not threaten Israel. But the IDF pushed north all the way to Beirut and had been attacking the city from the sea, air and land, cutting off food, water and power.

The Siege of Beirut - Phases of the Campaign:

June 6 — "Peace for Galilee War" begun.

June 9-13 — battles on Beirut southern external belt of defense, along DAMUR - HALDE.

June 13 – achieving Beirut encirclement.

June 25-31 – battles on Beirut eastern external belt of defense, ALEII – BAHMADUN area, completing the encirclement and tightening the siege.

July 1982 – static siege.

Aug. 1-11 – “biting” the urban area, fighting on Beirut southern internal belt of defense, the international airport and EL-UZAY suburb and eastern internal belt of defense the hippodrome and the “museum”.

Aug. 11-12 – surrender of the Syrian Army and PLO in Beirut and signing an evacuation agreement with the US envoy Philip Habib.

Aug. 21 — About 350 French troops arrive as an advance unit of the international force to supervise the evacuation, which begins that day.

Aug. 23 — Lebanese legislature elects Bashir Gemayel president of Lebanon.

Aug. 25 — The remaining international troops arrive, including 800 U.S. Marines.

Sept. 1 — Evacuation of PLO personal (8300) and Syrian soldiers ends.

City of Beirut – Capital of Lebanon

In 1982, Beirut was but a shell of its former splendour. By the 1960s, the city had gained the deserved reputation as the Paris of the Middle East.

Beirut was fought on a scale even larger than Tyre or Sidon. It was large, 50 square km, with 600 – 700,000 inhabitants. A French city influenced also by American architecture. The skyline was studded with ancient and modern buildings (3-4 stores but also 13-14 stores). During the twentieth's and thirtieths of the twentieth century, the city was the French High-commissioner location. In World War Two the British Army conquered the city after occupying Damascus and Damur layout of defense. In 1958, a civil war in Lebanon was denied by landing of US Marines at Beirut.

Beirut served as a financial, educational, and cultural centre for the Arab world. Rue de Banques was rumoured to possess half the Arab wealth. American University and St. Joseph

University were both prestigious institutions of higher learning, attracting students from the Arab elites in the entire Middle East. The press was relatively free, and many Arabs could print their ideas in the publishing houses of the city.

At 13 April 1975, a civil war started in Lebanon who continue until 1982. That war divided Beirut in two sectors: west and north dominated by Christian forces and population and east and south by Muslim population ruled by Syrian Army and PLO terrorists.

Unfortunately, the Lebanese Civil War, dramatically changed the city's quality of life. War brought much destruction and left a divided Capital.

Besieged Syrian forces

Syria consider Beirut as a key area in Lebanon and had stationed its 85th Mechanized Infantry Brigade reinforced by Infantry Battalion no. 622 in west Beirut. ORBAT of that force:

3 Mechanized Infantry Battalions.

One tank Battalion – T-54/55.

One Artillery Battalion.

One Engineer Company.

One A/T Company.

One AA Battery.

2 PLA (Palestinian Liberation Army) brigades: HETIN and KADASYIA.¹

PLA Armor Regiment no. 420 (60 tanks).

Commando Battalion no. 226 (belonged to 36th Special Operations Regiment).

Units of 569 Division - About one Battalion size.

EL ASAD Battalion (Lebanese Militia of BAAT' party).

Comprising some 10,000 men, the brigade possessed thirty T-54/55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, 18 - D-30 - 122mm, howitzers, 82mm mortars, Katyushas, 130mm field artillery, and 57mm AA guns. The Syrians deployed in the southern parts of west Beirut.

Besieged PLO Terrorist forces

The PLO was an umbrella organization for a number of different terrorist groups. Yasser Arafat was the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee as well as the commander in chief of all PLO military forces. He also directly controlled Fatah, the largest group.

In addition to FATAH, at least four other Palestinian organizations were in west Beirut: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of

¹ Syrian Army formations employed by Palestinians.

Palestine-General Command, and *al-Saiqa*, controlled by Damascus. The PLO forces deployed on the PLO headquarters and the three refugee camps of Sabra, Shatilla, and Burj al-Barajnah as military bases.

PLO forces in Beirut were the largest in Lebanon:

AJANADIN PLO forces (brigade size FATAH force).

Several other battalion size groups.

BADER forces from Jordan.

PLO (and other terrorist groups) HQ at PHAKHANI neighborhood.

Artillery, communication, engineers and logistic units.

All together about 10,000 terrorists (8,300 expelled).

the PLO headquarters had constructed three levels underground shelters. By the time of Operation *PEACE FOR GALILEE*, the PLO had prepared bunkers and tunnels in anticipation of an Israeli invasion.

It had stockpiled arms, fuel, food, and medicine. In 1981, the Palestinians had also begun constructing a number of secret emergency command posts.

Central control assumed by PLO Chief of the General Staff – Brigadier Saad Sayel (Abu Walid) from an operation center (room) – underground bunker.²

² Born in Kafr Qalil, near Nablus, in 1932; studied Military Engineering at the Jordanian Military College, graduating in 1951; enrolled at military courses in Britain in 1954; joined the Jordanian army in 1956 and became an infantry brigade commander; underwent further military training in Egypt and Iraq in 1958 as well as in Britain then the US (1960 and 1966); left the Jordanian army in Sept. 1970 and joined Fateh; became Fateh commander of the Yarmouk forces; chaired the PLO's Higher Military Committee in the Lebanon from the late 1970s; was a senior aide of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and served as his chief-of-staff; military commander of the PLO PNC member; served mostly in Lebanon, holding the rank of a Brigadier; in 1976, was involved in direct consultations with the US ambassador to Lebanon about protection of the US Embassy; was elected member of the Fateh Exec. Committee in its Aug. 1980 conference in Damascus; was killed in the Beka'a Valley, Lebanon, on 29 Sept. 1982 (PLO leaders accused Syria, while others suspected the Abu Nidal organization to be behind the assassination); was buried in Al-Yarmouk Refugee Camp, Syria; the PA has named its Military Academy in Jericho after him;.

Beirut city divided into 7 (seven) PLO sectors of defense and some sub-sectors.

Major PLO weapons: 24 – T-34 tanks, 200 artillery pieces (including 12 – BM-21 rocket-launchers), 4 AA guns ZU-23x4, hundreds of AA machine-guns and personal SA-7 missile launchers.

The PLO had turned west Beirut into a Palestinian capital in exile

IDF's IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield)

In anticipation The IDF was faced with the daunting prospect of operating inside a large modern city.

Since LITANY Operation (1978) the possibility of a large-scale operation in Lebanon increase. The Intelligence Branch of IDF Northern Command begun preparing intelligence aids: air-photo enlargements, Orto-Photo, maps of different scale, Sector Files and villages files.

At March 1982, a special project was initiated evolving also the IDF General-Staff intelligence branch – Beirut Sector File.

The aim of that file was to provide IDF units, evolved in contingency operation plans with Lebanon Capital comprehensive intelligence knowledge about Beirut to enable conquest of the city and govern it after. File Contents: explanation about the file, introduction and general review of Beirut. Doctrinal aspects of Enemy Courses of Action defending Beirut. Terrain summery, model of enemy deployment to defend Beirut. Urban warfare lessons learned from 1958 and 1976 battles during Lebanon Civil Wars. Collecting intelligence in urban terrain. Operational analysis of Beirut defense in and around the city. The infrastructure installations that enable control of the city. That file disseminated to IDF units at the beginning of May 1982 – one month before the war started.

Fighting on the external belt of defense: 7 – 13 June 1982, encirclement of the city

The forces of 96 divison under command of Brig-General Amos Yaron advanced toward Sil village (Halde junction) along the seashore rout. That

division had 4 brigades: 2 infantry – “Golani” and 35th paratroops and 2 armor - 211 and 188. To breach over the external belt of defense from the south, that IDF division fought three battles.

The beginning looks promising, when at 7th of June the paratroops reached Damur and engaged with Beirut defense forces for the first time. Next 24 hours lost because order from the Supreme Command to halt the advance towards Beirut and the forces stopped.

This recreation time exploited by both sides to regroup and prepare for the anticipated battle. The Syrians deployed two mechanized infantry battalions, two tank battalions, one commando battalion reinforced with anti-tank weapons and dozens of terrorist groups. Center of gravity of the Syrian force lay on the exit seashore rout south to the international airport at Sil village – HALDA junction.

The first attack of Sil village abreast along the seashore on the 9th of June failed. The second attempt on June 10th not succeed as well.

On 11th June a ceasefire was declared in Lebanon. The terrorists in Beirut area did not respect the ceasefire, and the fighting continued with the Syrian units also. On other Lebanon sectors the fighting stopped. A third attack on Sil village launched by 188 armor and GOLANI infantry brigades launched and at that time they accomplished their mission. HALDA junction occupied and IDF forces reached Beirut suburbs.

After the third battle, the path to Beirut opened to them. The Paratroopers Brigade advanced into mountainous terrain while fighting against the Syrian and terrorist forces. On June 13, shortly before noon, they joined forces with the Christian forces in the Shima village. From there, the forces advanced in the territory under Christian domination, towards East Beirut. PLO terrorists and the Syrian forces were cut-off and isolated into the city of Beirut.

Strengthening the envelopment: 22 – 25 June

The ceasefire in the Beirut region was unstable. IDF forces were positioned to the east and south of the Lebanese capital, but the Syrian and

terrorist forces occupied the west of the city and the ridge on ALEI-BAHMADUN area that dominates the eastern city.

Attempts to stabilize the ceasefire failed and it was decided to tighten the siege on Beirut. From June 22 to June 25, the 96th and the 162 divisions attack from south and east respectively, and conquered the region that dominated Beirut. The Syrian forces: 62 mechanized infantry brigade, two commando regiments and one artillery regiment annihilated. Some survivals at this point run away to the Bekaa valley. With this takeover, the IDF obtained control of the Beirut-Damascus road and control over Beirut by the east. Last hope to open a route to besieged forces for reinforcement or evacuation vanished.

The siege: 13 June – 12 August 1982

The IDF objective surrounding Beirut was not a building-by-building fight to destroy the PLO. Instead, it was more focused: not the destruction but the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon. Therefore, the IDF limited the scope and duration of the ground fighting in Beirut. Firepower played a more prominent role here than earlier in the campaign. Beirut was too big to overwhelm with numbers. Actual ground fighting was defined strictly to PLO and Syrian - held areas. These areas, like before, would be isolated and then thoroughly saturated by fire before any ground forces advanced. The destruction was greater than that inflicted earlier in the campaign, but the casualty-conscious IDF determined it could not afford to do otherwise.

IDF operations during the static siege of Beirut lasted approximately one month. Fighting was mainly in the southern and eastern parts of the city. The IDF had the PLO and Syrian forces in Beirut isolated and could bring all its pressure on them.

On 22nd of June Operation HONG-KONG started. IDF Northern Command establish a team of experts who collected information about the infrastructure installations of Beirut. Based on the Sector File already exist, electricity, water system and sewage professionals supported by Christian population functionals affect that infrastructure as well as the communication, transportation and food. That activity pushes the inhabitants of Beirut to press PLO and Syrian forces in order to surrender.

Piecemeal, limited ground attacks, led by company-sized teams of infantry; tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces escorted by cutting water or electricity were used in these operations. These so-called “salami” tactics, named because they sliced off small pieces of enemy-controlled territory, accomplished their goal of pushing the PLO into an ever-shrinking area.

31 July – 1 August: Operation Olive-Tree: the international airport and Hai-E-Salum suburb occupied.

3-5 August: operation Benei-Zait: EL-UZAY, Hippodrome and MUSEUM suburbs occupied.

The ground activities, combined with with Psi-Ops and the most intense close air support and artillery fires of the campaign, made the PLO, after many cease-fires and negotiations, agree to leave Lebanon.

Surrendering negotiation and agreement

An agreement was finally reached on August 18, under which French troops would arrive in Beirut on August 21. They would be joined by US and Italian forces.

Their mission - to ensure the PLO leaves Beirut. The evacuation got underway on August 21, when several hundred PLO fighters boarded a ship for Cyprus.

In the following days, the evacuation picked up pace, and on August 30, it was the turn of PLO chairmen Yasser Arafat, wearing olive-green military fatigues and with his trade-mark black-and white checked keffiyeh headdress, to board a ship taking him from the city where the PLO had had its headquarters.

Some eight and a half thousand PLO members were expelled to Tunisia. Another two and a half thousand ended up in other Arab states.

Arafat had been in Israel's crosshairs for years. According to reports, an Israeli sniper even had him in his sights during the siege of Beirut, but was under orders not to fire. The US was acting as his protector.

Towards the middle of August, an agreement was reached for the Syrian and PLO surrender. Expelling of the Palestinian terrorists and forces from Beirut. The evacuation was carried out under the aegis of an international force. The terrorists were expelled by sea to the Arab States, which were ready to receive them, and the Syrian forces were expelled by the Beirut-Damascus road to the territory held by the Syrian forces in the Bekaa region. The expulsion was completed on August 31.

Although Israel failed to kill Arafat, for the PLO, the evacuation from Beirut was a clear, painful loss. Among some Israeli officials, there was a feeling of triumph, but it was to be short-lived.

The PLO was obviously defeated, but it tried to put the best face on it. They wore fresh uniforms. They had red kaffiyehs, all of them holding their rifles on these crowded trucks. And the trucks then slowly drove all these people to those huge ferries from Greece or Cyprus.

While on the roof, snipers were still shooting from west Beirut and Israeli intelligence people were there with huge telescopes taking pictures of each and every PLO person boarding the ships. That was going on for most of the day. And then the PLO moved to Tunis.

For Israel, the relocation of the PLO from Beirut meant the group was now vulnerable. As far as Arafat is concerned, he's just arrived in Tunis and began operating. Now, the idea of the first Lebanese war was in fact to reach Beirut and cut "the head of the snake", as it used to be called. And in this way Israel would be able to have real autonomy rather than an autonomy governed and influenced by Arafat.

The departure of Arafat from Beirut turned out to be the high watermark of Israel's Lebanon war.

After Israel's ally, Christian leader and president-elect Bachir Gemayel was assassinated on September 14, Israel stood by as a Christian militia entered two Beirut refugee camps, Sabra and Shatilla, supposedly to clear them of stay-behind PLO fighters and massacre hundreds of civilians.

IDF forced to occupy the entire city of Beirut in order to stop the massacre and provide law & order to the population – Operation Iron Brain.

Syrian forces fighting significance

Uncompromising fighting Focused on the external defense belt and key areas into the city. The main fighting on the built-up area carried by PLO terrorists.

Terrorists fighting significance.

IDF halt after Sidon landing used to regroup and preparations in Beirut.

Participation along the external belt battles.

Shock after HALDA occupation and complete the preparations for siege.

Dealing with siege difficulties: food, water, electricity.

Morale problems.

Dealing with “hunting” the leaders.

Poor resistance at the end – the last phase of the siege battles.

IDF lessons

IDF was able to adapt to the urban terrain mission of the 1982 Lebanese campaign. Despite being a heavy force, the IDF proved that such a force could operate in an urban environment. Where other armies failed, the IDF did not, due to its flexibility, adaptability, training, and small unit leadership. Some units in the IDF did better than others in urban terrain. The difference lay in pre-invasion training and preparations. Those units that trained in some of the captured villages in the Golan and the Sinai were more prepared than those that did not. This training was conducted in small villages that were necessarily not representative of the large modern cities of Lebanon, but urban training can be conducted successfully in relatively modest training areas; large city-sized structures are not necessary. What matters most is for soldiers and leaders to learn the fundamentals of operating in and around buildings.

Another important subject concerns the use of armor in urban areas. Tanks could operate relatively safely in urban areas in conjunction with dismounted infantry. Thinner-skinned APCs were found vulnerable to AT fire and were withdrawn from fighting. To protect infantry on the move, the IDF began using armored engineer vehicles; this is a good example of IDF flexibility. Other armies in similar circumstances have tried similar adaptations before. Battles in Chechnya and Somalia amply demonstrate the danger thin-skinned vehicles face in the modern urban environment. The history of armored vehicles has shown a general trend of progressively greater and greater armor protection. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to posit whether there is any such thing anymore as “light” armored vehicles. Small, disorganized PLO AT teams savaged IDF APCs near Tyre. As the IDF has fought in Lebanon over the years, its infantry rides in a variety of “battle taxis” made from converted tanks. Modern western armies, including the British, American, spent large sums of money and effort to equip its armies with heavily armed but lightly armored IFVs (Infantry Fighting Vehicles). The IDF, with considerably more recent combat experience deems it more prudent to favor armor over speed or firepower. Those who plan the future of the mounted force should bear this in mind.

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Invasion of Izmir and the Turkish National Struggle (1919-1922)*

Bülent Durgun (Türkiye)

Prelude

The Mudros Armistice Agreement signed after the First World War, constituted the last link in the sequence of activities carried out to oust the Turks first from Europe and then from all of Anatolia, within the context of the "Eastern Question-Oriental Question"¹. Anatolia was shared by the Allied Powers and

* This proceeding contains some materials previously discussed in my master's thesis with the title of *1919-1922 Yılları Arasında İzmir'de İktisadi Durum*, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İzmir, 1998.

¹ Bülent Durgun, *Balkan Harbi'nde Osmanlı Ordusu'nun Ulaştırma Faaliyetleri (1912-1913)*, İsbankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, Nisan 2018, p. 2-6; Kemal Beydilli, "Şark Meselesi", *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/sark-meselesi>, (25.01.2022); Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi V. Cilt*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 4. Baskı, Ankara, 1983, p. 203-204; Suat Muhtar, "Şark Meselesi", *İstisare*, Cilt 1, Sayı 18, 14 Kanunusani 1324, s. 840-844; William L. Langer and Robert P. Blake, "The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and Its Historical Background", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Apr., 1932), p. 468-505; Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question In Greece and Turkey*, Constable and Company Ltd, London, Bombay, Sydney, 1922, p. 160; Seymour Doğu Sorununu tarihin başlangıcına kadar dayandırmaktadır, bkz., Charles Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War 1870-1914*, Yale University Press, Tenteh Printing, 1918, p. 194-195; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi VIII (Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri (1876-1907))*, 3. Baskı Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1988, s. 78-80; *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of Balkan Wars*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Division of Intercourse and Education, Washington D.C., 1914, p. 21; Norman Dwight Harris, "The Effect of the Balkan Wars on European Alliances and the Future of the Ottoman Empire", *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, Vol. 10, Tenth Annual Meeting (1913), p. 105-111; Stephen P. Duggan, "The Balkan Adjustment", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1913), p. 628, 645; Stephen P. Duggan, "Balkan Diplomacy I", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1917), p. 39; R. J. B. Bosworth, "Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire", *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, Edited by Marian Kent, Frank Cass&Co.Ltd., England and USA, 1996, p. 52; Ulrich Trumpener, "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire", *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. Edited by Marian Kent, Frank Cass&Co.Ltd., England and USA, 1996, p. 107-126; David Starr Jordan, "The Balkan Tragedy", *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Oct., 1918), pp. 120-135.

attempts of invasion started. In this fight for sharing, the Great Powers allowed Greece to go to İzmir to achieve its ambitions of grabbing a big bite.

Contrary to the spirit of the Mudros Armistice Agreement, the Greeks², without spending a lot of effort and paying a price in the First World War, together with İzmir, took the biggest share from the "sick man of Europe" Ottoman Empire, on the grounds of the articles of the Treaty, with reasons that do not exist in reality. The unlawful invasion was tried to be camouflaged and legitimized technically, and under the auspices of the "Supreme Council" and under the protection of the ships of the Entente States, soldiers landed in İzmir³.

Venizelos expresses British support for the Greek invasion of İzmir as follows⁴: "...The friendly relations between us started with the **Big Four**'s suddenly inviting me and asking: If we were capable of occupying İzmir? Yes, I answered and they gave the order to invade. I requested the escort of a British navy to the Greek convoy in order to prevent the possibility of an incident. The British Navy escorted the Greek convoy. Later, when I wanted to invade Eastern Thrace before the execution of the Treaty of Sevres, they gave a positive answer.

When the Greek representative in Istanbul, Mr. Katehaki, went to the British command to notify that Greek Army had received orders to invade Eastern Thrace and demanded the means of landing, which Greek Army did not have any in her inventory, the British staff confined all the means of landing at their disposal. Not satisfied with this, he sent one of the biggest battleships of the British Navy to protect the Eastern Thrace landing...Before the expiration of the six-month deadline given to Turkey for the execution of the Treaty of Sevres was over, I applied to the British Government and explained that we needed to prepare for the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres. What I wanted was, apart from the ammunition that had to be supplied, 3,500,000 sterling for the expenses of the war effort in Asia Minor and the participation of the British Air Force. Mr.

² Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (A Study in the Contact of Civilisations)*, Constable and Company Ltd., London, 1922, p. 79.

³ Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 52.

⁴ E.K. Venizelos, *Küçükasya Felaketinden Kimler Mesuldür: Bugünkü İktisadi Müşköllerimizin Geç Kalmış Sebepleri*, Başvekil E.K. Venizelos'un üç tarihi demeci, Milli Matbaa, Atina, 1932, p. 34.

Lloyd George explained that he found them quite natural. When was our friendly relationship not proven?"

Within the framework of its Great Ideal Megali Idea, Greece has gradually expanded its territory since 1821 and intensified its preparations to reach its goals in Western Anatolia⁵. On the pretext of saving the Greek people living in Anatolia from the pressure of the Turks, the Greeks, who went to Izmir on May 15, 1919, did not encounter any intervention "to prevent regrettable events", but from the first day, until they left Anatolia, murdering, torturing, raping, plundering and pilfering were kept⁶. As a result of the massacres, thousands of Muslims were killed, forced to flee or left their ancestral homeland, and migrated to Anatolia. In the two years following the tragedy of the Invasion of Izmir, 325,000 Muslims left their homes, workplaces, fertile vineyards, shops and production areas and migrated to the mountains or to the interior of Anatolia⁷.

There were a total of 8 (eight) Greek divisions responsible for the invasion in the Izmir region⁸. In addition to this, İzmir Port and the roads extending from İzmir to the east (especially railways) had strategic importance in terms of supplying and reinforcing the Greek army in Anatolia. In this context, it is possible to say that most of the production opportunities and products are mobilized to the Greek army in order to feed and support the Greek army in the daily life of İzmir.

The provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Ottoman Delegate on 10 August 1920, regarding İzmir, were as follows⁹:

⁵ Hamdi Ertuna, Necati Ökse, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Megalo İdea*, Gnkur Basımevi, Ankara, 1985, p. 43-44; Mustafa Kemal, *Söylev (Nutuk) II*, Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1973, p. 453-454; Brian W. Beeley, "The Greek-Turkish Boundary: Conflict at the Interface", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 3, No. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World (1978)*, p. 352.

⁶ Talat Yalazan, *Türkiye'de Yunan Vahşet ve Soykırımı Girişimi I (15 Mayıs 1919-9 Eylül 1922)*, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1994, p. 1-18.

⁷ *Türkiye'de Yunan Fecaii Birinci Kitap*, Dâhiliye Nezareti Neşriyatı, Matbaayı Ahmet İhsan ve Şürekâsı, İstanbul, 1921, p. 16.

⁸ Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, Türkiye Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1960, p. 501.

⁹ Şerafettin Yamaner, *Sevr ve Lozan (Öncesi ve Sonrasıyla)*, Harp Akademileri Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 53-54.

“İzmir Region: The borders of this region include the area of more or less Kuşadası, Ödemiş, Salihli, Akhisar, and Kemer pier.

This region will remain under Turkish sovereignty, but Turkey will give the right to use this sovereignty to Greece. A Turkish flag will be found in one of the outer castles of the city of Izmir as a sign of Turkish sovereignty (A strange sovereignty). The region will be administered by a commission consisting of British, French, and Italian representatives, and Greece and Turkey will each give a representative to the commission. A regional assembly (Izmir Parliament) will convene and this assembly will be able to make a plebiscite five years later and decide to add Izmir and its region to Greece for good. Thus, all rights and values in the region will belong to Greece; The symbolic sovereignty of Turkey, which is already displayed on paper and with a flag, will also come to an end. In addition, the Turks in these lands that will leave Turkey will also become Greek nationals.”

It would be useful to remember Kazım Karabekir Pasha's assessment here. “*A perfect partition in themselves! A term for the gradual, that is, civilized extermination of the Turks in two or five years for İzmir! What is the need for two years for the Greeks! A few weeks after the announcement of the Greek administration, it can come into the presence of world civilization with a dirty face and is not ashamed of declaring that it is ready for the dream.*”¹⁰

There are also those who try to explain what was done as an attempt to getting rid of the barbarians or as an attempt to take revenge.¹¹ In any case, the Turks have been harmed by this.

During the invasion, commercial life was dominated by the minorities through which by the foreign elements.¹² Under the shadow of the flags of the

¹⁰ Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, p. 721.

¹¹ Hanri Nahum, *İzmir Yahudileri*, İletişim yay. , İstanbul, 2000, s. 197.

¹² Erkan Serçe, “Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında İzmir ve İzmir Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası”, *İzmir Ticaret Odası Tarihi (19. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla)*, p. 69; Süleyman Vasfî (Adıyaman), “Bir Gümrükçünün İşgal Yılları Anıları”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 255; Zafer Toprak, “Yayınlanmamış Bir Monografiden İzmir 1920–1921”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 228; Özlem Yıldırım, “İtibar-ı Zirai Birlikleri Kanunu ve Aydın İncir Müstahsilleri Kooperatifinin Yeniden Canlanması”, *Tariş Tarihi*, Türkiye Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Tarih Vakfı, Tariş Tarihi Projesi, İzmir, 1993, p. 66; Kamil Su, *Sevr*

invading forces and ships, minorities and foreign elements were able to trade freely.¹³ Another important issue was that the Greek forces were financed by wealthy local Greeks who were then Ottoman citizens.¹⁴

Throughout history, İzmir has always been found valuable as a trade center, as it has been the gateway to Western Anatolia. The wealth of Western Anatolia was collected in İzmir -especially after the industrial revolution- and transferred to Europe and imperialist countries. The manufactured goods coming from Europe to İzmir were distributed and consumed in Anatolia, thus the region was caught in a double-sided exploitation grip. Local minorities and foreign groups called “Levantine” formed the main actors and the most profitable ones in this two-way trade conducted in İzmir.

Economic reasons lie on the basis of the invasion of İzmir, which has great wealth with its hinterland.¹⁵ The economic foundations of the invasion of İzmir can be inferred from an agreement signed with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Sforza, and Bekir Sami Bey on 12 March 1921, which says “during the London Conference... Pursuant to the agreement..., Italy will defend the return of Izmir and Thrace to Turkey at the Conference; and in many provinces of Southern Anatolia, concessions would be granted”¹⁶.

While the Western states were trying to prepare their public opinion for the Greek invasion campaign, which was carried out with economic interest concerns, the Greeks also made an irritation to support these efforts.¹⁷

Antlaşması ve Aydın (İzmir) Vilayeti, Kültür Bakanlığı yay., 1. baskı, Ankara, Mayıs, 1981, p. 8–11; Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, p. 27–41.

¹³ Feridun Ergin, “Birinci Dünya Savaşında ve Atatürk Döneminde Fiyatlar ve Gelirler”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, III/7 (Kasım, 1986), p. 65.

¹⁴ Yaşar Aksoy, *İzmir, Smyrna Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, İzmir Büyük Şehir Belediyesi Kültür yay. , 1. baskı, İzmir, Ocak, 1990, p. 153.

¹⁵ Ergün Aybars, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi I*, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Yayınları, Dördüncü Bası, Ankara 1995, p. 229; Salahi R. Sonyel, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*, I, 2.baskı, T.T.K. Basımevi, Ankara, 1987, p. 95; R. Funda Barbaros, Gülcan Paker, Beyza Sümer, Yaşar Aksoy, *Ege Bölgesi Sanayi Odası'nın 50. Yılı*, Tükelmat AŞ., İzmir, Eylül, 1995, p. 3; Aksoy, *İzmir, Smyrna Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, p. 153.

¹⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, Cem Sar, “1919–1939 Dönemi”, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1990)*, Siyasal Kitabevi, 8. baskı, Ankara, 1993, p. 32.

¹⁷ Richard Lewinshon, *Esrarengiz Avrupalı Zahoroff*, Çeviren: Cem Muhtaroglu, İletişim yay. , 1.baskı, İstanbul, 1991, p. 117; Aybars, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi I*, p. 227–237; Kenan

Under these conditions, the Turkish bourgeoisie was compelled to make its national revolution before it could complete its primitive capital accumulation.

Invasion of Izmir

With the start of the invasion; Life, which had already deteriorated during the First World War, became more and more complicated. On the one hand, while the Turks leaving the city, on the other hand, Greek immigrants were settled in the dwellings evacuated by the Turks. Invading authorities took control of every part of the city, with the excuse of ensuring public order. With martial law declared after the invasion, a ban on leaving the city was introduced. With the prohibition, the people had to get permission to go to their fields, vineyard, or garden¹⁸. The villagers, on the other hand, became unable to commute to the markets in their towns and suburbs. In addition to the permission problem, there were also possibilities such as local supporters and invading soldiers blocking the roads of the villagers and usurping their valuables. The ad hoc solution that the people set out en masse to eliminate this possibility did not constitute a resolution either¹⁹. These robberies, plundering, extortion, and rape, which the invading forces started with the local Greeks and Armenians, continued unabated, even intensified, until the last day of the invasion. The Greeks and local accomplices kept carrying out these plundering²⁰ and assimilation activities without even waiting for the dark of the night, in daylight, in front of the representatives of the Entente States, and in the most public place²¹. Not only in Kemeraltı, but also in various regions of İzmir, the businesses and shops belonging to the Turks were selected and plundered one by one by the Greek soldiers under the guidance of the local Greeks, and everything worthwhile was

Kırkpınar, "Milli Mücadele Dönemi'nde İngiliz Basını ve Kamuoyunda Türk İmajı", *ÇTTAD.* , I/3 (1993), p. 171.

¹⁸ Kamil Su, *Manisa Yöremizde İşgal Acıları*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları Kültür Eserleri Dizisi, İkinci Baskı, Ankara Ağustos 1986, p. 29.

¹⁹ Halide Edip Adivar, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Mehmet Asım Us, *İzmir'den Bursa'ya*, Atlas Kitabevi, 3. Baskı, İstanbul -1980, p. 122.

²⁰ Selahattin Tansel, *Mondros'dan Mudanya'ya Kadar II*, Başbakanlık Basımevi, Ankara, 1973, p. 182.

²¹ Bayram Bayraktar, "Mütareke'de Yunanistan'ın Ayvalık Politikası", *Ç. T. T. A. D. I/2*, İzmir 1992, p. 88.

usurped²². The same incidents were performed during the seizure of government offices by the Greek authorities²³. Even Venizelos had to admit that it was the Greeks who caused the chaos and plundered. While Venizelos was distributing money for propaganda purposes²⁴, he sent 250,000 T.L. to compensate those injured in Aydın and Nazilli²⁵. Consul Horton's comments that was justifying the murder committed by the Greeks are noteworthy in terms of indicating the western perception of Turkey and Turks²⁶:

“What was obvious to me was that the brutality and violence that the Greeks inflicted immediately after the landing was quite natural, which those familiar with human nature could have predicted... it was nothing less than a miracle that the situation would be restored.”

However, the massacres and plunders described in the publications of *İzmir Disaster in the Vicinity I-II*, which contains the reports from the military authorities about the invasion of İzmir, Ayvalık, Aydın and its environs by the Greeks and the local Greek atrocities, had not connection with civilization and humanity²⁷.

The Greek troops, who came to İzmir in a raid style with the arrangements of the British Admiral Calthorpe, attacked the Turks with unprecedented brutality, without recognizing the sacredness of family privacy and the sanctity of the clergy and religious institutions, and started to plunder the city. This invasion was welcomed with great enthusiasm by the local Greek people. Local Greeks covering the entire length of the boardwalk greeted the Greek soldiers waving Greek flags, throwing flowers, applauding, and cheering "Zito". The number of Turks killed in İzmir and its suburbs (including the Urla

²² Tansel, *Mondros'dan Mudanya'ya Kadar II*, p. 177; Bayraktar, Mütareke'de Yunanistan'ın Ayvalık Politikası”, p. 89.

²³ *Türk İstiklal Harbi II/1*, p. 57.

²⁴ *DH-KMS*, Dosya 54/2, Belge no. 35.

²⁵ Tansel, *Mondros'dan Mudanya'ya Kadar II*, s. 186; Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio and London, England 1988, p. 67.

²⁶ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 66.

²⁷ *Mülhakatta İzmir Fecaii I-II (İzmir, Ayvalık ve Aydın ve Havalisinin Yunanlar Tarafından İşgali ve Yunan Mezalimi Hakkında Makamati Askeriye'den Mevrud Raporlar)*, Matbaa-ı Askeriye, Dersaadet, 1335.

peninsula and its villages) within the first 48 hours of the invasion has exceeded 2000.

The local Greek gangs, who were armed months before the invasion, cooperated with the Greek soldiers in this atrocity. The Greeks established special entities according to the characteristics of their actions. These units have raped, committed robbery, looting, arson, and started fires.

On May 15, 1919, when the Greeks occupied İzmir, 57 Ottoman officers were killed and some of them were injured in the terror movement, and the massacre and looting continued increasingly. The Greek detachments with bayonet entered the barracks, marched all the commanders and officers in the barracks, including the Corps Commander, along the cordon in the form of a captive convoy, to the Passport pier, to the Patris ferry, which debarked Evzon Battalion, and imprisoned hostages in the deck of the ferry. Meanwhile, another Evzon detachment raided the government building, entered the governor's office, and wounded the governor, the provincial officers, and the soldiers they captured in the barracks with bayonets and butts. While the convoy was being taken to the ferry, 9 officers were martyred by fire, bayonet, and buttstock strikes along the way, with the participation of Greek soldiers, civilians, and local Greeks, 21 officers were injured, and the fate of 27 officers remained unknown.

The atrocities, murders, and tortures that the Turks were subjected to during the invasion for three years, in the center of Izmir, in its hinterland and its neighborhood, Western Anatolia and Thrace, have been tried to be summarized above as it is included in the documents and reports. However, it is also known that there were many more atrocities whose documents have not been found or documented.²⁸

²⁸ *Türkiye'de Yunan Fecayii I-II*, Dahiliye Nezareti Neşriyatı, Matbaayı Ahmet İhsan ve Şürekası, İstanbul, 1337; *Mülhakatta İzmir Fecaii I-II (İzmir, Ayvalık ve Aydın ve Havalisinin Yunanlar Tarafından İşgali ve Yunan Mezalimi Hakkında Makamatı Askeriye'den Mevrud Raporlar)*, Matbaa-ı Askeriye, Dersaadet, 1335; Talat Yalazan, *Türkiye'de Yunan Vahşet ve Soy Kırımı Girişimi I (15 Mayıs 1919-13 Eylül 1921)*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1994; Talat Yalazan, *Türkiye'de Yunan Vahşet ve Soy Kırımı Girişimi II (13 Eylül 1921-9 Eylül 1922)*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1994; *Askerî Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, Batı Anadolu'da Yunan Mezalimi*, Sayı: 93, Ocak 1992; *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Milli Mücadele ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Md.lüğü Yayınları, Ankara, 2007, pp. 26, 191, 213-237; *Arşiv Belgelerine*

Even historical artifacts had their share of looting, theft, and plunder. All valuables were pillaged from the ruins of Sard, except for the sarcophagus and broken jugs, which were difficult to transport. The damages in the region during the invasion period are as follows²⁹:

Real Estate Damages	Number of (*1000)	Cost(*1000.000 Lira)
Izmir City	19	176
Other Cities	54	305
In Towns and Villages	87	177
Total	160	658
Securities Damage		
Furnishings, Commercial Commodities, Cash, Agricultural Tools, Grains, etc.	-	567
Animals and Transportation Vehicles		
Bovines	695	65
Ovine (sheep goats)	2592	44
Transport Vehicles	25	3
Total		112

Göre Balkanlar'da ve Anadolu'da Yunan Mezalimi II (Anadolu'da Yunan Mezalimi), Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Md.lüğü Yayınları, Ankara, 1996; Genelkurmay ATASE D. Bşk.lığı Arşivi; İSH Koleksiyonu Kls.84, Dos.23, 23AA, 23AB, 23AC, 23AD, Kls.93, Dos.73, 73AA, 73AB, 73AD, 73ADA, 73AE, 73AF, 73AG; *Yunan Ordusu İzmir'de Ekler*, Harp Tarihi Dairesi Neşriyatı, Atina, 1957, s. 20-25.

²⁹ Yücel Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1994, p. 5; Vedat Eldem, *Harap ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi*, T. T. K. Yayınevi, Ankara 1994, p. 218-219.

The distribution of the damage to the suburbs/counties/districts is as follows³⁰:

Type Suburb/county/district	Real Estate (1000.000 lira)	Securities (1000.000 lira)	Animal	Total
Izmir	230	65	20	315
Saruhan	132	112	11	255
Aydın	59	111	4	174
Bursa ve Kütahya	44	43	14	101
Ertuğrul	22	4	7	50
İzmit	37	98	10	145
Eskişehir	60	23	37	120
Karesi	70	90	2	162
Sair	8	5	7	20
Toplam	662	567	112	1342

Damage and loss were widespread in all areas under the Greek invasion. It was determined that the damage had been relatively higher in İzmir, where the Greek invasion lasted the most compared to other regions³¹. Ali Fuat Pasha reveals the situation with all its clarity in the report he wrote to the Istanbul Government, which he asked to act according to the wishes of the nation. “The province of İzmir was devastated, the province of Aydın fell into misery with the immigration of one hundred thousand Muslims, and more than fifty thousand Muslims were martyred. National Struggle is not against the Great Powers, but

³⁰ Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi*, p. 219.

³¹ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 38; Vasfi, “Bir Gümrükçünün İşgal Yılları Anıları”, p. 248,

against the cruel and ruthless Greeks who caused this persecution. Please ask British General Milne not to cause any more violence.³²”

Especially in the first years of the invasion, it is known that the local Greeks and Greeks were looking for any opportunity to buy and /or seize the land and real estate title deeds and the lands of Turks. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman government also comprehended the Greeks' plan to claim lands and claim a legal sovereignty right in the region here, and tried to prevent this, albeit partially, with loans to be given by Ziraat Bank. The Greeks were not idle either. They tried to oppress the people by spreading speculative news and forced Turks to flee due to the persecution they faced³³.

The Turkish people, who had fallen into misery with the effect of the First World War and the previous wars, were dragged into poverty and deficient with the policies implemented by the Greek and local Greek minorities during the invasion period. “Men with assets worth hundreds of liras are in need of a bite”³⁴. The following incident faced by Fatih Rıfıkı Atay constitutes an interesting example in terms of displaying the situation:

“People are without money, without food, and without animals. The first day I came, I saw a man on the street pointing at me like a mute. It turned out that he was speechless from hunger and thirst. This man was a retired Colonel...”³⁵”

This misery of the time was including all the people in the invasion area, without discriminating city or town. The people had to give up production to defend themselves. The people, who could not produce even for their own livelihood, were condemned to starvation. Diseases caused by hunger and bad conditions were the icing on the cake.³⁶

Although İzmir and its surroundings have rich lands for crop yielding and varying overall agricultural output; war, and invasion caused a decrease in production. Disruptions in transportation had a negative impact on the stability

³² Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, p. 146.

³³ Tansel, *Mondros'dan Mudanya'ya Kadar II*, s. 198.

³⁴ Su, *Manisa Yöremizde İşgal Acıları*, p. 87.

³⁵ H. Edip Adivar, *İzmir'den Bursa'ya*, p. 67: 28 Eylül 1922'de Turgutlu'da cereyan etmiştir.

³⁶ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 13, 25.

of food prices in 1921, and a decrease in price hikes was not on the horizon. Food prices displayed a continuous upward trend in this period.³⁷

Many of the Turks, who were taken into custody by the Greeks, died during the interrogation. The environments in which they were kept under surveillance were kept far from sanitary and hygienic conditions, and their treatment was inhumane. In addition to the tortures, food items such as “a rusk, a box of sardines-canned- and some dried figs³⁸” were given as food.

Along with ordinary snatchings, shop and house pilfering can be observed by scanning of the periodicals of the time.

Even the local Greeks were uncomfortable with the security environment³⁹. The brutality and cruelty committed by the invaders was totally out of control. So much so that, in addition to the brutality inflicted on the Turks, “They raped more than three hundred local Greek girls in Manisa, Menemen and other places.⁴⁰”

However, some Greeks earned a lot of money under the protection of the Ottoman sultans during the First World War, they did not hesitate in donating this money to the Greek army in order to slaughter the Ottoman Turks. Despite all the massacres, rape, torture, looting and extortion committed by the invaders and local accomplices, the Ottoman Government perceived no harm in delivering food to the Greek soldiers. The same attitude was also followed by foreign nationals. For example, "British Officer Hover", who traded licorice root in Anatolia before the First World War, organized Greek espionage in the First World War and was assigned to control the region during the invasion period. Hover was able to ignore the persecution of the Turks during these duties.

³⁷ J.K. Birge ve diğeri, *İzmir'deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, p. 45.

³⁸ Vasfi, “Bir Gümrükçünün İşgal Yılları Anıları”, p. 242.

³⁹ Zeki Arıkan, *Mütareke ve İşgal Dönemi İzmir Basını (30 Ekim 1918- 8 Eylül 1922)*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara 1989, s. 254.

⁴⁰ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 5.

Another contradictory situation exists in the fact that Turks continue to shop from Greeks while Turkish tradesmen remain futile.⁴¹

Intellectuals in the military prison in Izmir were rescued by the people before the invasion. Those imprisoned in the general prison with despicable crime, escaped by breaking the doors with the invasion on 15 May. These, like Greek soldiers, gangs, deserters, Greek deserters, and Armenian gangs, have plagued the villagers and the people together with the Efes, whom Türkan Çetin described as "Social Bandits".⁴²

Effects on the People and Repercussions

As mentioned earlier, the living standards of the Greek refugees who migrated to Izmir and the Turkish refugees who migrated from Izmir to Anatolia could not reach the level of humanitarian living conditions during this period despite the help and efforts of many Turkish, Greek and Allied institutions and organizations⁴³.

During this period, in addition to the hospitals controlled by various nationalities, Turks had a well-managed and modernly equipped hospital. Of course, there was a need for the construction of new hospitals to meet the need.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Arıkan, *Mütareke ve İşgal Dönemi İzmir Basını (30 Ekim 1918- 8 Eylül 1922)*, p. 252- 254; *DH- KMS*, Dosya 54/ 1, Belge no. 16; *T. İ. H. I*, s. 137.

⁴² Kazım Özalp, *Milli Mücadele (1919-1922) I*, T. T. K. Yayınevi, 2'nci Baskı, Ankara, 1985, p. 7; Türkan Çetin, "Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında İşgal Bölgesi Köy ve Köylüsü", *Ç. T. T. A. D. I/3*, s. 180.

⁴³ *Ahenk*, 16 Teşrinisani 1335; *Şark*, 25 Şubat 138; Zeki Arıkan, "İzmir- Kasaba- Aydın Demiryolu İşçilerinin Bir Muhtırası", *Tarih ve Toplum*, Sayı: 49, Ocak 1988, p. 51-56; Engin Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, İzmir 1993, p. 160 - 165, 222 - 229; Engin Berber, "Kurtuluş Sonra İzmir'de Yunan İşgal Dönemine Tepkiler", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı 8, Cilt: III, Mart 1987, pp. 443-460; Alptekin Müderrisoğlu, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Mali Kaynakları I*, Kastaş yay., 1.baskı, İstanbul, Nisan, 1988, p. 34; Gotthard Jaeschke, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile ilgili Belgeler*, Çeviren: Cemal Köprülü, T. T. K. Yayınevi, Ankara 1971, p. 47- 48; Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele'de Ege Çevresi*, p. 9 - 31, p. 128-129; *1930 İstatistik Yılığ*, Başvekâlet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, Ankara, 1930, p. 100.

⁴⁴ Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey, (A Politico-Ekonomico Interpretation, 1908-1923 Inclusive, with Selected Chapters by Representative Authorities)*, The Macmillian Company, New York, December 1924, p.176; Yaşar Aksoy, *İzmir, Smyrna Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür yay. , 1.baskı, İzmir, Ocak, 1990, p. 50; Su, *Sevr Antlaşması ve Aydın (İzmir) Vilayeti*, p. 44.

It can also be said that Izmir's sanitary department closely monitored the health situation of the city and demonstrated the necessary sensitivity to various requirements.⁴⁵

During this period, when epidemics were widespread and affected many people due to malnutrition, a local official in each sanjak, province, and municipality, working in coordination with the World Health Organization, operated bacteriological and chemical laboratories on behalf of the government.⁴⁶ The health organization of Izmir, which had recently suffered from regional epidemics, was part of the Ottoman Empire's structure adapted from the superior French system. In practice, however, due to the lack of trained personnel, infrastructures such as hospitals and laboratories, the success of the French system was not achieved. In addition to a general lack of knowledge on the part of the authorities, there was also carelessness and negligence in the quarantine activities that had to be applied to the immigrants.⁴⁷

Diseases such as malaria, smallpox, syphilis, and spotted fever were among the most common epidemics.⁴⁸ The Hilal-i Ahmer (Red Crescent) Society was trying to overcome the inadequacy of the hospitals with some medicine and treatment aids. However, these efforts were not enough to achieve complete success in the fight against epidemics caused by the deteriorating living conditions due to the invasion. The epidemics, which had become uncontrollable in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, had also greatly affected the people of Izmir.⁴⁹

In addition to the individual assistance of the wealthy elite in meeting the various needs of the relatively low-income Turkish immigrants⁵⁰, the Greeks had established a dispensary and “started to meet the medical and pharmaceutical

⁴⁵ *Ahenk*, 25 Teşrinisani 1335.

⁴⁶ *Ahenk*, 25 Teşrinisani 1335; Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 156-166.

⁴⁷ Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 156; Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 165 -166, Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele (Türkiye’de Zorunlu Göç) 1923-1925*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, Eylül 1995, p. 9.

⁴⁸ *Ahenk*, 27 Teşrinisani 1335; Mear, *Modern Turkey*, p. 155; Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele’de Ege Çevresi*, p. 13, 26, 85.

⁴⁹ Özkaya, *Milli Mücadele’de Ege Çevresi*, p. 9-10; Tansel, *Mondros’dan Mudanya’ya Kadar II*, s. 147; Kazım Çavdar, *İzmir*, Bilgehan Matbaası, İzmir, 1986, p. 55-56.

⁵⁰ *Ahenk*, 20 Şubat 1338.

needs of the Turkish immigrants settled in the mosques and madrasas in the vicinity free of charge.⁵¹” Doctors examined patients, who were unable to come to the dispensary, in their homes. In addition to providing medical aid to the Turks⁵², the Greeks also provided financial aid for this purpose⁵³. However, all these efforts were not a solution to the victimization of the Turkish element, which was most affected by the invasion.

”More than 500 of the 10,000 migrants in the Söke region died from hunger and deprivation. The remaining ones tried to take shelter in mosques, police stations, and ruins and struggled in the agony of death. Unable to find food, these poor people ate wild grass. Amidst this grim scene, Turkish officers voluntarily took part in the relief work of the Red Cross. Some European nationals also volunteered for relief work. Despite this, the suffering of the people, who were writhing in hunger and misery, was increasing day by day.⁵⁴” It was estimated that 4% of the deaths in 1921 were caused by food insufficiency. However, not all of the problems in accessing food due to food shortages and high prices can be included in this figure. Many diseases either directly or indirectly caused by food shortages were observed in Izmir during this period.⁵⁵

On the other hand, daily life continued. Cinemas and theaters continued to operate, albeit for reasons such as serving various propaganda and providing financial resources for various purposes. While there was a decline in theater audiences compared to the past, it is known that there was no change in the demand for cinemas⁵⁶.

Upon taking his office Steryadis, with great determination, banned gambling and closed brothels as one of his first acts to ingratiate himself with the

⁵¹ Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 165.

⁵² Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 165.

⁵³ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 68 -70.

⁵⁴ *Türk İstiklal Harbi II/2*, p. 143.

⁵⁵ J.K. Birge ve diğerleri, *İzmir'deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, Uluslararası Amerikan Koleji Araştırma Komitesi, Çev. Aykan Candemir, İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, İzmir, 2000, p. 34.

⁵⁶ *Ahenk*; Oğuz Makal, “İzmir Sinemaları”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 387-394; Eftal Sevinçli, “İşgal Yıllarından Cumhuriyet’e İzmir’de Tiyatro”, *Üç İzmir*, p. 379 -381; Oğuz Makal, “Tarih İçinde İzmir’de Sinema Yaşantısı”, *Ç. T. T. A. D. I/3*, p. 206.

local Muslim population which did not endear him to the local population.⁵⁷ What Steryadis was trying to do in İzmir was to prepare the ground for a Greco-Turkish Empire to be established.

Social life was under the control of the Greek invasion forces. The invading forces command restricted life under martial law and interfered with the natural flow of life with daily orders. It was forbidden to congregate without permission for any reason, and it was necessary to obtain permission from the local invasion commander to go to commute⁵⁸.

Apart from this, İzmir nights were extremely colorful, especially for foreigners, minorities, and Greeks. The cafes, clubs, and casinos on the promenade were in a race to entertain their customers with spectacular lights throughout the night⁵⁹. In 1921, it was reported that “*the way of life in the city was based on extremely generous spending. In fact, this generosity can be characterized as wasteful spending. In terms of following fashion, İzmir was a little like Paris and its inhabitants spend large sums of money on clothes and ornaments. Goods for clothing, footwear, and personal care were imported predominantly from Germany, France, England, Italy, and the United States.*”⁶⁰ On the other hand, the main places of entertainment for Turks in İzmir were 495 coffee houses employing 2429 people⁶¹.

Street lighting was rarely provided by electricity, partly by gas lamps and partly by luxury lamps, but mostly by oil lamps. We can see from the advertisements in the newspapers of those days that there were craftsmen capable of laying electric and telephone lines. We can say that the lighting of the streets was done with gas lamps and was robust during the period we searched⁶².

⁵⁷ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 68.

⁵⁸ Arıkan, *İşgal Dönemi İzmir Basını*, p. 82.

⁵⁹ Bilge Umar, *İzmir’de Yunanlıların Son Günleri*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Birinci Basım, Ankara Haziran 1974, p. 235; Haydar Rüştü Öktem, *Mütareke ve İşgal Anıları*, Hazırlayan: Zeki Arıkan, T. T. K. Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, p. 99.

⁶⁰ Birge and others, *İzmir’deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, p. 1-2.

⁶¹ Birge and others, *İzmir’deki [Küçük Asya], Bazı Sosyal Koşullar Hakkında Bir Araştırma İzmir 1921*, p. 69.

⁶² *Ahenk*, 12 Şubat 1338; 2 Haziran 1938; 14 Şubat 1335; *Şark*, 25 Şubat 1338.

The Greeks who retreated to Izmir with the advance of the Turkish Army naturally had a negative impact on the economic and daily life of the city. “Due to the unceasing influx of immigrants, there was a shortage of bread in the city on September 5.⁶³” The retreat of the Greek army later turned into a panic flight. All the local Greeks and Armenians participated in this flight. Unfortunately, these elements left behind many of their commercial and economic assets in an idle state, and unfortunately, there were no human resources to operate them. During this great exodus, some local Greeks looted the assets of the wealthy. Unfortunately, it is a bitter fact known to everyone that the Greeks burned and destroyed everywhere they passed during this escape. The Greeks, who retreated to Izmir by burning almost the entire Aegean, paralyzed the economy of Izmir by setting a fire that burned 2600 acres of land into ashes while evacuating Izmir. Foreign companies doing business in Izmir at that time demanded losses of up to 100.000.000 dollars from insurance companies after the fire⁶⁴.

Conclusion

As a result, the unjust invasion of Izmir by the Greeks caused torture, atrocities, practiced brutality, and the deaths of many people.

For more than three years, the Turkish people of İzmir and its sub-region lived in agony. This suffering continued to increase during the forward movement of the Greek army. The invasion and forward movement of the Greek army was supported materially and morally by the local Greek elements and Armenians. This unlawful atrocity, which was also supported by the British, caused the national flame to ignite in the Turkish nation and lasted until the liberation of Izmir. The liberation of Izmir became a great ideal not only for the Turks living in Izmir but also in Ankara and all of Anatolia. Although these practices during the years of invasion had inflicted great wounds on the Turkish people, in the days following September 9, 1922, many Turks from Izmir made efforts to ensure the safety of their Greek neighbors and helped them to leave the city safely, despite everything that had happened. In the days following the liberation, the Ankara Government did not act with the idea of revenge and no massacres took place in İzmir. Apart from the prosecution of the criminals, as

⁶³ Berber, *Mütareke ve Yunan İşgali Döneminde İzmir Sancağı*, p. 317.

⁶⁴ Dobkin, *Smyrna (The Destruction of a City)*, p. 230.

Mustafa Kemal, Commander-in-Chief and President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, stated, "We do not have the idea of revenge and retaliation. We are not here to settle old scores. For us, the past is buried."⁶⁵ From then on, the goal of Turkey under Atatürk's leadership was to develop economically, scientifically, and educationally in peace at home and in the world.

⁶⁵ *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III*, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 5. Baskı, 1997, p. 66.

Burning Down (Empty?) Cities Fire in Roman-Sasanian Urban Warfare in the *Res Gestae* of Ammianus Marcellinus

Christina Kecht (Germany)

Introducing Ammianus

Let me take you back to the 4th century CE, a bit further southeast to the shores of the Tigris. The Sasanian king Shapur II is besieging the Late Roman stronghold of Bezabde, “*a very strong fortress, placed upon a hill [...] which sloped towards the banks of the Tigris, and where it was low [...] it was fortified with a double wall*” (Amm. Marc. 20.7.1 – translations respectively by Rolfe).

Ammianus Marcellinus writes as a contemporary witness who has seen, if not Bezabde itself, at least the region in question, on the fringes of the Roman Empire at the (of course, relatively fluid) border to the great Persian Empire under the rule of the Sasanian king Shapur II. The year before, in 359 CE, Ammianus was as a *protector domesticus* amongst the defenders of the Roman town of Amida in Upper Mesopotamia.

He escapes the fallen city but seems to only return to military service for emperor Julian’s Persian campaign in 363 CE, obviously in a lower rank instead. 30 years later, Ammianus, originally probably from Syria and Greek speaking, wrote in Latin from the ancient capital of Rome. He received a classical education knowing the ancient epics, poems, and historiography treating the great wars of the past by heart. With his *Res Gestae*, Ammianus wanted to continue the history of his idol Tacitus, beginning where the latter stopped, at the death of the emperor Nerva.

While the first 13 books are lost to us, the preserved parts from 353 CE onwards give us an impression of the time Ammianus has already experienced as a contemporary witness. The value of this source evolves in the extraordinarily long passages, where Ammianus was actually *involved* in the events he narrates. He calls himself a former soldier and a Greek – *miles quondam et Graecus* (Amm. Marc. 31.16.9) – but it seems that the soldier mainly remains in the

background, and that the *Graecus*, the man of letters, seizes the high ground. Thus, we have to bear in mind that ancient historiography is always *literature* with the aim to entertain and to give moral instructions by comparing their respective times with the ‘good old days’ and their ‘good old *exempla*’.

To sum up, Ammianus knows the environment, the actors, and the circumstances of the siege of Bezabde, but, in contrast to Amida, he was not there when it happened. Drawing on literary conventions and reports of witnesses, he continues with the description of the battle at Bezabde.

‘Elemental Warfare’ and the Fire Fights of Bezabde

After a few days, the walls were attacked with battering rams, but

“fear of stones [...] and of arrows kept them off, yet neither the ballistae nor the scorpions ceased, the former to hurl darts, the latter showers of [...] blazing wicker baskets, smeared with pitch and bitumen. Because of the constant fall of these [...], the engines were halted [...] and the constant shower of fiery darts and brands set them on fire. [...]he besiegers were fired with the greater desire to destroy the town[... F]inally [...] the enemy pushed on the rams, huge stones coming thick from the walls, and varied devices for kindling fire, debarred them from going forward. However, one ram, [...] which was covered with wet bull’s hide and therefore less exposed to danger from fire [...] made its way [...] to the wall. [...]It weakened a tower and overthrew it.” (Amm. Marc. 20.7.10-13)

“[...] A] hotter fight raged within the walls” (Amm. Marc. 20.7.14) *“The king[...] having long burned with a desire of taking [...]Bezabde] stationed there an armed force”* (Amm. Marc. 20.7.16).

Even the shortened passage reveals several important components of what one might call ‘elemental warfare’: Defences and attacks taking advantage of the elements. (This is no official *terminus technicus*. As far as I can tell, there is a computer game called like that, but no scientific study whatsoever; then again, it describes the systematic use of water, air, earth, and fire as a weapon, as strategic means, or as part of a defensive system.)

We have the water of the rivers, securing different sites; also wet cloths and hides as a protection against fire. On other occasions, dams are flooded, or canals drained to delay the enemy's advance. Cutting-off water, as well as food, can be a potent weapon to achieve surrender.

Walls are built of stone. In some cases, like the sieges of Amida and Maiozamalcha, dams are mainly built out of soil and wood, higher than the city walls themselves; below them, tunnels are dug to undermine the structures and take the settlement from within. In building trenches, earth is removed. The crops of the land are furthermore destroyed by friend and foe to deny the respective enemy its fruits.

Missiles are flying through the air – actually, or at least potentially, as the sheer *'fear of thrown stones and arrows'* in the passage regarding Bezabde suggests, already a mild version of psychological warfare.

Last but not least, there is the fire: First, as a metaphor, when *'the besiegers were fired with [...] desire to destroy the town'*, or *'a hotter fight raged within the walls'*. Second, there is fire as a weapon: Here in the form of *'blazing baskets, with pitch and bitumen'* or of *'fiery darts and brands'* setting machines on fire, notwithstanding the means to distinguish them.

Shortly after the Persian seizure of Bezabde, the Roman emperor Constantius II tries to retake the city – and fails. But at least he gives the new Sasanian masters a good fight: after several days, the defenders *"all strove [...] to set fire to them, constantly hurling firebrands and blazing darts. [...] The timbers were covered with wetted hides and rags [...], so that the fire fell on them without effect"* (Amm. Marc. 20.11.13). Against the battering ram *"they poured down scalding-hot pitch. [...] Making a sudden rush through the gates, they attacked [...] hurling upon the rams firebrands and baskets made of iron and filled with flames"* (Amm. Marc. 20.11.15-16).

A last great effort was undertaken by a sally of the Persians,

"with still greater numbers of men" – meaning: civilians! – *"carrying material for setting fires drawn up among the armed soldiers; then iron baskets filled with flames were hurled upon the woodwork, as well as [...] other things best suited for kindling fires. And because the pitch-black clouds of smoke made*

it impossible to see, [...] all the siege-engines were destroyed by the spreading flames[...], some brave men [were] barely rescued in a half-burned condition” (Amm. Marc. 20.11.18-19).

Moreover, smoke is not only a byproduct, but also a strategic means to either blur the sight, make it difficult to breath or even kill enemies, for example, advancing through narrow tunnels, as we will see later.

In short, fire is a major feature of those sieges of Bezabde in 360 CE – first, by the Sasanian king Shapur II, then the failed one, by the Roman emperor Constantius II. Fire arrows and thrown firebrands are the most common weapon to ignite flammable material (including people). But there are more ‘elaborate’ methods, like the mentioned fire bombs of bitumen (asphalt) or naphtha, a kind of petroleum that cannot be distinguished by water.

The problem with fire is: Used on a large scale, it is not easy to control. With the scorched earth policy, the Romans tried to slow down Shapur’s advance into their territory. Therefore, they burnt down their fields and fruits, “*the mighty violence of that raging element consumed [...]every kind of growing plant”* (Amm. Marc. 18.7.4). It did force the Persians to take another way but the affected villages themselves, or “*what remained of”* them, “*was hideous from the utmost destitution”* (Amm. Marc. 24.8.2).

Concerning fortified settlements of all kinds, fire is not only used in storming them, but also to deliberately destroy their infrastructures in cold blood. It is the simplest method to wipe out a built environment, especially, when made of an easily flammable material. The main alternatives are systematic demolition and slighting, which, however, require too many resources in those campaigns, where time and manpower seem to be a decisive factor. Therefore, while being commonly used to gain access to a fortress, we do not find demolition in the aftermath of the Roman-Sasanian sieges.

Julian’s Campaign of 363 CE

Burning down cities, in contrast, often occurs either after, or even entirely without any combat at all, as the example of Julian’s retaliation campaign in 363 CE shows. It is a determined march forwards to the Persian capital of Ctesiphon, its speed decisive – at least, in Ammianus’ narrative, where all his favourite

characters, and Julian above all, have the positively associated attributes of decisiveness. But indeed, it takes Julian less than 3 months to cover (and fight along the way) the approximately more than 1.000 km distance by foot from his starting point to the heart of the Sasanian power, where he is forced to retreat.

Before the tragic end of the campaign, however – with Julian being killed in the so-called battle of Maranga –, he leaves a trail of burnt cities along the Euphrates: Parts of the troops were sent “*to capture the fortress of Anatha*” (Amm. Marc. 24.1.6). The defenders surrender, “[*a*]t once the whole fortress was set on fire; [...] its commander[...] was given the rank of tribune. As for the rest, they were treated kindly” – not killed, that means – “*and with their families and possessions were sent to Chalcis, a city of Syria.*” (Amm. Marc. 24.1.8)

“*After storming and burning the first city to which we had come*” (Amm. Marc. 24.1.12) – remark the first person, indicating Ammianus’ presence, but also the exaggerated ‘storming’ as the town had surrendered – after that, the army passes Thiluta and Achaiachala. The settlements surprisingly remain neutral, and the Romans do not try to attack. A very peculiar passage, as fortified towns are left in the army’s back without any security measures like the common hostages to guarantee for the agreement. Thereafter, destruction continues, as the source casually remarks: “*The next day another castle, which [...] had been abandoned, was burned in passing*” (Amm. Marc. 24.2.2).

So, while they leave two inhabited settlements behind that could either attack from the rear or at least inform the Persians about the advance of the Romans, they burn down an abandoned castle, the structures of which (depending on its size and state of preservation) could still serve strategic purposes. But there is for sure no urgent necessity.

Julian advances to „*the city of Diacira[...] This place was without inhabitants[...] After burning the city, and killing a few women whom we found*” (Amm. Marc. 24.2.3), without additional violence being mentioned, they went on.

“*[W]e [...] took*”, Ammianus continues, “*possession of the town of Ozogardana, which the inhabitants had likewise deserted through fear*” (Amm. Marc. 24.2.3). The escape of the civilians may have saved their lives, but not their left belongings and homes: “*After burning this city also*” (Amm. Marc.

24.2.4), the author shortly remarks, they headed for Pirisabora, also known as Peroz-Shapur or Misiche. A fierce fight evolved, and eventually the cornered defenders asked for peace. “[T]he victors took what they needed and burned the rest along with the place itself” (Amm. Marc. 24.2.22).

Here, the soldiers were ‘lucky’ to get their hands on the enemy, proving their brave fighting for glory. Or how else would you explain that they were furious on the opposed occasion? An unnamed “*city which, because of its low walls, had been abandoned by its Jewish inhabitants, was burned by the hands of the angry soldiers*” (Amm. Marc. 24.4.1).

In Maiozamalcha, they get their revenge on a large city, again with double walls. Another fight full of flames emerges, until the city, thanks to a mine, is taken from within. Close by, however, the Persians have taken refuge in tunnels. Roman soldier “*gathered straw [...] and piled [...] it before the entrances [...]. The smoke from this[...] killed some by suffocation; others scorched by the blast of fires, were forced to come out and met a swift death; and so, [...] all had fallen victims to steel or flame*” (Amm. Marc. 24.4.29-30) – both the city and its men. “*Thus a great and populous city, destroyed by Roman strength and valour, was reduced to dust and ruins.*” (Amm. Marc. 24.4.30)

At the end of Julian’s campaign, according to Ammianus’ narrative, at least eight cities and forts are burnt down (not to mention smaller villages and farmhouses). One, Anatha, after the dwellers’ capitulation without confrontation. Another, Peroz-Shapur, following its surrender after combat. Two, an unnamed castle and Maiozamalcha, are burnt down after the storming – in the latter case admittedly in a highly rhetorical manner, postulating to have it ‘*reduced to dust.*’

Nearly every attacked site Ammianus mentions meets fire in battle, though always in combination with other means of demolition. It is therefore not the first choice of weapon, rather one component in the complex siege warfare of Roman-Sasanian conflicts. In half of the eight cases of incinerated settlements, in contrast, Ammianus gives a short remark about the use of fire against *abandoned* places.

Can fire then be labelled the preferred mean of deliberately destroying built environment in the (possibly urbicidal) aftermath, or rather: in the absence of any fight? It is for sure a swift method, saving time, men, and resources and it

is often chosen despite of the lack of control and limited results regarding permanent structures.

Devastated Settlements? Thoughts about Building Techniques

Talking of which – How devastating could those destructions have been? The seemingly devastated Amida, “*only a heap of ashes*” (Amm. Marc. 20.11.5) after the Persian attack is soon to be repopulated with the displaced inhabitants of Nisibis after the treaty of 363 CE. The modern town of Diyarbakir still presents its changed, but intact walls nowadays, built out of long-lasting basalt.

The problem is: Of most places Ammianus mentions, we do not even know the name, let alone where they are located. Therefore, we do not have archaeological evidence on architecture and settlement pattern.

The most common building material in this region are sun-dried mudbricks, hardening when exposed to high temperatures. At least the defensive walls would have been built out of stone. Peroz-Shapur hosts an especially strong double wall, “*built of bitumen and baked brick, a kind of structure [...] than which nothing is safer*” (Amm. Marc. 24.2.12).

Timber is mainly used for beams, thick enough to persist a relatively long period of time thanks to its protective layer of coal. In 3rd century Rome, the praetorians set fire to the city during Civil War, heading purposefully for the wooden doors and balconies, according to Herodian. In any case, at least the interior – wooden furniture or mattresses out of reed –, would be ablaze in seconds. City houses furthermore stand close to each other; nonetheless, extra fuel would be needed on several different locations to spread the flames surrounded by clay and stones. A lot depends not only on fire-barriers through open places and walls but also on the air circulation in each inhabited space.

The physic structure of the city, to summarize, might not be so severely affected. Then again, this is just an assumption without the possibility of archaeological evidence. For the inhabitants we can nonetheless expect terrible losses of personal belongings, valuables, and lives.

What we do know for sure of comparative studies is the close connection of Ammianus’ *Res Gestae* with the typical siege descriptions of the great authors

before him: In addition to directly citing Homer, he draws heavily from Virgil, Livy, Caesar, Tacitus, and others.

Is it then, at least in some cases, possible that the historiographer's accounts are merely phantasy and exaggeration? Ammianus, however, still writes for an audience that was close enough to the events not to be entirely misled. Apart from that, we are talking about an unbounded war of a highly contested border zone in antiquity. Of course, we must assume the use of each of the elements as a weapon to *win* a battle at all costs.

Why Burning Down (Empty) Cities?

Fire may not be the most destructive measure against cities made of partly non-flammable material. But it seems to be an economical weapon for achieving seemingly sufficient devastation without undue investment of time, men, and material. Therefore, fire is the first choice against abandoned structures. If, instead, there is the possibility to take a strategically, economically, and socio-politically important city without overstressing one's resources in exerting control over the territory, both sides rather prefer to preserve the structures.

Why then burning down populated cities when they could be taken? Julian might have another goal than permanently occupying the settlements – or he simply does not have enough troops with his divided army to do so.

Why is Julian therefore burning down empty ones? One hint from above might point to violence as an outlet for angry soldiers. More likely though, he mainly destroyed potentially useful infrastructure.

So what *did* Julian want to achieve with his campaign if not occupation? Revenge? Imitating the Great Alexander? Earning glory and charismatic legitimacy? Securing Roman territory? We may never know for certain but we must acknowledge that the region has always been – and perhaps, always will be – a contested zone between different forces.

Siege and Change: Belgrade – A City between Orient and Occident

Claudia Reichl-Ham (Austria)

1. Introduction

Walking through downtown Belgrade with an open eye today, you quickly realize that the city's eventful history also manifests itself in the cityscape. The frequently changing ownership and the many wars accompanied by destruction have left unmistakable traces. As a result, hardly any buildings in the old town are more than 100 years old. However, not only the wars, but also the lack of financial resources, construction speculation, corruption and indifference towards the historical heritage are among the reasons for the crumbling facades.

In the early modern period, the fortified city of Belgrade was considered a “bulwark” of Christianity and a key fortress at the confluence of the Danube and Sava rivers for the defence of Hungary.

As a fortified hilltop settlement called Singidunum, the permanent settlement of the area began under the Celtic Scordiscans, who were expelled by the Romans in the 1st century BC. They built a *castrum* for the Legio IV Flavia Felix on the site of today's Belgrade Fortress and subsequently granted Singidunum the status of a *municipium*, and in the 3rd century AD the status of a *colonia*.

The period of the migration of the peoples was an important turning point in the development of the city, because it led to the decline of the ancient urban culture and is also the reason why hardly anything worth mentioning of the ancient heritage has been preserved. In the course of the following centuries, the city continued to be exposed to invasions and destructions from outside and was situated on the edge of Byzantine, Frankish, Bulgarian and Hungarian territories of interest. In the 9th century, the city was first mentioned under its Slavic name, Beograd, which means White City.

In the 15th century, Belgrade became part of the Kingdom of Hungary and occupied a central position in the defensive fortress belt against the Ottoman Empire. At that time, the fortified area consisted of the castle situated on a rock, the water or lower town spreading below the castle at the confluence of the Sava River into the Danube, and the upper town.

2. The conquest of Belgrade by the Ottomans in 1521 and the transformation of the city

The Ottoman expansionist efforts under Sultan Suleiman I in the 1520s were directed towards the northwest of the empire against the Kingdom of Hungary and later against the Habsburg Empire. The conquest of Belgrade in 1521 resulted in the destruction and pillaging of the city and the fortress by the Ottomans and paved the way for them to Central and Western Europe.

Belgrade was incorporated into the Sandžak Smederevo. The establishment of separate administrative and legal structures, incorporating older local administrations, was a common procedure in the Ottoman Empire. The transfer of the pasha's seat from Smederevo to Belgrade changed the role of the city. Although the pasha had the city developed into a Janissary garrison, which meant that it retained its military importance - hence the epithet *dar-al ğihad*, house of the Holy War - the administrative function dominated over the strategic importance of the fortress, which was now called Kalemegdan (from the Turkish *kale meydan*: fortress square).

The Ottoman takeover of Belgrade caused an extensive ethnic shift within the city's population. Sultan Suleiman applied the policy of state-controlled migration or population transfer (*sürgün*). This was a common means used by the Ottomans to secure their rule over newly conquered territories and to neutralize the original inhabitants, especially the elites of a country, by isolating them far from their homeland. High-ranking noble Serbian families "disappeared" into the vastness of Anatolia and made way for a new "elite," mostly of non-noble origin, who received land or properties from the sultan as a fief.

A large part of Belgrade's Serbian population was relocated to Anatolia in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople. The name Belgrade Forest

for a recreation area in the north of Istanbul is still a reminder of this today. In return, numerous Muslims from Anatolia were settled in and around Belgrade: In addition to nomadic Turkic tribes, who were forced to settle in the Balkans, these were mainly trained craftsmen, administrators, functionaries, dignitaries, clergy, and soldiers. Since the Ottoman settlement policy was characterized by a certain degree of tolerance, Armenians/Aromans, Greeks and Roma also settled in the city as merchants, traders, and residents, as well as Jews, who were well-liked in the Ottoman Empire because of their trade contacts. The population grew rapidly, and trade and commerce flourished.

Already shortly after the conquest, the reconstruction of the fortress and fortifications, as well as the city, began.

In the following decades, Belgrade underwent a fundamental expansion and transformation into an oriental Ottoman city, as some kind of “over-forming” or “re-shaping” of the medieval urban structures based on the model of Islamic cities took place. The city was divided into quarters for the individual ethnic groups, and buildings typical of the Ottoman culture shaped the cityscape – mosques, schools, caravanserais, etc. –, as was the case with other conquered cities such as Skopje or Niš. The cultural “overforming” or “transformation” also affected everyday areas such as language, food, music, and craft tradition.

The urban space of a city had the same layout throughout the Ottoman Empire; it was divided into two large areas: a “public” centre and a “private” residential area with its associated gardens and fields, both usually protected by a wall. These walls are clearly visible in the case of Belgrade on the 1690 plan. The institutions that significantly shaped urban life were not supported by the city or the state, but by wealthy donors within the framework of so-called *vakifs*, pious or family foundations, that financed the charitable and sacred institutions and buildings.

The proceeds from trade served as maintenance for mosques, schools, hospitals, baths, bazaars, bridges or as retirement income for the donor family. There were four groups of endowments: 1) the public bath (*hamam*) and other sanitary facilities,

- 2) the mosque with its social facilities,
- 3) the dervish monastery (*tekije*) with its soup kitchens and caravanserais,
- 4) the *bazaar*, also called *bedestan* in large cities, or the *čaršija*, central point and economic center of an Ottoman city.

The *bazaar* fulfilled not only an economic but also a social function, as it was the meeting place of the city's inhabitants, who otherwise segregated themselves in their districts, and acted as a kind of "information exchange" between the city's districts.

Large squares, which dominated public life in European cities, did not exist in Ottoman cities.

In an Ottoman city like Belgrade, political institutions and functions that were already typical of a European city at that time, such as a city hall and a mayor, did not exist either. This shows the main difference in the political organization: The Ottoman city did not have self-administration, separate jurisdiction, civil rights privileges or the ability to grant market rights.

From the administrative point of view, Belgrade was initially divided into two so-called *varoši* - the Ottoman and the German - a division that lasted until the 19th century: While the *čaršija* represented the city's public space, the residential area was divided into independent districts or quarters, the *mahalas*, which were subordinate to a local imam. Therefore, they were usually grouped around a mosque. An average district contained between 25 and 50 houses, often separated by walls. The streets were narrow, and cart traffic was almost impossible due to the mostly non-existent thoroughfares. People of the same religious affiliation, ethnic group, descent or profession lived in these *mahalas* and were subject to a strict social neighbourhood order.

Everyday life in the quarters was organized according to the rules and traditions cultivated by the residents, which led to the development of individual identities that are still influential today. This environment offered the residents protection and care, but on the other hand, it also created an atmosphere of strong social control.

The system, which relied increasingly on private initiatives to shape public space, was also beneficial for the development of Belgrade. Private merchants who had settled there now invested in the city's development, as they could make a profit from the newly created infrastructure. This was also a reason why Belgrade developed into a flourishing Ottoman city. The Belgrade art historian Divna Đurić-Zamolo proved the existence of no less than 275 Oriental buildings, including 55 mosques.

3. Belgrade under Habsburg rule from 1717 to 1739 – the redesign of the city based on the European model

In 1688, 1717 and 1789 the Habsburg troops succeeded in conquering Belgrade three times but failed to hold it permanently. The conquest and destruction by Prince Eugene in 1717 were especially significant for the city. Until the Ottoman reconquest in 1739, northern Serbia, which included the entire Pashlik of Belgrade, was under Habsburg rule. The so-called “Kingdom of Serbia” was directly incorporated into the monarchy as a *dominium regium* within the framework of the *Neoacquisita* and adopted the Habsburg administrative structures as well as the instructions and regulations drawn up for the *Neoacquisita*. For the city of Belgrade, this was another comprehensive turning point. The focus shifted once again in favour of the fortress function, because Belgrade once more found itself in a border position between two great empires.

The city acted as a centre of operations for the entire Balkan region and the fortress was considered a bulwark in the fight against the Ottoman Empire.

During this period, the appearance of the city and fortress of Belgrade also changed, “subsidized” by Pope Benedict XIII in the form of a “Turkish tax”. In addition to the transformation of the fortress into a modern fortress with bastions based on Vauban's model, the plans of the Habsburgs also envisaged a comprehensive redesign of the city based on the European model with straight streets, large squares and monumental buildings for the administration and the army built around them, as well as churches, monasteries, hospitals etc. The primary goal was to erase the Ottoman heritage: Thus, the largest mosque was converted into a cathedral, and most of the 55 mosques were converted into residential buildings, monasteries, places of worship and hospitals; only about

14 mosques continued to exist. Belgrade thus lost most of its oriental appearance, acquiring baroque contours and the look of a European city instead.

According to Theodor von Stefanović-Vilovsky, “the former Ottoman city, in which the small Ottoman houses were arranged in irregular groups, like swallows’ nests, and the narrow and excrement-covered streets made passage impossible, while in the busiest places mosque followed mosque and minaret followed minaret, became ... a strongly fortified city, crisscrossed by regular and beautiful streets, the picturesque location of which ..., [the] public buildings, churches and monasteries reminded so vividly of Vienna [...]”

The Habsburgs promoted the emigration of Muslims, who fled to Niš or Vidin, and the immigration of as many Christians as possible – especially Catholics. The colonists from Hungary, the Habsburg and the Holy Roman Empires and from other European countries were settled in the so-called “German Town”, within the fortress walls from Stambul Gate to the Danube. An important principle was that “the population of the capital must be German by nationality, Catholic by religion, and the native population, in this case the Raiscian or Serbian, should be relegated to the city’s territory outside the fortifications”. However, this strict division could not be carried out consistently, because the wealthier Greeks, Armenians and Serbs, in whose hands the wholesale trade mostly lay, also had their houses in the city.

The division into “*varoši*”, which had their own administration, remained. The “German Town” received a kind of limited municipal autonomy by imperial decree of February 18, 1724, and had the right to elect a municipal judge. It had a magistrate, who had to be confirmed by the government in Vienna and was entrusted with the management of municipal affairs. In addition, the municipality was granted the right to collect certain fees, to determine the number of inns and taverns, to issue pharmacist licenses and to supervise church and school systems as far as they concerned Catholic affairs in Belgrade.

The “Serbian Town” of Belgrade, which was located outside the fortifications, also enjoyed a certain degree of self-government. In accordance with tradition, the Serbs had the right to elect a *knez*, i.e. a municipal judge, and four jurors, who were entrusted with the management of municipal affairs. Apart from the Greeks and Armenians, there continued to be a Jewish community in

Belgrade during Habsburg rule. The Jews, however, experienced a (spatial) segregation in this period. They were assigned their own Jewish court and had to pay a so-called tolerance fee.

4. The reconquest of Belgrade by the Ottomans and its re-transformation

From 1737 to 1739 there was another war between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, which culminated in the renewed conquest of Belgrade by the Ottomans. The city that the Ottomans again took possession of now had little in common with the one they had to leave 20 years earlier. The fortress had been rebuilt, the streets straightened, many houses demolished. In addition, the siege of the city and fortress had once again led to great destruction and a massive loss of population.

In accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Belgrade of September 18, 1739, before returning the city to the Ottomans, the Habsburgs had blown up all the fortifications they had built after 1717 and the detached works beyond the Danube and Sava rivers. Thus, the fortress lost a great deal of its defensive power.

Belgrade now once again became a “city with oriental characteristics in a border location”. The city was divided into a western Christian-Serbian and an eastern Muslim-Jewish part. However, there were no longer such profound changes as had been the case some 200 centuries earlier. Economically, it was also no longer possible to revive the heydays of earlier years, since trade links with the Ottoman Empire were mostly cut after the Habsburgs had conquered Belgrade. The former long-distance trade was replaced by agriculture and livestock exports to the Habsburg Monarchy. But even if the former wealth did not return to Belgrade, the city regained some modest prosperity in the course of the 19th century.

5. In the search of a Serbian identity

From the middle of the 19th century, a break of the principality of Serbia, which had become autonomous in 1830, with the Ottoman past took place, and it also manifested itself in urban planning. There was a general trend towards a

so-called de-Ottomanization or de-Orientalization. With the elimination of oriental urban structures and the destruction of the architectural heritage of the Ottoman Empire, often stylized as the “fight against the minarets of the numerous mosques”, Belgrade again experienced a politically and symbolically motivated “over-forming” or “reshaping”, this time against the background of the formation of the nation-state. This “Serbianization” was based on the emigration of the Muslims and the withdrawal of Ottoman garrisons on the one hand, and on the influx of Serbs from the villages and from the Habsburg monarchy on the other. The takeover of the city by the Serbs and their efforts to strengthen and affirm Serbian identity were reflected in the cityscape after 1840. According to the ethnologist Klaus Roth, what was at stake here, as in other Balkan cities, was nothing less than a “very emotionally charged elimination of all visible traces of the Ottoman past: The demolition of countless mosques and public buildings, total urban renewal with the erasure of entire Ottoman residential quarters ... were not only physical acts, but to a large extent also symbolic ones.”

The city owes its current appearance mainly to the urban planning expansions after the First and especially after the Second World War, which were based on previous heavy destruction. To this day, however, Belgrade’s cityscape is also shaped by its contested past. Most recently, in 1999, the NATO air raids set the city back in its development. Even today, ruins bear witness to the attacks, numerous construction projects remained unfinished after the war, and other buildings are empty or no longer in use after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The Egyptian forces suffered significant losses during the battle, including 254 aircraft due to a shortage of pilots, severe damage to their armored divisions, and almost complete destruction of the 16th Infantry Division and the 21st Armored Division. The Third Army was severely damaged, and the Egyptian Army lost its offensive capability and faced encirclement.

Starting on the morning of October 23rd, thousands of Egyptian outposts surrendered, resulting in 8,372 Egyptian prisoners captured by the IDF, with 6,000 taken in just three days between October 20th and 23rd. This increased the need for units to handle and guard the prisoners. Nevertheless, the Egyptian army still displayed some fighting ability.

News of an expected ceasefire on October 22nd caught the 162nd Division in charge of the southward, leading to their arrest near the city of Suez. The IDF aimed to reach lines where their superiority would be more evident, with hopes that these positions would influence post-war arrangements, particularly in the southern sector.

On October 23rd, at 18:50, Maj. Gen. Gonen, the head of the IDF Southern Command, instructed Maj. Gen. Magen, commander of the 252nd Division, "The 252nd Division will complete the encirclement of the Third Army- and at the same time serve as a flank bolt west of the city of Suez." This move proved successful.

At 23:00 that night as the 401st Brigade of the 252nd Division arrived at Ras Adabiyah on the coast of the Gulf of Suez- headquarters of the Egyptian naval, after moving at full lights on a rear axis at the foot of Jabel Atqah. On the morning of October 24th, two ships joined the mission, with Col. Zeev Almog, commander of the Red Sea theater. Following the ships, landing crafts evacuated 1,500 Egyptian prisoners, including the commander of the Egyptian theater. Thus, the Egyptians were deprived of their last anchorage near the Third Army and tightened the closure of the city of Suez and the Third Army forces besieged on the east bank, both by land and sea.

With the exception of the city itself, the 162nd Division and the 401st Brigade closed in on the Third Army from the Gulf of Suez in the south to Jenifa in the north. IDF forces held the Cairo-Suez road from kilometer 101 eastward, and Egyptian forces still operated in the area, remaining trapped in their pockets.

This successful move effectively encircled the Third Army, which consisted of over 20,000 soldiers and 300 tanks.

At the same time, at 01:00 on October 24th, the Security Council approved Resolution 339, jointly submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Its essence is an immediate ceasefire and a return to the October 22nd lines.

"Provided it if it is not Stalingrad"

On October 24th, in the middle of the night, a wireless call woke Maj. Gen. Eden in the war room on Jabal Jenifa. On the line was Brigadier General Uri Ben Ari, the deputy Commander of the Southern Command: Brenchik, (The nickname of the 162nd Division) I'm not letting you sleep. We don't know if there will be a ceasefire. In the meantime, we want you to occupy Suez - provided it's not Stalingrad. If it is like Stalingrad, then no! it's just like Beersheba, (in our War of Independence – 1948), then conquer it!

The initiative to take over the city was that of the front headquarters. No explicit approval was found from the chief of staff for such a move. In light of the signs of disintegration of the Third Army, which had been seen on the ground the day before, the command headquarters assumed that the conquest of the city was possible without getting involved in a fierce battle.

On the night of October 24th, the 162nd Armored Division stood at the gates of Suez, tired and worn out, but paradoxically, perhaps, also aggressive – and with a strong tailwind of success in recent days.

The huge city of Suez, with its tall buildings and wide streets, stood half desolate. Surprisingly, however, little information was about the city.

General Adan said: "We knew there was a commando battalion in Port Ibrahim in a very bad situation, (shouting 'Gewald') and asking to surrender. There is another commando battalion in the east of the city, and there are escapees, several hundred who fled from the Third Army into the city. The city was not empty, but we predicted the disintegration of the Egyptian forces. Therefore, I accepted the assumption that no special difficulties are expected in the conquest of the city."

No intelligence information about the Egyptian forces in the city, little air and artillery support, and hasty planning, as well as the definition of the demands of the senior command, embodied in the statement of the deputy commander of the command, Uri Ben Ari , were the basis for the plan of the 500th Brigade and other forces that were deployed into that battle. The one that put the 433rd Battalion on the main axis of the city with the intention of taking over Port Ibrahim (a port located on a land tongue leading out of the city).

The task was assigned to the commander of the 162nd Armored Brigade with the 500th Armored Brigade and its commander, Arie Keren, and with auxiliary infantry forces gathered from everywhere. Under the pressure of time, the planning was hasty, based mainly on the shock entry of an armored column led by the 433rd Battalion into the city's main street and the rapid collapse of its defense.

At 09:00 on October 24th, the entry of the forces began. At the head was an armored battalion, commanded by Nahum Zaken, followed by a paratroopers battalion, commanded by Yossi Yaffe. Within an hour, the invading battalions were deeply entangled in its streets. Some are on the main road, others in its alleys. Many organized and disorganized Egyptian forces that took advantage of the height advantage and the density of the buildings and the multitude of roads, alleys, courtyards and windows to shoot light arms and anti-tank launchers and throw grenades at the tanks and the armored personnel carriers and the open caterpillars of the infantry and relief soldiers .

Many organized and disorganized Egyptian forces that took advantage of the height advantage and the density of the buildings and the multitude of roads, alleys, courtyards and windows to shoot light arms and anti-tank launchers and throw grenades at the tanks and the armored personnel carriers and the open caterpillars of the infantry and relief soldiers.


The number of casualties increased, and the battle turned from a battle of conquest to a rescue battle. Various forces were caught in a fire trap among buildings and streets. Having no other choice, considerable rescue forces were invested in the battle by 4:00 P.M., and these attempts exacted a high price.

At the end of the day, the forces withdrew, and the Egyptians were able to record a considerable tactical achievement. However, in historical jargon, this

was a "Pyrrhic victory." IDF forces held the Suez-Cairo Road. Egyptian forces were captured in various pockets. Above all, the siege ring of the Third Army remained tight and stable.

Suez city stood alone and didn't fall until the end of the War. The operation to encircle the Third Army did bear fruit, but the Battle of Suez is an expression of the contradiction between the systemic/strategic and tactical perspectives. In the end, it did not serve the systemic purpose, and in fact almost thwarted it.

The main dilemma of the Israeli forces in the battle was whether to continuing the mission forward or rescuing and retreating and evacuating the casualties and the remainder of the battalion.



In real time, the command echelons did not ask themselves the question of whether the move was militarily necessary. Capturing a big city is a far-reaching step. Under the circumstances of the end of the war, and within an official ceasefire, was such a move appropriate? Was it necessary after the 401st Brigade completed the encirclement of the Third Army on the night of October 23rd-24th ?

IDF commanders believed that the takeover of the city dealt a fatal blow to Egyptian prestige and also tightened the siege on the army.

Failure in battle was painful. About 80 dead and 120 wounded. The pain was exacerbated by the controversial necessity of the move. It was the heavy price that overshadowed, at the end of the day, the great success. Maj. Gen. Eden concludes: "Today I regret that the mission was assigned and that I did not object to accepting it... The reason is simple - we were sensitive to additional casualties, so it would have been better not to try to take over the city. Especially since it didn't change the strategic situation."

Paroxysme de la Guerre Urbaine Entre Pouvoirs en Place (Anciens Colons et Nouveau Gouvernement) et Nationaliste/Rebelles Camerounais: Le 24 Avril 1960, Grave Incendie au Quartier Congo à Douala

Daniel Abwa (Cameroon)

Introduction

Grâce à la Grande guerre, une partie du Kamerun protectorat allemand tombe dans l'escarcelle de la France en 1916. Les alliés (anglais, Belges et français) engagent dès le début de la Première Guerre mondiale une campagne de conquête du Kamerun allemand, campagne qui est concrétisée par leur victoire et le partage du butin entre Anglais et Français. La France, sans beaucoup d'efforts reçoit ainsi les 4/5^e de ce territoire alors que l'Angleterre se contente du 1/5^e bien qu'elle ait joué un plus grand rôle dans cette victoire. Le congrès de Versailles qui se tient à la fin de la grande guerre entérine ce partage mais fait du Cameroun un territoire sous mandat de la Société des Nations (SDN) confié respectivement à la France et à l'Angleterre.

Bien que sous mandat de la SDN et plus tard sous tutelle de l'ONU, le Cameroun sous administration française subit tous les effets néfastes de la colonisation française. Une colonisation mâtinée de violences pour soumettre, sous prétexte de "pacification" tous les Camerounais. Les violences les plus inhumaines, faites de l'emploi des armes à feu et des incendies ont été menées sur les populations dites kirdis, bamiléké avec un paroxysme dans la guerre urbaine à Douala, le 24 avril 1960 avec l'incendie du quartier Congo. Nous allons dans cette publication, montrer dans un premier temps comment armes à feu et incendies ont été utilisés pour soumettre les kirdis et les Bamiléké (I) et ensuite nous examinerons le paroxysme de cette barbarie dans la ville de Douala (II).

Plan

I. Incendies, tirs et tirs aériens comme méthodes d'administration française au Cameroun

A. Le cas des populations dites Kirdé de l'Extrême-Nord du Cameroun

B. Le cas des populations dites Bamiléké sur le plateau ouest du Cameroun

II. Incendies, tirs et tirs aériens à Douala avec son paroxysme le 24 avril 1960

A. On tire sur les femmes à Douala

B. Les massacres de 1945 à Douala

C. Les massacres de 1955 à Douala

D. L'incendie du quartier Congo, le dimanche 24 avril 1960 ou le paroxysme de la guerre urbaine.

War and the City: The British in Occupation of Istanbul, 1918-23

Daniel Whittingham (Great Britain)

This paper will examine the topic of ‘War and the City’ using the example of Britain’s role in the Entente’s occupation of Constantinople/Istanbul between 1918 and 1923. The official historian Cyril Falls noted that ‘The conclusion of peace with Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne actually took four years and nine months, which was nine months longer than the war [with the Ottoman Empire 1914-18] had lasted.’¹ The British force of occupation – the Army of the Black Sea – demonstrates the growth of Britain’s reach, and the extent of its liabilities. It also allows us to see the interconnectedness of Britain’s problems, which are so often examined in isolation from one another. The Army of the Black Sea’s responsibilities stretched from Salonika to Constantinople, to Anatolia, to the Caucasus, and beyond to the Trans-Caspian and the Russian Civil War.

This paper will firstly assess the British army in its role as an occupying force. It will secondly look at the relationship between the British occupation and the complex geopolitical questions concerning the fate of the remnant of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. Thirdly, it will show how the army grappled with new responsibilities, as Constantinople became the centre of a major humanitarian crisis. Fourthly, the history of the Army of the Black Sea also demonstrates the fragility of inter-Allied relations, as diverging interests and mutual suspicion produced considerable friction. Finally, the paper will briefly explore the 1922 Chanak/Çanakkale Crisis, ‘Britain’s gravest strategic crisis between the 1918 Armistice and Munich’.²

¹ Cyril Falls, *History of the Great War... Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine: From June 1917 to the End of the War*, Part II (London: Macmillan, 1930), p.625.

² John R. Ferris, “‘Far Too Dangerous a Gamble’? British Intelligence and Policy During the Chanak Crisis, September-October 1922’, in Erik Goldstein and B.J. McKercher (eds.), *Power and stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p.136.

Britain as Occupier

The Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918. Clause 1 provided for the opening of the Straits and allowed the British to occupy the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts. Clause 7 gave the Allies ‘the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.’³ This, as it turned out, could be (and was) interpreted liberally by the Allied powers. The Ottoman delegation asked that ‘there may be no question of occupying Constantinople unless some definite necessity arises’. Again, this gave the latitude to formalise their occupation of the city in due course.⁴

The British established GHQ in the Military School at Pera on 17 December. General Sir George Milne took command of what would officially, from 13 May 1919, be called the Army of the Black Sea.⁵ The objects of the occupation were twofold: to ensure fulfilment of the Armistice terms (and ultimately the peace terms), and to safeguard Constantinople and the strategically vital Straits.⁶ On 11 January 1919, Milne was asked to assume responsibility for policing. As such, the Allies formed an International Police Commission and later, an Inter-Allied Military Court (in September 1919). An Inter-Allied Commission was set up ‘to deal with questions that arise under the Armistice’, and other commissions were put in place to deal with issues such as prisoners of war and sanitation.⁷

Later accounts described the feelings of optimism that existed in the aftermath of the British victory, but at the time there were dissenting voices, which grew louder after the Greek landings at Smyrna/Izmir and the consolidation of the Nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal. The evidence suggested that the armistice was breaking down. British troops were involved in skirmishing on the railway at Eskişehir in September 1919.⁸ On the night of

³ James Edmonds, *History of the Great War... The Occupation of Constantinople 1918-1923* (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2010), p.36.

⁴ Calthorpe to Admiralty, 31 October 1918, TNA WO 106/1433.

⁵ Edmonds, *Constantinople*, p.6.

⁶ The Army of the Black Sea’, 6 December 1920, TNA WO 106/1434.

⁷ Edmonds, *Constantinople*, pp.7-9.

⁸ Army of the Black Sea General Staff, War Diary, 18 September 1919, TNA WO 95/4950.

26/27 January 1920, a band of Nationalists removed 8,500 rifles, 30 machine guns, and half a million rounds of small arms ammunition from stores on the Gallipoli Peninsula.⁹ The Ottoman Chamber voted to agree to the National Pact on 28 January 1920.

Such breaches of the Armistice convinced the British that a formal, de jure military occupation of Constantinople was the only way out. On 5 March 1920, the instructions issued to Constantinople as agreed by the Supreme War Council noted that the peace terms being proposed needed to be imposed by force. The suggestion that a recurrence of breaches would justify harsher terms suggested a hardening of attitudes.¹⁰ The General Staff nonetheless issued a stark warning: 'The position is one which can be dealt with politically more effectively than by military measures on the part of the Allies. If it is to be dealt with militarily, protracted operations by fully equipped armies must be prepared for.'¹¹ The occupation itself, on 16 March, met with no serious resistance, although it was not bloodless.¹² However, at a time when Britain was demobilising after the First World War, and faced with political instability in Ireland, India, and Egypt, further deepening the commitment could not be contemplated.

On 19 June 1920, the Nationalists attacked British positions around Ismid/Izmit. As a result of the threat to Constantinople and the Straits, the Greeks exploited the opportunity to request British backing for an offensive. The Greek army commenced operations on 21 June, taking Bursa and Adrianople/Edirne in July.¹³ After some delay, the British finally declared the occupation zone as an area of active operations, following Milne's legitimate protest that the army could hardly be run otherwise.¹⁴ However, in practice the British occupying force

⁹ Thwaites to Hankey, 6 February 1920, TNA CAB 24/97/76.

¹⁰ Terms of Instructions Issued to the High Commissioner at Constantinople, 5 March 1920, TNA CAB 24/100/5.

¹¹ General Staff, The Situation in Turkey, 15 March 1920, TNA CAB 24/101/67, p.5.

¹² Army of the Black Sea General Staff, War Diary, 16 March 1920, TNA WO 95/4950.

¹³ Diary of Main Events in the Near East Since the Armistice, 4 November 1922, TNA WO 106/1416.

¹⁴ Edmonds, *Constantinople*, p.12.

largely took on the role of observers, especially after the fall of the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos in November 1920.

In October 1920, Milne was succeeded in command by General Sir Charles Harington. Major-General Sir T.O. Marden was appointed his principal subordinate and tactical commander. Marden later wrote that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir Henry Wilson, told him that ‘You are going to the quietest part of the British Empire.’¹⁵ It could well be that this was Wilson’s famous sense of humour, for the contemporary documents reveal his anxiety regarding the growing vulnerability of the British position at Constantinople. In 1921, the British occupying force tried to preserve neutrality as the struggle between the Greek and Nationalist armies reached its climactic phase. Wilson argued that the British force was now too weak to enforce peace terms and had to come away. According to his diary, he put this in his usual idiosyncratic fashion to the Cabinet on 1 June:

Winston [Churchill] wanted to reinforce Constantinople and make a “posture”, and then try to come to terms with Kemal. Curzon wanted to open negotiations with the Greeks and Turks, and Lloyd George did not know what he wanted. I said that the positions out there and in Ireland were substantially the same, and the choice of solutions the same, i.e. either knock the gentleman on the head – or – come out. In Ireland we must knock the gentleman on the head so we can’t come out [Emphasis in original]. In Turkey we can’t knock the gentleman on the head and so we must come out – but come out and make love to Kemal.’¹⁶

Geopolitics

Istanbul sat at the heart of a range of complex geopolitical questions relating to the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. Peace across the wider region depended on the Entente’s ability to draw up and enforce a successful treaty.

¹⁵ T.O. Marden, ‘With the British Army in Constantinople: A Personal Narrative’, *Army Quarterly*, XXVI (1933), p.265.

¹⁶ C.E. Callwell, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, II (London: Cassell, 1927), p.294.

The situation of the British at Constantinople was negatively affected by the precedence given to making peace with Germany. Given that for Britain Germany had been the principal opponent, this is perhaps not surprising; but the unprecedented difficulties of peace-making caused significant delays. Peace with Germany was signed on 28 June 1919, but British policy-makers remained tied up in questions surrounding the execution of its terms, especially the imposition of reparations. This helped to delay the Ottoman treaty until 1920, and even then, the minutes of international conferences designed to discuss the Turkish question show how other matters repeatedly intruded.¹⁷

The position of Constantinople itself had of course been at the centre of the so-called 'Eastern Question' for over a century. It was easier to agree on some form of international control for the Straits than to decide whether the Sultan should be allowed to remain in the city; in the Cabinet, the discussions began to heat up in late 1919 once the peace with Germany was concluded, and it became clear that the USA would not take on a League of Nations Mandate. Curzon, the Foreign Secretary (1919-24) favoured expulsion, whereas Edwin Montagu (Secretary of State for India, 1917-22) led the opposition. The armed forces generally supported Montagu.¹⁸ Curzon believed that Turkey's presence on the vital strategic point of the Straits had not done any good. He also believed that the Turkish Nationalists would be harder to defeat if they possessed Constantinople than if they were confined to Anatolia. The Allies could also settle the cause of intrigues which had led to war – such as the Straits question – once and for all.¹⁹ Montagu conveyed Indian opinion, including the concern that depriving the Turks of their capital would represent a dangerous interference with the Caliphate. His arguments on the question of resourcing also made sense: as he put it in his memorandum of 18 December 1919, 'The Government is continually seeking means of economy. I know of nothing which will make for greater expenditure than to make a peace which will involve us in large military commitments.'²⁰ Curzon was forced to admit defeat in January 1920.

¹⁷ See for example *the Documents on British Foreign Policy* series.

¹⁸ A.L. Macfie, 'The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 1918-January 1920', *Historical Journal*, 18:2 (1975), pp.391-392.

¹⁹ Lord Curzon, *The Future of Constantinople*, 4 January 1920, TNA CAB 24/95/95.

²⁰ Edwin Montagu, *The Turkish Peace*, 18 December 1919, TNA CAB 24/95/27.

Britain and the Ottoman Empire finally signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920. The terms were harsh. The Treaty imposed a series of military and financial restrictions. It also divided the remnant of the Ottoman Empire into Entente zones of influence; and envisaged the creation of an independent Armenia and Kurdistan. It further discredited the Ottoman regime, while providing more fuel for the Nationalist cause.²¹

Humanitarian Crisis

The example of the Army of the Black Sea also shows how armed forces were forced to take on a range of tasks that stretched far beyond the narrowly military, in the unstable and often violent aftermath of the First World War. Constantinople became the centre of a serious humanitarian crisis, and the British had to feed the city's population, as well as cope with an influx of refugees from the Russian Civil War.

The Bolsheviks seized power in the October/November Revolution of 1917. In March 1918, with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, they took Russia out of the First World War. Britain's initial intervention in Russia was launched to keep open an Eastern Front against Germany. Following the Armistice, Britain continued to support the White opposition to the Bolsheviks. The British felt that they could not abandon the White armies they had been supporting; there was also some expectation, especially in 1919, that the Bolsheviks would collapse, and the former Russian Empire would break up. Britain's policy was fraught with contradictions: there was never a coherent policy regarding how much to give the Whites, and it was not possible to square Britain's support for the new republics that formed in the aftermath of the 1917 with the fact that the Whites favoured the restoration of Russian control over these same republics. In January 1919, Lloyd George proposed a conference to be held on the Princes Islands in the Sea of Marmara, but this idea did not get far: the Whites refused to talk to the Bolsheviks, and lack of Allied unity also doomed the project.²²

²¹ *Treaty of Peace with Turkey* (London: HMSO, 1920).

²² Richard H. Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921*, 3 vols. (Princeton: University Press, 1961-73). On Prinkipo, see Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations, II*, pp.115-116.

In mid-1919 it did indeed appear that the Whites would triumph; but the Reds counterattacked and pushed back Anton Denikin's army on the Southern Front. In March 1920, Milne travelled from Constantinople to oversee preparations for the evacuation of White soldiers and civilians from Novorossisk on the Russian Black Sea Coast. The Bolsheviks entered the city on 27 March.²³ Denikin relinquished command to Pyotr Wrangel in April. The end of the Polish-Soviet War allowed the Bolsheviks to focus on the reconquest of the Crimea: Wrangel's main achievement was the November 1920 evacuation of most of his army, the second major wave to arrive at Constantinople.²⁴

As a result of these evacuations, there were 30-40,000 Russian refugees in Constantinople in 1921; possibly as many as 90,000. In the words of Pınar Üre, 'White Russians, while they were escaping from one collapsed empire, found themselves in the political turmoil of yet another collapsing empire.'²⁵ The challenge was considerable: the British had struggled to keep the city's population fed in 1920, even without this vast influx. As the General Staff noted on 24 March 1920, 'We are running a great risk of having this City, cut off from all its victualling grounds by the Nationalists, being left helpless and turbulent on our hands.'²⁶ The British and French authorities provided shelter and supplies for the refugees, but this was a considerable and largely unprecedented undertaking.

Inter-Allied Tensions

Fourthly, as the example of this humanitarian activity shows, the British had to work with their coalition partners; but the story of the occupation is one of increasing inter-Allied tension. The challenges of peace-making led to Anglo-French friction. Mutual suspicion grew more acute: the war against Germany had concentrated minds, and now wartime promises over the division of the Ottoman

²³ Army of the Black Sea General Staff, War Diary, Outline Diary of Events During Commander-in-Chief's Visit to Novorossisk, TNA WO 95/4950.

²⁴ Evan Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2008 [1987]), p.374.

²⁵ Pınar Üre, 'Remnants of Empires: Russian Refugees and Citizenship Regime in Turkey, 1923–1938', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 56:2 (2020), p.207.

²⁶ Minute, Victualling of Constantinople, 24 March 1920, TNA WO 32/5621.

Empire had to be honoured. This tension was manifested from the strategic all the way to the local level.

At Constantinople, Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, commander of Allied Army of the Orient, became increasingly unpopular. The exact division of command responsibilities between him and Milne caused friction, and although Milne was subordinate to Franchet d'Espèrey, there was some dispute over the extent to which the former could take decisions over military matters without reference to the latter. The British also believed that Franchet d'Espèrey was interfering in British business by attempting to micromanage. By 13 February 1919, Milne was complaining to the War Office that 'Continued action of this nature will undermine our position in Turkey as General D'Esperey is posing as a Military Dictator over the whole of Turkey.'²⁷ Of course, the British were not innocent victims here. They wanted to keep the French out of 'Turkey in Asia'. For example, Lloyd George believed that Britain's preponderant role in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire meant that it was entitled to a greater say in the peace settlement. There is no doubt that the British gave back as much as they got, but by January 1920, relations had broken down completely, with Milne complaining to the War Office that he would be unable to respond to any crisis if he needed to do so under the command of Franchet d'Espèrey.²⁸

As the Treaty of Sèvres unravelled, the British and French disagreed over the question of whether to come to terms with the Nationalists. On 20 October 1921, Henry Franklin-Bouillon signed the Treaty of Ankara with the Ankara Government, effectively ending France's war. This prompted furious reaction in Britain. The British believed that the French had signed a separate peace, contrary to their alliance obligations. Curzon called it 'an act of great treachery'.²⁹ Anglo-French relations would reach something of a nadir in 1922, as Britain's occupation of Constantinople reached its crisis point.

²⁷ Milne to War Office, 13 February 1919, TNA WO 32/5606.

²⁸ Milne to War Office, 29 January 1920, TNA CAB 24/97/40.

²⁹ Cited in David Gilmour, *Curzon: Imperial Statesman* (London: Penguin 2019 [1994]), p.533.

The Chanak Crisis

The Chanak/Çanakkale Crisis of 1922 was the most serious diplomatic crisis the British faced between 1918 and 1938. The Turkish Great Offensive began on 26 August 1922, and the total defeat of Greek arms uncovered the British position on the Straits. British and Turkish troops faced each other in a tense stand-off.

However, the British were on their own. The French and Italians would not permit their troops to be embroiled. Curzon travelled to Paris to meet French Premier Poincaré, but their conversations grew heated; at one point on 22 September, a shaking Curzon walked out of the council room.³⁰ Nor would the Empire come to Britain's aid; Churchill's appeal to imperial solidarity received a cool reception. The crisis also played out against a rising tide of criticism at home. The Daily Mail printed its call to 'Stop This New War!' on 18 September – this was certainly the most hostile comment, but the Lloyd George Government was undoubtedly vulnerable.³¹

The peak of the crisis occurred when Turkish cavalry crossed the neutral zone boundary on 23 September. There were daily Cabinet meetings – three on 30 September alone. The Cabinet decided on a hard line: as David Walder put it, despite everything 'they were resolved to embark upon a war with Turkey over a city which they were prepared to give up to the Turks and a neutral zone which was disavowed by nearly all the nations which had created it.'³² They authorised Harington to use force; instead, he opted for negotiation, and signed the Armistice of Mudanya on 11 October. Harington as the 'man on the spot' took the key decisions. His resolution has been praised for saving Britain from war, but his game of bluff ran considerable risks.³³ The Daily Mail claimed that Harington had brought back 'peace with honour' – an often-used phrase now more associated with the Munich Crisis 16 years later.³⁴

³⁰ Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, III (London: Ernest Benn, 1928), p.304.

³¹ David Walder, *The Chanak Affair* (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp.228-231.

³² Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, p.285.

³³ Ferris, 'Far Too Dangerous a Gamble', pp.148-149.

³⁴ Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, p.319.

War and the city had brought about the fall of the British government – Lloyd George resigned on 19 October. At Lausanne, a hundred years ago this year, the long war in Turkey finally came to an end. The Ottoman Empire was one of its casualties – the Sultan departing the city on a British boat in November 1922. On 2 October 1923, the British flag was lowered in Istanbul.

Conclusion

The use of armed force was vital to the execution of British strategy; but the example of the occupation of Constantinople also shows the limits of British power. The carve-up of the Ottoman Empire presented immense possibilities for Britain, but it quickly became clear that the military liabilities were too extensive. The occupation of Constantinople was initially successful. The British also improvised a response to a major humanitarian crisis. However, the Treaty of Sèvres was by far the least successful of the treaties, because, as James Edmonds wrote in the official history, ‘A treaty is only effective as long as it can be enforced.’³⁵ The Chanak Crisis was a major defeat for Britain. Paradoxically the outcome was the Treaty of Lausanne, the last and most successful of the peace treaties.

³⁵ Edmonds, Constantinople, p.17.

**The Italian Royal Air Force and Strategic Bombing
in the International Disarmament Years**

Davide Borsani (Italy)

The First World War significantly accelerated the development of aviation, marking the birth of the modern concept of air power. Even today, the tasks of air forces conceptually have much in common with the roles and missions carried out during the Great War. Nevertheless, some key concepts were asserted, starting with the idea that air superiority was a crucial element in the conduct of military operations.

Until the outbreak of the WWI, the debate on air power wasn't crucial to strategic thinking. Still, the war not only encouraged the quantitative and qualitative development of aviation but also provided the empirical basis on which schools of thought could develop.

At the time, it was strategic bombing against civilian infrastructures and populations that attracted the most public attention. Among the main proponents of air bombing supremacy in military strategy were the Italian Giulio Douhet, the American William 'Billy' Mitchell, and the British Hugh Trenchard.

Actually, throughout the 1920s, despite air bombing being a significant part of the strategic debate, none of the great powers deemed it necessary to equip themselves with a large fleet of long-range bombers. A major factor contributing to this choice was technology. Industrial investments primarily focused on engines to increase power, also in relation to the possible benefits that the improvement in speed and load capacity could have on the civilian sector.

On the field, in the years after the conclusion of the First World War, air power was extensively employed by European countries like Britain, France, Spain, and Italy to quell insurgencies in their colonies. However, the public opinion had a very fearful attitude towards the possibility of massive bombings on European soil. During the 1920s, the possibility that enemy bombers could fly over national skies, attacking millions of unarmed civilians and destroying almost defenseless urban centers, contributed to creating apocalyptic scenarios.

Not by chance, one of the major concerns that emerged in diplomatic circles debating international disarmament was the threat that air warfare posed to civilian populations.

Italy had an important role at the time, not only in strategic thinking as Douhet's works showed. After Great Britain, it was the first great power in continental Europe to create an independent air force. The Italian Royal Air Force (in Italian, Regia Aeronautica) was born precisely one century ago, in March 1923. Although the pursuit of independence was a defining aspect of aviation identity, this decision was part of Benito Mussolini's initiatives to bolster the modern image of the Fascist regime and to break away from previous governments.

Throughout that decade and beyond, Douhet's work would serve largely as a political benchmark in the discussion surrounding the Italian Air Force's role. While his theories weren't fully adopted at a military level, they were instrumental in strengthening the air force's independence and stimulating discussions among the military.

Italo Balbo, a prominent political figure who held from 1926 to 1934 the top positions at the Ministry of the Air (first Undersecretary, and then Minister), envisioned an air force that was crucial in fostering national prestige. Balbo's 'seven-year tenure', as important as it was in consolidating the image of the Italian Air Force and shaping its identity, was a period of transition, conditioned- no differently from what was happening in France and Great Britain- by a limited availability of resources and the attempt to build an air doctrine, which was never really completed in Italy.

Diplomatic discussions aimed at limiting the threat of air bombing culminated in 1932 at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. There, the complete abolition of such tools in future wars was proposed by a number of delegations. The negotiations also sought to regulate the development of military aviation and supervise civilian aviation that could potentially be weaponized. However, all diplomatic efforts ended up unsuccessful.

In Balbo's view, if air bombing was banned, it would have meant putting Douhet's war theory aside, which largely justified politically the existence of the Italian Air Force as an independent military force, mainly in public eyes. In the

longer term, it would also have prevented Italy, as a poor nation, from having a cost-effective tool for deterrence and coercion, particularly considering the high expenses related to naval construction. The negotiations at the World Disarmament Conference collapsed quickly, much to Balbo's relief. This also marked the end of attempts to limit and reduce armaments globally.

**A City under Siege: Bucharest during the Revolution
of 1848 and the Crimean War**

Dumitru Preda (Romania)

Bucharest A City Under Siege 1848-1856

The European 19th century is characterized by the struggle in the South-East of the continent, including the Balkan Peninsula, between the three Great Powers of the time, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Empire. At the mid-19th century, the Romanian area looked like this: two principalities Țara Românească (Wallachia) and Moldova – the Danubian Principalities – were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire; other provinces were under foreign occupation for a longer or shorter time: Dobrogea (from the 15th century under the Ottomans), Transylvania (from the end of 17th century under the Habsburgs), Bucovina (northern Moldova, since 1775 under the same Habsburgs) and Bessarabia-Moldova between Prut and Nistru rivers (since 1812 under the Russian Empire). But importantly, although divided and often suffering the interference, control and military occupations of the Imperial Powers, the geo-political reality highlights the (partial) preservation of Romanian statehood. This would favour the effort of national reawakening and the gradual winning of the Romanian unity and independence in the following decades. From the end of 18th century and the first half of 19th century, we assist at an international revival of the "Oriental Question" connected to an increasing struggle of the Balkan peoples for emancipation and national liberation. A main feature characterizes the entire period: War is seen as a normal recourse in this fierce competition when the means of a very active and subtle diplomacy did not achieve the achievement of the proposed objective.

In my intervention, I will only talk about Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, a city under siege, in the period 1848-1856, from the Revolution that found its last European bastion here to the complex events surrounding the Crimean War. Its path towards modern development and affirmation as an important European center experienced a decisive turning point in those years. I'll start with some essential coordinates of Bucharest: officially documented in

1459, although notes about a certain fortress are earlier, temporarily the princely residence, it becomes the capital of Wallachia in 1661. A little town, initially, crossed by a small river Dîmbovița, located in the south-east of the country, in Romanian Plain, Bucharest has developed gradually, coagulating the surrounding villages around the old historical center. Numerous churches, larger fortified inns were built; also, it appears the first road paved with wooden beams, the Mogoșoaia Bridge (1692), later renamed Calea Victoriei in 1878, after the 1877-1878 War. In 1786 our City was surrounded by defensive walls. And the foreign visitors mentioned that Bucharest had about 50,000 inhabitants, 360 Greek (Orthodox) churches, one Catholic and one Lutheran. Later, in his book published in 1839 (*Coup d'oeil sur la Valachie et la Moldavie*) the French Raoul Perrin says that it had 1,500 streets and 130,000 inhabitants. Ten years later there were 160,000 registered. The majority of foreign travellers who arrived these times in Wallachia perceived a picturesque city, full of colour, but mud and disorder. A curious city, closer to the Eastern ones but with a certain flavour that was missing from both South-East European and Ottoman-Turkish cities. We cite: "Bucharest is a special city that does not resemble any of our European capitals, aligned and with a uniformity that makes the artist despair. The long and winding streets, like Italian streets, refuse any law of harmony". A city of contrasts! The streets are paved with wooden beams ... Nearby in the center of the city there are numerous rows of open shops, Turkish-style bazaars that are protected from the midday sun by a wooden eaves ... The houses are arranged around the Royal Court and the Metropolis, in artisan-merchant districts (mahala).

Bucharest, as all Romanian provinces were affected during the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century by the Russian-Austrian-Ottoman wars of 1716-1718, 1736-1739; 1768-1774; 1787-1791/1792; 1806-1812, mainly material and human destruction, but also territorial seizures from the Romanian territory, with a deep impact on the morale and population's mentality (we read: "a country completely stripped, desolate, looted and burned"). But also, the City-Capital was touched by natural disasters (earthquakes, floods), fires (as the big of 1847) and epidemics (plague), that bring great damages. I would like to clarify from the beginning: It is not a question of a classic siege, but of a state of siege suffered by the inhabitants and authorities under the pressure of foreign invasions and occupations, a state with many and various consequences for the

city and for the entire Romanian space. In this regard, there are many testimonies that attest fears and reactions of both high classes and humble beds of the capital's population. The frequent invasions of foreign troops in almost all the country produced especially in the towns close to the Danube, as Bucharest, as reported by several witnesses, causes the inhabitants to leave the city, taking with them all they could and fleeing wherever they could, fleeing in terror to the mountains and forests; when they returned to their houses found nothing left of them, everything had been plundered, burnt, destroyed. The period chosen for study is one dense in military events and confrontations, with special consequences for everyday life, but also lasting for the geopolitical map of the European continent.

The streets of the city were "beautiful, wide and paved with square trunks and jammed and placed on the side". The houses were large, built of stone (brick), separated by fences and surrounded by gardens. The Prince palace was grand, and the court servants very numerous. In 1782, the first foreign diplomatic agencies were opened in the Capital; the first is Russia followed, in the same year, by Austria, in 1785 by France, in 1786 by Prussia and in 1801 by England.

1848 Revolution In Romania

The Revolution of 1848 represented a landmark moment for the city and Romania's history. The complex events that overcame the European continent were not the cause, but only the opportunity (Nicolae Bălcescu) for the Romanians to assert their desire for freedom and justice, their aspiration for union and independence. Aspiration that the frequent interventions of the neighboring empires could not stop.

In this context, I point out that the issue of the 1848-49 Revolution is currently, in Romania, in a complex process of investigating new sources, re-evaluating and deepening the events.

June 11: Bucharest would be the center of the movement in Wallachia, its citizens took to the streets. The Head of State Gheorghe Bibescu, knowing that he does not have the support of the army (during the morning all the officers had come to him showing that they will defend the country from enemies, but they will not shed Romanian blood) at 10 p.m. issues the new Constitution and

accepts the formation of a provisional government. After this act, the ruler abdicates and retires to Transylvania.

On June 15, in Filaret Square (then called Freedom Square), 30,000 people are attending the taking oath by the members of revolutionary cabinet, Bucharest becoming the seat of the Revolutionary Government. On June 16, all political prisoners are released.

The first measures are: Establishment of the national flag with the motto "fraternal justice", The civil ranks (boyars) are abolished, and every Romanian having "the right to speak, write and print freely on all things"; A national guard is also founded. The reactionary forces spread the rumor that the Russian army had entered the country. The Government retreated to Târgoviște on June 28. The popular desire in favour of the revolution brought the government back to Bucharest.

Russia, the Protective Power, wanting to maintain its authoritarian control over Wallachia, asks the Porte to restore "order". Suleyman Pasha, the sultan's brother-in-law, is sent to inform himself on the spot and take the necessary measures. Warmly received by the Government and the population, Suleyman is content to appoint instead of the government a "Lordly Lieutenancy" and on July 29, 1848, the Ottoman Porte recognized it as legitimate, and the „Constitution" amended (minor changes). But, under the pressure of Russia and the intervention of some reactionary elements (boyars), soon the Sublime Porte will refuse to confirm this recognition

The Ottomans arrested Romanian Government delegation, then arranged on three columns (about 20,000 troops) they proceeded towards Bucharest. Missing arms and leaders, men and women, young and old, tried in vain to prevent the advance of the Ottoman units with cavalry and using bayonets and rifles. Hundreds of people were trampled by horses' hooves or fell to pieces by bullets and bayonets. Their brave resistance at Cotroceni was followed by the heroic battle engaged by the military garrison of the capital with the third Ottoman column, led by Kerim Pasha, coming towards the barracks in Dealul Spirii garrison

September 13/25, 1848, The Dealu Spirii fight. The Ottoman troops violently attack the fire company that puts up strong resistance and breaks through the enemy lines and manages to continue the fight alongside the soldiers in the Alexandria Barracks on the Hill of Spirii. After a fierce battle that lasted approximately two and a half hours, the Romanian troops are dispersed.

The Revolution is defeated, the Ottoman troops occupy the city. On October 2, around 7,000 Russian soldiers also enter Bucharest. A period of double Russian and Turkish occupation begins that will last until April 1851. After an agreement signed between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, known in historiography as the Balta-Liman Convention, an agreement signed in 1849, the Romanian Countries were reconfirmed as states under Ottoman suzerainty.

The Crimean War 1853-1856

The Crimean War, considered to have been one of the last religious wars on the continent, began in July 1853 with the occupation by the Russian Empire of the Romanian Principalities. A new period of foreign occupations begins for Bucharest: Russian military occupation from the summer of 1853 to July 1854, Ottoman from July 1854 to August 1854 and Austrian from 1854 to 1856. In his book *Roumania: the border land of the Christian and the Turk* (New York, 1858) the American military doctor James Oscar Noyes (1829-1872), attached to Omer-Pacha forces, on the way to Bucharest, impressed by the traces left by the battles and the retreat of the Russian forces, writes: "Everywhere I saw the evidences of cruel war. We were obliged to ford the river, as the Russians in their hasty retreat, had destroyed the bridges. Deserted villages and dwellings burned to the earth, cornfields and vineyards trampled to the ground, whole districts uninhabited save by wolfish dogs and flocks of carnivorous birds still feasting upon the carcasses of horses and of men exhumed from their shallow graves – these were among the blessing left by Cossack hordes of the Czar to a land that otherwise would have smiled with peace and plenty

The Vienna negotiations (1855) and the Treaty of Paris (1856), recognizing the importance of the "Romanian Question" and the wide autonomy of the Romanian Danubian Principalities, put them on the European collective guarantee, granting the restitution of southern Bessarabia.

Conclusion ·The “Romanian Question” becomes in the middle of the XIX-th century a matter of European interest and the presence of the Romanian military factor will be more and more considered on the continental (échiquier) chessboard, the campaign of 1877-1878 demonstrating its indisputable value. ·Bucharest became a real European Capital and in 1913 Romania will host the negotiations for the Peace in Balkans (The Bucharest Peace Treaty)

**The Impact of Ground, Air, and Naval Operations on Urban
Combat during the 1968 Tet Offensive
of the Vietnam War**

Edward Marolda (USA)

Many students of the Vietnam War are familiar with images of heavy fighting by Americans and Vietnamese, both allies and enemies, in the jungles, forests, and flat lands of the Asian country. Less well known but especially relevant to the conflicts of the 21st century were the cataclysmic struggles for the population centers in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), especially in the country's Mekong Delta. In 1968, that region was South Vietnam's richest agricultural area and home to one-half of the population. The Delta was crisscrossed by 3,000 nautical miles of rivers, canals, and other waterways separated by broad expanses of swamp and inundated low land. Only one major road, QL 4, traversed the region from the capital Saigon to Ca Mau in the far southwest. As a result, much of the population was concentrated in a number of large cities and towns, whose control was essential both to the government of the Republic of Vietnam and its internal Communist adversary, the National Liberation Front (NLF). The NLF's armed component was the 80,000-strong People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), better known to Americans and South Vietnamese as the Viet Cong.¹

Prior to 1968, President Nguyen Van Thieu's government and military forces maintained firm control of the nation's urban centers while the Viet Cong

¹ For additional information on the battles for the urban centers of the Mekong Delta during the Tet Offensive, see Thomas J. Cutler and Edward J. Marolda, eds., *The Brown Water War at 50: A Retrospective on the Coastal and Riverine Conflict in Vietnam* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2023); William B. Fulton, *Riverine Operations, 1966-1969* in *Vietnam Studies* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1973); Marolda, *Combat at Close Quarters: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War* (Annapolis: NIP, 2018); Richard L. Schreadley, *From the Rivers to the Sea: The U.S. Navy in Vietnam* (Annapolis: NIP, 1992); John Darrell Sherwood, *War in the Shallows: U.S. Navy Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam, 1965-1968* (Washington: NHHC, 2015); Erik B. Villard, *Staying the Course: October 1967 to September 1968* in *Combat Operations, United States Army in Vietnam* (Washington: US. Army Center of Military History, 2017); Andrew Wiest, *The Boys of 67: Charlie Company's War in Vietnam* (London: Osprey, 2012).

operated around them in forests, mangrove swamps, jungles, and seasonally inundated lowlands. That situation changed suddenly on 30-31 January 1968 during the annual Tet lunar new year celebration and self-imposed seven-day allied ceasefire. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military forces stormed 36 of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals, including the major cities of Saigon and Hue. The Communists also assaulted 13 of the Mekong Delta's 16 larger cities and towns.

One of the first urban centers in the Delta to fall was My Tho, located on a tributary of the Mekong River in Dinh Tuong Province southwest of Saigon. In a tactic often repeated in Delta attacks, following a rocket and mortar barrage three Viet Cong battalions totaling 1,200 troops stormed into the city. Local guerrillas, who knew every building, street, and allied defensive position, served as guides for the assaulting forces. Many of the invaders took up fighting position in schools, orphanages, churches, and medical facilities, hoping the Americans would not bomb those sites. Viet Cong troops quickly occupied much of My Tho and threatened to overwhelm scattered South Vietnamese units of the 7th ARVN (Army of Vietnam) Infantry Division, half of whose men were off duty for the holiday. Also under threat was a base occupied by a 10-boat section of U.S. Navy river patrol boats and a small number of special operations SEALs and American advisors.

Also just before dawn on the 31st, 800 Viet Cong fighters of the 518th Main Force Battalion and the 516 Local Force Battalion stormed Ben Tre, a city of 75,000 people situated eight miles south of My Tho. Within a day and a half, the attacking force had seized most of the city and pushed the defenders, two South Vietnamese infantry battalions and a small number of U.S. military and civilian advisors, into a four-square-block area around the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) compound. The situation looked dire for the understrength allied forces trapped there.

Finally, on the fateful morning of 31 January, two enemy battalions totaling 1,200 men attacked Vinh Long, the capital of Vinh Long Province on the Co Chien branch of the Mekong. The assault prompted U.S. naval forces there to evacuate to USS *Garrett County* (LST-786), then deployed a few miles from the city. The size of the city, home to 110,000 civilians and the site of numerous South Vietnamese and U.S. military bases and headquarters, posed a

particular problem for the attackers. They could not seize all of their targets at once, but the several pockets of unbeaten allied forces in and around the city were still in grave danger.

The operational situation facing the allied side in the wake of these early Tet attacks presented both challenges and opportunities. One major challenge—common to urban warfare throughout the centuries—was how to conduct military operations without destroying the cities and killing their civilian inhabitants. The nation-wide scale of the offensive also meant that the allied command would not be able to dispatch infantry and aircraft reinforcements to any but the most critical Delta battle sites. Allied leaders were especially concerned that with QL 4 interdicted by enemy forces at many points, the only feasible way to move troops and supplies would be by water and by air. Conversely, the allies possessed many advantages that could be exploited to recover the lost cities, deal a severe blow to the Viet Cong, and extend RVN government control to a wide area of the Delta. The keys to allied success in the Delta during the Tet Offensive would be mobility, firepower, combined arms tactics, logistics, and allied cooperation.

The allies' most vital quick reaction force during the Tet Offensive was the U.S. Army-U.S. Navy Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). The joint force was established in 1967 at the urging of General William C. Westmoreland, Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). The ground combat element of the MRF was the 2nd Brigade (and later also the 3rd Brigade) of the 9th Infantry Division. The primary combat formations of the 2nd Brigade were the 47th and 60th Infantry Regiments and the 4th Artillery. The latter unit's 105mm howitzers routinely operated from barges tethered for stability to trees on the riverbanks. The division's armed and transport helicopters further enhanced the mobility and firepower of the three-battalion infantry regiments.

The Navy half of the MRF was the Riverine Assault Force (Task Force 117) with two (later two more) 400-man River Assault Squadrons. Each squadron operated five monitors protected with plate and bar armor and armed with 40mm and 20mm guns, .50-caliber machine guns, mortars, and grenade launchers. Another three similarly armed and armored craft served as command boats. Each squadron's 26 armored troop carriers (ATCs) could embark a 40-

man infantry platoon. Other vessels mounted flame throwers or water cannon to destroy enemy foliage-covered bunkers dug into riverbanks. Several boats boasted helicopter landing pads for the speedy evacuation of wounded soldiers and sailors. Each squadron operated specially designed patrol boats for minesweeping and escort tasks. What gave the MRF its great mobility was Task Force 117's Mobile Riverine Base that consisted of 10 LSTs, barracks ships and craft, repair vessels, and a tug. Ships operated by Naval Support Activity, Saigon, kept the MRF and its shore base at Dong Tam well supplied with fuel, ammunition, and supplies.

By early 1968, the MRF was battle-hardened and experienced, having fought and won major battles against the enemy's main force battalions during 1967. In a series of operations named Coronado, the force killed thousands of Viet Cong fighters. As captured documents confirmed, for instance, in June 1967 the MRF virtually destroyed the 450-man 5th Nha Be Main Force Battalion. Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV), related that after MRF operations in one enemy stronghold, "the size of the enemy units encountered has grown smaller and the percentage of prisoners taken versus enemy killed has risen steadily. Increasingly large caches of weapons have been uncovered. River Assault Craft now move freely through areas where two months ago ambush with [rocket propelled grenades] or recoilless rifles could be anticipated at any moment. In summary it appears that a VC haven and stronghold, rarely ventured into by ARVN in the past has been reduced to an area containing only scattered and poorly organized VC guerillas."²

Army O-1 Birdog aircraft provided the MRF with eyes from the sky to spot enemy movements and direct artillery and air strikes on the Viet Cong. U.S. Air Force AC-47 and AC-130 gunships brought considerable firepower to the battlefield with organic guns and rockets, as did fighter-bombers based at Binh Thuy Air Base near Can Tho and Bien Hoa Air Base near Saigon. Planes from these airfields could be over the MRF battles in 15 to 30 minutes. B-52 bombers on occasion hit selected targets in the Delta but the heavy concentration of civilians in the region ruled out a systematic use of the big bombers.

² Quoted in Fulton, *Riverine Operations*, 125

Another U.S. Navy command that exploited the Mekong Delta's maritime environment was the U.S. Navy's River Patrol Force (Task Force 116). Each of the command's river divisions operated two 10-boat sections based ashore and on LSTs deployed in the rivers. The fighting vessels of the River Patrol Force were 32-foot-long river patrol boats (PBRs) armed with two twin .50-caliber and two 60mm machine guns, and a grenade launcher. The highly maneuverable boats, powered by Jacuzzi jet pumps, could turn on a dime and speed along the rivers at 25 knots. Supporting Task Force 116 was Helicopter Attack Light Squadron 3 (HAL-3), better known by its nickname, the "Seawolves." Two-plane detachments of HU-1B helicopters, "Hueys," operated from LSTs in the rivers and from shore bases. The rotary-wing aircraft carried a powerful array of miniguns, rockets, and 60mm machine guns.

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) contributed to the combat power and mobility of the allied military contingent in the Delta. In 1968, the Vietnam Navy (VNN) operated hundreds of ships and craft there. The naval service's Fleet Command operated submarine chasers, escorts, motor gunboats, large support landing ships, minesweepers, and logistic ships and craft. The larger vessels boasted 40mm and 20mm guns and .50-caliber and 60mm machine guns. The River Force fought with former U.S. LCM 6 and LCM 8 landing craft and American-built river patrol craft. These vessels performed combat, patrol, transportation, and logistic duties. The VNN's 13 River Assault Groups (RAGs) operated from bases in Saigon and throughout the Delta. Three ARVN infantry divisions, the 7th, 9th, and 21st, totaling 40,000 men, operated there, as did ranger battalions and thousands of paramilitary territorial troops. The Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) flew propeller-driven A-1 Skyraider attack planes and H-34 Sea Horse and UH-1B helicopters.

Despite this formidable concentration of allied military power and might, by early February 1968 thousands of Viet Cong fighters had infiltrated and seized all but small allied-held pockets in My Tho, Ben Tre, and Vinh Long and were threatening Can Tho. To the surprise of the Communists, most of the civilians in My Tho and the country's other urban areas did not surge into the streets to welcome the Viet Cong as liberators. Indeed, they fled into the countryside or tried to find shelter from the combatants' bombs, rockets, and rifle fire. Reports that enemy fighters were executing some South Vietnamese government officials

and even wounded ARVN soldiers did not endear them to much of the population.

The Fight for My Tho

Launching one of the first counterattacks in the Delta, the PBRs of River Section 532 teamed up with ARVN rangers to fight their way up a canal, surprising and decimating a VC unit. Then the MRF, like the U.S. cavalry in many American Western movies, rushed to help the embattled forces in the city. As Captain Robert S. Salzer, the commodore of the MRF's Task Force 117 (and later Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam), observed, the only difference this time was that the Indians were already in the fort.³ My Tho's proximity to Dong Tam, the MRF's shore base only five miles away, enabled a quick reaction to the crisis in the city. In the afternoon of 1 February, Task Force 117 landing craft deployed battalion-size elements of the 47th and 60th infantry regiments to the southwestern corner of the city. The soldiers advanced methodically northward. General William B. Fulton, commander of the Army's 2nd Brigade and later assistant division commander of the 9th Division, observed that "the fighting was intense and continuous and of a kind new to the riverine battalions," which had been used to maneuvering through rice paddies and jungle. In addition, "the city had to be cleared slowly and systematically" because "pockets of enemy resistance had to be wiped out to prevent the Viet Cong from closing in behind allied troops." The "troops moved in and out of doorways, from house to house, and from street to street." Particularly well-defended enemy positions were reduced by artillery, air strikes, and naval gunfire. In one instance, "tactical air strikes with napalm were called in and dislodged Viet Cong troops holding a guard tower near a highway bridge."⁴

The MRF's "Dustoff" medical evacuation helicopters quickly picked up and transported wounded soldiers to the ships offshore for treatment. After nightfall, surviving Viet Cong troops withdrew from their positions and fled into the countryside. By late morning the next day, allied forces had eliminated enemy resistance in the city. The battle cost the lives of three American and 25 South Vietnamese soldiers. Hundreds of VC fighters, some as young as 14, were killed

³ Robert S. Salzer, U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History.

⁴ Fulton, *Riverine Operations*, 150-51.

or wounded. From a military standpoint, the two-day operation was a success and the RVN was now back in control of an important urban center. But the city and its people paid dearly for that accomplishment. Allied artillery fire and air strikes and Viet Cong mortar and rocket attacks killed and wounded more than 700 civilians, created over 39,000 refugees, and destroyed close to 5,000 houses and other structures.

The Retaking of Ben Tre

The action then shifted to Ben Tre, the capital of Kien Hoa Province. The city had long served as an inspiration to the Communists since it was the site of the first major rebellion against the RVN. Surrounded by two branches of the Mekong River and other waterways, Ben Tre proved to be an ideal operating environment for the employment of naval power. Even as the MRF was securing My Tho, River Patrol Force PBRs of River Sections 534 and 532 poured heavy fire into enemy forces threatening the almost-surrounded MACV compound. The river patrol boat sailors used their .50-caliber and 60mm machine guns to prevent enemy troops from crossing the Ben Tre Bridge and attacking allied positions from the river side. Light Antitank Weapons (LAWs) proved especially effective at demolishing buildings harboring Viet Cong fighters. As an American soldier remarked to a reporter from the *Washington Post*, the PBRs “saved our bacon that day.”⁵

USS *Harnett County* (LST-821), deployed in the Ham Luong River, employed its 40mm guns in support of the PBRs and kept the boats well-supplied with ammunition and fuel. Another allied asset, air power, then joined the battle when HAL-3 helicopter gunships and U.S. Air Force AC-47 “Spooky” aircraft arrived overhead and began pummeling enemy forces. On 1 February, helicopters landed elements of two infantry battalions from the division’s 3rd Brigade into the city. The units immediately took heavy fire from enemy troops holed up in buildings and from snipers. The battalions sustained 16 casualties and could not advance. Coming to the aid of the soldiers, who were unfamiliar with urban combat, were fixed-wing and helicopter gunships, artillery, and naval gunfire. The combined air and naval fire obliterated enemy positions and drove

⁵ Quoted in Sherwood, *War in the Shallows*, 298.

the surviving troops into the open where they became prey to allied arms. After three days, the 9th Division troops had secured the city and moved into the countryside to keep pressure on the fleeing enemy soldiers. During the fight for Ben Tre and the surrounding countryside, the allies killed 328 Viet Cong fighters. The government of South Vietnam was once again in control of Ben Tre. The keys to allied success had been their mobility and firepower that enabled the employment of ground, air, and naval forces in a coordinated, all-arms counterattack.

After the battle, a 9th Division soldier captured the bitter irony of the allied victory in Ben Tre and indeed of urban combat throughout time. He told Australian journalist Peter Arnett that “it became necessary to destroy the town to save it.”⁶ Ben Tre was flattened, with 5,000 buildings destroyed. The battle also created 30,000 refugees. Close to 2,000 Vietnamese civilians were killed or wounded in Ben Tre and the surrounding region. One cause of the death and destruction was the employment by Viet Cong and allied forces of tracer bullets coated with a phosphorous chemical. The rounds set the city of thin wooden homes, stores, and other structures on fire. Because of heavy fighting in the city’s streets and alleyways, firefighters could not prevent the spread of the resulting conflagration. Ground, air, and naval gunfire also took a heavy toll of more substantial structures.

The Fire Brigade Recovers Vinh Long

Like Ben Tre, Vinh Long was virtually surrounded by water and naval forces there joined early in the fight to save the city and its essential military bases. After evacuating 2,500 dependents and other civilians to islands in the Co Chien River, the Vietnam Navy put up a stout defense of its naval base. On 31 January, the river combat craft of RAGs 23 and 31 poured sustained fire into advancing Viet Cong troops. Pilots, aircrews, and base personnel of HAL-3, under fire from enemy mortars, joined with U.S. Army maintenance personnel to beat back early enemy attacks on Vinh Long’s airfield. That same morning, light tanks and armored personnel carriers of the ARVN 2nd Cavalry Regiment arrived and drove the enemy from the environs of the airfield. Army troops

⁶ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 298.

airlifted to the base at dusk further reinforced the defenders. From 2-4 February, the armored cavalry unit, an ARVN ranger unit, and a battalion of South Vietnamese soldiers deployed into the city by river craft fought street-by-street in an effort to eject the Viet Cong from the city. During that same time, River Section 535 joined with VNN forces, SEALs, and U.S. rear echelon personnel to defend the Vinh Long naval base.

What enabled the allies to eject the enemy from Vinh Long was the arrival on 4 February of the MRF. Task Force 117 vessels and Army helicopters deployed two battalions of troops into the area. With the support of gunfire from River Assault Division (RAD) 92 and RAD 111, the ground troops cleared VC troops from the city's environs. Late on 5 February, soldiers of the 47th and 60th regiments, after eight days of non-stop combat ashore, retired to barracks ship USS *Colleton* (APB-36). The MRF's sailors ensured that their compatriots were provided with hot showers, food, and undisturbed sleep. By 6 February, the heavy fighting for Vinh Long was over. While the MRF had suffered the death of five fighting men and the wounding of 76 more, it had inflicted hundreds of casualties on the Viet Cong and secured the city.

General Fulton observed that “the effectiveness of the Mobile Riverine Force at each city resulted in a reduction of the Viet Cong attacks to harassing actions and elimination of the threat to the city.” He added that “by using in combination with the Mobile Riverine Base, which moved large numbers of troops and support elements between the areas, assault water craft, and supporting helicopters the Mobile Riverine Force not only moved quickly to each new area but also arrived in strength and was able to sustain operations as needed.”⁷

Following the city battles, Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, stressed to his command that “now is the time to resort again to the basic tactic of concentrate and clobber... The enemy is moving about. Sometimes lost, and very vulnerable to ambush. Recommend all units move to the offensive... This is a time when ingenuity can pay off.”⁸

⁷ Fulton, *Riverine Operations*, 154-55.

⁸ Quoted in Marolda, *Combat at Close Quarters*, 109-110.

The Concentration of Force at Can Tho

Mobility, firepower, and combined arms warfare also enabled allied forces to thwart the enemy's assault on Can Tho, home to 166,000 South Vietnamese and the site of the major airfield at Binh Thuy. When allied intelligence discovered in mid-February that a 2,500-strong Viet Cong force had set its sites on the city, the MRF sprang into action. The Mobile Riverine Base, with 9th Division troops embarked, steamed from its base at Dong Tam to Can Tho, a distance of more than 100 miles. Complementing logistic support by the Mobile Riverine Base, Army logistic commands in the central Delta provided the combat forces with fuel, rations, and construction materials and facilitated the evacuation of casualties. Once off Can Tho, the MRF, River Patrol Force PBRs, and South Vietnamese naval units defeated one VC unit after another. Realizing the futility of their assault on Can Tho, Viet Cong forces finally attempted to escape into the surrounding region. On the 17th, the MRF virtually surrounded and bludgeoned a large VC force near the Bassac River. The U.S. commands lost 19 soldiers and 2 sailors killed in action but killed 68 VC soldiers and captured 280 mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle rounds. This proved to be the enemy's last attempt during the Tet Offensive to occupy and hold a major urban center in the Mekong Delta.

Allied and Viet Cong operations and weapons inflicted grievous damage on the Delta's urban centers during the Tet Offensive. The fighting destroyed much of those cities, killed many innocent civilians, and drove thousands of people from their homes. The enemy, however, had consciously chosen the cities as their battleground. To concede their capture, the government of the RVN and its U.S. ally would have had to accept defeat in the war. Regardless of cost, they had no choice but to recapture the urban centers and free the population from Communist occupation.

The mobility, firepower, logistical capability, and cooperation of the American and South Vietnamese forces had enabled them to respond almost immediately to the enemy's attack on My Tho, Ben Tre, and Vinh Long and ongoing assault on Can Tho. The MRF, the "fire brigade of the Delta," moving from one battle site to another, had facilitated the successful fights for these cities. During the Tet Offensive, the MRF traveled more than 600 miles throughout the Delta. Its combat accomplishments earned the command a

Presidential Unit Citation. Admiral Veth observed that during the Tet battles, “the Army and Navy elements [of the MRF] operated cohesively to restore order in the besieged Delta.”⁹

The allied forces brought to the fight overwhelming naval, ground, and air power that the enemy could not withstand for more than a few days. The bombs, rockets, miniguns, and machine guns employed by allied aircraft, the 40mm and 20mm guns, machine guns, and mortars fired by the Riverine Assault Force, and the weapons of the PBRs were used to great effect against the enemy. Finally, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces fought and won these battles side by side.

⁹ Quoted in Schreadley, *From the Rivers to the Sea*, 139.

Urban Warfare and Peacekeeping Operations, the Change of Parameters

Enrico Magnani (Italy)

Urban operations entered the *modus operandi* and *pensandi* of UN stabilization missions and ‘coalitions of the willing’ as the most visible sign of the decomposition of consolidated patterns due to the Cold War and the emergence of intra-state conflicts (or civil wars) to the detriment of conflicts interstate, or conventional warfare. Before going into detail, it is useful to make some clarifications, some of which are apparently detached from history, military history and more related to the demographic and social evolution of the world. Urbanization is a major economic and social phenomenon which take a global dimension, giving that since 2008, the majority of world population lives in cities and urbanized areas. Other than an economic and social challenge, the presence of large urban areas also represents a major problem for military planners, which are obliged to focus organization, training and equipment to operate in this environment. This problem is present as well for the military operations addressed not to eliminate opposing forces but to the stability. And it is useful resume shortly the evolution of the capabilities of the UN in managing military operations, which was limited since the earliest activities, in the late '40s, with the staff as almost entirely civilian and lacked the capacity to handle military issues. With the end of the Cold War and the increased use of force in peace operations, the Secretariat established in March 1992, the DPKO, and since the release of the ‘Brahimi Report’ there has been a significant increase in military personnel in the department. The growth of civil wars has had, among others, the consequence of involving urban areas in conflict-related instability and has led to the need to stabilize them. Complicating factors in urban warfare for stability operations is the presence of civilians and the complexity of the terrain, and in some cases, the necessary restraint of the use of force. In general terms, the operations in urban areas by UN and/or multinational forces are the more similar to the ordinary military operation giving that operate within the framework of the ‘peace enforcement’ or Chapter VII of the Charter. In a peacekeeping operation, more or less, common is the will of the parties to respect the ceasefire/truce, but in the cases mentioned in this paper, Haiti and Somalia the UN and/or

international forces operated against more or less organized armed formations that contrasted, for various reasons (purely criminal and/or for the acquisition of power), the presence of these forces.

Somalia

In 1992 the UN dispatched a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, not in response to a peace agreement but to assist the safe distribution of international aid against a famine, induced by drought and prolonged by civil war between local factions following the collapse of almost thirty years dictatorship of Siad Barre (October 1969- January 1991), that portended a major humanitarian catastrophe. It was initially a small mission, named UNOSOM (later known as UNOSOM I), but ineffective and its enlargement did not bring any substantial change on the situation.

Phase I - UNITAF

UNOSOM I was replaced by UNITAF, a multinational ‘coalition of the willing’ led by the USA and mandated by the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing the use of the force in pursuing the spirit and the letter of the mandate of the UNSC. This, repeating the operational and legal formula of the UN Command in Korea: a largely USA-led and formed operation with 23 other nations contributions, including several elite units from France, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Spain, Sweden, Germany, and Canada. The force, well organized and disciplined, operated between from 5 December 1992 until 4 May 1993 in central-South Somalia. It should be noted that the force included specific assets, which resulted critical in urban operations, like PSYOPS, CIMIC/CA and liaison. While judged positively the resuming of the humanitarian assistance work, UNITAF did not addressed other critical tasks, like the disarmament of the local militias, the establishment of judiciary, police and correctional systems and other nation building missions, as requested by the UN. The withdrawal of local gangs limited the clashes with multinational forces to few and minor cases, due the deterrence of UNITAF, that had a strength of 37.000 troops. Unlike typical UN ROE, UNITAF authorized to use not just ‘force’ but ‘deadly force’. It was authorized the use of deadly force not only when troops were fired on or threatened but also when there was ‘a clear demonstration of hostile intent’. An

entire section of the ROE was devoted to contrast ‘crewserved weapons’ or ‘technical’ (pick-up 4x4), largely used by local armed groups.

Phase II – UNOSOM

While UNITAF was regarded as a successful mission which skilfully employed the threat and use of force to bring back the normality, UNOSOM II, the follow-up body, fully UN flagged mission, succumbed to ‘mission creep’, with serious operational, managerial and command mistakes, lost its legitimacy, and withdrew ignominiously. UNOSOM II was forced to deal with the issues not previously tackled, in particular disarmament, deployment throughout Somalia and the wider nation-building agenda, failing in all and each. On 26 March 1993 UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 814, authorizing the UNOSOM II to succeed UNITAF. It was the first mission organized and commanded by the UN to be explicitly mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the first since the Congo to be specifically mandated to use force beyond self-defence. Like UNOSOM I and UNITAF, it was to be deployed without the consent of a host government, since Somalia did not have one. UNOSOM II’s CONOP was ‘military concept of operations’ and a ‘cease-fire and disarmament concept’. The mission, operated in the Centre-South Somalia, excluding Somaliland and Puntland, between March 1993 and March 1995, was constantly understrength, affected by lack of a proper command and coordination system between national contingents. Especially this affected seriously the conduct of operations in taking control of key areas or storming critical targets, opening the door to the use of unnecessary force. The then UNSG, Boutros-Ghali, looked for an expansive view of the use of force, which impacted negatively on the weak structure of the force, poorly coordinated and understrength. Despite its more ambitious mandate, UNOSOM II had a smaller, less capable and less coherent military structure than UNITAF. Its authorized strength was 20.000 troops and 8.000 civilian and logistics personnel; the USA provided 4.000 troops, the bulk of UNOSOM’s logistical wing, which were simply transferred from UNITAF, ensuring at least some continuity. This was the first time the USA had directly contributed troops to UN operation, but keeping its contribution as small as possible in order not allowing the operation to fail, deploying a JTF off the Somali coast, and on land, a QRF in support of UN troops in emergencies. These forces remained fully under exclusive US command and control and furtherly

increased. Unfortunately, the critical PYSOP, CIMIC/CA and liaison assets of UNITAF were not continued in UNOSOM II, paving the way for the disaster. Together with the intra-UN communication problems, as all levels, at Mogadishu, between Mogadishu and New York, between UNSG, UNSC, TCCs and other Member States, there was created an inextricable loop. With UNOSOM II's arrival, militias began to infiltrate heavy weapons back into Mogadishu and the tensions escalates since May with uncoordinated and badly planned inspections in the arsenals of a local warlords. In June there was the first serious clash when 24 'blue helmets' with KIA and 60 WIA by militiamen using the crowds as cover, ambushed and attacked the unprepared and too late responsive peacekeepers. Based on UNSC decisions and the position of UNSG Boutros-Ghali, strongly in favour of iron fist, the UNOSOM entered in open confrontation with the local militias engaging intense urban combat operations in Mogadishu, with a 'systematic' drive to restore law and order by destroying or confiscating illegal weapon stocks and neutralizing its broadcasting stations. The offensive, despite aerial bombardments (the first such UN action since the former Belgian Congo in the '60s) and frontal assaults by UNOSOM and QRF troops, was repelled by the favoured tactic of the militiamen using civilians as human shields. The summer 1993 with the escalation of urban combats, recorded an increased number of KIAs among the international troops, without keeping the control of Mogadishu. This situation originated growing concerns and doubts among TCCs due the increased number of fatalities among their own troops, deployed for an in-theory peace-oriented operation, adding fractures to an already fragile political consensus. As well, the persistent lack of coordination between US-led forces and UN-led national contingents, added additional divides. The disarmament of the warlord's militias, in particular the one of Aideed, neglected humanitarian and nation-building efforts. In October, another raid, uncoordinated, badly planned and worst carried out, ends up with 19 KIA, 90 WIA among the international forces and up to 1.000 Somali killed, originating a major turning point in the approach and evaluation of the entire mission. In December the US decided to withdraw, already preceded by Belgium, France and Sweden, and followed by Italy, Germany, and Spain for the spring 1994. Although still under Chapter VII, the operation abandoned coercive means. On 4 February 1994 UNSC decided to withdraw UNOSOM II by March 1995 and initiated the scaled-down of the force. The UN asked military assistance in

ensuring the safe removal of UNOSOM II. Another ‘coalition of willing’ with forces from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, USA, the UK, protected the withdrawal of the last 2.500 Bangladeshi and Pakistani ‘blue helmets’ from Mogadishu. Although there were 27 incidents involving weapon fire, from snipers to RPGs fired by militias, the entire force was withdrawn well ahead of schedule, in 73 hours instead of the planned 7–10 days. No lives were lost. UNOSOM II was gone by 3 March 1995. The entire deployment of UN and multinational forces had 217 fatalities and caused an unspecified number of Somali fatalities, militiamen and civilians.

Haiti

Haiti has been plagued with instability for much of its existence, despite being the second country in the Western Hemisphere, after USA, to declare independence on 1st January 1804. UN, OAS, US and ‘coalitions of willing’ have been involved in Haiti constantly since 1993. However, the creation of a long-lasting secure government has eluded Haiti, and today we are at the eve of another deployment of another UN mission there, giving that the current presence, BINUH, appear totally incapable to assist the local authorities, improve the governance and facing the endless wave of criminal violences. The island life was marked by violence and crime and the degradation of the economic and social situation in an already poor territory worsened the situation, which received a serious blow with the earthquake of 2010. This one fully opened the door to ties between local gangs and criminal organisations from Mexico, US, Brazil and Colombia. Since the first deployment, all the missions, regardless their institutional framework, failed in the final achievement, the establishment of a solid, democratic, inclusive governance; where able only to alleviate the desperate economic and social condition of the civil population, and losing 200 elements (military, police and civilian staff). Despite efforts, one of the main tasks of the international efforts for the island, the establishment of a professional police force, with a planned strength of 25.000, capable to re-install the monopoly of the use of the force, was not achieved. Even though mostly composed by military forces—the presence of the requested strength of police officers has proven difficult due to the resistance of many countries to the precious staff and dispatching armed forces ones into a foreign mission — the UN faced uncontained violence stemming from political unrest and from common

criminals. As result of it, the thousands of military and police personnel deployed in the island across the years, instead to be only the trainers and be the back-up of the ongoing formed police forces, become the main keepers of the law and order of Haiti, something for what those where not fully prepared. The are several reasons of it, like the lack of minimal local conditions for the setting up of national building programme, then a growing criminal environment and other external factors, like the extended misconduct cases of UN personnel, the cholera epidemic, which destroyed any trust with the local population and the earthquake of 2010. In the first period of the MINUSTAH mandate, the mission was rocky but headed in the right direction, however the degradation of the security and economic and social situation imposed progressively a mandate creep to the UN forces. Like in Somalia, there was a critical fact; the deadly incursion at Cité du Soleil, in Port-au-Prince, when 1.500 ‘blue helmets’ in 2005 stormed the area, attacking the criminal gangs operating there shooting 22.000 bullets with estimated 80 civilian killed. But like in Somalia that was a peak of the iceberg, hiding the progressive degradation of the law and order and since then the ‘blue helmets’ were involved in a myriad of skirmishes with armed groups, sometime heavily equipped, and to face it often was requested the support of helicopters. In 13 years of presence in the island, MINUSTAH (and precedent missions) lost 60 personnel, in vast majority military and police, involved in street fighting (there were more than 100 fatalities due to the earthquake). In April 2017, UNSC decided in resolution 2350 (2017) that MINUSTAH, dispatched since 2004, would close on 15 October 2017, transitioning to a smaller follow-up peacekeeping mission which would support Government efforts to strengthen rule-of-law institutions, further develop the HNP and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis, the MINUJUSTH, then replaced as of 2019, by BINUH, currently there. Analysing the mandate of MINUSTAH, the most controversial presence of the international organization, it is possible to identify that the mission suffered of the same problems of UNOSOM II, with a prevalence of the use of force and not enough attention to the governance and development dimensions. And, as above mentioned the limited number of police personnel did not allow to train, mentor and monitoring the establishment of a proper security service, together with the missed task for a judiciary and correctional architectures. The institution building mission in Haiti faced the inability of Haitian political actors to accommodate and compromise. However, the failure

of the UN and international missions in Haiti to establish a lasting government or police force embodies larger failures by the UN and its stakeholders to understand how missions should approach institution building. The peacekeeping missions in Haiti show once again that security-only interventions in failing regimes do little to address why the insecurity exists in the first place. Instead, the UN must learn that mandates to establish security must be accompanied by an effort to establish a government capable of providing basic education and health to its citizens.

Conclusion

Urban warfare is one of the most difficult forms of warfare. There are disproportionate levels of political, tactical, and accidental risks in attempting to take the control of an urban area. This is even more difficult for forces mandated to stabilize an area and not, as first task, to degrade the capabilities of an opposing force. Separating hostile forces from among millions of people while maintaining a military/institutional legitimacy could be considered more difficult—it is one of the riskiest missions for an organization, or group of nations in case of a coalition, can attempt.

Glossary

BINUH - Bureau intégré des Nations unies en Haïti (UN Integrated Office in Haiti)

CA – Civil Affairs

CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation

CONOP - Concept of Operation

DPKO – Department of Peace Keeping Operations

HIPPO – High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (N.B. quoted as source in bibliography, UN body)

HNP - Haitian National Police

JTF - Joint Task Force

KIA – Killed in Action

MINUJUSTH - Mission des Nations unies pour l'appui à la Justice en Haïti (UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti)

MINUSTAH – Mission Intégrée des Nations unies pour la Transitions en Haiti (UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti)

OAS – Organization of American States

PYSOP – Psychological Operations

ROE - Rules of Engagement

RPG – Rocket Propeller Gun

TCC(s) – Troop(s) Contributing Country(ies)

UN – United Nations

UNITAF – Unified Task Force

UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UNOSOM I/II – UN Operation in Somalia

USA – United States of America

UNSG – UN Secretary-General

WIA – Wounded in Action

QRF - Quick Reaction Force

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ENDALL

**Gulf War II (1991 Liberation of Kuwait) and its Impact on
the Population and Environment of the Region**

Faisal Mohammed Alblooshi (UAE)

1. The beginning of the crisis: the invasion of Kuwait in 1990

On 2-8-1990, Iraq surprised the world by invading the independent State of Kuwait, at a time when the Iraqi army considered the fifth largest army in the world, as it controlled Kuwaiti territory during two days of military operations and annexed it to its borders and considered it the 19th province. This military action provoked a great reaction in the world, as the international media reported the news in a unified format: Kuwait disappeared from existence as an independent and sovereign state.

On 3rd August 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 condemning Iraq's 5-month invasion of Kuwait, demanding that Iraq withdraw unconditionally from all forces deployed in Kuwait. A deadline of January 15, 1991, was the final day for the withdrawal of the invading forces, but the Iraqi government met these decisions with intransigence and refusal to meet with the coalition army of 700,000 fighters from 34 countries who massed in Saudi territory that led the joint operations to liberate Kuwait.

2. Beginning of the military operation (Kuwait Liberation 1991)

Coalition forces launched a major military offensive against Iraq. Inside and Iraqi forces stationed in Kuwait in mid-January 1991, Allied aircraft were targeting Iraqi military positions and destroyed the Iraqi air force. The fighting continued until late February 1991, and on 25 February Kuwait completely liberated and devoid of Iraqi forces, which failed to withdraw their destroyed military sectors.

3. Environmental catastrophe during military operations

A. Deliberate oil diversion in the Arabian Gulf.

The operation plans of the Iraqi Army were to deter any possible attack by land landing through the Arabian Gulf coast, the Iraqi forces pumped liquid oil into the waters of the Gulf, which amounted to 8 million barrels of oil held in the Kuwaiti port of Ahmadi, this act, contrary to international law, was regarded as the largest deliberate diversion in the history of humanity which caused the death of fish and birds and cost years to clean up the disaster after the end of the war, at a cost of approximately \$700 million.

The leak caused the formation of 200 oil lakes. NGOs and volunteers worked to clean up the seabed in partnership with government companies, and there was a significant role for Saudi Aramco in the clean-up process.

B. Smoke emissions due to the explosion of wild oil wells in Kuwait

Coalition forces faced an exceptional situation in the advance due to the increased thickness of the smoke rising over the theatre of operations This done after Iraqi forces followed a scorched earth policy. The number of wells burned was 1073 and the number of wells destroyed was 727. which described at the time as the largest oil combustion in history, The Arabian Gulf flooded with poisoned fumes, indicating that smoke clouds reached Greece west and China east.

The numbers of barrels of oil that burned daily estimated 6 million barrels and a total of 1 billion barrels of oil until the last extinguishing of the last burning well. According to KOC (Kuwait Oil Company), this mass and catastrophic bombing caused oil rain to fall on all countries, and the flare-up lasted 10 months, requiring a global response team and a technical alliance of more than 10,000 people from more than 38 countries to extinguish it.

(1) the impact of smoke emissions on the ozone layer.

Meteorological sources have published in the impact of gases on ozone:

- The overall ozone focus was approximately 1000 mg per cubic meter, equivalent to 8 times the maximum permissible limit.

- The Sulphur dioxide concentration was 10,671 mg/m³ and the permissible limit was 105 mg/m³.

Lead is 92.5 mg/m³ and the permissible limit is 80 mg/m³.

- An increase in the concentration of macromolecules 3000 mg/m³ and the permissible limit of 150 mg/m³.

(2) negative health impact on the population due to smoke emissions.

Smoke emissions: The emission of black smoke and the intensity of oil rains led to the spread of what was known at the time of the oil lakes, which affected the overall healthy life of Kuwait, where underground water has also been damaged.

Use of uranium: the use of uranium in bombs and rockets has led to an increase in radioactive emissions, which has exacerbated health crises and causes of health.

Groundwater pollution: pumping oil into Gulf waters, particularly on Kuwaiti and Saudi beaches, and burning 727 wells, which destroyed fish resources and polluted groundwater.

Toxic gas emissions: one of the most dangerous phenomena associated with the burning of oil wells, with gas emissions being catastrophic, including carbon dioxide, Sulphur dioxide, hydrogen Sulphur, nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons.

(3) impact and climate change due to smoke emissions.

According to thermal figures and estimates, the temperature decreased by 100 degrees Celsius in the area of a radius of 100 kilometers and its center Kuwait for an area of up to 1000 kilometers. This is equivalent in the simplified estimate to a decrease of 10 ° C, as the day in Kuwait is night due to smoke emissions.

The disaster plagued the theatre of operations and the perimeter of the war, with global environmental centers monitoring the emission of petroleum smoke 2000 kilometers from Kuwait to China and India in the east, causing climate variables such as flooding and rising unnatural rainfall in Asian countries.

(4) the impact of emissions and oil diversion on livestock.

Rising smoke and oil leaks have caused disaster for the animals' wealth, as large numbers of animals have died, forcing global associations to take pairs of birds and animals and keep them away from disaster.

Fish wealth has also affected and reduced in numbers to rely heavily on sea-food sources, with fears of causing famine and near danger.

The stability of migratory birds that were temporarily bees on Kuwait's beaches and Gulf coasts affected, confusing their usual migration, and causing their death.

(5) the impact of emissions and oil diversion on soil and plant life.

The combustion process and the smoke deposits had a direct and catastrophic impact on the soil and plant life of the region, which increased the salinity of repentance and rendered us unfit for cultivation, and this has seriously and negatively affected the population of the region in general.

(6) Military operation and the impact of smoke.

This environmental disaster forced coalition forces to return military plans in advance forced to use chemical equipment and protective clothing throughout the period of progress, These measures are detrimental to ground operations commanders and the Air Force reorganizing plans according to the variables of wind direction and clear visibility of the theatre of operations, especially as they advance, hold, occupy and clear land, which is particularly difficult to do during ground operations.

The Allied Coalition Forces to use chemical equipment and protective clothing throughout the advance period, as these measures are an impediment to progress in ground operations in general.

(7) Technical human consumption in the process of extinguishing petroleum wells.

It took 8 months to extinguish the wells, a period that shattered expectations, as they expected to span large periods of time and at significant financial costs. In addition to the significant role played by Kuwaiti professional institutions in controlling and treating this disaster, all countries allied with Kuwait have participated. International companies have been instrumental in this process. Notable companies include:

- American companies five companies extinguished 428 wells, approximately 58% of the total burning wells.

- Canadian companies have supported by 6 Canadian fire brigades and have extinguished 196 wells, about 27% of the number of burning wells.

4. The destruction of the withdrawn Iraqi sectors and their environmental impacts.

The unexamined and indiscriminate withdrawal of the Iraqi military sectors caused an environmental catastrophe along the withdrawal corridor from Kuwaiti territory, given the size of the withdrawn force and the amount of minerals burned, which cost considerable effort to clear and recover to preserve the environment and population during the liberation period.

Those sectors were easy targets in the Coalition Air Force's range, and figures indicate that more than 1,400 Iraqi vehicles bombed during the withdrawal, and the street used by Iraqi forces named (Dead Road).

5. Catastrophic effects on the population in Kuwait and Iraq during and after the war.

Despite overcoming environmental disasters during the war, their destructive effects on the environment and humanity have been stuck for many

years, especially with the proliferation of indiscriminate minefields planted by withdrawing forces, which required redoubled clearance.

In addition to the casualties caused by aerial bombardment and the firing of unguided rockets, both sides lost large numbers of people, and coalition forces lost 400 troops in this war.

6. Position of the United Arab Emirates on the crisis

The position of the United Arab Emirates on the occupation summarized in four main points:

- A. Categorically rejecting the Iraqi occupation of the State of Kuwait
- B. Its attempts to end the conflict peacefully through the immediate exit of the Iraqi army from the State of Kuwait, a bloodshed, and a disaster rescue for the region.
- C. Provide full support to the Kuwaiti people.
- D. To use all means of political and military support for the sisterly State of Kuwait.

7. The Emirati government and grass-roots role in containing the displaced Kuwaiti population

The United Arab Emirates has provided the means of comfort and reassurance to embrace Kuwaiti families and displaced persons from the aftermath of the invasion. More than 66,000 Kuwaitis resided there until the liberation of his country. Sheikh Zayed, may God have mercy on him, ordered the Kuwaiti flag to raise alongside the Emirati flag in all the schools of the Emirates.

- A. Provide transportation from buses and transport aircraft.
- B. The reception of Kuwaiti families by Emirati families.
- C. Guest houses opened for Kuwaiti families coming overland to the state.
- D. Housing Kuwaiti families in apartments and houses equipped with all the needs.

E. Exemption of Kuwaiti families from tuition fees, treatment, water, electricity. and. Establishment of centers dedicated to volunteer courses in all areas.

F. Receiving students in schools and distributing stationery and school uniforms to them at various levels of education.

G. The payment of tickets to Kuwaiti brothers who wish to travel to any destination in the world, whether for treatment or to catch up with their families.

H. Distribution of food supplies and basic needs to Kuwaiti families.

I. The preparation of cultural and recreational programs for children in coordination with the activities.

Summary and recommendations

1. It is difficult in wars and crises to fully control the negative effects and consequences on the environment and population, but international organizations and institutions of the international community must strive to develop laws and studies to reduce and reduce such disasters.

2. It requires military institutions and institutes of environmental studies to intensify joint studies with a view to developing studies and recommendations and activating joint agreements that contribute to overcoming negative phenomena on the environment in times of crisis and war.

3. The development of clean, peaceful sources of energy and the use of nuclear energy requires military institutions to intensify defensive positions around those facilities, which constitute destruction if international laws breached in war to destroy them.

4. States located in a geographical area with international crises (hot spots) required to draw up contingency plans to accommodate displaced persons in cooperation with international and humanitarian organizations.

him. The Arab Gulf crisis (Kuwait Liberation War, 1991) is one of the global crises that have affected international politics and economics in general, as well as the environment in the vicinity of the crisis.

**The Destruction of Atlanta and Sherman’s “March to the Sea:” The
Impact of a U.S. Civil War Military Operation on
Urban Space and Population**

Fred Borch (USA)

Introduction

In September 1864, Union Army General William T. Sherman decided to make the people themselves experience the horrors of war. He marched to Atlanta, a major city in Confederate Georgia, and burned it—destroying everything of military value in this urban area. His actions also forced the city’s population to flee.

Ten weeks later, he launched his famous—or infamous—“March to the Sea.” Taking some 60,000 soldiers and heading towards Savannah, Georgia, Sherman adopted a deliberate policy of destroying all communication and transportation facilities. He and his Union troops also confiscated large quantities of food. What the soldiers did not seize, they often destroyed. As Sherman put it, his military strategy was to “make Georgia howl.”

From Savannah, Sherman and his troops turned north into South Carolina and ultimately marched into North Carolina. The destruction of urban space and the civilian infrastructure in South Carolina was arguably worse than that wrought on either Georgia or North Carolina.

Sherman’s decision to inflict suffering on the South’s civilian population played a major role in ending the war because of it helped break Southern morale and hastened the end of the Civil War. It is a good historical example of the effects of armed conflict on urban space and populations.

Where Are We in History? And Why?

In the 1850s, the Southern states became increasingly vocal in claiming that their slave-based economies were an integral and permanent part of the United States. They also insisted that those who owned people had the legal (and

moral) right to transport these enslaved men and women to any state—and also to those territories that would become future states.

The majority of Northerners were willing to permit slavery to continue in the southern United States, but were opposed *to the expansion of slavery* into “free” states and the western territories; the Northern states wanted enslaved people restricted to the Southern states.

After the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, most Southerners were convinced that Lincoln and his Republican Party wanted to severely restrict the rights of slaveowners, if not ultimately abolish slavery. Consequently, some southern states decided to leave the Union—secede from the United States—to establish a new country called the Confederate States of America.

Abraham Lincoln insisted after he was elected U.S. president that he would not dismantle slavery. He famously announced that, while personally opposed to slavery, he was willing to keep slavery to preserve the Union. But the legislature of the state of South Carolina did not believe Lincoln and it voted to leave the Union. Other states followed it.

The American Civil War that followed (starting in April 1861) was about PRESERVING THE UNION for the North. (It was about preserving slavery for the South). In mid-1862, however, Lincoln realized that he had to strike at the Confederacy’s economic foundation—its slave-based economy—if he was going to win the war and keep the Union together. After January 1863—and the Emancipation Proclamation giving freedom to enslaved people in the states in rebellion—the war was transformed into a fight for FREEDOM for enslaved Black men, women, and children.

While many Northerners continued to support the goal of preserving the Union and freeing Black people from slavery, there also were many Northern voters who were tired of the war. As a result, while Lincoln was running for re-election as president in mid-1864—and wanted to be re-elected for another four years—a “Peace Platform” in the Democratic Party appealed to many voters. Perhaps a negotiated peace with the Confederates would end the war? Lincoln rejected the idea of a negotiated peace (because that would mean the end of the Union) and was determined to continue the war.

Union Strategy

In March 1864, Major General Ulysses S. Grant was called east by Lincoln, promoted to lieutenant general by the U.S. Congress, and appointed by Lincoln to be the Union Commander-in-Chief. This resulted in Sherman being responsible for the Union war effort in the west—as the commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi.

The plan was for Sherman to advance from Chattanooga, Tennessee, across Georgia to Atlanta and then Savannah, cutting the remaining Confederacy in half. Grant, meanwhile, would advance on Richmond, Virginia, pinning Confederate General Robert E. Lee to the defense of the Confederate capital. As Sherman put it: “If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic I think ol’ Uncle Abe [Lincoln] will give us twenty days leave to see the young folks.”

Sherman’s Military Strategy from March 1864 through August 1864

By May 1864, Sherman had a force of 100,000 men in Tennessee. Opposing him was Confederate Joseph E. Johnston. Johnson had only 65,000 men but he was in a strong defensive position in the mountains of western Georgia.

Over the next weeks and months, Sherman and Johnston maneuvered against each other—with the Confederate forces slowly giving up ground. Impatient with his progress against the enemy, Sherman acted recklessly on June 27, 1864 and attacked Johnston at Kennesaw Mountain. The Union suffered heavy losses of men and materiel.

But despite Sherman’s errors on the battlefield—which might have benefited the Confederacy had Johnston remained in command—Confederate President Jefferson Davis was unhappy with Johnston. Believing that Johnston was too cautious, Jefferson fired him and replaced him with the much more aggressive General John Bell Hood. True to his character, Hood foolishly went on the offensive. Sherman deployed all his forces well, beat off Hood’s attacks, and slowly surrounded Atlanta.

Destruction of Atlanta and the Impact on the Urban Area and Civilian Population

Hood was forced to abandon Atlanta and Sherman captured the city on September 2, 1864—declaring “Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.” It was an important victory because Atlanta was a key railroad junction. The capture of the city also was politically important because President Lincoln’s reelection in November was very much in doubt and Sherman’s victory boosted Lincoln’s prestige. The victory encouraged more than a few war-weary Northern voters to stick with Lincoln and support him for another four-year term as U.S. president.

Sherman ordered all civilians in Atlanta to leave the city. He then ordered his troops to burn all storehouses, machine shops, mills and factories “within the lines of enemy defenses in Atlanta.” As the fires also consumed many private homes and stores, much of Atlanta was destroyed.

The Union troops also destroyed miles and miles of railroads in Georgia. Railroad ties were heated and then twisted so that they were unusable. A section of track was pulled up and the rails were laid across wood, which was then lit. When the iron began to soften, the rails were either bent or twisted around a nearby tree. Union soldiers called these “Sherman’s neckties.”

The “March to the Sea” and its impact on civilian infrastructure in Georgia and the Carolinas

After the burning of Atlanta, Confederate General John Hood attacked Sherman’s supply base at Nashville, Tennessee. Sherman decided that he would not engage with Hood. Rather, he sent Union generals George H. Thomas and John M. Schofield in pursuit of him. They ultimately defeated Hood at the Battle of Franklin (November 30, 1864) and Nashville (December 15-16, 1864).

By November 15, 1864, Sherman had 60,000 men ready for his “March to the Sea.” He had cut his own supply line, and had split his army into two wings, with two corps in each wing: XV and XVII Corps were on the right and XIV and XX Corps were on the left.

This permitted Sherman to threaten two targets at once—and the Confederates would not be able to resist two Union movements at the same time and would be required to choose where to defend.

As for supplies, Sherman had 2,500 wagons (with another 60 wagons as ambulances). His operational concept was to keep the wagons stocked with food and live off the land—destroying anything and everything that his Army did not need. But Sherman did not advocate indiscriminate violence. Rather, he was “quite precise in directing it against the property (but not the persons) of wealthy Southern die-hards whose assets had been largely untouched by the war.”

Sherman took 20 days supplies with him when he left the Atlanta area. Each brigade in each of the four corps also was tasked with organizing foraging parties that would be on the flanks of the columns.

Special Field Orders No. 120, issued November 9, 1864, allowed “liberal” foraging for the purposes of feeding the soldiers, but required commanders to establish foraging parties under the command of “discreet officers.” It prohibited soldiers from entering people’s homes or “committing any trespass.”

The Field Orders did allow the destruction of mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc., but withheld that authority to the Corps-level commanders. The Orders also permitted the appropriation of “horses, mules, etc.” but required the “discrimin[ation] . . . between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly.”

Finally, in all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties were required to refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts [of the foraging], but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion [of food] for their maintenance.”

Foragers worked in parties of 30-50 soldiers, with one or two officers in charge. They would leave camp every morning and travel 5-6 miles, visiting nearby farms and plantations and taking whatever they could find. Union troops would seize livestock (usually hogs and chickens) and food (molasses, honey, hams) from the local civilians they encountered during their march. At the end

of each day, the foraging parties would rendezvous with the Union wagon trains to unload supplies. Foragers would often leave on foot in the morning and return riding horses and mules.

There was little control over the foragers—with the result that personal property (gold, jewels) sometimes were stolen. There also were acts of robbery, pillage and violence.

In this “March to the Sea,” Sherman cut a 60-mile wide swath of destruction across the state. His troops marched some 235 miles and captured Savannah on December 21. Sherman then presented the city to President Lincoln as a Christmas present.

In Savannah, Sherman obtained additional reinforcements and then headed north into South Carolina. He and his Union soldiers were particularly hard on the citizens of this state, believing that as the first state to secede from the Union, it was not only more blameworthy than other Confederate states but also that its destruction would hurt Confederate morale the most.

Sherman faced light resistance and captured Columbia, the state capital on February 17, 1865. The city was destroyed by fires that began that night and continued into the next day. While some claim that Sherman intentionally set fire to the city, most historians believe that the fires resulted from the burning bales of cotton that the retreating Confederates under General Wade Hampton III left behind.

Moving into North Carolina, Sherman’s men did relatively little damage to civilian property and infrastructure—at least when compared with Georgia and South Carolina. This is likely because Union troops recognized that North Carolina had been reluctant to leave the Union, being the second from last state to secede (Tennessee was the last).

Sherman defeated Joseph Johnston at Bentonville, North Carolina on March 19-20, 1865. On April 26, 1865 (15 days after the surrender of Robert E. Lee at Appomattox), Johnston surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. The Civil War was over – at least for Sherman and his March to the Sea.

Conclusion

Sherman's March to the Sea resulted in the destruction of the cities of Atlanta and Columbia—as well as many other farms and plantations in Georgia and the Carolinas. The Union also captured a total of 13,294 cattle and 7,000 horses and mules. Nearly 10 million pounds of corn were seized and over 300 miles of railroad destroyed.

The exact dollar amount of damage will never be known; Sherman thought \$100,000,000—a huge amount for America in the nineteenth century and a loss from which it would take Georgia years to recover from. About 4/5 of the damage was simply waste and destruction. As for the Carolinas—it was more of the same—but more so in South Carolina.

Sherman is probably the most controversial general of the U.S. Civil War. Some see him as the prophet of modern war while others condemn him as a ruthless barbarian for his attacks on civilians. British military historian B. H. Liddell Hart claimed that Sherman was “the most original genius of the American Civil War” and “the first modern general.”

A postscript on Sherman: When he died in 1891, he was the last four-star general of the U.S. Army (other than the Army Chief of Staff) until the rank was revived in 1944. The Army named its most famous World War II tank, the M-4 *Sherman*, in his honor.

**Zaragoza Doesn't Surrender: Effects of the Zaragoza's
Napoleonic Sieges 1808-1809**

Gerardo Lopez-Mayoral Hernandez (Spain)

Introduction

People and society need to defend their possessions against other groups being essential cities' defence. On war and cities, there are two main types of operations: Battles and sieges.¹ In History, sieges are numerous, as old as the world. Some experts think that they would disappear after WWII but, curiously, was just on the contrary (Bayreuth, Sarajevo, Dubrovnik, Grozny...). They are the ultimate moment of war, when the rest of options fail, normally a consequence of not defeating the enemy as planned. But everything should be considered before taking the decision to set up the siege and its consequences.² They are, in essence, psychological operations and normally require astuce, human imagination, inventions, determination or ingenious to resist or survive (Tyre). Always they are singular events which nowadays attract media interest.³ But most important, they make up the most intense war operations which fully involve civilian population, at least in some phases, supposing an exceptional people's effort on casualties and the logistics' support of the troops with complex sanitary evacuations which oblige to economize resources transforming the aspect and the behaviour of the population (black market, money exchange, etc.).

On our period, previously to Peninsular War there were a lot of continuous periods of confrontation between France, Britain and Spain. Alliances and loyalties were consistent with hostility (1702-1808). The events in the Spain of 1808 were part of a wider European conflict which started with the confrontation of the European monarchies and its allies of the 1793 French

¹ George Roux: *La Guerra napoleónica en España*. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, colección Austral, 1971), 127.

² Jean Louis Dufour: *La guerre, la vie et le soldat*. (Paris: Eds. Odile Jacob), 109.

³ El Álamo, 1836; Toledo, 1936; Bayreuth, 1982; Sarajevo, 1992.

Revolution. The Napoleonic intention was to injure as much as possible British interests in the heart of Portugal.⁴ (APPENDIXES 1 & 2)

Spain, in theory, still was a great power but ineffective with a contradictory internal situation and interference between internal policies over the Spanish foreign policy. Known this situation by Napoleon, he decided to make Spain a satellite state and adopted, at first, during 1808, by force, tactical decisions oriented towards the fully occupation of the Spanish territory⁵ which finally triggered several actions and reactions.⁶ (Table 1)

Table 1: NAPOLEONIC INVASION OF SPAIN GENERAL TIME CHART: CHRONOLOGIC EVENTS & SIEGES

⁴ Mariano Alonso Baquer, “La conducción de las operaciones en la Guerra de la Independencia” (Cap. 1) in *La Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1814). El pueblo español, su Ejército y sus aliados frente a la ocupación napoleónica*. (Madrid: MINISDEF., 2007), 30.

⁵ Alonso Baquer, “La conducción de las operaciones en la Guerra de la Independencia” (2007), 39.

⁶ José María Jover Zamora et al., *España: Sociedad, Política y civilización (siglos XIX-XX)* (Madrid, Areté, 2001), 18.

To understand what happened in the Iberian Peninsula between 1808 and 1814 we need to consider that there was a war in Portugal during 1807-1808, followed by a war of Spain during 1808-1809 which, in 1810, became a war of Spain and Portugal.⁷ As Alonso Baquer explains, we admit the complexity of the denomination, that, at least, there were two overlapping wars, the French “*Guerre d’Espagne*” with the British “*Peninsular War*”.⁸

Where resistance was possible, the urban multitude ended the hesitations of the higher Spanish society, in a first act on 2 May 1808 in Madrid. After the Royal Family exile’s attempt, the unanimous and energetic revolt became a strategic change not well understood by Napoleon. Some noblemen, clergy and military joined the population. The uprisings spread out region to region creating several “*Juntas*” as a former first stage to a new political power.

Two were the specific differential aspects of Napoleonic campaigns during the Spanish War: *Guerrilla’s* fight and sieges.⁹ Too much has been written on “*guerrilla*” but probably less on sieges. They were normally enforced by a technical impossibility to defeat the enemy but, in this case, with a new component: The active participation of the civilian population in the defence, a form of urban resistance which supposes efforts and privations shared by the whole people, normally with some epic personal examples.¹⁰ Spanish population will suffer many hard sieges on strategic cities.¹¹ As Escribano says,¹² our “*Independence War*” was probably the last scenario for a generalized use of these actions ending in Sebastopol or Stalingrad.

⁷ Alonso Baquer, “La conducción de las operaciones en la Guerra de la Independencia” (2007), 27.

⁸ Mariano Alonso Baquer, “Las ideas estratégicas en la Guerra de la Independencia” in *Fuerzas Armadas Españolas. Historia Institucional y Social*, ed. HERNÁNDEZ SÁNCHEZ-BARBA, Mario y ALONSO BAQUER, Miguel (Madrid: Alhambra, ASORI), 2: 230.

⁹ Francisco Escribano Bernal, “Los sitios en la Península Ibérica (1808-1814): mucho más que mitos”, *Revista de Historia Militar* (Madrid, IHCM., nº extraordinario, 2009), 195.

¹⁰ Palafox, Agustina of Zaragoza or Alvarez de Castro in Gerona.

¹¹ On statistics, during the 72 months’ war (May 1808 until April 1814), just in eight there were no important siege operations. Between June 1809 and October 1812, always one siege is in execution, overlapping sometimes five of them.

¹² Escribano Bernal, “Los sitios en la Península Ibérica (1808-1814): mucho más que mitos”, (2009), 201.

On different phases and scenarios, and according with Serrano's chart,¹³ between February and March 1808, we can note the occupation by the French of strongholds and fortress closing the border in case of invasion which made safe the area allowing new units' entrance without problems. During the first moments of the war, summer 1808, we observe the siege of Zaragoza (penetrations from the Pyrenees) and the two first more symbolic Gerona's sieges to ensure Barcelona's communications with France.

Then, just the attack to Valencia a fortified city, not a true siege. Finally, in winter 1808, a second Zaragoza's siege (communications knot and mythic case after the first one) and Rosas (danger of a possible British navy base close to the main way to France).

Zaragoza's Sieges: 1808-1809

Taking into account the chaotic events of this war, Colonel Priego, suggested studying the Peninsular War¹⁴ following a chronological pattern, except for 1808, differentiating two parts: The Spanish population's uprising followed by the French repression ending with the French Ebro's withdrawal after Bailen's defeat and, second, the own Napoleon's campaign in Spain (November 1808 – January 1809).¹⁵

¹³ Antonio Serrano Montalvo, "El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades", in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*. (Cátedra "General Palafox" de Cultura Militar, AGM., Zaragoza, 1958), 506.

¹⁴ The Spanish Army consisted of the active Army (around 100,000 men, veterans, except 15,000 in Denmark and 20,000 in Portugal; a grand total around 80,000), provincial militias (30,000) and urban militias (some type of reserves in the cities), not so bad if conveniently organized and employed. They were peripherally deployed except some concentrations in Galicia and Cadiz-Gibraltar. Thus, operations in Spain were of three types: Regular Army, militia and guerrilla, with a same political purpose.

¹⁵ Juan Priego López: *Cómo fue la Guerra de la Independencia*. Edición del bicentenario (Madrid: Edit. San Martín. 2ª edición, 2008), 16. Main sources: Arteche ("*Guerra de la Independencia. Historia Militar de España de 1808 a 1814*", Madrid, 1868-1903, 14 vol.), Oman ("*A History of the Peninsular War*", Oxford, 1902-1915, 5 vol.) and Grasset ("*La Guerre d'Espagne*", Berger-Levrault, Paris, 3 vol. 1914, 1925, 1932, not finished).

Resistance & Revolution

The main uprising of the Spanish people in Madrid on 2 May 1808 in relation with the trip of the rest of the Royal Family to France was furiously repressed by Murat between 2 and 5 May 1808, which opened big tensions and ended in the war with the sporadic and almost simultaneous (*organized conspiracy?*) uprisings in the different outlying provinces and gathering in scattered elements of the partially disbanded Spanish Army.¹⁶

The defence of Zaragoza became a concern for the French in Madrid. The conscience of the population changed in just one month, from uncertainty to opposition and hate, which was dangerous, also for Napoleon because his proximity to France and the value of the Ebro river communications.

As already appreciated by the Romans, one of the main features of the Spanish character was not to flinch after the defeat or adversities in spite of the winners' courage and discipline which again occurred in our war.¹⁷ This was the secret of the long and stubborn resistance of the Spanish population in the different invasions suffered in its territory included the XIXth Century's French one.¹⁸ Lacking enough military resources, Zaragoza guaranteed its luck to its population patriotism.

The city was in the centre of the Ebro's valley, a key communications' junction in the Northeast to control Aragon's region and ensuring supplies' line to Catalonia's troops. A small tributary river (Huerva) in the Eastern flank offers some points able for defence with, inside the city, a central old core of small and narrow streets among the houses' blocks of stone. Founded by the Romans, it was also important as capital of the ancient Aragon's Kingdom and his population was very proud of his past, a solid race famous by his obstinacy. With more than 60,000 people, they are mostly catholic with many churches, convents and the Virgin of Pilar's temple, for pilgrimages. During the transit from the XVIIIth to

¹⁶ Vincent J. Esposito and John Elting R.: *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars* (London: Greenhill Books and Pennsylvania, Stackpole Books, 1999), Campaign in Spain: Map 84.

¹⁷ José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*. (Madrid, Imprenta Depósito de la Guerra, 1878) II: 359.

¹⁸ José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia Militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, 51-52.

XIXth centuries, its society was also a reflection of the rest of cities and villages of the region with the typical contradictions of the ancient society and a minority opened to transformation and renovation.

General Palafox tried to approach some members to form a “*Junta*” with some selected authorities and was hidden until the events were more mature. After Madrid’s uprising, on 6 May, some natural leaders were mobilizing the population against the French but without a clear head. On 24 May, the situation exploded and he was invested as new Captain General, writing his first “*proclama*”, a public edict of the declaration of war, establishing some centralization through specific city functional committees. He also rapidly started to organize the Aragon’s Army based on local militia forces and others, a total of five “*Tercios*” (4,000-5,000 men) who left to fight in Tudela. On 6 June Palafox concentrated forces in Zaragoza and reinforced the northern border with France.

Supplies were a big problem with the difficulty to organize an army although they tried to improvise as much as possible. The scarcity of ammunition was solved with creativity. Groceries were also limited and prices were rising every day. The bad feeding and the lack of hygiene will be later on important causes of mortality. Simultaneously a war’s economy was imposed by Palafox and his intendent. Justice had three Courts and the Audience with a military specific commission to examine expedients, a difficult task sometimes not completely equal for everybody...

From the very beginning there were two “*order-disorder*” conflicts: One, external with the French invaders and, second, internal, avoiding the revolution of the population, a difficult balance between the different local institutions and with Palafox who ordered more military disciplined measures.¹⁹ The inhabitants

¹⁹ A difficult particular issue was also the xenophobia against the French residents whose imprisonment avoided major problems. Luis Sorando Muzás: “En la retaguardia” in *Los Sitios de Zaragoza 1808-1809* (Zaragoza: HERALDO DE ARAGÓN. Monográfico bicentenario, 2008), 192.

of the city began to be called as the “*Zaragoza’s defenders*”²⁰ spread outin the entire city.²¹

First Siege (Appendix 3)

On 6 June 1808 General Lefebvre left Pamplona (4,000) to Tudela towards Zaragoza without waiting for General Verdier coming from Vitoria with the same objective. After a quick confrontation, he was in Zaragoza on 15 June. The situation he saw at first made him to assume that a determined attack would easily overthrow any resistance but he didn’t foreseen the will of an open city as Zaragoza.²²

As known, Zaragoza was not a fortress and probably was not defendable. Palafox had reinforced it with the rests of the Tudela’s advanced position easily taken afterwards by Verdier. Then, they withdrew to Alagón, and again, finally to the city. He still was probably thinking to defend it from outside, because inner conditions were not so good.²³ During the next days, he left to closer villages to gather possible reinforcements for Zaragoza and the civilians took the initiative in the beginning without any defence plans as Ibieta describes. He also was not able to cut off any French supplies in its way from Pamplona and Tudela to Alagon.²⁴

To stop the uprising, General Verdier arrived also to Zaragoza from Pamplona on 15 June with two Divisions,²⁵ deploying the artillery in Torrero’s Hills, starting the “*first siege*”. His first attack in “*Eras del Rey*” was the

²⁰ José Gómez de Arce y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 75.

²¹ As Arce states, it’s difficult to carefully examine at this exact time which was the character of the revolution that was really taking place in the Spanish population to understand the internal feelings mixed with the intention to resist to invaders. José Gómez de Arce y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*. II: 400.

²² Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), I: 145.

²³ Zaragoza’ force, 1 June: 8,070 men: Artillery men and civilians, 250; veterans and some deserters from other units, 700; “*aragoneses*”, enlisted, 3,500; people out of service in reserve, 2,000; cavalry, 170. Gómez de Arce y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 347.

²⁴ Herminio Lafoz, *Los Sitios. Zaragoza en la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1809)*. (Zaragoza: Caja de Ahorros de la Inmaculada de Aragón, 2000), 48.

²⁵ 3,000 soldiers and a siege train with 30 cannons, 4 mortars and 12 howitzers.

foreword of the immortal defence of Zaragoza, ²⁶ a new name for the glorious Spanish patriotic sieges. ²⁷ This action infused in the population some encouragement to continue with the defence of the city. ²⁸ Lacking soldiers and sappers to execute all defence works, the civilians²⁹ worked alternating with other combat tasks as patrols, guards and advanced posts. ³⁰ The determination and aggression of local inhabitants took completely the French by surprise. ³¹ Verdier noted it was impossible to take the city and asked for reinforcements which arrived on 26 June trying to modify his plans.

Inside the city, the authorities' understood the clear dependence of the local population in the extreme desperate situation. The lower social classes were totally integrated in the feelings of the rest. ³²

The fiercest fighting was around the gates of the city, mainly in Portillo's West Gate where took place the personal intervention of Agustina (*de Aragón*) shooting herself a cannon, obliging the French to withdraw for more reinforcements and to organize a new attack. After some other attempts (more the 200 losses) Verdier concluded with some reluctance that the city only would fall through a regular siege. On 3 July, the French started building parallel trenches approaching the city, which took twelve days to reach the first convents outside the city. After one month of works and bombings, the main assault³³ became embroiled in a ferocious street-to-street and house-to-house fighting. French troops have never experienced before this form of combat and soon were

²⁶ Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), I: 149.

²⁷ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 84.

²⁸ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 314.

²⁹ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 318.

³⁰ Palafox: "Churches are full of women, old men and children; the rest managed weapons". Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 319

³¹ Nick Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*. (Great Britain, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 40.

³² Ronald Fraser, *La maldita Guerra de España. Historia social de la Guerra de la Independencia 1808-1814*. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), 259.

³³ 13 battalions: 9 French and 4 Polish.

suffering considerable losses from the Spaniards firing down from upper windows and rooftops.³⁴

Finally, on 11 August, Palafox knew about the great victory in Bailén which would have national consequences, changing deeply the events. Madrid was abandoned and the French Army was in movement towards the North. Lifting the siege of Zaragoza was just a question of time. Verdier took the decision to stop it and maintain positions to prepare the withdrawal by night. Next day, 14 August, the enemy had disappeared blowing up Saint Engrace's Bridge and St. Francis' convent. The defenders thought it was a Virgin's miracle.³⁵ Nothing as different to Napoleon's strategic and tactical manoeuvre war as the combats in Zaragoza whose resistance and defensive procedures were not known until the moment. During the first siege and taking into account the streets' configuration of the city, the Spaniards discovered the "barricade" easily defendable, to detain the superiority of French infantry and cavalry as a basic obstacle which not needed any particular tactical manoeuvre or instruction.³⁶ The tactical and psychological combat advantages of the French Army (mobility, artillery, etc.) disappeared with the tenacity of the tactical plan of the "zaragozanos" stocked among the ruins.

Women also participated widely in the defence (Agustina, Bureta's Countess, etc.) with some success, a frenetic popular defence sometimes undisciplined to the established authority, selecting some popular leaders. In spite of the French superiority, Verdier had been defeated without controlling the geographical space. In a real tactical sense, the blockade of the city was not complete because the defenders always maintained a Northern weak communication with external forces. Lifting the siege was a major blow in the prestige and martial reputation the French Army, which softened the impact of Napoleon's initial success while the Spanish propaganda started to highlight the victory something embarrassing for the Emperor.³⁷

³⁴ Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 42.

³⁵ Verdier destroyed a total of 54 guns, mortars and howitzers and marched westwards. Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 42.

³⁶ Miguel Artola Gallego: "La Guerra de la Independencia" in *Historia de España. La España de Fernando VII.* (Madrid, Espasa Calpe. Ramón Menéndez Pidal, 1968), 108.

³⁷ Charles Esdaile in Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 42.

Second Siege

After Dupont's defeat in Bailén (July 1808), the strategic French situation in the Peninsulawas disturbed and Napoleon was obliged to directly intervene and took the personal decision to go to Spain. At the end November, wining in Somosierra, he entered Madrid in December almost simultaneously with Moore's retreat to La Coruña and opened the time for the second siege of Zaragoza. Before departing back to Paris at the end of the month, he sent out orders to Joseph to cope with the non-compliance of the Spaniards inthe strictest terms. He thought again that, after the capital was taken and the armies beaten³⁸, the nation would submit.³⁹

Zaragoza was an unfinished item which had been considerably delayed. General Castaños was again defeated in Tudela on 23 November and Lannes slowly advanced to Zaragozawith IIIrd and Vth Corps, a Cavalry Brigade and a siege's train (35,000 men). After the first battle, Palafox reached Zaragoza with more than 32,000 troops, supported by 15,000 armed civilians and 150 artillery cannons. He still had some time to rapidly fortify in deep the improvised fortifications of the weak city as much as possible (Colonel Sangenis) with the first siege's experience and collecting three months' supplies and provisions,⁴⁰ arming the population and the closest areas reinforcements. Women and the clergy also supported their morale.

On 21 December the French were ready. Moncey dispatched a courier to Palafox on 22 December offering the capitulation but he again denied it.⁴¹ After some assaults' attempts, on 30 December, they were opening the *parallels*' trenches for attacking externalconvents and to approach the city.

Already in 10 January 1809, there were no groceries since some weeks and the soldierswere very weak. Dead were not buried. Gangrene and typhus' epidemics were spreading out; no medicines. Between Spaniards, military

³⁸ In that moment, around 135,000 Spanish soldiers against 290,000 French, more than twice.

³⁹ Lipscombe, *The Peninsular War Atlas*, 102.

⁴⁰ See J. Belmas Zaragoza's description. J. V. BELMAS, *Journaux des sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans la péninsule de 1807 à 1814 / rédigés, d'après les ordres du gouvernement, sur les documents existant aux archives de la guerre et au dépôt des fortifications* (Chez Firmin Didot Frères, 1836-1837) II: 202.

⁴¹ The terms of surrender were also truly rejected.

martial Courts have also to maintain the discipline with death penalties. Losses were considerable on both sides. The determination of the defenders was a bit undermined but Zaragoza's example was invaluable to the nation and Europe.

Lannes arrives to his command post on 22 January with Napoleon's orders to take Zaragoza by any means. The population suffered the effects of the siege but the defence was still in place until the French entrance from the East, the last phase, fighting house- to-house with underground mines. On 24 January, he sent out another message for capitulation and Palafox refused it again.⁴² At the same time, Palafox addressed another *proclama* to the population asking for some more efforts of the different parishes to avoid the surrender.⁴³ On 28 January, the terrible bitter assault started reporting to Napoleon. Each building was as a fortress, flat-to-flat, room-to-room... Losses were huge by both parts.⁴⁴ The heroic final fanatic Zaragoza's resistance started on 29 January. The internal defence, by neighbourhoods, as the assaults using mines were something new (29 days of external attacks; 24, internal assaults).⁴⁵

On 13 February there were some desertions and signs of tiredness are shown by the defenders. Palafox got ill on 15 February and was replaced by the "*Junta*" starting negotiations. On 18 February, the situation was not sustainable being totally surrounded. The capitulation was on his way ending on 21 February.⁴⁶

Zaragoza's second siege had been a Palafox decision not accepting combat in open place, occupying the city. Operating methodical and carefully, replacing artillery fire and mining for infantry assaults, Lannes broke finally

⁴² "Surrender? I don't know surrender; after dead, we will talk on it". The rest of his comrades said "Win or die, Life to Ferdinando, Life to Spain!" Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 351-352.

⁴³ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 439-440.

⁴⁴ French were 22,000 men in that moment.

⁴⁵ J. V. BELMAS, *Journaux des sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans la péninsule de 1807 à 1814...*, 215.

⁴⁶ Expressively described by General Lejeune, "... still with a proud feeling in their livid faces". Lannes also reflected some months later before dying in Essling if really this effort had been necessary...

Palafox's fanatical (incompetent for someone?) resistance.⁴⁷ After two months' siege, they surrendered as the rest of the maintowns of Aragon without a big resistance.

Some historians think that this siege was not as meritorious as the "victorious" first one and characterized by a less popular and civilian nature mainly because the no so much active important participation of the civilians although the special circumstances for each one are maybe not totally taken into account.⁴⁸ Technically, as seen, the first one was not a siege in itself, just an imperfect blockade⁴⁹ lifted by Bailen's victory.

In this second one, none of the dispersed Spanish armies were in condition to support the city and Zaragoza returned back to be the Spanish resistance symbol. Local character was much over the war context. Trying to finish with the myth, a form of propaganda, they created maybe another bigger one. In this second part, there was a secret affective emotional law, the memorial honour.⁵⁰

Concerning possible Palafox's tactical errors,⁵¹ he concentrated 40,000 defenders in a place which could be defended by just 25,000...⁵² Military authorities of Zaragoza were convinced that locking up the troops in the city was

⁴⁷ Esposito and Elting, *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars*, Map 91.

⁴⁸ Maybe this participation was not as important as in the first one during the external phase and they were reserving some energy for the next phase inside the city but, anyway, the efforts were more than important. Even that, the inner fight took 23 days in comparison with 10 days during the first siege, maintaining the fight until the last moments.

⁴⁹ Priego, *Cómo fue la Guerra de la Independencia*, 330-332

⁵⁰ "The dead of the first siege called their alive counterparts of the second..." Gregorio Cayuela Fernández and José Ángel Gallego Palomares, *La guerra de la Independencia. Historia Bélica. Pueblo y nación en España 1808-1814* (Salamanca, Eds. Universidad, 2008), 195.

⁵¹ Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War*, 141.

⁵² The Spanish Reserve forces had been concentrated in Zaragoza included some other troops from Valencia and Murcia, a considerable force organized and relatively disciplined able even to operate in some tactical actions. This fact also feeds the controversy of the possibility to have made some exits to harass the enemy or not. Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 317-318.

harmful but nothing was done.⁵³ He didn't neither make any big scale sorties⁵⁴ nor took good profit of the three weeks' French delay. His conduct has been sometimes judged as controversial, but, anyway, he will always be morally attached to Zaragoza. As important psychological agent during both sieges, he wrote a lot of public proclamations, psychological actions to increase the morale and to counter indiscipline acts.⁵⁵ No unity among the Spanish commanders without a Supreme Commander also favored civilian disorders and indiscipline, which lacked some efficacy in the heroic resistance.

Table 3: ZARAGOZA 'S SECOND SIEGE 'S TIME CHART

⁵³ "*Palafox was fluctuating and undecided*": Agustín Alcaide Ibieca, *Historia de los dos Sitios que pusieron a Zaragoza en los años de 1808 y 1809 las tropas de Napoleón*. (Madrid: Imprenta de D.M. de Burgos, 1830 Facsímil, 2 vol., suplemento y erratas), II: 46.

⁵⁴ Oman qualifies Palafox of not being a very capable officer but not as a coward or a marionette of someone... although his personal influence with continuous harangues and proclamations was important for the population, maybe more typical for a patriot than for a military. He was able to link population and regular Army: Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War*, 142.

⁵⁵ "*These speeches maybe higher quality than his military leadership*". Ronald Fraser, *La maldita Guerra de España. Historia social de la Guerra de la Independencia 1808-1814* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), 359.

No	10 Eylül										11 Eylül										12 Eylül										13 Eylül										14 Eylül									
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Surrender – End

The impossible resistance left the city in ruins, completely destroyed and full of corpses. Around 54,000 losses (soldiers and civilians) were registered. Palafox, sick, proposed a three days' truce, denied by Lannes. He finally resigned giving the power to the Junta on possible negotiations for capitulation, controversial issue although most part of the population was in favour to surrender. On 20 February started the negotiation conditions and, after Lannes's agreement⁵⁶, Zaragoza finally surrendered. Next day on 21 February, General Lejeune and the rest of the French Army were in formation to witness the exit with honours of the defenders. 8,000 people of the garrison were authorized to leave the city.⁵⁷ Defenders left out the city leaving their arms with or without uniforms by Portillo's Gate in the presence of Lannes.⁵⁸ Compassion and respect were seen in the faces of the French units. Palafox was imprisoned and conducted to Vincennes (France). On 22 February Lannes entered discreetly Zaragoza to attend a mass in the cathedral. The city surrendered but the war still went on.⁵⁹ French troops stayed in Zaragoza until 1813 in Aljafería's Castle and the conditions of capitulation in general were accomplished with some particular exceptions.

Summary and Final Conclusions

As stated in my foreword, I try to focus not in the more military issues but mainly just on urban, social and populations' effects' conclusions.

Sieges were a typical feature of the Independence War, maybe due to orographic reasons combined with the poor agriculture which didn't allow French mobility. This war also reflected the tendency to "total war" which characterized Napoleonic Wars and Zaragoza was the maximum example.⁶⁰ As a strategic

⁵⁶ He also was a bit obliged to end the terrible fight.

⁵⁷ At the capitulation, 21 flags and standards were also taken by the French (Invalides).

⁵⁸ Gómez de Arceche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 505.

⁵⁹ Lafoz, *Los Sitios. Zaragoza en la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1809)*, 89.

⁶⁰ José Herrero Vicente, "Vencedores y vencidos" in Serrano Montalvo (2008), *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza* (Zaragoza, 1958), 506. (also in *Revista de Historia Militar* n. 91).

enclave, when Napoleon knew that Zaragoza has upraised, its conquest was a priority, a clear example of the improvisation and meditated calculation in the first moments of this War, allowing time to organize the Spanish resistance and defence.

But Zaragoza's case was also special: During the first siege, no big defensive walls, scarce garrison and artillery men with a mixture between soldiers and armed civilians which stopped the French direct assaults; during the second one, building parallel trenches techniques and a mines' war also during the internal final house-to-house phase with new types of operations (barricades, fortification of houses by armed garrisons), a form of combat for which they were not prepared but rapidly adapted... the unique case of fighting so many days within the city, the unique big city sieged and the only place where convents were fortified in a modern way during the war.⁶¹

As in the rest of Spain, in Zaragoza, the society was divided and fractured. It was an agrarian community, artisans and guilds with not too much power, some nobles and a powerful clergy, a prominent state in the Spanish XVIIIth century who influenced the conduct of the population.⁶² Also they received some influence of the *Illustration* ("*les lumières*"), European (French) movement with different answers.⁶³ The "*Juntas*" joined the four classical arms of the society: Church, nobles, gentleman and university or council. Military and civilian authorities were in a controversial situation to follow the recommendations of the "*Supreme Junta*" accepting the invasion or uprising, but just few of them took the second option!

The defence of the city, after all, was a military mistake. Tactically, Palafox thought that the defence should be from and not outside the city, maybe still confident in external support. For Zaragoza's population, the city in itself was a trench. The Spanish discover the value of the *barricade* to stop the French superiority. The tenacity of the defenders stuck to the ruins made the advance more difficult which facilitated the French failure in Zaragoza. The city, at the end capitulated by epidemics, an extreme example of the sieges during this

⁶¹ Escribano, *Los sitios en la Península Ibérica (1808-1814): Mucho más que mitos*, 224.

⁶² Serrano, "El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades", in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 56.

⁶³ Guillermo Pérez Sarrión, "Una sociedad dividida y fracturada" in Serrano, 51-52.

Independence War. The capital itself became the international symbol of the popular resistance, a global resistance spirit.⁶⁴ The “zaragozanos” were ready to fight until dead because the fidelity to their homeland, to the Virgin and to their King.

Without any doubt, the person of General Palafox was the soul of both sieges, inducing unexpected reactions because of his presence or words. He multiplied inventions and fortune solutions. Outside everything was destroyed but inside almost everything was collected for producing powder or protecting walls.⁶⁵ Sometimes criticised but always understood.⁶⁶ Maybe, also Napoleon was obsessed by discrediting him, but probably he also learned from the Zaragoza’s resistance.⁶⁷

His principles for population as defence against tyranny, freedom and nation were combined with other more classical myths as religion, monarchy and tradition. People of Zaragoza were also stimulated not only by the Palafox’s allocutions but also supported by the clergy. They were exercising a popular authority that someone has considered as part of the XIXth Century’s revolutionary cycle in Aragon.⁶⁸ Rumours were also frequent and he tried to send papers and messages to the different nationalities of Napoleonic armies inviting them to desertion with false news on war in other fronts.⁶⁹

Thousands of Spanish women took also an important active part in civilian resistance, particularly in the defence of the city. Most of them tended the wounded, cooked and brought forward ammunition or water, but others even took up arms beside the men. The individual episode of *Agustina* lifted the morale of the defenders and was the binder of many other anonymous individual actions.

⁶⁴ Pedro Rújula, “El levantamiento popular de Zaragoza” in Serrano, 32.

⁶⁵ This was a marginal solution for small cities and not valid in big scenarios like Paris, Moscow or Saint Petersburg against modern motorized armies.

⁶⁶ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 510.

⁶⁷ Serrano, “El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades”, in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 208-209.

⁶⁸ Serrano, “El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades”, in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 13.

⁶⁹ Something similar was also repeated in Spanish Civil War in 1936 (Toledo).

⁷⁰ Monks were also deeply involved and convents were usually strongholds, improvised hospitals or ammunition stores.

On health and medical assistance, as capital of Aragon in 1808, Zaragoza had the most important healthy institutions of the time to warranty the assistance to the population⁷¹ but nothing was prepared for the first siege or former combats, relapsing the assistance on the civilian centres of the city or on the spontaneous surgeons which finished to invent tactical procedures keeping as close as possible to the front.⁷² No health specialist was part of the *Junta* which could have been useful. Nonetheless, after the first siege, some measures were taken in October 1808 as part of a militarization for the second siege (Health Commission): Small first aid kits in units, centralization of hospitals, health echelons and other improvised measures.⁷³ On the other side, the French bombing of hospitals was part of the psychologic war.⁷⁴

In another context, the war can be seen as part of a internal political Revolution (Spain and America) whose first phase was 1808-1814, giving to the Spanish liberalism a specific mythical model, the new 1812's Constitution, an emotional nationalism and a union between liberals and the Army, a special relation between "*militarism*" and "*civilism*".⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814, II: 562-563: "*Las mujeres de Zaragoza, animadas así, se organizaron en compañías y se dividieron los distintos barrios de la ciudad que debían de defender*".

⁷¹ Luis Alfonso Arcarazo García, "La Sanidad Militar Española a comienzos del siglo XIX. La organización de la asistencia médica durante los Sitios de Zaragoza (1808-1809)" in *Revista de Historia Militar* (Madrid, IHCM., nº extraordinario, 2009), 68-73.

⁷² Arcarazo, "La Sanidad Militar Española a comienzos del siglo XIX. La organización de la asistencia médica durante los Sitios de Zaragoza (1808-1809)" in *Revista de Historia Militar* (2009), 47.

⁷³ Arcarazo, "La Sanidad Militar Española a comienzos del siglo XIX. La organización de la asistencia médica durante los Sitios de Zaragoza (1808-1809)" in *Revista de Historia Militar* (2009), 59-73.

⁷⁴ Just in one day, the assistance could reach 13,000 patients. Arcarazo: "La asistencia sanitaria en Los Sitios" in Serrano, "*El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades*", 37.

⁷⁵ Maybe one of the conclusions of the war, will be the military pretension of holding power, as depositaries of the national will in a new counter-revolutionary phase, deeply studied later by Professor Seco Serrano.

Our *Peninsular War* was one of the longest Napoleonic campaigns but military conquest cannot always give the political victory as it was the case.⁷⁶ Anyway, the war was a national catastrophe with a very negative impact in urban areas, completely devastated being rebuilt in the next years and century.⁷⁷ Casualties and victims were huge entailing a national and local social tragedy.

Finally, on the literature and arts' repercussions of these events, although the best praise for Zaragoza were the Lannes' words close to his death in Essling⁷⁸ and General Lejeune's, an historic and epic event like these sieges had a lot of influence in literature, theatre, poetry and opera or music (folklore), painting and cinema: Goya (notary of horror), Galdós, Richard Ford (counter vision), Locke, Ticknor, Byron, Hugo, Jardiel, Chomón or, even, Marshal Lannes or General Lejeune⁷⁹ themselves as witnesses of the events for the future.

130 years are the separation between the end of Napoleonic Wars and WWII, a period of changes earmarked by some continuity elements. With the Napoleonic manoeuvre and mobility, siege's war seems to be ended although still in WWI enormous defensive lines were created (Maginot), even in WWII (Atlantic Wall) considering cities as fortifications. In Zaragoza, Palafox showed a big merit and determination as General Lannes writes in his letters,⁸⁰

⁷⁶ David Chandler, *Las campañas de Napoleón. Un emperador en el campo de batalla. De Tolón a Waterloo (1796-1815)* (Madrid, La Esfera de los libros, 2005), 702.

⁷⁷ Nonetheless, curiously, at the end, the French presence also produced a change of character in the life of the city of Zaragoza. Suchet, military, cultivated and good leader, was the highest French authority in Zaragoza and his most important goal was to normalize the life in the city. During the next five years, the life of the population was under the influence of the Empire. In 1813, in silence, all French left exploding the main bridge, with the exception of 400, some still injured in hospitals. Rújula, *La Zaragoza francesa (1809-1813)* in Serrano "El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades", in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 236.

⁷⁸ Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Guerra de la Independencia: Historia militar de España de 1808 a 1814*, II: 513-514. "¡Qué guerra! ¡Qué hombres! Un sitio a cada calle; una mina bajo cada casa. ¡Verse obligado a matar a tantos valientes, o mejor, a tantos furiosos! Aquella guerra es horrible: se lo he escrito al Emperador; la victoria da pena".

⁷⁹ Serrano, "El pueblo en la Guerra de la Independencia: La resistencia en las ciudades", in *La Guerra de la Independencia Española y Los Sitios de Zaragoza*, 245-278.

⁸⁰ "Never Sire, I had seen so much endeavour in the enemy to defend a city. I have seen women come to die in the wall. Sire it's a war that provokes horror..."

something that also will take place later on in 1936 during the Spanish Civil War (Toledo's Alcazar) and similar epic conducts in other sieges.

Today, cities have proliferated with a lot of consequences in the evolution and preparation of war. 53% of the population lives in cities, normally big cities, which seem to indicate that war in the future, will happen mainly in these areas, not so much at the open country. The same nature of the city has changed and war is becoming more and more "civilian"... If true, our obligation will be to define adequate State security and defence's policies adapted to these new situations.⁸¹ But cities are always dangerous and suppose a lot of risks. No nation is completely able to totally protect its own cities. Soldiers hate mortal urban combat where everything is more "civilian". Tomorrow, peace should be urban, if not, cities still will be objectives to attack and to defend, a contradiction.

⁸¹ Dufour, *La guerre, la vie et le soldat*, 10.

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
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
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APPENDIX 2: PENINSULA'S INVASION & DEPLOYMENT
(Internet)



APPENDIX 3: ZARAGOZA'S 1ST SIEGE (Oman)⁸²



⁸² OMAN, Charles. *A history of the Peninsular War*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Vol. I, 1902), 160

Cities for the War, the Cantonment System in British India and its Impact on the Raj's Domestic and External Security

Gianluca Pastori (Italy)

1 - Since the half of the 18th century, the final decline of the Mughal empire allowed the British East India Company (EIC) to assert its territorial control over a wide span of Indian territory. After the battle of Buxar (1764), the Company was appointed the revenue collector (*diwan*) of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, becoming de facto the ruler of large areas of the lower Gangetic plain. The Anglo-Mysore Wars (1766-99) and the Anglo-Maratha Wars (1772-1818) left it in control of large areas south of the Sutlej River, while expansion continued in the northern territories: the North-Western Provinces (Rohilkhand, Gorakhpur, and the Doab; since 1902, merged with other territories, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) came under EIC's control in 1801, Delhi in 1803, Assam in 1828, and Sindh in 1843. Punjab, the north-west frontier, and Kashmir were annexed in 1849-56; Berar entered the EIC's domains in 1854 and Oudh in 1856.

2 - The spreading of the British dominion led to a parallel expansion of the Company's military instrument. Between 1796 and 1857, the EIC Army grew from 70,000 to 350,000 men, with the European/native ratio declining from 0.23 to 0.13. The development of the cantonment system went hand in hand with the process: Barrackpur (Barrackpore, near Calcutta) and Danapur (Dinapore, in Bihar) date to 1765; Dum Dum to 1783; Meerut, in today's Uttar Pradesh, and Secunderabad, in the Hyderabad district, to 1806; Kanpur (Cawnpore) to 1811; Pune (Poona), in today's Maharashtra, to 1817. In the following years, 'cantonmentisation' strictly followed territorial expansion. In 1839, Ferozepur was established on the eastern bank of the Sutlej River as the last British outpost facing the Sikh empire. After Ranjit Singh's death and the Anglo-Sikh wars (1845-46 and 1848-49), the process restarted in the recently annexed trans-Indus regions.

3 - Originally, cantonments were conceived as semi-permanent structures. At least in the early years, their establishment entailed some kind of

agreement with the local authorities, which tried to limit both the risks to their position coming from a foreign military presence and the contact between troops and the local population. For instance, in 1807, *nawab* Sadat Ali Khan allowed the establishment of the Mardiaon cantonment in Lucknow upon conditions that the cantonment was only for the British troops and followers; no market was to be erected for traders or merchants, no moneylenders or inhabitants of Lucknow could live in the cantonment without the *nawab*'s approval, no fortified building was allowed besides the officers' bungalows and the artillery depot, a ditch was to be dug to mark the cantonment's limits, and a *nawab*'s delegate was to station in the cantonment to collect news since the structure was built on *nawab*'s land.

4 - The 'Great Mutiny' (more properly, 'Indian rebellion') in 1857-58 affected the development of British India's military system in several ways. The disbandment of the EIC's armies and their replacement with a new military instrument (albeit still divided into the three 'Presidential armies' of Bombay, Madras and Bengal) heavily impacted its strength, ethnic balance, technical equipment, and European/native ratio. European troops' weight rose to one-third of the force in the 1860s, and artillery became de facto a European-only branch of service. Uniforms, weapons, and units' structure evolved to mirror a new, more 'Indian' identity. New ethnic groups replaced the old upper-caste Hindu and Muslim soldiers of the Bengal Army. In the same way, the units' geographic distribution evolved to cope with the new security needs of a country whose northern territories were growing increasingly important for the Raj's internal and external security.

5 - The cantonment system underwent a similar transformation. During the Mutiny, their large troops' concentration made cantonments one of the hotbeds of the rebellion, which started in Barrackpur and quickly spread to Agra (a cantonment since 1805), Allahabad, Ambala (a cantonment since 1825) and Meerut (a cantonment since 1803). Nonetheless, in the following years, they survived the reshuffle of the Indian security system. Separating troops from the civilian population emerged as their primary 'domestic' function. At the same time, they strengthened their role as an instrument to control the Indian element of the 'new' armies, together with a higher European presence, a different recruitment strategy and a careful balance of the different components of the nominally ethnically homogeneous units. The segregation between Europeans

and ‘natives’ became evident also in the cantonment’s structures, layout, spaces, and features.

6 - On the ‘external’ side, cantonments evolved into the pillars of the defensive network commanding the country’s turbulent north-western frontier and the springboard for projecting the Raj’s military potential towards Afghanistan and the other transborder ramparts. Since the 1860s, a new cantonment network was established west and north-west of Ferozepur, especially in today’s Pakistani Punjab, transforming the country into what one author called ‘the garrison state’¹. At the time of the Partition, in 1947, Pakistan inherited 23 cantonments. As a comparison, by the mid-1860s, there were some 54 cantonments in the whole territory of the present-day Republic of India. At the same time, recruitment increasingly focused on the north-western regions, supported by an ethnographic approach looking at Sikhs and Muslim peoples as more ‘warlike’ than the Hindu communities of the Gangetic plain and central and southern India.

7 - In any case, cantonments remained isolated and controlled environments, physically separated from the neighbouring civilian settlements. They were self-contained, with everything the troops needed, including shops, housing, barracks, hospitals, and other facilities. Even when the civilian settlements expanded, integrating the cantonments into the urban fabric, the latter preserved their own identity. With the Cantonments Act, 1864, *ad hoc* legislation developed to regulate cantonment life, land rights, and the status of the army followers living inside. Over time, legislation evolved (especially with the two Cantonments Acts, 1889 and 1924), often transferring to the Indian context the social, moral, and hygienic concerns of Victorian and post-Victorian Britain, with the underlying idea that both military efficiency and imperial prestige required tight control over Indian as well as European troops’ demeanour, especially when off-duty.

8 - From a military perspective, with the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the decline of the ‘Forward School’, the cantonment system emphasised its defensive traits. Military presence was strengthened near the main mountain

¹ T. Tai Yong, *The Garrison State. The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947*, Sage, New Delhi - Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005.

passes of the north-western frontier, with Quetta commanding the Bolan and Khojak and Peshawar controlling the southern tip of the Khyber. Heavily garrisoned, these strongholds were the pivots of the local defensive system, providing logistic and operational support to an articulated network of lesser positions. At the same time, major cantonments – such as Quetta, which was the seat of the British administration in Baluchistan since 1877 – assumed increasing administrative responsibilities. The road and railway network's improvement made connections faster and easier both among cantonments and between them and their outposts, allowing for a gradual disengagement of the most forward presence.

9 - The withdrawal behind the administrative border after the creation of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, 1901) also boosted the cantonments' role, putting them at the forefront of the British security system vis-a-vis the troublesome inhabitants of the tribal belt. In 1903-1909, the Kitchener reforms went in the same direction, linking the newly established Army of India's divisional structure to the cantonments' territorial distribution. With the external security of the north-western borders as its primary aim, the reform aggregated the existing troops into ten new divisions stationed in Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Quetta, Mhow, Poona, Meerut, Lucknow, Secunderabad and Burma, and four new independent brigades stationed in Kohat, Bannu, Derajat, and Aden². This new structure – which replaced the previous scattering of troops all over the Raj's territory – led some of the existing cantonments to increase their size dramatically.

10 - Although the 1922 Army's reform led to a new reshuffle of British India's military establishment, the cantonments' structure survived largely unscathed during the post-war period. Since the early 20th century, cantonments have officially evolved into permanent structures, while the Cantonments Act, 1924, transferred their administration to a partly elective Cantonment Authority. In 1948, India and Pakistan inherited this system, which has left a lasting imprint

² Eight divisions and the four independent brigades were banded in three territorial commands: Northern (Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Lahore Divisions plus the Kohat, Bannu, and Derajat Brigades), Western (Quetta, Mhow, and Poona Divisions), and Eastern (Meerut and Lucknow Divisions plus the Aden Brigade). The Army Headquarters retained direct control over the Secunderabad and Burma Divisions.

in both the military and civilian fields. Today, 61 cantonments in India, 56 in Pakistan, and 30 in Bangladesh embrace a fair share of these countries' urban areas. For instance, today, Karachi's six cantonments account for about 40% of the city's total area. However, although the cantonments' physical distribution highlights a strong external orientation, their domestic' function is still evident, confirming the critical role that 'law and order' considerations had in their establishment.

**“Bluffing On a Couple of Twos?:” Armored Cars
in the Jaffa Riots, 1921**

Gil Barndollar (USA)

Palestine was one of Britain’s spoils of the Great War – General Allenby’s Christmas present to the British people in a difficult year, 1917. Taken from the crumbling Ottoman Empire, it remained under British control after the war and the ensuing negotiations among Arabs, Zionists, Britain, and France.¹ Prized for both its symbolic value as the birthplace of Christendom and its strategic position as a safeguard to the Suez Canal, Palestine was given to Britain under the authority of a League of Nations mandate.

In Palestine, rising Arab nationalism, aided modestly by the role of Lawrence’s raiders in defeating the Turks, ran headlong into the growing power of Zionism. The two communities found themselves contending for power in a state whose very future, as a mandate, was open to question. Though the Balfour Declaration had committed Britain to the fostering of a Jewish ‘National Home’ in Palestine, the exact nature of this new entity was far from decided. While some Arabs were willing to tolerate a country of roughly equal Jewish and Arab numbers and political power, fears of Jewish domination grew as Jewish immigration into Palestine surged in the early interwar years.

After their distinguished service with Allenby’s army, armoured cars were a natural addition to the British garrison in Palestine. Following the 1920 reorganization of the former units of the Machine Gun Corps, the 4th Armoured Car Company was posted to the Mandate, with its headquarters at Jerusalem. Equipped with eight Admiralty pattern Rolls-Royces and thirty-seven Ford light cars armed with Lewis guns, the company was usually compelled by the terrain to stick to the roads in Palestine.² But in Palestine, unlike in the Arab states to

¹ For an account of the diplomacy that led Palestine’s post-war status, see Martin Sicker, *Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831-1922* (Westport, Connecticut, 1999), pp. 139-66

² Lieutenant-Colonel C.D.V. Cary-Barnard, ‘The Tank Corps in Egypt and Palestine’, *Tank Corps Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 42, October 1922, p. 161

the south and east, the population was concentrated in the urban centers. When outbreaks of sectarian violence occurred, they usually took place in the Mandate's cities, where the majority of the Jewish population lived.

Urban Peacekeeping

Riot policing and crowd control were and are missions detested by most soldiers. Lord Ironside undoubtedly spoke for the British Army as a whole when he said that 'for a soldier there is no more distasteful duty than that of aiding the Civil Power'.³ It was work that had to be done though, and done with a difficult mixture of speed and caution. As in all imperial policing tasks, constant stress was laid on the need to respond to revolt or disorder with the utmost speed. A veteran of the 1929 fighting in Palestine wrote, 'Looking back down the roadway of events, the point that stands out most clearly during the early days of the disturbances, is the immediate effect which the arrival of a handful of British troops had upon the excited inhabitants.'⁴

Despite fears of being trapped in narrow streets and overwhelmed by masses of rioters, armoured cars quickly came to be appreciated as extremely potent tools in quelling urban strife. The primary benefit was what was then called the 'moral effect': the armour and machine guns of the cars usually intimidated all but the most determined of civilians. Numerous accounts in newspapers, service journals, and the testimony of armoured car crewmen testify to this. An armoured car officer who faced sectarian violence in India said, 'Well, when they saw an armoured car they stopped. It was very effective. We never actually fired on them as such ... At least my troop didn't ... Things were burning and everything when we arrived. But they shut up like a shot just on the appearance and the thing quietened down.'⁵

³ Quoted in Jeffery, 'The British Army and Internal Security 1919-1939', p. 377

⁴ Captain A.W. Lee, 'Reflections on the Recent Disturbances in Palestine', *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1930, p. 45

⁵ IWM transcript of interview with Colonel G.J. Kidston-Montgomerie of Southannan, reel 02, pp. 21-22

Communal violence in Palestine, though intermittent and usually low level, began before the mandate was even firmly established, with the deaths of five Jews and four Arabs in April 1919.⁶ There was little the military could do about the occasional stabbing or shooting; large-scale fighting and rioting were where the Palestine garrison could earn its keep: ‘When there was a riot going on we’d just blaze away with machine guns over their heads and it stopped. And we held on to vital posts and points of supply and things like that, and so that the two could not get together and make a little war of it.’⁷ Despite strict injunctions by Army regulations not to do so, at least one interwar Middle East armoured car veteran recalled that ‘we would also carry blank ammunition; we let off blank ammunition it didn’t hurt anybody and as soon as they heard that they’d run.’⁸

Armoured cars were also important for their other moral effect, on the policemen they were aiding: ‘when the police felt that it was getting out of hand or that a crowd of a few thousand were collecting in a place and being worked up by some agitators in the background, that the presence of some armoured cars behind the police, not going into the crowd, might have its salutary effect’.⁹ There was a close link between armoured cars and the infantry in riot control, with the standard procedure being ‘that the infantry covered the armoured cars so that the mobs didn’t get too close to you. And you covered the infantry so that they didn’t get over-run by the mobs themselves, covered them by fire if that was necessary.’¹⁰ Urban policing and riot control, therefore, reinforced the value of combined-arms operations and reminded mechanized soldiers that their machines were not invulnerable, even on a battlefield where most of the enemy combatants were unarmed.

⁶ Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate*, p. 80

⁷ IWM transcript of interview with MSM Lewis Harold Porter Harper, reel 05, p. 56

⁸ IWM transcript of interview with MSM Lewis Harold Porter Harper, reel 05, p. 55; on the strict ban on the use of blanks, see NA WO 279/468 – Duties in aid of the civil power 1929 and IWM *Military Training Pamphlet No. 11 (India), Notes on Training for Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1941*, p. 11.

⁹ IWM transcript of interview with Major-General K.C. Cooper, reel 03, p. 24

¹⁰ IWM transcript of interview with Major-General K.C. Cooper, reel 03, p. 26

British doctrine called for breaking up crowds: ‘In all dealings with mobs it must be understood that a mob will never become dangerous or purposeful unless it has been formed some time. If a crowd can be kept moving and any small collections broken up, the formation of the crowd will be prevented.’¹¹ There was, in theory, an orderly progression of steps, each increasingly aggressive. A captain who had served in riots in Shanghai explained how this worked for infantry on the scene: ‘Intimidation, by the mere arrival and disciplined action of the platoon, may be sufficient in itself. This can be followed by the use of lachrymatory gas, followed by the use of batons, then the bayonet and lastly by fire, each and all under the *absolute* and *direct* control of the commander.’¹²

There were those who argued that armoured cars could only be a bloody tool of coercion. Even some armoured car crewmen felt this way. Major General N.W. Duncan of the RTC, despite having spent some time with armoured cars, judged them ‘virtually useless for crowd control ... its only offensive possibility is a gun. And if you’re going to use guns on that scale then you are going to have something like the Amritsar Massacre all over again.’¹³ Duncan termed the use of armoured cars in civil disturbances ‘bluffing on a couple of twos’.

Captain E.H. Grant wrote in the *Army Quarterly*: ‘In times of civil disturbance personality and tact are often more effective than ruthless force, which often leaves unhealed scars behind it: the British private soldier is world famous for his cheery good-fellowship under the most trying conditions; to imagine a tank being tactful is merely humorous.’¹⁴ The reply, in the same pages, was that tact and humour, ‘admirable as they are, are somewhat easier of exercise for a man with a good solid wall of steel between himself and the rioters, than

¹¹ Captain and Brevet-Major H.P. Radley, ‘The Suppression of Riots’, *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Volume 58, No. 250, January 1928, p. 33

¹² Radley, ‘The Suppression of Riots’, p. 30. Indian doctrine, on the other hand, later stressed that fire and the threat of fire were to be relied upon, and that it was ‘definitely wrong’ to allow troops to come into physical contact with crowds; see IWM *Military Training Pamphlet No. 11 (India), Notes on Training for Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1941*, pp. 8, 10.

¹³ IWM transcript of interview with Major General N.W. Duncan, reel 07, p. 84

¹⁴ Captain E.H. Grant, ‘Looking Ahead’, *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 1934, p. 44

for one standing unprotected in a street, disturbed and exasperated by stones and bottles flying past his head'.¹⁵

The Jaffa Riots of May 1921 came early in the Mandate's history and were a relatively serious threat to communal peace in Palestine. Thanks to the *Tank Corps Journal* there is a more complete account of the Jaffa Riots than of most similar events in Palestine, and, slightly biased though it may be, it shows the value of armoured cars in urban imperial policing.

The Jaffa Riots actually began as a clash between Bolshevik and Labour Party Jews; when the members of the Jewish Labour Party chased their communist co-religionists into mixed Arab and Jewish quarters, the Arabs thought they were under attack and launched themselves at both Jewish factions. The men of the 4th Armoured Car Company's headquarters and No. 1 Section had mostly been relaxing at the time, as 1 May was a Sunday. Some of the men were off in the city (Jerusalem) or the country, but the majority 'repartook of a siesta.'¹⁶ When the call came in from the Commanding Officer in Jerusalem at 3.20 pm, needless to say, the crews of the cars were not in parade ground attire, nor were they in much of a mind for combat. Nonetheless,

In eight and a half minutes from the receipt of the telephone message, three Rolls armoured cars and two Rolls tenders, fully armed and manned with wondrous crews, some men with and some without coats, one man in running shorts, a sergeant with only one puttee, a lance-corporal with his shirt outside where it should have been inside, and so on, pulled up outside the general's house.¹⁷

The telephone message had been garbled, and the officers and men of No. 1 Section had been under the impression that the trouble was in Jerusalem. Told they had to make the forty-mile drive to Jaffa as rapidly as possible, they were naturally dismayed. Yet, led by a commanding officer wearing a cricket shirt, shorts, and blue and red soccer stockings, they set off with as much haste as possible. The drive to Jaffa, despite the excellent condition of the road, was

¹⁵ Captain E.W. Sheppard, 'Seeing Ahead', *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1, October 1934, p. 110

¹⁶ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921, as seen from an Armoured Car Officer's Point of View', *Tank Corps Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 51, July 1923, p. 77

¹⁷ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921', *Tank Corps Journal*, pp. 77-8

anything but easy. The *Tank Corps Journal*'s anonymous correspondent related the journey of one of the tenders:

Except for about two miles, the road is downhill for nearly 15 miles; but interspaced at varying distances are a series of remarkable hairpin and double hairpin turns, guaranteed to give thrills to even the most initiated. It was one of the maddest drives imaginable, all accelerator and brakes and no happy medium, the crew hanging on for grim death, waiting spellbound for the impending crash that should have occurred about 40 times into donkey, camel or Jew's Ford, whichever might be the unfortunate one; however, it did not happen....¹⁸

Once into Jaffa, the quiet Rollsies sneaked into the middle of full-fledged street combat, and, with klaxons blaring and belts and pickaxe handles in the hands of the crewmen, set about dispersing the mob. The impact was immediate: 'It was ever so simple; the crowd just disappeared, like a shovelful of snow on a red-hot stove.'¹⁹ The cars spent the rest of the day roaming the city, dispersing crowds with physical force and the occasional warning burst of machine-gun fire, and arresting miscreants. There is disagreement about whether armoured cars or the infantry of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment were the first into Jaffa, with the *Tank Corps Journal* stating that the cars were the first to the scene, and the High Commissioner for Palestine's telegram reserving the leading role to the infantry.²⁰ Regardless, it is clear that just a four car section of the 4th Armoured Car Company had a dramatic effect in ending the unrest in Jaffa.

The rioting flared up again the next day, and civil strife in the area would continue for the next two weeks, but the worst of the storm had been weathered. With the proclamation of martial law, the cars were free to use their weapons when necessary, which added to the terror they caused in even the largest mobs.

The rapidity with which the cars could respond to trouble, amply demonstrated on 1 May, never flagged. Lieutenant Colonel C.D.V. Cary-Barnard, the Commanding Officer for the armoured cars of Egypt and Palestine, praised the vigilance of his crews in Palestine: 'They were always the first to be called upon in an emergency, and the last to be dismissed; and often, for weeks

¹⁸ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921', *Tank Corps Journal*, p. 78

¹⁹ 'The Jaffa Riots, May, 1921', *Tank Corps Journal*, p. 79

²⁰ See 'The Jaffa Riots: Communist Jews Start Trouble', *The Times*, 4 May 1921, p. 9

at a time, they “stood by” ready to turn out at five minutes’ notice. Indeed, one section in Palestine had a sub-section “standing by” at five minutes’ notice for over a year, and were frequently timed by their brigade commander for practice.²¹ In this type of action, where an immediate response could often defuse a volatile situation, just ‘a handful of troops’ – or a pair of armoured cars – ‘were more valuable than thousands a day late’.²²

Palestine’s armoured cars, possessed of a speed of response and radius of action far beyond that of any other available arm, had proved themselves uniquely valuable during the Jaffa Riots. The following year, armoured cars were a great aid in pre-empting sectarian violence, when an Easter pilgrimage of armed Arabs to Moses’ supposed tomb, a procession that had caused bloodshed in the past, was shepherded by armoured cars and kept out of trouble.²³ The Mandate would remain relatively calm for the next three years, before renewed riots and then, in 1929, open rebellion among the Arabs.

²¹ Cary-Barnard, ‘The Tank Corps in Egypt and Palestine’, p. 162

²² Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, p. 231

²³ ‘No. 4 Armoured Car Company’, *Tank Corps Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 39, July 1922, pp. 68-9

**Urban Warfare in a Village. Theory, Course and Legacy
of the Battle of Bazeilles 1870**

Heiner Bröckermann (Germany)

Abstract

The German Doctrinal Principles for the Command and Control of Land Forces have their origins in the Prussian Army of the late 19th century. In modern war, the loss of an overall control forced military leaders like Helmuth von Moltke the Elder to develop principles for leading large armies in the field. Military practice and field manuals became the basis for a common understanding of operational/tactical command in the German land forces across all command levels. Although there has always been combat action over localities, the theme of warfare in urban spaces was gradually incorporated into field manuals at the end of the 19th century. In this light, the Battle of Bazeilles as part of the Battle of Sedan in the Franco-German War of 1870/71 was soon evaluated in Germany as one of the first modern examples of urban warfare. The most recent German “Command and Control of Land Forces” regulation describes urban warfare more or less as a mixture of everything in a nutshell. Leaders and troops operate within a short period of time or even in parallel with different and changing intensities, if necessary also in different types of operations. The behaviour of the population is mostly unpredictable, and rapid changes in the situation increase complexity and dynamics. Mission-type command and control and freedom in mission accomplishment are particular characteristics of operations in urban areas. The lowest tactical units are often the mainstay of the battle in urban operations. With a view to old and new theories, the lecture reconstructs the contemporary evaluation of the battle and deconstructs parts of the legacy associated with Bazeilles to this day.

Keywords: Urban Warfare, German Army, Bazeilles, Sedan, Franco-German War 1870/71

Introduction

The "Command and Control of Land Forces" military regulation, which was revised in 2022, has been a required reading for line and general staff officers of the army for nearly a hundred years. The regulation contains the traditional German command and control philosophy and associated command and control principles. Urban warfare is still a relatively new topic. In the German language, the term "urban warfare" has many equivalents: *Orts- und Häuserkampf* (combat in built-up areas), *Straßenkampf* (street battle), *Ortsgefecht* (urban engagement) or *Stadtkampf* (urban combat). From today's perspective, it seems astonishing that German armies before World War I considered urban warfare a rather negligible type of warfare.

¹ In addition, even then the sub-concepts of the topic from individual houses to large cities, mixed with operational principles, support requirements, commitment of forces and command echelons. Hybrid wars, digitalisation and cross-dimensional conduct of operations make it absolutely necessary today to take a look at the aspects of urban warfare. War takes place where people live and in regions that are important to people. It is assumed that in the future urban areas will become even more important to warfare.

The classic example of urban warfare in the armies of the German Empire before World War I dates back to the Franco-German War of 1870/71. It was the brutal episode of the fighting at Bazeilles during the Battle of Sedan. And what the "Command and Control of Land Forces" regulations describe today also had been the challenge in the fighting for built-up areas back then:

"Urban areas force commanders and troops to operate within a short period of time or even in parallel with different and varying intensities, and in different types of operations, if necessary. The often unpredictable behaviour of the population and the resulting rapid changes in the situation solidify complexity and dynamics. Mission-type command and control and freedom in mission accomplishment are particular characteristics of the conduct of operations in

¹ Adrian E. Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2014), 26-31.

urban areas. The lowest tactical levels are often the mainstay of combat in urban operations”.²

Typical aspects of the battle for built-up areas are: the employment of small combat units, the hampering troop movements, the dominance of close combat and the high probability of civilians influencing one’s own warfare in different ways, right up to active resistance. Plans must provide for limited command and control and restricted communication as well as for an urban battlefield that changes unpredictably as a result of destructions. The structural possibilities offered by a built-up area can grant inferior defenders temporary superiority. On the whole, combat in built-up areas is seen as an immense effort in terms of personnel and material with the risk of high losses and moral attrition among both the attacker and the defender.³

Combat in small localities or villages is usually done with small units and subunits only. Ordinarily, this refers only to problems of tactical command and control but not military operations. In the Franco-German War of 1870/71, however, a small village gained notoriety: Bazeilles. It is located on the outskirts of the town of Sedan, and in 1870 the vicinity of the fortress of Sedan was the reason for the importance of the village for coherence in the conduct of operations within the framework of a decisive battle of the war. And while Sedan became the symbol of the defeat of the French Empire and the reason for a German national holiday, Bazeilles became the symbol of the French will to resist and of a brutal German or Bavarian war furore. Although France was a "military loser", the example of Bazeilles made them feel as "moral victor".⁴

The Short History of Urban Warfare

The German history of urban warfare in modern military history is rather short. For Friderician Prussia, the decision needed to be sought in the open field. In the 18th century, built-up areas were considered unsuitable for the conduct of

² Kommando Heer, *Truppenführung. C1-160/0-1001*, (Strausberg: Bundeswehr, 2022), (16029) 133.

³ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 29-30. In his list, Weinstein refers to the research done by Gregory John Ashford on cities in war.

⁴ Karine Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat. The War of 1870–71 in French Memory*, (Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 18, 174.

operations and were therefore avoided. If anything, light or free infantry battalions were considered suitable for a forced fight in built-up areas. On the other hand, battle orders were occasionally placed adjacent to built-up areas because as quasi blank space in the conduct of operations they were regarded as secure pillars of the vulnerable flanks. Even as early as in the 18th century, the military intended to torch buildings to further increase the obstacle effect of built-up areas.⁵

In the Napoleonic wars, the alleged protective character of built-up areas was used, for instance, to remove reserves in the rear from enemy fire. Battles with built-up areas were also regarded as a possibility to contain enemy forces that would not be available in the decisive battle. These were usually battles that used above all the outskirts of built-up areas. Built-up areas could also serve as a kind of brake for the assault wave. With well-defended individual farms and villages, as could be observed in the Battle of Waterloo near Hougomont, La Haye Saint and Plancenoit in 1815, troops had contained considerable superior forces. The battles of the Wars of Liberation also show how the battle for built-up areas could virtually "swallow" larger formations, for example at Großgörschen/Lützen and Leipzig in 1813 as well as at Ligny in 1815.⁶

The industrialization and the development of the artillery caused the concepts of towns as fortified squares change towards considerations to fortify the town itself and larger buildings and installations for defence where the original fortification belts had fallen victim to town expansions. At the same time, modern infantry armament had given the defenders of built-up areas more advantages in terms of ranges and firepower. This is exemplified in the defence position of a bowling alley in a vanguard engagement near Frohnhofen in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. There, the Prussian losses of 65 troops were opposed to the loss of about 700 men in the attacking Hessian brigade. In the Franco-German war, too, combat in built-up areas was already a much-noticed aspect of the first battles of Wissembourg, Woerth and St. Privat. An engineer

⁵ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 35; Friedrich Immanuel, "Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften. Kriegstechnische Betrachtungen aus der neuesten Kriegsgeschichte," *Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift*, no. 7, 8 (1916), 149.

⁶ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 35-36; Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 150-152.

company had been assigned to the divisions to prepare built-up areas for the defence, and individual soldiers in the infantry battalions were to receive special training for this purpose.⁷

The analysis of the Franco-German War of 1870/71 was intended to contribute to the further development of doctrinal ideas about fighting in built-up areas in the German armies. Colonel Friedrich Immanuel (1857-1939) was one of the leading military writers in this respect who discussed this topic several times in comparisons.⁸

For Immanuel, the fighting in and around Bazeilles in 1870 as part of the Battle of Sedan was a classic example of addressing fighting in built-up areas. At the same time, in the run-up to World War I, it was assumed that in consequence of the development of artillery the defence of a built-up area was doomed from the outset and could therefore be disregarded. However, if it needed to be taken into account than it was a task primarily for the engineer corps to deal with. Even during terrain exercises, built-up areas were usually disregarded. After all, by that time the experiences of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War had also been included in the analysis of combat in built-up areas. The significance of indirect artillery fire and the future value of built-up areas in the defence remained a matter of controversy. The Prussian Drill Regulations for the Infantry of 1906, therefore, contained only a few sentences on the topic in paragraph 434: "Massive, tenaciously defended built-up areas can become focal points of the battle. But one should take care not to accumulate too many assets in the built-up area itself." And the experiences of the attackers and defenders in the battles of 1870/71 were summarised in regulations in similar length in paragraphs 436 to 438:

⁷ Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 37-38; Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 152-153.

⁸ Friedrich Immanuel became an officer in the Prussian infantry in 1879. A general staff officer since 1904, he was retired as colonel in 1919. During his term of service, Immanuel had been an instructor at the War Academy and a regiment commander in World War I, among other things. He became known, however, as a military writer and editor of many specialist books. In addition, 44 articles in military journals were identified as having been written by him; Christian Haller. "Fachautoren in Militärzeitschriften der Weimarer Republik," *Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte*, no. 14 (2012): 126.

"If the enemy enters the built-up area, every section, every farmstead shall be defended. The reserves shall expel the hostile intruder with melee weapons. Expediently, the attacker will have stronger elements advance on the flanks of the built-up area from the outset. The artillery shall prepare the assault thoroughly; indirect fire is desired. Once the outskirts of the built-up area are taken, the intruding detachments seek to follow hard on the heels of the enemy and to use their melee weapons to push their ways through to the other side. They also need to work their way forward outside the streets through gardens and farms. Smaller elements shall be left out to seize the farmsteads that are still held by the enemy".⁹

Paragraphs 74 to 76 of the Regulation on Field Fortifications were also dedicated to the defence of a built-up area:

"Key points are intended to prevent the hostile intruder from advancing further and to facilitate the recapture of the village. For this purpose, the defender selects fixed buildings or farmsteads in open places and road junctions and strongly fortifies them. A second line of defence in the interior can only be considered where wide roads, open squares or creeks cut through the village, in parallel to the defence front. They are set up in a similar way to that of the boundary with numerous passages being left open. Where a minority is exposed to surprise attacks or is expected to mount continuous resistance, it may be advisable to place the defence into fixed buildings rather than on the outskirts. The defence capability of the latter must then be brought to the highest possible level so that the battle can be continued even in the event of a full envelopment."¹⁰

It was only in consequence of World War I that definitions were developed later in the Wehrmacht which slowly approach what is currently understood by the term "urban warfare". The army manual *Heeresdruckvorschrift 300* describes the "urban engagement" as follows:

⁹ Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 145-147, 160, citations on 145 and 160; Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 45.

¹⁰ Quoted in Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, *Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906. Kriegsgeschichtlich erläutert*, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1907), 219.

"Fighting for built-up areas happens frequently in battle, and it can shape the battle in densely populated areas. The importance of built-up areas in a battle depends on their location in the terrain as well as on their architecture and size. Connected groups of buildings, such as extensive industrial and mining facilities, are equally important as built-up areas. Towns and cities can also become combat areas.¹¹

Bazeilles 1870

Bazeilles with its stone buildings, the surrounding gardens and parks, including hedges and walls, as well as the small river Givonne was suitable for defence. The chateaus of Dorival and Monvillers were large buildings on the outskirts of the village, and Villa Beurmann was located on a fork in the centre of the village and offered excellent capabilities for action along the main street of Bazeilles. The Givonne river, in addition to hedges and walls, channelled the movements of the troops in the park of Monvillers. Bazeilles was located on the route from the German crossings over the Meuse toward the fortress of Sedan, and as a built-up area it channelled the troop movements to either bypass the village or move through its centre on the connecting road. On the far side of the village, there were the villages of Balan and La Moncelle.¹²

Général de Division Barthélémy Lebrun was in command of the French 12th Corps near Bazeilles, and since 1869 he had also been aide to Emperor Napoleon III. Lebrun described the battle in his memoirs. The 2nd French Infantry Division of Général de Division Lacretelle took up positions at La Moncelle. Behind them, east of Sedan there was the 1st French Infantry Division of Général de Division Granchamp. The newly formed "Blue Division" of the Marine Infantry (3e Division de Marche de l'Infanterie) of Général de Division Élie de Vassoigne was tasked with the defence of Bazeilles. The Marine Infantry Brigade of Brigadier General Charles Martin des Pallières was employed on site, and the 1st Marine Infantry Brigade of Brigadier General François Reboul was initially deployed west of Bazeilles near Balan with five artillery batteries. Martin de Pallières was wounded on 31 August. In the morning of 1 September,

¹¹ *H.Dv. 300. Truppenführung* (225), citation in Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 28.

¹² Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 158; Freytag-Loringhoven, *Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906*, 220.

Reboul assumed battle command in the north of Bazeilles as well as between Bazeilles and Balan. The French had focussed their defence primarily on the main road in the village of Bazeilles and on the Villa Beurmann there, and had not intended to mount an all-round defence. In addition, barricades had been set up in the village.¹³

Two Bavarian corps, including the 1st Bavarian Army Corps of General of the Infantry von der Tann, were subordinate to the Commanding General of the German Third Army, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm. On 28 August, the Crown Prince had already committed his experiences and views on civilians who participated in battle in an irregular manner to his diary. According to this entry, at the time the German troops were already “maliciously” and “cowardly” ambushed by individuals. Countermeasures were to include torching of houses from which shots are fired, taking of civilian hostages or demanding contributions. For the day of Battle of Sedan, the Crown Prince had ordered the First Bavarian Army Corps to “detain the enemy and cooperate with the Army of the Meuse” without further specification.¹⁴

Originally, the fights surrounding Bazeilles are an example of the problems in war, here they mean “incompetence and confusion”. At first, French Marshal Patrice de MacMahon had emphasised the significance of the place by issuing a stand-fast order to the 12th Corps of Général Lebruns. The village was to be retained, and maybe there would be a chance to break through and attack in south-eastern direction toward Mouzon. The envelopment attack of the Germans put the significance of Bazeilles into perspective. Moreover, it was not yet clear whether the French army would be able to withdraw in the north to Mézières. At around 7.00 a.m. Marshal MacMahon was wounded about 1000

¹³ Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 159; Friedrich Immanuel, *Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele zur Taktik der neuesten Zeit. 1870-1913. Eine Erläuterung der heutigen Grundsätze für Heer- und Truppenführung*, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1914), 124-126; *Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71: Redigiert von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des Großen Generalstabes. Erster Theil. Geschichte des Krieges bis zum Sturz des Kaiserreichs. Zweiter Band. Von der Schlacht bei Gravelotte bis zum Sturz des Kaiserreichs*, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1875), 1144.

¹⁴ Mark R. Stoneman, “The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870–1871: A Cultural Interpretation,” *War in History* 8, no. 3 (2001): 274; *Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71*, 1147.

meters north of Bazeilles. General Auguste-Alexander Ducrot, who had been appointed commander-in-chief by MacMahon, gave order to withdraw from Bazeilles to the northeast in the direction of Mézières over Lebrun's objections. That withdrawal, which was difficult to organise in terms of space and time, began in Bazeilles at 8.30 am. The marine infantry withdrew to Balan. However, the order did not reach all soldiers. And at 8.30 a.m., General Emanuel Félix de Wimpffen also had taken over the supreme order and stopped the initiated withdrawal. He evaluated the 12th Corps in its positions well and planned to break out towards Carignan in south-eastern direction. In Bazeilles itself, the urban engagement was conducted as a battle in the battle. In the end, between 150 and 200 marine infantrymen remained in Bazeilles, including some 60 soldiers in what would be called *Maison de la dernière cartouche* at the northern end of the main street. Other sources mention 120 soldiers at times at the house. 35 of them died before the ammunition was fired, and Major Lambert and his troops surrendered to the Bavarians under Captain Friedrich Lissignolo. For his bravery, he was allowed to keep his sword.¹⁵ But how had the day begun on the Bavarian side?

On 1 September 1870, the 1st Bavarian Army Corps attacked with some 40,000 soldiers at around 4.30 a.m. without prior reconnaissance. In the course of the day, they expected to connect with the Army of the Meuse under the command of Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, which attacked Sedan on the right side of the Meuse. Initially, fog facilitated the approach but also prevented artillery support. The French had failed to blow up the nearby railway bridge over the Meuse. The Bavarians had held the bridge the day before. There, elements of the 2nd Bavarian Brigade attacked together with Royal Bavarian 2nd Infantry Regiment “Crown Prince” the from the west across the Meuse. In the course of the day, the 3rd Bavarian Infantry Brigade intervened in the battle at the park of Montvillers and occupied La Moncelle. Finally, elements of the 4th Bavarian Infantry Brigade were to be set in motion to Bazeilles across the bridges. The marine infantry had moved into Bazeilles for defence. However, the

¹⁵ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 165-166; Joseph Lebrun, *Bazeilles-Sedan: Par le général Lebrun. Avec deux Cartes*, 5th Edition, (Paris: E. Dentu, 1884), 100-111, 121; Emmanuel Felix de Wimpffen, *Sedan*, (Paris: Librairie internationale, 1871), 168, 294.

population had not left the village completely, and in some cases, they provided support for their own soldiers and even mounted a joint defence.¹⁶

A private soldier of the Royal Bavarian Infantry Lifeguards Regiment, Florian Kühnhauser, described the battle in his memoirs a quarter of a century later. As part of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Brigade, his regiment crossed the Meuse on a pontoon bridge near Allicourt and attacked with a battalion the outskirts of the village in southwestern direction, with a battalion along the main road and with a battalion in the park in the east. Kühnhauser described the attack of lead company of his battalion without resistance into the centre of the village. There, the rifle and mitrailleuse fire started. The French used the Villa Beurmann to focus their efforts on the entire length of the main road. In addition to the first losses, the Bavarians were also afraid of coming under crossfire without protection. According to Kühnhauser, the first success in this situation was the torching of a corner house which forced some Frenchmen to withdraw into rear positions. The Bavarians, who had meanwhile occupied initial positions in the houses, fired indiscriminately in windows and roof lights allegedly to deter inhabitants and enemy soldiers. Engineers used their axes to open building entrances, and the Bavarians occupied more positions in the buildings. Kühnhauser describes the arresting of nine French soldiers and a craftsman who had participated in the battle in civilian clothing with a rifle. The latter was immediately shot. Elsewhere, he described an episode where a woman with a child wanted to prevent Bavarians from searching a house thus allowing French riflemen to evade. He also described the disregard of the Red Cross by the French and their crimes against the wounded. The use of artillery guns in direct laying against the Villa Beurmann ended with the artillerymen dying in infantry fire. To change the situation, the Bavarians were given order to torch the house using “firebrands” among other things, which Kühnhauser credibly described as: “The French were burnt out like wasps”. In this, the report contradicted the official statement of his Commanding General of 1870. Soon, the entire 1st Bavarian Army Corps, including more than 15 battalions and two guns, was involved in the battle for the small village against the French Blue Division and the French

¹⁶ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 153-154; Nicolas Graff, “Petite Histoire de la “Maison de la Dernière cartouche,” *Le Souvenir français*, [accessed 30 July 2023] <https://le-souvenir-francais.fr/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Historique-Maison-de-la-Derniere-cartouche.pdf>. ; Freytag-Loringhoven, *Das Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie vom 29. Mai 1906*, 221-224.

who were at times attacking from the north. In the course of the day, two brigades of the 2nd Bavarian Army Corps had also been brought up over the railway bridge. The last resistance described by Kühnhauser was fought in the north-western part of the village behind a barricade. Then, Kühnhauser's regiment was withdrawn from the village to resupply ammunitions and also because subunits no longer fought in body. Some 15 officers and 260 troops of this regiment were dead or wounded. In order to repel a counter-attack on the village of Bazeilles by the French in the afternoon, Kühnhauser's battalion was led forward bypassing the burning village and moved into its position at the northern exit of Bazeilles in the direction of Balan where elements of the Blue Division of the Marine Infantry had moved into new positions.¹⁷

At about 8.30 a.m. General von der Tann had ridden from the crossing site near Allicourt to the southern edge of Bazeilles to continue command and control of the battle. Shortly afterwards, a French counterattack on the gap between La Moncelle and the park of Chateau Montviller caused a serious crisis in the north and east of Bazeilles which lasted for about an hour. While the battle was still going on in the village, the tasks associated with the success of the Battle of Sedan were only the employment of reserves and artillery around the village. The connection with the Saxons had already been established. An outbreak of the entire French army to the east, however, was still feared at first. From 9.30 a.m., they were able to bring up fresh forces and both replace the battle-weary forces in the village and support the units outside the village in the direction of La Moncelle and then also in the direction of Balan. From 10.00 a.m., they also assumed that Bazeilles had been captured but due to the fires it did not need to be occupied with more troops. In the area of Bazeilles and La Moncelle, the

¹⁷ Florian Kühnhauser, *Kriegserinnerungen eines Soldaten des königlich bayerischen Infanterie-Leib-Regimentes 1870-71*, (Partenkirchen: Leonhard Wenzel 1898), 66-77; Lebrun, *Bazeilles-Sedan*, 119; according to the history of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Kühnhauser initially probably encountered soldiers of 2nd Bavarian Light Infantry Battalion. According to this, there was gun shelling on a corner house, and the personnel in the corner house was "captured and killed". Britzelmayr, *Auszug aus der Geschichte des k. b. 16. Infanterie-Regiments Großherzog Ferdinand von Toskana und seiner Stammabteilungen: Für Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften bearbeitet von Hauptmann Britzelmayr*, (Passau: Kommissionsverlag M. Waldbauersche Buchhandlung, 1903), 34; Schmidhuber, *Der Deutsch-Französische Krieg 1870/71 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Antheilnahme der Bayern: Auszug aus dem Generalstabswerk. Mit 50 Plänen und 48 Bildern nach Original-Gemälden Moderner Meister*, (Landshut: J.F. Riet'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1900), 82-100.

concern was to prepare for another counter-attack by the French, which would indeed be carried out later from Balan. The engagements of the day ended at 6.00 p.m.. As a result of the ceasefire negotiations no further attacks would be launched. In the evening, von der Tann proceeded to Sedan Fortress and then through the burning villages of Balan and Bazeilles back to Remilly where he waited for further news. In the three days at Sedan, the 1st Bavarian Corps lost 145 officers and 2513 troops.¹⁸

For an ordinary soldier like Kühnhauser, it was impossible to make sense of the to and fro of the battle for Bazeilles. The described loss of track and control of closed units and subunits agreed with the large picture that was apparent to the Bavarian leadership but which the French had been unable to exploit. While the order to withdraw from Bazeilles issued by General Ducrot had not reached all forces in the area, the attacks for a break-out in south-eastern direction, for which General von Wimpffen was responsible, failed in the course of the day because of the resistance put up by Bavarian, Saxon and Prussian formations. While Kühnhauser's perspective concerned the centre of Bazeilles and the continuation of the attack via Balan, the 1st Bavarian Army Corps had created the prerequisites for the further attack on Sedan in the east and north-east by linking up with the XII (I Royal Saxon) Army Corps near La Moncelle. At around 11.00 a.m. the Saxons had nearly sealed off Bazeilles in the north. In addition, the artillery prevented the reinforcement of French troops from the north. In Bazeilles, the artillery was eventually able to fire twelve grenades at the Villa Beurmann thus rendering it unable to withstand attack. Three French officers and 120 marine infantrymen were taken prisoner there. The infantry on site, which soon occupied the villa, meanwhile consisted of Bavarian soldiers of two regiments and a light infantry battalion as well as of Saxon soldiers. And the last French defenders of Bazeilles persevered somewhat further down the road in the "House of the last Cartridge", as is well known.¹⁹

¹⁸ Hugo (von) HELWIG, *Das I. bayerische Armee-Corps von der Tann im Kriege 1870/71: Nach den Kriegsacten bearbeitet von Hugo Helwig. Hauptmann im Generalstab*, (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1872), 77-84.

¹⁹ Immanuel, *Der Kampf um und in Ortschaften*, 159-160; Wettstein, *Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942*, 40-41; Hugo von Helwig, "Ludwig Freiherr von der Tann-Rathsamhausen. Königlicher Bayerischer General der Infanterie und Kommandierender General des Königlich Bayerischen I. Armeekorps. Eine Lebensskizze," *Militär-Wochenblatt. Beiheft*. no.

Controversies over fires and crimes at Bazeilles

During the battle at Bazeilles, about 400 houses, including the town hall and the church, were burnt. 39 of the 2048 inhabitants died. Contemporary press reports exaggerated the civilian victims and reported hundreds of burnt victims and countless civilian deaths that had been burnt alive and had not been able to escape from their basements. About three weeks later, the first realistic woodcuts on the basis of photographs appeared in English newspapers, they were to confirm the horror reports about the battle, which was continued in contemporary media later during the siege of Paris.²⁰

The Commanding General of the I Bavarian Corps had already gained experience in dealing with criticism in the press after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. On 15 September 1870, the London Times published a letter by Duke Édouard Antoine Sidoine de Fitz-James. Fitz-James had visited Bazeilles, provided assistance and spoken to inhabitants. He wrote of Bavarian crimes, however, he exaggerated and mentioned numbers that did not bear scrutiny. The interest of the European press, however, was aroused. The Bavarians were soon supported by war correspondent Hermann Voget who published an emotional letter that many newspapers reprinted in excerpts. Voget justified firm action and described in turn the crimes of the inhabitants of Bazeilles:

“But the incineration of a village and the killing of individual inhabitants was not an act of base vengeance but an act of self-defence, and in a few individual cases a just punishment. If innocent people were also killed during the fire, then this was an accident, not a crime that could burden the German fighters. (...) But I witnessed these atrocities, witnessed the crimes that were the reason for the fire being thrown into the houses. I saw with my own eyes how an inhabitant of the village with the help of a woman tried to drag a wounded Bavarian from the street into a burning house; I saw how these two evildoers were knocked down by a fellow-soldier of the wounded, and how their still-twitching bodies were thrown into the same flames that they had wanted to be

7., 8., 9. 1882: 25-427; Immanuel, *Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele zur Taktik der neuesten Zeit*, 129; Karl Woide, *Die Ursachen der Siege und Niederlagen im Kriege 1870: Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung des deutsch-französischen Krieges bis zur Schlacht bei Sedan*, (translated by Major Klingender), 2nd Volume, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1896), 281-285.

²⁰ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 154, 159.

the wounded Bavarian's grave. (...) When a woman takes a weapon and fires a lethal bullet at the soldier from an ambush, she is no longer entitled to the gentle consideration that is otherwise paid to her sex. Terrible things happened in Bazeilles. The atrocities I have seen there make a mockery of the culture of the 19th century. But it was the inhabitants of Bazeilles who by participating in the battle in defiance of all international law unleashed the passions, it is them who are to blame if their native village today is only a heap of rubble.”²¹

Notwithstanding this kind of public support, the Bavarian Army and the General in charge eventually deemed it important not to have to admit any mistakes, but they also did not to repeat the allegations against the inhabitants. And about a year after the battles of Bazeilles and the accusations in the press against the 1st Bavarian Army Corps and, in part, against the Prussian 8th Infantry Division, General Ludwig von der Tann published his statement. He begins with a compilation of the allegations as they had become known to him:

"Bavarians and Prussians are said to have set fire to the village in order to punish the inhabitants for their participation in the defence. The *Garde nationale* had largely remained, the inhabitants had fled to the cellars; women, children, all had been burnt. Out of 2000 inhabitants, less than 300 had remained who claimed that the Bavarians had pushed entire families into the flames and shot women who had wanted to flee.”²²

Later, the general referred to a statement by the mayor of Bazeilles indicating that a total of 39 civilians had been either killed, wounded or missing. According to that, only three men, two bedridden women and three children had died in the fire or from smoke inhalation. And neither were any houses deliberately set on fire, they caught fire only as a result of “mutual bombardment” and the “street and house-to-house fighting”. This view of the general, however, contradicted the memories of contemporary witnesses and the mayor's report. While the number of victims could be verified, the mutual opinions regarding the fires remained in place.²³

²¹ “Die Einäscherung von Bazeilles, ” *Süddeutscher Telegraph*, München, III, Nr. 248, 23 September 1870, 2-3.

²² Helwig, *Das I. bayerische Armee-Corps von der Tann im Kriege 1870/71*, 88.

²³ Helwig, *Das I. bayerische Armee-Corps von der Tann im Kriege 1870/71*, 88-89.

However, the German reports in the official regiment history of the Lifeguard Infantry Battalion as well as Kühnhauser's memories were clear about fires and alleged war crimes:

"Then Lieutenant von Ehrne resorted to another means, supported by Sergeant Gerstmaier he had fire thrown in one of the nearest French-occupied houses. Soon, the flame soon blazed happily away, the personnel had to flee the element and they approached between smoke and flames once again, this time successfully. Defying description, the battle was raging. The members of the 2nd Battalion, who had mostly fired the ammunition, fought forward with great urgency, driven by anger and bitterness they went berserk with the bayonet. Unfortunately, during the battle for the possession of this road, a remark had been made that local inhabitants participated in the battle in a treacherous and vicious manner.²⁴

For a long time, the role of the women of Bazeilles did not seem to be worth mentioning in French public memory. From the Bavarian point of view, the women had motivated the men to fight, even taken up arms and therefore had not behaved as women should, which further enhanced the general impression of the unlawfulness of civilian resistance.²⁵

The mayor of Bazeilles wanted to agree to the German statements on the cause of the fire only in 37 cases. In more than 300 instances the Germans had committed arson with petrol, matches and candles, he stated. There were also different assessments concerning the maltreatment of casualties. The exaggerations of chroniclers, including Émile Zola, were characterized by the patriotic duty to clearly emphasise the national victim of Bazeilles, which also supported the creation of legends. Apparently, there was never a specific accusation that could be linked to a person. The general accusation apparently

²⁴ Franz Illig, *Geschichte des Königlich bayerischen Infanterie-Leib-Regiments von seiner Errichtung bis zur Rückkehr aus dem Feldzug 1870/71: Auf Befehl bearbeitet für den Unteroffizier und Soldaten von einem Lieutenant des Regiments*, (München: R. Oldenbourg 1881), Citation 52, 137-138. Hermann Ehrne von Melchthal (1843-1899) was Lieutenant Colonel and platoon leader in the 5th Company in 1870. For his achievements in Sedan he was awarded an Iron Cross 2nd class. On 20 February 1871 he was awarded the Military Order of Max Joseph and enobled as Ritter.

²⁵ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 157-158.

sufficed to maintain the accusations against Germany in general. On the other hand, there was probably no public need for clarification in Germany because in retrospect, the described behaviour of the French in 1870/71 was indeed considered punishable. In any case, the official monument of Bazeilles, which dated back to 1875, listed the regiments involved and 27 names of citizens including one victim with an unexplained number of children. 16 names were not listed because of the will of the surviving dependents.²⁶

Bazeilles as myth and symbol

Bazeilles as victim of German warfare became the symbol of a national French victim role, and with the heroic defence by the marine infantry it was simultaneously the antithesis of the humiliating defeat of Sedan. It was also a kind of compensation for lack of valour in other places of the war. Commemoration in Catholic, anti-liberal clerical or republican, democratic-laicist commemorative discourses was initially influenced by the polarisation in the so-called Deux France question. From 1890 on, a centrist, general patriotic discourse prevailed in the public sphere. In addition to increasing militarisation, it also offered chances for a social compromise in “non-partisan patriotic sacred actions” of commemoration ceremonies at the time.²⁷

The possibility of multiple interpretation and own identification constituted the success of the painting *The Last Cartridges* (Les dernières cartouches) by Alphonse de Neuville. The room was painted with nearly photographic accuracy. Neuville, however, had not painted the fighting soldiers of the marine infantry as would have been historically correct. By painting different uniforms, he provided a cross-section of French Army soldiers of 1870, offering quasi a possibility of national identification. The blue uniforms of the marine infantry seemed too grim and ultimately boring to the artist. And he was right. His painting achieved almost iconic status. It did not matter that he assigned Major Arcène Lambert a central role and not Captain George Aubert as would have been correct. Lambert proved to be an exceedingly mean fellow soldier

²⁶ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 155-156, 159-161.

²⁷ Andreas Metzinger, “Kriegsgedenken in Frankreich (1871-1914): Studien zur kollektiven Erinnerung an den Deutsch-Französischen Krieg von 1870/71,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg i. Br., 2002, 242.

when, many years later, he denied Aubert a rectification of history and even tried to undermine Aubert's credibility in the military by alleging that he had been a Dreyfus supporter and a "Jew".²⁸

Among the people in the *House of the Last Cartridge* was Joseph Gallieni, lieutenant of the 3rd Marine Infantry Regiment. As military governor of Paris in 1914 and organiser of the taxicabs to the Marne, he would later become a hero of World War I. In remembrance this supported the symbolic meaning of the house as a place where the better France was represented. In 1900, Bazeilles was even awarded the Order of the Legion of Honour. A similarly symbolic event was the erection of the neo-Gothic crypt at the cemetery of Bazeilles, an ossuary. It was erected between 1878 and 1890 and served as the final resting place for 998 French and 1061 German soldiers. Until 1914, the bones of the Germans could be seen on the left side and the bones of the French on the right side. In World War I, the German occupation forces had the German casualties buried. For the French victims, it was not so much a resting place but rather a place of encounter. Of the spooky kind, however. Even the guard could not get used to the horrible sight. Some of the skeletons still wore pieces of uniform and their wedding bands. The bones of the dead could be seen by visitors, like in old catacombs. Only in this case, it was not a pragmatic solution for lack of space or an idyllic "memento mori" but was charged with national myths. The visitors were able to meet the dead heroes quasi in person. In the view of the believers, the dead had ascended to heaven, while modern Republicans believed in the return of the restless skeletons on the day of revenge on the Germans. This extreme form of a culture of remembrance was accompanied by a domestic struggle of the French Republic against the influence of the Catholic Church in public in the late 19th century up to the separation of state and church in 1905. The Catholic Church in France did not accept this without protest. Thus, the military culture of remembrance before World War I was also a question of the assertion of religious views in public space and as an important element of patriotism.²⁹

²⁸ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 26-153, 166-170.

²⁹ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 69-70, 162-163; Annette Becker, "Monuments aux morts après la guerre de sécession et la guerre de 1870-1871: Un legs de la guerre nationale?" *Guerres*

Bazeilles and Sedan belonged to the same battle, however, from the perspective of politics of memory, they did not fit together. While the defeat of Sedan marked the inglorious downfall of the Empire, the defence of Bazeilles is remembered as part of the eternally strong France that showed its potential also in the defeat. When the town of Sedan wanted to raise funds for a war monument in 1890, the French Prime Minister refused to become honorary chairman of the monument committee and even prohibited the collection of money within the army. The town and inhabitants of Sedan were stigmatised for a long time. In 1897, their monument came into existence nevertheless, with the bas-reliefs highlighting the cavalry attack of Division Marguerite near Floing and the honourable defence of Bazeilles.³⁰

For a long time, France did not have a public museum remembering the war of 1870/71. The famous *Maison de la dernière cartouche* owes its existence to the owners and its survival to this day to the marine infantry who uses it to cultivate a power place of their tradition. Nevertheless, in its character the small museum reflects the suffering and the hardships of war which are expressed in the core of the museum, a room maintained in the original with the damages caused by the fighting, a flag of the Red Cross, pieces of bread and the painting by Neuville. This originality, from the entire house to the bread crumb marks the attractiveness of this special memorial site and museum to this day.³¹

Since 1951, the French marine infantry commemorates the battles of 1870 each year on 1 September and cultivates the memory of Bazeilles in its barracks, museums and memorials. Today, the core of this commemoration is connected with the "House of the last Cartridge". Since 1952, four marine infantry regiments and a regiment of the marine artillery have borne the honorary name "Bazeilles 1870" on their flags.³²

Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains, no. 167 (1992): 29; Antoine Champeux, "Bazeilles, lieu de mémoire européen. Bazeilles, ein europäischer Ort des Gedenkens."

³⁰ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 84-87.

³¹ Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat*, 122-124.

³² Champeux, "Bazeilles, lieu de mémoire européen. Bazeilles, ein europäischer Ort des Gedenkens."

Conclusion

The fighting for the village of Bazeilles on 1 September 1870 no longer serves as a military example of how urban warfare can succeed. Rather, the events are a warning for generations to come. The particular commemoration of the defence of the homeland in Bazeilles is unique in view of the events of 1870 and of the original tasks of the French marine infantry. The exception to the rule of 1870 thus founded a long tradition and connected the marine infantry of France in a particular manner with the homeland. The German soldiers employed in Bazeilles had altogether earned many war decorations on 1 September 1870. In Germany, the victories of the Franco-Prussian War did not establish military traditions that endured to the present.

Military service in Europe is connected to international values and norms. Experiences of past conflicts and wars as well as international law have been included in the command and control regulations of the Bundeswehr. According to the Doctrinal Principles for the Command and Control of Land Forces, the population in urban spaces is accorded particular protection:

“The inhabitants usually do not (cannot) leave the urban area even if or when it becomes the scene of intensive military action. In their planning, commanders consider evacuation possibilities for the population as well as the handling of the remaining population and their protection. This includes their reception and subsequent (initial) treatment.”³³

German citizens in uniform defend their constitutional state. Tradition today, therefore, does not include the Bavarian General von der Tann but his grandson, General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel. As military commander in France he implemented the plot against Hitler in Paris on 20 July 1944. Although the resistance ultimately failed, it was a sign for the better Germany and for values that are important to the German democracy today.

³³ Kommando Heer, *Truppenführung*, (16037) 134.

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Appendix:

N.N. Map Sedan 1870 (ZMSBw)

**Thwarting Anarchy and Bolshevism in Moldovan Cities
as a Hypostasis of the National Revolution in
Romania 1917-1919**


Iulian Stelian Botoghina (Romania)

Chapter II. a. Romania and Russia in World War I or the enemy ally. Historical summary of Romanian-Russian relations before the war

28 May 1812 - the Russo-Turkish War 1806-1812 ended with the signing of the Peace of Bucharest. The Principality of Moldavia had the geographical area between the Prut and the Nistru rivers taken from it, which was assigned to the Russian Empire, a province then called Basarabia; - April 1828, during the Russo-Ottoman Wars: the first presence of the Russian army on the soil of the Romanian Principalities. The Treaty of Adrianople (14 September 1829) confirmed Russia's political ascendancy in the region; - 1848 - the bourgeois-democratic revolution was defeated by the intervention of Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire; - 1877-1878 - Romania's participation in the Russo-Turkish War or War of Independence, the title established in Romanian historiography. Russia forced the United Principalities to cede three counties in the south of Moldavia: Cahul, Ismail, Bolgrad, which had been returned to the Principality of Moldavia after the defeat of the Tsarist army in the Crimean War. At the Berlin peace conference, Russia was obliged to cede Dobrogea, the Danube Delta and the Snake Island in exchange for the three counties; - 1 June 1914 - visit of Tsar Nicholas II with the imperial family to Constanta.

Chapter II.b. Romania and Russia in World War I or the enemy ally. Historical summary of Romanian-Russian relations at the time of the war

In the autumn campaign of 1916, Russian troops were stationed in defensive positions on the Eastern Carpathians and took part in the battles for the defence of Dobrogea and the battle for Bucharest (30 November - 3 December 1916).



Map of operations in the battle for Dobrogea (1 September - 20 October 1916)

**Chapter II.b. Romania and Russia in World War I or the enemy ally.
Historical summary of Romanian-Russian relations at the time of the war**


1) October 1916 and completed at the beginning of December 1916: the withdrawal of the Romanian administration to Iași, the country's second urban centre, with about 75 000 inhabitants, with the advantage that geographically it was further away from the military conflict zone, close to the border with Russia and on a possible withdrawal route of the Romanian authorities outside the borders, if the pressure of the front became too great; 2) The army reorganization was roughly completed by early July 1917; 3) February 1917 Revolution, Tsar Nicholas II abdicates on 15 March 1917; 4) 22 July - 1 August 1917: Battle of Marasti; 5) 8 August - 22 August 1917: Battle of Oituz; 6) 6 August - 19 August 1917:



Russian soldiers on the Romanian front in the summer of Battle of Mărăști; 1917

Chapter II.c. The Bolshevik Revolution and its consequences on the Romanian front. From ally to enemy

4) 5 March 1918: Preliminary peace treaty of Buftea; 5) 7 May 1918: Bucharest Peace Treaty, also known as the Peace of Buftea-Bucharest.



Russian military demonstration on the front in Moldova


**Chapter II.d. Romania and Russia in World War I or the enemy ally.
The Bolshevik Revolution and the Romanian-Russian armed
confrontations: Iași...8-9 december 1917**

The centre of the Russian unrest was the Socola camp, located in the southern part of Iasi, with more than 3000 soldiers, being also the central point of the Russian military traffic, which allowed the revolutionary agents coming from Russia to arrive without any control. The Bolshevik group led by Rosal who had arrived in Iasi to assassinate General Scerbacev, dethrone the King and establish the Bolshevik regime in Romania, had established their headquarters here. On 8 December 1917, the Bolsheviks tried to arrest Scerbacev, but were disarmed by his personal guard and the Romanian military. The Russian general and ministers of the Entente ultimately insisted that the Romanian government liquidate the Bolshevik camp, which meant starting hostilities against the Petrograd government. News of the arrival of more Bolshevik troops prompted the government to give the order to assault: the Bolsheviks were disarmed and dispatched across the Prut River that very night.



Galatzi...20 and 22 January 1918 Galatzi is the strategic city at the confluence of the Siret and Prut rivers with the Danube, a geographical area known as the "Gorges of the Danube". The battle for the defence of Galatzi, was the biggest confrontation with the Russian Bolshevik troops, when 2,000 Romanian soldiers and firemen defended the city against 12,000 Russian soldiers

from the Russian 6th Army, Siberian Corps and 10th Infantry Division, deployed on the front around and in Galatzi. The Romanian resistance was centred on Țziglina Hill, fortified with field artillery and guns from naval ships, from where it worked well with the military stars on the Danube.



Galatzi...20 and 22 January 1918

On 16 January 1918, Russian divisions left the front, moving towards Galatzi and on 20 January 1918 began shelling the city; the Romanian artillery returned fire. On the night of 20-21 January, the rebel soldiers attacked from the inside, trying to burn the town, but in a surprise bayonet attack the Bolsheviks were repulsed. Three Romanian military airplanes bombed all the enemy positions in the area of Barboși Railway Station, in the area of Țziglinei Hill and Malina lake. On the evening of 21 January, the Bolsheviks surrendered their weapons. Some of them crossed the railway bridge over the Siret River and surrendered to the Germans, who disarmed them and sent them back. The Bolshevik soldiers were escorted across the Prut River.



Chapter III The National Revolution of the Romanians in 1918

27 March 1918 the Democratic Republic of Moldova it decided to unite with the Kingdom of Romania; - 15 November 1918, the General Congress of Bukovina voted to unite the former Duchy of Bukovina with the Kingdom of Romania; - 1 December 1918, the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia decreed the union of the Romanians of Transylvania, Banat and the Hungarian Country and all the territories inhabited by them with Romania. In the following months, the Saxons, Jews and Gypsies of Transylvania signed the proclamation.



Chapter IV Memory of posterity...Fălticeni



The monument from Fălticeni, the work of sculptor Teodor Burcă



Celebration at the Guard Monument in the interwar period

Chapter IV Memory of posterity...Galatzi



To honour the memory of the Romanian soldiers who fought to defend the city from the Bolshevik troops, in 1925 the Galati municipality commissioned the erection of a monument, known as "The Defenders of Galati 7-9 January 1918", by the Galati sculptor Ioannis N. Renieris. Also at that time a plaque and

a badge were struck in memory of the battles and sacrifices of the Defenders. In 1963 the monument was destroyed "for building works in the area".

Chapter IV Memory of posterity...Galatzi to 20 January 2018

In 2017, the Galati County Council financed the projects of restoration of the monument "Defenders of the City of Galati 7-9 January 1918". The monument "Defenders of Galatzi 7-9 January 1918" was inaugurated on 20 January 2018, on the occasion of the Centenary of the Battle of Galatzi.



Chapter IV Memory of posterity...Galatzi to 20 January 2018

And...military history enthusiasts, in an engaging re-enactment of the battles of January 1918





**Remembering the Urban Battle of Montese 80 Years after the Creation
of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force - 1943-2023**

Israel Blajberg (Brazil)

Summary

This work describes the Battle of Montese in Italy, during World War II, between Brazilian and German troops, fought in a residential area, causing extensive damage to buildings, urban infrastructure and civilian population. In addition, the 80th anniversary of creation of FEB – Brazilian Expeditionary Force in August 1943 is remembered. In August 1942, Brazil was attacked by German and Italian U-boats, in retaliation for supporting Allied countries and breakup of relations with Germany. In just 4 days, 6 ships were torpedoed, 600 passengers and crew disappearing at sea, determining the declaration of a state of war with Germany and Italy. The bloody battle took place from April 14 to 17, 1945, as part of the Final Allied Offensive in the Italian Campaign. On one side was the 1st Brazilian Expeditionary Infantry Division (1st DIE), reinforced by the 1st American Armored Division; and on the other, elements of the 14th Army of Army Group C of the Wehrmacht. It was a region of difficult access, hampered by the German fortifications in the region. The artillery of the two forces caused enormous destruction in the city. Montese lost about $\frac{3}{4}$ of the 1,200 existing homes, with nearly 200 Italian civilians dead. Conquest of Montese marked the beginning of the Spring Offensive, contributing strongly to the complete dismantling of the German defense lines. Taking of Montese was a great achievement for Brazilian arms, deserving praise from the American Command of the V USA Army.

Keywords: WW2, FEB, Brazil, Italy, Montese

Introduction

Like almost all South American countries, Brazil was still a rural and neutral country. There was some Nazi-Fascist influence, due to Integralism, counterbalanced by sympathy for the Americans. Brazil remained neutral, but the signs of belligerence were growing after the Conferences of the Foreign

Ministers of the American Countries, held in Panama on 03 Oct 1939, Havana in July 1940 and Rio de Janeiro 28 Jan 1942.

Due to the systematic attacks on Brazilian merchant ships, and the U.S. pressure for Bases in North East Brazil to reach African and European battlefields, the Brazilian Government recognized the State of War on 22 Aug 1942, encouraged by the compensations in the form of a steel mill to be financed by the American Government.

It was decided to create and organize an expeditionary force, being the initial idea an Army Corps, composed of 3 Infantry Divisions, one from the southeast and the others from the South and North Brazil, all depending on the evolution of the war and the possibilities of these last regions. There were great difficulties to form an Expeditionary Corps, such as obsolete weaponry, outdated doctrine and poor health of the population. The Organization of FEB – Força Expedicionaria Brasileira (Brazilian Expeditionary Force) by the Ordinance of 09 Aug 1943 provided for the constitution of the 1st DIE (Infantry Expeditionary Division) and non-divisional Organs. Of 40 M population about 200 thousand were screened for FEB, equivalent to 1 M soldiers today. A great effort was made to mobilize 25,000 men, requiring postponement of the 1943 licensing, convocation of reservists, opening of military instruction schools, drawing contingents from all over the country. There were great difficulties to gather the effective, due to the poor land communications, precarious and dangerous maritime communications – due to the nazi U-boat submarine campaign, determining the option of employing Units of the Southeast (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais), respectively 6th, 1st and 11th Infantry Regiments, and exceptionally the 9th Engineering Battalion of Aquidauana – State of Mato Grosso.

Training was carried out in Rio de Janeiro, with the new armaments, techniques and tactics, being completed in Italy after receiving the material. There were courses for officers and enlisted men, and exercises on the ground. LOGISTICS was a new science, officers took courses in the USA. The supply chain and composition of the food rations were different from the Brazilian diet, with consequences in the adaptation of the troops. The embarkation of the 25,000 men begun on 02 Jul 1944, with arrival on 16 Jul 1944 – In addition to the maritime displacements there were small contingents by air.

The Campaign took place in the North Central Region of Italy, comprising the valleys of Serchio, Marano / Panaro and Po (Fornovo), until the junction with the French Army in Susa.

Some important dates of FEB were

Engineering - 1st Troop in Combat - 09/09/1944

1st Artillery Fire – 16/Sep/1944 – Monte Bastione

Infantry - 16/Sep/1944 - Serchio Valley (Camaiole – Barga and Galicano)

- Castle Mount – Psychological Victory

- Montese – Tactical Victory

- Collechio - Fornovo – Strategic Victory

Conquest of Montese - April 14-17, 1945

" ... On April 14, 1945, in the region of Montese, begun the most arduous battles fought by Brazilians in Italy. The operations, lasting four successive days - from 14 to 17 - took place under violent and uninterrupted bombardments..." – as referred to by FEB Commander, General Mascarenhas de Moraes, in his book "Memories" - Vol. 1 – Army Library Publishing.

Montese is a medieval village located in the foothills of the Apennines, in northern Italy, region of the Emilia Romagna, 60 km from Bologna. The importance of the conquest of the city, its strategic position, was a remarkable fact that caught the attention of the Allied commanders and the Press. Small town, almost a village, valued by the important intersection of roads and elevations. In this place took place the bloodiest combat and the one of greatest value. It was the beginning of the end of the war in Italy. In the capture of Montese by FEB, the Germans unleashed on the locality the largest concentration of artillery fire ever seen until then. This achievement resonated favorably in the upper echelons and the FEB deserved recognition and the highest praise from the American V USA Army command.

The 3 biggest victories of FEB - Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy were Monte Castello, Montese and the Capture of the 148th Whermacht Infantry Division. Montese accounted for almost 500 dead and wounded. Thousands of shells were fired by the Artillery in support of Montese's urban fighting. The Fire Support of the entire FEB Artillery during the night of 14 to 15 Apr, corresponded to more than 3,900 Artillery Shells.

The capture of Montese was characterized as the bloodiest battle in which the FEB participated and where the action of the commanders of small fractions, particularly Platoons, Squads and Combat Groups, was decisive.

In the spring offensive, operations began with the Germans having 28 divisions and 01 brigade and the Allies with 20 divisions and 10 brigades. The German divisions were incomplete, with serious re-completion problems and supply chain deficiencies, eight of which were engaged in the fight against the partisans.

The Allies gave priority to the Western European Theater of Operations, diverting much of the human and material resources there. The Germans kept the Allies in check in Italy for 20 months and created enormous difficulties to surrender every inch of the 1,300 km of the retreat. The conquest of Montese opened the way to the Panaro River Valley.

The mission of FEB was to invest over the Montese massif and cover the left flank of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division, which was executed by the 11th INFANTRY REGIMENT (11th RI), with FIRE SUPPORT by the 1st Group of Artillery, the 11th RI, 2nd Btl/1st RI and the 2nd Group of Artillery. Reinforcements were received from Company A of the 760 Tank Battalion (USA), and from the 2nd Company of the 9th Engineering Battalion, which kept the roads within the action zone in traffic. FEB's Mechanized Cavalry Squadron operated on the axis MONTELLO - MONTESE and took advantage of the success on the PANARO RIVER.

The enemy formations present at the front of the 4th Corps was thus constituted:

- 01 Italian Division in Massa.
- 148th Infantry Division in Serchio Valley
- 232nd Infantry Division in Monte della Torraccia.
- 114th Light Division.
- 334th DI barring access from Zocca and 94th DI to the Rhine River.
- Reserve: 90th and 29th Panzer Divisions.

The Germans had excellent observation points, decks and shelters, excellent firing ranges for tense fire guns, with observation making it possible to conduct the fire of artillery guns in excellent condition, with advantages for the defender. FEB received a Front of 25 Km and selected 5 Km, with Depth of attack of 2.5 Km.

Spring Offensive

The campaign began in April 1945 and ended on 2 May 1945. Start of FEB operations took place after the conquest of Monte Castello – an exceptional feat, a symbol for the Brazilian forces, dominating the Gothic Line, a fortified bastion that seemed impregnable, at high cost in Brazilian precious lives. Successive and brilliant victories followed in the next phase, late February 1945 until March 1945, with the preparation for the Spring Offensive, the attacks on La Serra and Castelnuovo on 22/23 March 1945.

In the Spring Offensive of the Allied Forces, the IV Army carried out the Main Effort, with FEB being the Key Piece in this Maneuver, to break the position of the Genghis-Kan Line in the foothills of the Apennine Chain.

Covering the Flank of the 10th Mountain Division, FEB attacks and Conquests Montese, defending the triangle Montese, Montello and Montebufoni; maintaining the massif at any price, as the mission consisted of conquering Montese, attracting enemy fires and reserves, so that the American 10th Mountain Division could descend the counterslope of the Apennines, taking advantage of the Success over Zocca and reaching the Po Valley.

Montese was of great importance for its tactical consequences: the last lines of enemy defense, embedded in the watershed between the Panaro and Po rivers. The main attack was assigned to the zone of action of the 10th Mountain Division, however the bloodiest combat took place on FEB lines. As a result of enemy bombardment, Brazilian troops suffered enormous losses. Finally, at dawn on April 18th, reconnaissance squads no longer engaged the enemy, occupying the objective.

Traditionally, Americans don't like the 13th very much, especially when it's Friday. The so-called Spring Offensive, in which Montese's victory is inserted, was scheduled for April 12; it turns out that on that day President Franklin Delano Roosevelt passed away. According to conjectures, – they appear in several books – the Americans did not want to launch the offensive on the 13th because it was Friday, preferring the next day, the 14th, which was Saturday. During the battle of Montese FEB received reinforcements of American tanks, to counter the German armor. The fighting force of the 11th RI – I and III battalions – was inoperative at the end of 17 April, being regrouped in the rear and recompleted, but there was a fear of going into combat again, if the attack continued, because almost 60% of the fractions were made up of inexperienced soldiers from the Reserve Contingent.

April 14- "D" Day of Spring Offensive

The attack on Montese was part of a major offensive planned by the Allied High Command in Italy called the "Spring Offensive." This offensive was already being prepared, from the victories of February and March, in Monte Castello and Castelnuovo. It lasted from 9 April to 2 May 1945, covering all of Northern Italy, along a line about 30 km south of Bologna. All the Allied forces located in Italy participated in it. The German forces of 28 Divisions + 1 Brigade were confronted against the allied forces of 20 Divisions + 10 Brigades. The Effective of the Three Regiments of FEB on 13/04/1945 was

- 1st RI: 3,263 men (160 officers and 3,103 enlisted men)
- 6th RI: 3,247 men (161 officers and 3,099 enlisted men)
- 11th RI: 3,252 men (153 officers and 3,099 enlisted men)

The following units were part of the IV Corps:

- 10th Mountain Division
- 1st Armored Division
- 34th Infantry Division
- 85th Infantry Division
- 1st Expeditionary Infantry Division - FEB

The mission assigned to FEB was

- "conquer Montese and exploit success until the cutting of the Panaro River"
- "continuously replace the western (left) flank of the 10th Mountain Division" and
- "progress in the direction of Zocca - Vignola".

War Correspondents' View of the Capture of Montese

Capture of Monte Castello that took place on February 21, 1945, in the vicinity of Montese, placed the Brazilian Expeditionary Force as a veteran and offensive troop ready to act in the so-called Spring Offensive, whose objective was to stop the Germans to the north and liberate Bologna. It was believed in a strong German presence in Montese, a strategic point for all involved.

Brazilian Press sent many war correspondents to Italy's campaign in 1944. There were numerous newspapers of the time, especially those in the federal capital, Rio de Janeiro, that covered the campaign until the end of the war.

10 correspondents embarked for Italy along with the Brazilian troops, in the various echelons, as Rubem Braga (Diário Carioca), Thassilo Augusto Campos Mitke (Agencia Nacional), Raul Brandão (Correio da Manhã), Joel Silveira (Diários Associados) and Egydio Squeff (O Globo), as well as foreign correspondents such as Frank Noral (Inter-American Affairs) and Henry Bagglely (Associated Press).

The conquest of Montese was thus narrated by Egidio Squeff: *"In frank disintegration the forces of Kessserling, the soldiers, by the hundreds, descend the slopes surrendering themselves to our combatants. Despite the large number of Nazi prisoners, there is no evidence of the German withdrawal. The Germans retreat under pressure of American and Brazilian forces, although the number of those who surrender grows, we cannot say that the enemy is abandoning their positions without a fight."*

In another report: *"I arrived in this city in the company of correspondents Joel Silveira and Mitke, the first journalists who entered it. No houses were left intact and only now can we assess the terrible effect caused by the firing of our artillery, the bloodstains on the houses signaling the violence of the battle."*

In the evaluation of the experts, Montese was the campaign of greater magnitude for its military aspect, because of the 4 days of intense combat, being FEB the only troop to enter the city and surrender the enemy. For the Montesinos inhabitants it was tragic: There were about 200 dead among the civilians and almost total destruction of the city, in addition to the great casualties suffered by the Brazilians, whose saga would follow later in the battles of Collecchio and Fornovo.

General Crittenberger's Statement

When the American 34th Infantry Division completely failed to attack a locality, General Crittenberger, commander of the IV Corps meeting at his HQ, blurted out:

"In yesterday's journey only the Brazilians deserved my unrestricted congratulations: with the brilliance of their feat and their offensive spirit, the Brazilian Division is in a position to teach others how to conquer a city." (He was referring to the taking of Montese.)

The Conquest of Montese had great repercussions; it was the biggest win in the V Army Offensive on the entire front.

On the night of 14 to 15, the area of the Montese received 2800 shells of the German artillery – this figure is 3 times higher than that received by the other Divisions of the IV Corps, in that time frame.

Lieutenant Ary Rauén, Hero of Montese

Lieutenant Rauén suffered a fatal wound in Montese. On the same occasion Lieutenant Dentist Ruy Lopes Ribeiro was hit by the explosion of a mine. An hour after the start of the deployment, the 2nd Platoon of Lt. ARY RAUEN was detained in a minefield between MONTAURÍGOLA and MONTESE, suffering heavy casualties.

Enemy fire destroyed the Wired Communications System, with the platoon detained for over 3 hours in the face of the minefield, rifle and machine gun fire, and concentrations of artillery and mortars. Lt. Rauén dies as a result of a head wound received from a mine explosion while trying to neutralize a Machine Gun Position that was causing many casualties in his fraction.

Medical Lieutenant Dr Ivon, Lieutenant Dentist Dr Ribeiro and Stretchers Team, in face of the large number of casualties come to the aid of the Platoon. 3 soldiers and the Lieutenant Dentist die; a Sergeant manages to retract and inform the Battalion commander that the team had been decimated. After the war, the name of Lt Ary Rauén was given as Historical Denomination to an Infantry Battalion of Rio Negro, his birthplace, in Paraná State.

Three Brazilian heroes

During the capture of Montese there was a singular tribute paid to three Brazilian soldiers who, on a patrol mission, when faced with an entire company of the German army, having been ordered to surrender, refused and died fighting. In recognition of the bravery and courage of those soldiers, for the way they fought, the Germans would have buried them in shallow graves and, next to the graves, placed a cross with the inscription "Drei Brasilianischen Helden" (three Brazilian heroes). They were - Arlindo Lúcio da Silva, Geraldo Baeta da Cruz and Geraldo Rodrigues de Souza - in the graduation yard of the battalion to which they belonged, after the war was erected a monument that reveres them.

Lieutenant IPORAN NUNES de OLIVEIRA and Sgt NESTOR DA SILVA, Heroes of Montese

Lt. Iporan made a quick study of the enemy and the terrain in support of Lieutenant Rauén's platoon which was being heavily harassed. The Lt. also

ordered the platoon's Deputy, Sgt. NESTOR DA SILVA, latter a retired Colonel, to coordinate the fire carried out by the 2 Combat Groups that were stranded. - Throughout the night the Brazilian troops were harassed by artillery fire, mortar fire and resistance that had not yet been subdued. The clean-up work of MONTESE continued during the morning of 15 Apr under massive fire from German Artillery. The region of the Tower of MONTESE was only conquered around 12:00 pm on 15 April in an action commanded by Ten IPORAN himself. Today, Sgt Nestor is one of the approximately 200 Brazilian WW2 Veterans still alive, 104 years old.

Artillery Lieutenant Salli Szajnferber, Hero of Montese

Lt Salli fought in 2 great moments of the FEB, the Conquest of Monte Castello and Conquest of Montese. At Montese he was lightly wounded when in the duties of Artillery Advanced Observer with the 9th. Company of the III Battalion of the 11th. Infantry Regiment. For his bravery in action in the conquest of Montese, he was awarded by the President of the Republic with the 1st Class Combat Cross. The diploma, signed by Minister of War General Pedro Aurélio de Góis Monteiro highlights his great courage, cold blood and capacity for action during the fierce battles of April 14 and 15, 1945. Progressing through mined terrain severely battered by artillery fire, mortar fire, and automatic weapons, Lt. Salli gallantly fulfilled his mission as an Advance Observer by precisely adjusting our artillery fire.

He was also praised in Bulletin by the Commander of the Tiradentes Regiment, 11th. RI of São João D'el Rey, Col. Delmiro Pereira de Andrade, for his bravery and spirit of sacrifice in the hard days of April 14 and 15, together with the platoons terribly harassed by the enemy. His calmness, his competence and his personal bravery made him worthy of the admiration of the whole Company.

Salli Szajnferber, brave Brazilian soldier of Jewish faith, Hero of Montese, in the fighting of Italy honored the memory of Mallet, Patron of the Artillery.

Summary of casualties in Montese from 14 to 18 Apr

- 6th RI: 14 killed, 131 wounded and 03 lost (total of 148);
- 1st RI: 08 killed and 27 wounded (total of 35);
- 11th RI: 12 killed, 224 wounded and 07 lost (total of 243)
- Grand total: 426 combat casualties

34 killed

382 wounded

10 lost.

PRISONERS

- 453 German prisoners

Operations in the Po River Valley - Pursuit and Exploitation of Success

"Operation Pursuit" began after the Capture of Montese, on 20 Apr 45 in the locality of Zocca, situated northwest of Montese and five kilometers from the Panaro River, cut by secondary roads.

On 26 Apr in the locality of Colecchio took place the "Siege Operation". The 148th German division intended to effect the retreat to the north.

The Brazilian maneuver, which imprisoned the vanguard and surrounded the bulk of the enemy, left no alternative but the unconditional surrender of the Germans and Italians at Fornovo di Taro (28 Apr). It was the "Crowning Operation", the consecration of the strategic maneuver and the consolidation of FEB's actions in the fields of Italy. The surrender of the German 148th Infantry Division resulted in the capture of approximately 15,000 prisoners of war, 1000 motor vehicles, 1500 hippomobile vehicles, 80 wagons, guns and more than 4000 horses.

Conclusion

After conquering Monte Castelo in Feb 21 1945, FEB continued a series of victories. On March 5, 1945, the Brazilians conquered Soprasosso and Castelnuovo. On 5 April 1945 the Allies entered Bologna. On April 29, the eve of Hitler's suicide, the FEB captured, in the town of Fornovo di Taro, the German 148th Division, which meant the imprisonment of more than fifteen thousand Germans, including two generals. From that moment on, the FEB became a military occupation force. The next day, Alessandria, 60 kilometers from Turin was occupied, and, along with American soldiers, also participated in the liberation of Turin itself. On May 2, General Mark Clark ended the Allied campaign in Italy. For the Brazilians, the war was over at this moment.

In Susa occurred the joining of the Brazilian forces with the French troops, characterizing the end of the participation of the FEB in World War II. On 2 May 1945, the war in Italy ended, and on 8 May it ended in Europe, with the victory of the Allies and the definitive surrender of Germany.

In almost one year of campaign in Italy, FEB presented the following figures:

Total effective	25,334
Taken prisoner	35
Fallen	457
Wounded in the Theater of Operations	2 722
Missing - (10 buried as unknown).....	23

Upon returning to Brazil, FEB soldiers were received with great popular enthusiasm. The first echelon arrived back in Rio de Janeiro on July 18, 1945.

The history written by FEB with golden letters in WW2, full of glories, confirms the value of the Brazilian soldier: selfless and determined when facing obstacles; highly creative and rustic, which makes it adaptable to different combat situations; and, above all, imbued with an extreme feeling of love for the Fatherland.

Brazilian troops in Italy to this day are remembered for having treated Italian families very well and sharing their own meals with them. This is the way of being of the Brazilian soldier, brave and supportive, bold and friendly, patriotic and understanding, creative and communicative, attributes that have so marked our performance, not only in those places during World War II, but also in São Domingos, Angola, Mozambique, East Timor and in Haiti, in the UN Peace Forces.

In Pistóia, at the Brazilian Military Votive Cemetery until 1960 456 FEB soldiers were buried, as well as 8 pilots of the Brazilian Air Force and 40 German soldiers, whose bodies were collected by the Burial Platoon in the lines of combat.

On December 22, 1960, the Brazilian Government arranged for the removal of the remains of these 464 heroes from Pistoia to Rio de Janeiro, in order to rest, definitively, in the Mausoleum of the National Monument to the Fallen of the Second World War, erected for this purpose, in the Flamengo Embankment. Today this Monument is an important memory spot, where many ceremonies are held in memory of the brave Allied soldiers which together contributed to the final victory of the free nations against Nazi-Fascism.

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
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APPENDIXES

1. Brazil at the Verge of War



2. Allied Divisions in Italy



3. FEB Operating Area



4. MONTESE Urban Warfare



5. Montese: Today and in 1944



6. Gen Otto Freter Pico, Commander of the 148th Infantry Division of the Whermacht surrenders to Brazilian Col Nelson de Mello, Fornovo de Taro, April 1945



7. Votive Monument at the former Brazilian Military Cemetery in Pistoia, and statue of General Mascarenhas e Moraes, FEB Commander



8. Return of FEB from Italy, 1945 and Parade in Rio de Janeiro, 25 years of the V-Day, 1975



9. National Monument to the Fallen of WW2, Rio de Janeiro



**The Dilemma of Humanized Urban Warfare - The Military,
Political, and Societal Implications of Urban Operations**

Jonas Neugebauer (Germany)

Abstract

This paper examines how military operations conducted in an urban terrain by Western armed forces in the past repeatedly have provoked wide-ranging reactions and considerable backlash among Western societies. In doing so, the study draws a line from the expectations and demands that societies in countries like the USA and Great Britain have developed following the experiences of the Vietnam War in terms of tolerated and undesired military casualties, to the innate characteristics of urban operations and urban armed conflicts, which usually involve high risks for participating forces to suffer significant numbers of casualties. Reflecting upon various examples of Western urban military operations, ranging from the 1968 battle of Hue, to the British Army's engagement in Northern Ireland, to US operations in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993 and finally to the two battles of Fallujah in 2004, this paper elaborates how Western societies in the past few decades have reacted to the consequences, and influenced the course of their armed forces' urban operations based on their aversion against military casualties. This study ultimately reaches the conclusion that the combination of societal expectations with the tactical particularities of the urban battlespace, in the past has repeatedly put forth impactful challenges for Western governments and Western armed forces, more than once even bringing about an unsuccessful end of a military operation.

Keywords: Urban Military Operations; Western Societies; Casualty Aversion; Technological Determinism; Western Democracies at War

When artillery shells and air-dropped munitions hit the ground, and soldiers start to roam the streets alongside tanks and armoured vehicles, the city's residents usually are the first victims of an armed conflict that is waged in an urban environment. As several examples in history show, wars and conflicts

regularly take high tolls on cities, with large portions of urban areas being damaged or destroyed, the civilian population threatened to be killed or injured, and vital infrastructure being impaired or rendered dysfunctional. The battle of Hue, during the Vietnam War's Tet-Offensive in early 1968, destroyed almost 80 percent of the city's structures and severely damaged its water, sanitation and power systems, making it impossible for many of those residents who had fled Hue or had survived the 30-day battle to continue living in their former hometown. In addition, some 4.000 civilians had lost their lives in the course of the battle, with just as much being injured as a result of the fight.¹ Similarly, the second battle for Fallujah in November 2004 produced large destruction and damage to the Iraqi city's structures, with more than 60 percent of its buildings left damaged, and 20 percent destroyed.² Some parts of Fallujah even were flooded by the nearby Euphrates River, as several of the pumps that had been installed to avoid such incidents were rendered inoperable by the fighting, as were large parts of the power and fresh water supply.³ The second American attempt to secure the city of Fallujah supposedly produced only minimal civilian casualties as a result of the fact that the city's residents mostly had fled the area before the US troops started their attack.⁴ The first battle of Fallujah, which had taken place earlier in 2004, however, had generated some 200 to 600 killed civilians within just a few days⁵ - enough to trigger vocal criticism from within parts of the Iraqi population and from the Iraqi transitional governing body, the

¹ National Archive College Park; No. 6A General Offensive and General Uprising (DIA Paper); 1968-1969;

p. 56./ National Archive College Park; Hue, One Year After Tet; 8 February 1969; p. 1./ Peter Braestrup; Big Story; How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Novato, Presidio, 1994); p. 203.

² Kendall Gott; Eyewitness to War. The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History, Vol. I (Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006); p. 14.

³ William Knarr, et al; The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr; in Al Sahawa - The Awakening, Vol I: Al Anbar Province Final Report; Institute for Defense Analysis Joint Advanced Warfighting Project (2009); p. 70f.

⁴ Spencer, J.; Case Study #7. Fallujah II.; URL: <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-7-second-battle-of-fallujah/>.

⁵ Spencer, J.; Case Study #6. Fallujah I; URL: <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-6-first-battle-of-fallujah/>./ Alice Hills; Fear and Loathing in Falluja; Armed Forces & Society, 32:4 (July 2006); p. 623.

Iraqi Governing Council, which ultimately created sufficient diplomatic pressure to force the United States to abort its first assault on the city.⁶

While the residents of a city can be seen as the first victims of an armed conflict that is waged in an urban area, the urban environment also usually takes its toll on the troops and soldiers who are forced to operate in the city's dense and challenging terrain. Comprising countless natural and man-made structures, chaotic alleys and streets, culturally and religiously significant buildings and an omnipresent population of civilians, the urban battlespace oftentimes is considered to be the "worst", most challenging and most demanding environment in which military operations can be conducted.⁷ The difficulties this environment entails by impeding armed forces' situational awareness, disrupting their communications and command and control efforts, and hindering them in bringing to bear the full toolbox of weaponry and technological gadgets they usually can rely on, in the past regularly have presented armies in urban combat situations with considerable challenges, forcing them to quickly adapt or face serious consequences.⁸ In addition to that the urban environment oftentimes in the past has provided countless advantages to those, who tried to defend a city against an attacking army, by offering ready-made cover, innumerable opportunities to ambush and isolate the enemy's forces and by providing ample ways to counter an opponent's numerical and technological superiority. In the end, this repeatedly created situations in which seemingly superior armies were forced to sustain significant casualties and overcome severe strains when faced with a skilled and determined enemy utilizing the features of the urban environment. The battle of Grozny in 1994-95, during which Chechen fighters were able to inflict heavy damage on the Russian forces attacking the city by exploiting the benefits provided to them by the urban battlespace and by quickly

⁶ Spencer, J.; Case Study #6. Fallujah I/ Alissa J. Rubin and Doyle McManus; Why America Waged a Losing Battle on Fallouja; LA Times (24 October 2004); URL: <https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-fallouja24oct24-story.html>.

⁷ Ministry of Defence; Future Operating Environment 2035. Strategic Trends Programme (2015); p. 25./ US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Publication 3-06. Joint Urban Operations (20 November 2013); p. I-2./ Michael Evans; Lethal Genes. The Urban Military Imperative and Western Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Century; Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:4 (August 2004); DOI: 10.1080/01402390902986949.; p. 518.

⁸ US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Publication 3-06; p. I-1ff.

adapting to the modus operandi of their enemies, is one such example.⁹ Similarly, and at almost the same time, urban guerrilla fighters in Mogadishu, Somalia were able to badger and harass both the assembled international armed forces of the United Nation's mission in the country and the conventional and special operations forces of the United States that had been deployed to Somalia. By not only turning to account the special features of the urban terrain, but also employing tactics that implicated significant portions of the city's civilian population directly in the armed confrontations, the fighters of Somali warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid were able to hamper with their opponents ability to apply force, to offset their enemy's military and technological advantages and ultimately to create a deadly environment in which the international contingents suffered significant casualties. The helicopters the Somalis were able to shoot down and the twenty US, Malaysian and Moroccan soldiers they were able to kill during the notorious battle of Mogadishu on 3 October illustrate the effects the urban battlespace can have in certain situations on the one hand and underline the Somali fighters' skills and ingenuity in utilizing these effects on the other.¹⁰

The people who live in an embattled city and the soldiers who partake in urban military operations experience the devastating effects and high risks of urban armed conflict more immediately and in greater detail than any other groups involved in or observing such events. It therefore is of little surprise that these two are the groups most frequently examined and analysed by scholars and researchers trying to explore and explain the various aspects of armed conflicts in urban environments. However, looking at groups that seemingly are less directly and immediately affected by the occurrences and effects of the confrontation itself, by the fighting and the dying on the streets and in the buildings, too can provide interesting insights into the wide-ranging complex of urban conflict, especially as such groups notwithstanding their actual distance can have considerable influence on the course of events on the battlefield. The

⁹ Timothy L. Thomas; *The Battle of Grozny. Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat*; *Parameters* 29:2 (Summer 1999); pp. 87-102.

¹⁰ US Army; *United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994* (Washington D.C; Center of Military History; 2003); p. 139./ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel (UN S/1994/653) (1 June 1994)*; in *United Nations; United Nations and Somalia. 1992-1996* (New York; 1996); p. 410.

societies behind those armed forces who wage war in a city, for example, can be seen as such a group that technically is not directly affected by urban conflicts that are waged in a foreign country, a foreign city, but which nevertheless is able to influence the way in which their own armed forces conduct their operations, thus potentially altering the course of the conflict. This in the past repeatedly has been the case especially in Western societies, as these societies in the last few decades increasingly developed rather specific expectations on how war has to be waged and especially on what human costs armed conflicts should or should not involve.¹¹ This furthermore has been of particular significance in Western democratic societies, as these not only exhibit the aforementioned expectations, but also through form of government have the unique ability to exert pressure and thus influence on their political decision-makers, based on public sentiments and expectancies.

The aim of this paper is to take a closer look at the expectations and perception of Western democratic societies in the context of urban military operations, examining the origins of their apparent aversion to the bloody realities of war in general, illustrating how this aversion in the past repeatedly played a role especially in the context of urban military operations conducted by Western armed forces, and pointing out how public expectations and sensibilities in multiple cases impacted political decisions with regard to such operations, in some instances permanently altering the course and outcome of events.

Western Aversion to the Costs of War

As many scholars have pointed out, the Vietnam War marked the starting point of an emerging trend of casualty sensitivity and casualty aversion among the American public.¹² Following the costly Tet-Offensive of 1968, decision-makers in Washington had come to realize that public support in the United States for the war in Vietnam was significantly dropping due to the countless casualties the American troops had suffered during the North Vietnamese attacks

¹¹ Robert Mandel; *Security, Strategy, and the Quest for Bloodless War* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2004)./ Christopher Coker; *Waging War Without Warriors?. The Changing Culture of Military Conflict* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2002).

¹² Sebastian Kaempf; *Saving Soldiers or Civilians?. Casualty-Aversion versus Civilian Protection in Asymmetric Conflicts* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018); p. 62ff./ Christopher Coker; *Humane Warfare* (London, Routledge, 2001); p. 36.

on southern cities. Especially the 30-day battle for the old imperial city of Hue, with its more than 200 US soldiers and Marines killed and over 1.500 wounded had made a lasting impression on the American public, who had closely watched the fight for the city on their television screens back home.¹³ In the end, the actually successfully repulsed Tet-Offensive, via devastating media representation and poor political guidance would be turned into a strategic defeat for the United States and its South Vietnamese allies, not only changing the course of the war for the worse for the US, but permanently affecting the American public's relations with and perception of American military endeavours in foreign countries and the human costs resulting from such undertakings. "The ideational purpose which had not only mobilized the American nation in the past, but had also legitimized its costs in lives and material, began losing its appeal"¹⁴, and thus the deaths of American soldiers in faraway countries were increasingly deemed needless and undesirable. As became apparent later on, the Vietnam War had marked the "first conflict in which the American people were unwilling to subject their own soldiers to the cruelty of war".¹⁵

Even though virtually none of the other Western democratic nations shared the experiences the United States had made in Vietnam, societies in other countries like Great Britain too started to develop an increased sensitivity towards losing soldiers' lives in military operations, especially if these operations were perceived to be pointless or if the public accredited them with little or no prospect of success.¹⁶ Thus, merely a few years after the United States had made its experiences with impactful casualty-related public discontent in the context of the Vietnam War, Great Britain similarly faced challenging societal dynamics with regard to its military involvement in Northern Ireland. Even though the

¹³ Jack Shulimson et al; U.S. Marines in Vietnam. The Defining Year 1968. (Washington D.C., 1997); p. 210./ Peter Braestrup; Big Story.

¹⁴ Sebastian Kaempf; Saving Soldiers or Civilians?; p. 63.

¹⁵ Christopher Coker; Humane Warfare; p. 36.

¹⁶ Jason Reifler et al; Success Matters. Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq; Political Science Faculty Publications, 10 (2006); URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub/10/ Andrew H. Sidman and Helmut Norpoth; Fighting to Win. Wartime morale in the American public; Electoral Studies, 31:2 (2012); pp. 330-341.

British Army's operation in "the Province"¹⁷ started off in 1969 as a peacekeeping and policing effort in support of the local representative government and security forces, by early 1971 it had turned into a fully fledged urban counter-guerrilla operation in which British Army casualties soon started to mount. Little by little, the rising numbers of killed and wounded soldiers in Northern Ireland created a strained atmosphere among parts of the general public in homeland Britain, as many not only felt discomfort over the fact that the men were dying in the streets of Northern Ireland, but sensed that they died in vain as little to no progress was being made in calming the overall security situation in the Province. Specifically, "the mounting deaths of soldiers in the streets of Belfast and Londonderry constituted a significant surge in the overall costs of the engagement, and thus had a permanent and negative effect on the people's willingness to ignore the evident lack in successes the government had produced"¹⁸ so far over the course of the entire operation. Calls to end the British engagement in Northern Ireland and to "Bring Back the Boys from Ulster" soon started to be voiced.¹⁹ Particularly vocal in their criticism of the British Government and in their calls for a withdrawal of the British Army from the Province naturally were the relatives of British soldiers, who feared to lose their kin to an IRA bomb or bullet. Their public protests and demands quickly incited growing sympathy and support and even caused the British Army's recruitment numbers to drop temporarily.²⁰

In the end, the public pressure brought to bear on the British Government as a result of military casualties being suffered in Northern Ireland never reached the same levels as it had within the United States with regard to the Vietnam War. This not least was the case as the decision-makers in London were able to

¹⁷ *The term Province refers to the fact that the six counties of Northern Ireland once were part of the historical Irish province of Ulster*: Britannica; Northern Ireland/ Ulster; URL: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Northern-Ireland>.

¹⁸ Jonas Neugebauer; *The Dilemma of Humanized Urban Warfare* (Dissertation forthcoming); p. 127.

¹⁹ Paul Dixon; *Britain's „Vietnam Syndrome“?. Public Opinion in British Military Intervention from Palestine to Yugoslavia*; *Review of International Studies*, 26:1 (January 2000); URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097658>; p. 112.

²⁰ Paul Dixon; *Britain's „Vietnam Syndrome“?*; p. 111f./ National Archives London; *Programme Analysis and Review Defence Manpower Summary No 6. Manpower for the Armed Forces*; 1971; p. A-5f.

reassure a portion of their critics by increasing the intensity and extent of the army's activities in Northern Ireland, thus giving the impression that progress was being made in the fight against the Irish Republican Army.²¹ As however can be observed in hindsight, the rising number of killed and injured soldiers in the Northern Ireland campaign in 1971 nevertheless produced sufficient incentive to force the British Government to alter its policy in the Province, which in turn suggests that the element of public casualty aversion in the past played a role in the context of Western military operations, not only in the United States, but in other countries like Great Britain as well.

With time, Western societies' growing concerns for those killed and injured in armed conflicts further consolidated and even expanded beyond their own soldiers to include the civilians who regularly and involuntarily got caught in the middle of violent confrontations. In that respect, scholars have identified another element of influence in shaping and defining Western societies' expectations on the manner in which wars are to be waged, namely the rise of so-called "technological determinism"²². This concept illustrates how societies have expanded and strengthened their expectancy that wars are to be fought with minimal effects on human lives, based on the simple perception that modern technological developments plainly enable armed forces to do so. In other words, from the public's perspective, new technological advancements, like precision-guided munitions, and sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting methods have allowed for modern armed forces to conduct operations drawing upon a complete understanding and awareness of the areas of operation and to carry out attacks with extreme precision and thus with virtually no risks of harming or damaging anything or anyone but the intended targets. This then oftentimes led to the conclusion that it has to be possible and thus can be expected of armed forces to employ these technological assets to the effect that military operations are conducted and wars are waged with minimal casualties suffered

²¹ Jonas Neugebauer; *The Dilemma of Humanized Urban Warfare* (Dissertation forthcoming); p. 126ff.

²² Ned Dobos; *Insurrection and Intervention. The Two Faces of Sovereignty* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); p. 54./ Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi; *Choosing Your Battles. American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004); p. 153ff.

and collateral harm caused.²³ As in the former case, the “technological determinism” too first and foremost came into effect within Western societies, and especially within the American public, as the people in this part of the world perceived their armed forces to be equipped with the most advanced technological gadgets and thus capable of dominating any opponent on the battlefield simply by drawing on their technological superiority.²⁴ The fact that even with the most advanced equipment and technological gadgets, armed conflicts usually are too complex and too unpredictable to reliably enable any actor to partake in a violent confrontation without taking at least some risk of suffering casualties and causing harm and damage, especially in certain environments and conditions, however, usually got overlooked.

The Realities of Urban Conflict

These expectations of Western societies that wars were to be waged with a minimum risk for soldiers and civilians, on multiple occasions in the past have collided with the inherent realities of armed conflicts, and thus repeatedly have presented Western armed forces with the challenge to comply with their societies’ expectations while nonetheless attempting to fulfil their military mission. This especially was the case in the context of operations that were conducted in an urban environment, since military engagements in this particular area of operations by nature run the risk of producing high numbers of military and civilian casualties.

This feature can be mainly attributed to two distinct aspects. First, the urban environment tends to interfere with and disrupt armed forces’ ability to effectively conduct their operations, among other things by hampering their communications and thus command and control efforts, by fragmenting large troop contingents into small, often separated groups and units, by canalizing troop movements, especially for large, heavily armoured vehicles that are confined to those streets and roads of a city which they can navigate, and by

²³ Marshall J. Beier; *Discriminating Tastes: “Smart” Bombs, Non-Combatants, and Notions of Legitimacy in Warfare*; *Security Dialogue*, 34:4 (2003); pp. 411-425.; URL: <https://journals-1sagepub-1com-100899a2v023b.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010603344003>; p. 413ff./ James Igoe Walsh; *Precision Weapons, Civilian Casualties, and Support for the Use of Force*; *Political Psychology*, 36:5 (2015); DOI: 10.1111/pops.12175; p. 507ff.

²⁴ Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi; *Choosing Your Battles*; p. 153.

limiting their ability to effectively bring to bear all the assets of warfare at their disposal.²⁵ The latter feature can be seen both as consequence of the other aspects, as for example an attacking force has little chance to apply direct fire from a tank or armoured vehicle if these assets are unable to reach the necessary firing positions due to natural and man-made obstacles impeding their movement, and as a result of the armed forces' efforts to avoid causing unnecessary harm and destruction in the course of their operations. During the battle for Hue, for example, the attacking US Marine forces were instructed to avoid unduly damaging the city and were ordered to especially look out for the multiple culturally and historically significant buildings that were located in the ancient part of the city. This, for a significant part of the battle precluded the use of indirect fires from artillery batteries and nearby navy ships and subsequently left the attacking US and South Vietnamese forces more or less without any supportive fires, as, due to North Vietnamese air defences and bad weather conditions, close air support too was rendered unemployable.²⁶ In the end, the considerably high casualty figures among the attacking forces in Hue, among other things can be directly attributed to the fact that the assault was predominantly carried out by infantry units, clearing the city street-by-street and house-by-house with little direct and even less indirect fire support.²⁷

Similarly, British troops in Northern Ireland, for a considerable amount of time were strictly limited in their ability to use force in order to avoid producing unintentional and excessive harm among the omnipresent civilian population.²⁸ As a result, the troops operating in the Province, patrolling the streets of Londonderry and Belfast, were permitted to open fire only in very narrowly defined circumstances and in most cases only following several warnings. They furthermore, especially in the initial phase of the operation, were

²⁵ US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Publication 3-06.; p. I-1ff.

²⁶ Luke Falkenburg; Charlie Company's Battle for Hue. An examination of an after-action report on urban combat; Marine Corps Gazette, 97:8 (August 2013); p. 48./ Richard D. Camp Jr.; Death in the Imperial City. U.S. Marines in the Battle for Hue 31 January to 2 March 1968 (2018); p. 45.

²⁷ James H. Wilbanks; The Battle for Hue, 1968; in Block by Block. The Challenges of Urban Operations; ed. William G. Roberston and Lawrence A. Yates (Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003); p. 152f.

²⁸ Desmond Hamill; Pig in the Middle. The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1985 (London; Methuen; 1985); p. 49ff./ Ministry of Defence; Operation Banner; p. 4-10.

only allowed to fire single shots instead of full-automatic fire-bursts and were prohibited to apply fires from heavy weaponry. This in turn limited the soldiers' abilities to effectively prevent and counter attacks and thus made them more vulnerable to the increasing assaults by IRA gunmen and bombers. Over the course of the British involvement in Northern Ireland, the restrictive guidelines were revised and adjusted several times, the basic challenge of weighing the minimization of unintentional harm and the safety and efficiency of British troops, however, remained for most of the conflict.²⁹ Both the example of Hue and the case of the British engagement in Northern Ireland furthermore highlight how military actors operating in an urban environment in the past repeatedly have been forced to balance the safety and well-being of their own soldiers against the integrity of the city and the safety and well-being of the non-combatants in the area of operations.

The Second aspect contributing to the fact that armed conflicts in urban areas usually produce high numbers of especially military casualties, is that this particular environment not only obstructs their abilities and capabilities, it additionally also offers those opponents who are capable and willing to turn to account the special characteristics of the urban environment countless opportunities to present the attackers with serious tactical and operational challenges. In the past, this particularly often was the case in operations in which a conventional army was forced to attack an urban area that was defended by a determined and skilled unconventional opponent with better knowledge of the local terrain and its innate particularities. During the British involvement in Northern Ireland, for example, the Irish Republican Army used the narrow streets and densely packed houses in Londonderry and Belfast in a relatively mobile fashion, ambushing British Army patrols or taking aimed sniper shots at British soldiers and then making a quick and unhindered escape before the troops could adequately react. In doing so they profited from their better knowledge of the terrain as they carefully selected firing positions and ambush sites, and exploited

²⁹ Jonas Neugebauer; *The Dilemma of Humanized Urban Warfare* (Dissertation forthcoming); p. 128ff.

the multiple escape routes made available to them by the numerous narrow alleys and tight streets of the densely built environment.³⁰

During the two battles of Fallujah in 2004, the insurgent fighters defending the city similarly took advantage of its tactical benefits, by using the network of paths and roads to evade and circle around the advancing attackers, and by preparing countless ambushes inside the city's residential buildings, with small groups of fighters just waiting hidden inside the houses for US soldiers to step into the rooms and be welcomed by a barrage of small-arms fire and grenades.³¹ Aware of the fact that the attacking American troops would be reluctant to simply tear down all the buildings in the city, this tactic offered the possibility to fairly easily exact heavy casualties on the supposedly superior enemy. This technique furthermore proved to be especially successful when insurgents took cover and started attacks from within mosques and other religious buildings, as the particular significance of such structures even further inhibited the US troops in their use of force.³² As a result, US Army and Marine Corps forces in their second attack on Fallujah ultimately were forced to escalate their use of force and in fact flatten several of the city's houses in an effort to minimize the deaths and injuries the units suffered when securing buildings room-by-room.³³ This in turn, however, produced vocal international criticism, even from some of the United State's closest allies, and in the end contributed significantly to the vast damage and destruction the battles of Fallujah caused in the city.

Society's Expectations and the Realities of Urban Conflicts

As several historical examples demonstrate, armed forces operating in an urban area in the past regularly suffered significant casualties that directly can be traced to the conditions and features innate to this particular environment. In

³⁰ Ministry of Defence; Operation Banner. An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland (2006); p. 5-3.

³¹ Kenneth W. Estes; Operation Vigilant Resolve. The First Battle of Al Fallujah; Leatherneck 102:4 (April 2019); p. 29.

³² Alfred B. Connable; The Massacre That Wasn't. Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare; in U.S. Marines in Iraq. 2004-2008. Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington D.C.; History Division US Marine Corps; 2010); p 75.

³³ Cpt. Natalie Friel; in Kendall Gott; Eyewitness to War; p. 67ff.

combination with Western societies' expectations that military operations should be conducted and wars should be waged with a minimum risk of producing casualties among the respective country's armed forces, this particular characteristic repeatedly has turned urban military operations not only into tactically, but also into socially and politically challenging undertakings. In more than one case, this even created a situation in which Western states and their governments found themselves confronted with such heavy public pressure that they were forced to fundamentally alter their policies or even abort the respective military operation entirely.

Especially the United States in the past decades have been prone to this particular dynamic, not least because of the country's experiences during the Vietnam War and the mostly urban Tet-Offensive. This offensive, and in particular the battle of Hue can be seen as one of the first examples of how a military operation in an urban environment took effect far beyond its actual military significance. The casualties suffered in Hue and the reports that were conveyed to the US addressing the fight and its implications, contributed significantly to a rise in American casualty aversion and thus anti-war sentiments, and ultimately created a public atmosphere in which the United States were forced to change and finally end their engagement in South-East Asia.³⁴

Some twenty years later, in a different conflict in a different part of the world, the United States once again were forced to face the unpleasant realities of urban conflict. In Mogadishu, the warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid and his militia fighters proved to be rather skilled in utilizing the city's special features to exact a considerable toll from international and US forces in the city. In the end, they were able to create a situation in which the American forces suffered 18 killed within just a few hours during a single operation on 3 October 1993, which in turn caused public pressure in the US to rise.³⁵ Just as had been the case following the Tet-Offensive and the battle for Hue, this pressure once again

³⁴ Andrew F. Krepinevich; *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press; 1986); p. 251./ Erik B. Villard; *Staying the Course. Combat Operations October 1967 to September 1968* (Washington D.C.; Center of Military History US Army; 2017); p. 445f.

³⁵ US Army; *United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report*; p. 139./ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry (UN S/1994/653)*; p. 410.

forced the US government to fundamentally alter its policy, ultimately causing President Clinton to reassess the entire American involvement in Somalia and to subsequently withdraw all American forces from the region.³⁶

Others besides the USA too have experienced which challenges can arise from a combination of military with societal and political factors in the context of urban military operations, as the involvement of the British Army in Northern Ireland clearly illustrates. In the early years of its engagement in Belfast and Londonderry, the British government too faced an increase in casualty-related public discontent, as the British society grew dissatisfied with the fact that several of its soldiers lost their lives in an operation which yielded no visible progress or success. Even though this dynamic did not create the same political repercussions as it had in similar situations in the United States, the public criticism and occasional calls for an end of the British Army's deployment to Northern Ireland nevertheless caused the government at Westminster to adapt its strategy and boost the army's actions against the IRA, thus demonstrating that the dilemma of conducting a low-casualty operation in an environment known for producing considerably high casualty figures has never been an exclusively American phenomenon, but rather can be detected among other Western nations as well.

When wars and armed conflicts are waged in an urban environment, the people living in the embattled cities and the soldiers and fighters participating in the hostilities are usually the ones most directly affected by the consequences. However, as this paper has shown, the implications of such events in the past have repeatedly exceeded these direct and obvious impacts, in particularly in cases in which armed forces of Western, democratic states like the United States and Great Britain have participated in urban confrontations. In these instances, the urban environment not only influenced the course of events in the conflict zone, but also took effect among the societies behind the participating Western armies. As has been elaborated furthermore, this first and foremost can be attributed to the fact that armed forces operating in the urban battlespace, with its unique set of characteristics and challenges, are prone to suffer considerably

³⁶ Douglas Delaney; Cutting, Running, or Otherwise?. The US Decision to Withdraw from Somalia; *Small Wars & Insurgency*, 15:3 (2004); pp. 28-46; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0959231042000275551>; p. 37.

high numbers of casualties, which in turn Western societies since the late 1960's have increasingly been unwilling and unable to condone. As a result, Western governments in the past have repeatedly been forced to fundamentally alter their strategies towards military involvements with a strong urban component due to public pressures and discontent, in more than one case even leading to a premature abortion of the military operation. Historical examples like the battle of Hue in 1968, the early years of the British involvement in Northern Ireland, or the United State's engagement in Somalia in 1993 underline these findings. Furthermore, more recent examples of Western urban military operations, like the two battles of Fallujah indicate that this by no means merely represents a phenomenon of the distant past, subsequently raising the question whether the "West", and Western societies in particular, are prepared and will be able to operate militarily in a modern world that is increasingly defined by global urbanization and the emergence of vast urban metropolises.³⁷

³⁷ David Kilcullen; *Out of the Mountains. The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford; Oxford University Press; 2013); p. 28ff.

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**The Effectiveness of Bulgarian Air Defense and Civil Mobilization
during the Allied Bombardments on Sofia
(November 1943-May 1944)**

Jordan Baev (Bulgaria)

The proposed paper discusses critically the legal procedures and practical measures, undertaken by the Bulgarian state, military, and municipal authorities for protection of the capital Sofia and its civilian population against the Allied bombardments during the UK-US “Point Black” air operation in Europe. The intensive bombardments on Sofia started in November 1943 and continued until May 1944. The primary aim of the Allied operation was to detach Bulgaria from the Tripartite pact. The US Office of Strategic Services organized at the same time a covert action for secret negotiations with the Bulgarian government, while the British Special Operations Executive started in March 1944 arms delivery by air to the Bulgarian leftist guerilla detachments.

The paper will not discuss the details of the air bombardments on Sofia, neither the air defense counterattacks by the Bulgarian Air Forces because these issues have been well described in many previous publications. The fate of the British and U.S. pilots shot down over the Bulgarian territory is also well known. Among the specific issues was the significant move from the principle of refraining from airstrikes on civilian population toward the total war and the disappearance of the characteristic distinction between front and rear. Our research will be focused mainly on the analysis and assessments on the effectiveness of the special measures undertaken for protection of the civilian population.

The research is based on various documents from the Bulgarian state, military, and regional archival records. We have revealed several collections of the Sofia City and District Archives, the Central State Archives, and the State Military History Archives. These collections include the protocol books of the Sofia Greater Municipality and the meetings of the mayor's administration, minutes of the meetings of the municipal council, documents, instructions, orders, reports and circulars of various offices at the municipality (including the

fire department), protocols for assessing destruction and the impact of bombing on the urban environment, materials on evacuation, the organization and work of individual commissariats on evacuation, assistance and recovery, etc. In the records of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Health there are stored also materials on the bombings, instructions, regulations on the amount of benefits (especially of the Department of Public Welfare), etc. Interesting materials on the evacuation and supply of the population were found in the records of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Labor, as well as in the later Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, where the materials of the Commissariat for Assistance are stored. Very difficult was to locate the materials of the Commissariat for Evacuation, which were scattered in different funds, but the most important part of them can be found in the Civil Mobilization Directorate. Some documents were also found in the records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is still unclear, was the amount and essence of the important government records taken by the Soviet troops in September-October 1944 – we have no access so far to these files, which are stored at the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA) in Podolsk near Moscow.

The first practical measures for anti-aircraft defense and protection of the population from bombings and chemical attacks were adopted soon after Bulgaria joined the Tripartite pact on 1 March 1941, especially after the first bombings on Bulgarian territory of April 1941 during the Nazi invasion in Yugoslavia. The announcement of the so called “symbolic war” against Great Britain and the USA on 14 December 1941 did not cause any urgent security measures next year with the illusion of the ruling elite that the “real war battles” between the leading war adversaries was far away from the Bulgarian territory. However, the eleven bombings over the capital in the period 14 November 1943 - 17 April 1944 were not a total surprise for the government since there were clear indications for such a threat in the mid-1943 when the Allied war operations came closer to the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean.

According to a special regulation for coordinating the activities of the wartime economy, approved by the Council of Ministers with a decree of 28 of May 1943, a new state institution was established. It was called the High Commissariat of the Wartime Economy, headed by a High Commissioner and determined to be directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers. The main task

of the High Commissariat was to coordinate and manage all activities through which the wartime economy was built.

On 12 July, 1943 the capital's mayor, Eng. Ivan Ivanov, issued a special order 394-VII on the necessary urgent measures for anti-aircraft and chemical defense. It was the result of a confidential letter of the Ministry of Public Health dated 8 of July, which warned that the danger of air attacks on Sofia has “increased extremely and can be considered imminent” The order recommended the creation of special anti-aircraft and chemical defense units at each municipal office, as well as undertaking of special measures with regard to blackout measures, the provision of materials and tools for protection, as well as the training of municipal officials. The responsible deputy mayor and the head of the Defense Department at the Greater Municipality were responsible for implementation of the order. The activities were carried out in coordination with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Health. The Minister of the Interior assigned this task to the head of the Central Department at the Ministry. Naturally, the fire prevention measures were also coordinated with the Chief of the Metropolitan Fire Command Yuriy Zakharchuk.

The main provisions of the order concerned the distribution of responsibility for the preparation and effective organization of the defense. The Directorate of Trams and Lighting was obliged to take all necessary measures for the complete street blackout in the area of the Greater Metropolitan Municipality. It should make the mandatory blackout devices for all municipal vehicles – trams, cars, trucks, omnibuses, etc. In each office of the Municipality, a person in a position of authority was appointed (deputy chief, head of service, head of bureau, etc.) and, if possible, a reserve officer or non-commissioned officer as head of Anti-Air Defense of the office, to be responsible for the decisions and actions taken by the office. A defense group composed of trained officials was formed for each office - the names of the leaders and members of these groups should be prepared within 3-4 days. General supervision was in the hands of Deputy Mayor Ivan Lekarski and the head of the Civil Department. In all public buildings, the measures required by the citizens were taken with specific tasks - protection and storage of warehouse property and archives (for which chests were provided by special order), and also for superiors to instill calmness and obedience in employees. Municipal officials and employees were

required to take similar protective measures in their homes in order to become role models for other citizens.

The service for “passive” anti-aircraft and chemical defense at the Greater Municipality was built in cooperation with the military leadership of the capital garrison. The head of the department was Capt. Kosta Stanev and he was assisted in the command by two sections - surveillance and warning (two officers) and civil Anti Air Defense supply and disposal service (five officers) or a command of eight officers in total. Attached to this command were five scribe defenders, five liaison defenders and eleven defenders on three telephone operator shifts in the department. In the event of an “alarm”, the heads of the relevant municipal services with responsibilities in the area of air defense (Sanitary Department, Technical Workshop and Cleanliness Department, Water Supply and Sewerage Department, Social Care Department and Architecture and Urban Planning Directorate, as well as some other departments) joined the emergency teams.

The territory of Sofia Greater Municipality was divided into twenty protective groups, of which fourteen were within the boundaries of the city and six were in the attached rural municipalities (Slatina, Nadezhda, Boyana, Dragalevtsi, Gorna Banya and Knyazhevo). It was the defense group that served the respective area and was obliged to put out the created fires and assist the injured population during an air raid. Each defense group had three cores – police-surveillance, sanitary-chemical and fire-technical-parachute. The police-surveillance core watched and protected the discipline of the citizenry when an “alarm” was filed, observed and investigated the defeats, immediately bringing to the head of the group to give immediate rescue and other assistance, protected the damaged property of citizens from looting, performed police service regarding the movement of citizens, the removal and escorting of troublemakers. The sanitary-chemical nucleus were obliged to give first medical aid to the victims, took severely injured citizens to the dressing points of the groups, collected the killed citizens and moved them to the designated places, acted as a chemical nucleus for decontamination of the gassed places and provided assistance to people injured by chemicals and animals. The fire-technical-anti-parachute core fought fires, found and extracted citizens buried under collapsed buildings, and fought against eventual paratroopers.

A comparison of the bombing coverage from November 1943 to May 1944 shows significant differences in approach and propaganda implications. The watershed, as in other elements of the social reaction to what was happening, was the two serial bombing (day and night) of 10 January 1944. After 10 of January 1944, the propaganda line changed. Certainly, after the double bombing, the government lost control over events, panic set in in the capital, the propaganda machine was also upset, and emergency measures were introduced. Unable to really influence the situation to the end, the government prohibited travel to the capital, introduced a curfew and closed schools indefinitely. Strict prohibitions were imposed on the publication of any information about the bombing of Bulgarian cities. Since the beginning of Operation *Point Blank*, the American air campaign in the Balkans had shown a contradictory approach. On the one hand, gen. Eaker ordered his commanders “to be especially careful so that it is a matter of first concern that non-military objects suffer as little as possible”. On the other hand, however, his priorities in defining the goals in March-April 1944 were in the following ranking: No. 1 – cities in Bulgaria; No. 2 – Budapest; No. 3 Bucharest, the targets of the airstrikes being both military and political. US and UK airmen were expected to terrorize the local population without ostensibly using terrorist tactics.

For the entire air offensive, more than 12,000 buildings in the capital were hit, 80% of the usable buildings had broken windows and roof tiles. Economic, cultural and government facilities were destroyed. Streets and sidewalks have been broken up; tram lines have been taken out. The water supply, electricity supply, sewerage and telephone system were seriously damaged. The aggregated data on the approximately 50,000 aerial bombs of various calibers dropped on civilian and military objects can be regarded as relatively reliable, with Sofia alone reporting over 2,200 killed and wounded citizens. The material damage was estimated at the astronomical sum of BGN 2.8 billion.

Despite serious efforts to prepare the capital for air defense, the city and its people were ultimately ill-prepared for such an ordeal. A lot had been done - both in terms of measures to ensure protection, and in terms of training the population and relevant services. Yet when the air war started, this would prove insufficient. Heavy casualties on the civilian population, destruction, evacuation

and all the other accompanying tragic consequences of this total war would follow. In those days (January-March 1944), a number of institutions were helping people to survive - and this was especially true for the protection groups, the fire and sanitation services, the police and the military, involved in the rescue and recovery work. Probably the most effective were the services of the Greater Sofia Municipality, despite the chaos created and those specific municipal government bodies - the commissariats that channel the efforts to deal with the crisis - both in clearing the destruction, and in the evacuation, and in helping the victims and providing water, food, heat, light and clothing for the inhabitants of the capital.

The main psychological effect and results from the Allied air raids and the Bulgarian Air Defense and protective measures were obviously opposite to the primary goals. The Bulgarian government did not take any step to leave the Tripartite Pact since it feared much more from the Nazi punitive strikes, as it happened in Northern Italy and Hungary. The civilian population distrusted the policy of the government and the alliance with the Third Reich; however, the anti-British and anti-American feelings and sentiments increased drastically. Exactly in these months, as many intelligence reports confirmed, visible hopes appeared (even within the legal liberal pro-Western opposition circles) that Bulgaria could go out of the war with the support of the USSR as a “mediator”. Perhaps these feelings were in favor of the “peaceful offensive” of the Soviet troops on Bulgarian territory in September 1944. Meanwhile, the memories for many civilian victims and the sinister traces of the air bombardments still existed in the next postwar years, which was used by the Communist propaganda during the Cold War era.

Havana, a Port City Shaped by War

José Ramón Vallespín Gómez (Spain)

1. Introduction

Wars are complex events that have effects of many different classes, and those effects are produced at very different levels. Throughout human history, cities have frequently been targets of military operations of many kinds, and their consequences have produced consequently all types of effects on them. Many cities have been damaged or completely destroyed, or even erased from the face of the Earth, but those are examples of effects of war on a short to medium terms. Other cities have been affected by wars on a more strategical scale, and not only in the form of damages and destruction, but on the contrary, in the way they were being constructed and the form they developed physically. Sometimes cities have developed mainly because the reality of war. Also, more importantly, wars have had an effect on their population bay way of the economic, governmental, racial, and other factors profoundly affecting their constitutions.

There are cities of many types. One particular case, very common anyway, is that of port cities, urban bodies that lay on the coast and are used to harbor vessels that sail the seas. These tend to be the most prosperous of all cities as the sea, regardless the perception on the inland man, has always been more a pathway than a frontier. Therefore, many port cities have played a prominent role in war. But the sea, compared to the land, is a hidden world, and the effects of war on port cities have correspondingly been less visible than in land locked ones.

Havana, the capital of Cuba, is a good example of a city affected by war mainly for its maritime dimension. As we will see, the development of both the physical and the human halves of Havana have been profoundly influenced by the different conflicts in which it was involved. And Havana is not just a port city, but it is the heart of a rich hinterland and it is not only the capital of the island in which it lays, but was the most valuable city of a vast part of a worldly structure, Spain and its dominions, an empire based on the control of the maritime realm.

Different geostrategic factors made Havana the hub of the maritime lines that connected the Spain with its overseas provinces.

Havana was founded almost right after Columbus' discovery of the New World, at the start of the Spanish establishment in America, and contrary to other main capitals of the Spanish America like Mexico or Lima, was raised from scratch. This reflected the fact that the Caribbean was an area where human civilization have developed only moderately and the Spaniards found no urban concentrations of significance there. For the same reason, and for the obvious fact that they came from the sea, Havana was erected on the coast. Therefore, from its very beginning, Havana has been exposed the enemies, and has suffered the effects of conflicts and war throughout its history. It has been under threat from the sea from the beginning, starting with pirates, corsairs and then proceeding to full-fledged wars.

2. The beginnings

San Cristobal de la Habana, as it is her full name, was initially established by Pánfilo de Narváz on the southern coast of Cuba, but very soon this location showed to be deficient and the city was move to is current situation, and gradually but constantly, grow up to become the jewel of the Spanish monarchy overseas. It acquired the rank of city in 1592 and in 1607 was recognized as capital of the island.

In the beginning, Havana face a very little threat. It was just a small village protected by a medieval palisade and it had no formal military establishment. There is no record of significant opposition from the indigenous taino population. In fist phases of the Spanish establishment in the New World what was needed was goods for the raising of the European population, compared to the importation of products from the new lands. The crown stablished very soon a system to regulate the required shipping and very soon a monopoly was imposed. This monopoly was needed as soon as non-Spanish merchants, as they learned from the Spanish the way to get to the Caribbean, tried to sell their own goods, supplementing the regulated commerce. This was never enough to satisfy the needs of the settlers, and therefore smuggling became a fact, an activity that was fought by the authorities but never totally suppressed.

Smuggling was quickly transformed into overt piracy and, when wars broke out in Europe, initially mainly France against the Hapsburg Empire, it became the basis of corsarism. This became the first important threat to Havana. Well known is the sacking of the city by Jaques de Sores in 1553 taking advantage of the little defense of the village at the time. Other ports in the area have been attacked before but Havana have been speared so far. This attack made the authorities to start the serious fortification of it. The first fort was erected in 1558, it being the Real Fuerza, a renaissance style castle in which Stereotomy was first used. The engineer who started the work of raising it was probably [Bartolomé Sánchez](#), and it was certainly continued under the direction of [Francisco de Calona](#) from 1561. Under its protection, the first *atarazana* (shipyard) was established. Intiially small ships for the local needs where constructed there, and later on galleons where built from the early XVII century. Caribbean woods were of prime quality.

As anticipated, and having being established in a very well protected harbor, and due to its strategic situation in front of Bahamas Channel, the way back to Europe for the sailing ships of the time, Havana was selected in the second half of the XVI century, when the *Carrera de Indias* was well organized, as the port of assembly for the fleets that returned to Catholic Spain with goods from the New World. From then on, the ships from Cartagena de Indias, Portobello and Veracruz came to Havana were they form the escorted convoys that sailed to the East. Of all the many goods that were transported on those ships since them, Protestants, both individually and as states, started to see Spanish silver as a commodity to acquire by any mean, including war, and therefore the conquest of the city became an objective in their plans to contest the Spanish Empire.

For France, England and the Low Countries, there was no

- a. Port of reunion of fleets on the way to Spain. Havana in the mind of the Protestants, willing to acquire Spanish silver.
- b. Slave trafficking.
- c. La Punta.
- d. Militias? 1655. Cromwel's Western Design. Havana not tested. British occupation of Jamaica. Port Royal becomes the hub of the slave traiding in the Carribbean.

- e. 1674, construction of Havana's first stone wall, (not fully completed until 1797).

3. Wars with Britain. 1702-1784?

- a. More smuggling. Jamaica-Cuba bond. The sweet gold: sugar. Black labor force, Black's as a own soldiers under promise of liberation. Reciprocal foment of subversion (Fort Moses).
- b. Spanish *Coartacion* (manumission).. At Utrech (1713), in exchange for its recognition of Phillip V as king os Spain, Great Britain replaced France in the monopoly of the supply of black slaves from Africa to Spanish America by way of t The *Asiento* (treaty) of the slave trade... For some, it was equivalent to Spain maintaining an empire for the British to commerce with it³³² (. The entity in charge of making it happen was the South Sea Company
- c. Tres Reyes, del Morro. Best defended Spanish harbor in America (¡Cartagena de Indias!).
- d. Divina Pastora battery.
- e. Real Armada (Royal Navy).
- f. 1723. Real Astillero de la Habana (Havana Arsenal). Serrano.
- i.From atarazanas to arsenal. From 1710 Havana is chosen as the center of the Spanish naval construction in the New World, concentrating the works previously conducted in Cartagena and Veracruz.
- ii.1743 Lorenzo Montalvo. First Navy commissary of Havana, then of Cuba (*Comisario ordenador*).
- g. 1748. GB sends a fleet. Knowles.
- h. Interwar.
- i.Haiti and Jamaica economically dedicated to sugar. Increase in Cuban exports of different goods (to them)
- ii.British intelligence. Knowles.
 - i. Seven years' war. 1762-63 British occupation of Havana.

³³² Fernández Durán, R. *Gerónimo de Uztáriz (1670-1732). Una Política Económica para Felipe V*. Minerva Ediciones. Madrid, cited by Donoso Anez (

- i. The invasion campaign. Lessons learned from Cartagena. Santo Domingo fake target Surprise (Old Babamas passage). Landings at Cojima and La Cabana hills dominating El Morro, main target.
- ii. Spanish reinforcements: Army Regiments (América). Navy squadron. Lack of preparation as the danger was undervalued. Confidence on the adverse conditions for the invasion (Fortifications, weather, medical risks). Portocarrero.
- iii. Montalvo. Hid shipbuilding material to the British, tried rebellions during the occupation which forced his escape, he was not court-martialed, on the contrary he was promoted to Navy Intendant in 1763. In 1765 was elevated to Count of Macuriges. 1769 Santísima Trinidad built in the Arsenal.
- iv. Loyalty of Havana's population to Spain is demonstrated, although differences between creole and peninsular Spaniards are stressed (HO and GC, epilogue note 292).
- v. Effect on the development of the city.
 1. Locals angry with Spanish officials (OC)
 2. Arsenal reconstruction. Montalvo.
 3. Black workers. Participated decisively in the defense of the city, but eventually lost their privileges. Increase of slavery in Cuba as the monarchy found that the blacks have been instrumental in the defense of the city, something unexpected by the British war commanders and the elites have, somehow, been unfaithful during the occupation..
 4. English merchants remain in Havana beyond the year they were allowed.
- j. War of American Independence. Support to the rebels from Havana for economic reasons. Havana naval and military base for operations in Florida (Mobile, Pensacola). Havana thrives from the war.
- k. Sugar boom.
 - İ. 1791. Haitian slave revolt.

4. The end of the presence of Spain in America

In 1886 the pro-independence political faction in Cuba, which have been growing steadily thanks, among other things, by the support of north-American interest, best represented by the famous statement by president John Quincy Adams early in the century that the Island would eventually fall under de influence of the North American Union, started an armed rebellion against Spain. Adams statement was just a particular case of the more general This was the initiation of the final phase of the emancipation which, after three separate conflicts (Ten Years War 1868-78, Little War 1879-80, and War of Independence 1895-1898) conducted to the establishment of the Republic of Cuba. All this was almost inevitable due to the increasing influence that the United States have been placing on the economy of Cuba, but it is paradoxical that a country that, although having banned slavery maintained a fierce segregation policy intervened in favor of a people whose half was precisely black. As in the case of the Union in the Secession War in the United States, those who led the rebellion against Spain in Cuba tended to grant freedom to the slaves only as a mean to recruit men for the armed forces. In spite of this, and repeating what have happened in the emancipation of the Hispanic American republics of the start of the century, if the lower/indigenous class leaned on one of the sides of the conflict, it was towards the Spanish crown, not the liberators. Most of the leaders of the independence movements were mainly white and relatively affluent criollos. In any case, Havana was again spared of the direct impact of the war. When war between Spain and the United States finally broke out in April 1898, the logical object of the invasion army of the last one that was amassed in Tampa should have been Havana, as it was the head of the government. It was only because the Spanish naval squadron that was sent by Madrid under the command or rear admiral Cervera, avoiding the encounter with the squadron of admiral Simpson, entered the bay of Santiago, that the landing was conducted in Daiquiri and Siboney with the goal of taking first Santiago. Still, after the eventual capture of Santiago, the war could have progressed towards the capital in a military campaign that for most military analysts would have been a very long and bloody one; as the American army was no match for the Spanish one, but the defeat of Cervera's squadron in front of Santiago, which happened just after rear admiral Montojo's one was similarly defeated in Cavite, in the bay of Manila, led to a surprisingly hastened surrender by Spain. If this

was the consequence of a secret agreement between the American and the Spanish governments as some want nowadays is an interesting topic, but goes beyond the scope of this study.

What happened afterwards

5. Continued (partial) black loyalty to Spain. Maceo

a. Cuba-United States. From patronage to desire. Spanish grip on the economy of Cuba. Manifest Destiny. USA foments mambis rebellion. Monopoly. Economic stagnation. First Cuban Uprising. Tensions with USA. Virginius. Second Cuban Uprising. USS Maine. Hispanic-American one. Cervera enters Santiago instead of Havana. End of story.

6. Independent Cuba

In principle, the independence of Cuba from Spain made Havana the capital of a sovereign country. In reality, it was simply a protectorate of the United States. This was demonstrated by many well known facts, specially by the intervention of

- a. Castros Revolution. Comunism. Blockade.
- b. Bay of Pigs. Ultimate objective Havana.
- c. Havana Today. Resistance.

7. Other cities in the Carribean

- a. Veracruz/San Juan de Ulúa
- b. Cartagena
- c. Portobello.
- d. San Agustin

8. Conclusion

Havana has been affected by war since its foundation in an increasing manner. The main factor for it has been the strategic importance of the city, during four centuries in the hands of the Spanish Empire, later on under the

protectorate of the United States, and in the last seven decades as an opponent to it. As part of the Spanish Empire it was the jewel of the crown as “the throat” of its body, and first pirates, then corsairs, and finally full-fledged armies tried to obtain its riches or even conquer it. Through its fortification, the establishment of a naval shipyard that became the most capable of Spain at its peak, and the military units established there, it became a very well defended city, which allowed it to prosper as it rejected attacks both actual and planned, and served as a base for military operations in different conflicts in the area. In that defense and these operations, integrated in the regular units of the Army or as militias, participated many people of African descent which arrived to Havana originally as slaves but who had reached a notable integration in society as free individuals thanks to the character of this society, much more open to this integration than the one of the colonies of the Protestant countries. As a break of the general rule, Havana was occupied briefly by Great Britain between 1762 and 1763 after the only success of the many intents to conquer it. For many historians this occupation was the cause for a complete reorientation of its economy and consecutively for its human composition but in reality the change, although very real, mainly in relation with the salve trade and cultivation of sugar, was being fermented in the decades before. On the contrary, the occupation forced the Spanish crown to increase the militarization and fortification of the city and this continued to dissuade enemies from attacking it. Then Cuba was detached from Spain in a war that spared Havana just by a narrow chance, although it was there were the incident, the blowing of an American warship that ignited the intervention of a nascent world empire, the United States, which sent her there officially to protect their interests. Under the protectorate of the new patron, Havana continued to grow as the capital city of a rich country, and since it changed sides on the world chess board, it has been suffering an increasing isolation that has provoked its current decadence.

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The Defence of Las Palmas, Gran Canaria, Capital and Port in World War II

José Romero Serrano (Spain)

*The Rock of Gibraltar was capable of withstanding a prolonged siege,
but it would have had no value other than that of a rock.*

*Faced with the danger of Spain closing that door, we had for nearly two
years prepared an expedition of over 5,000 men and the necessary warships to
occupy in a few days the Canary Islands, from which we could have fought the
enemy submarines by air and sea and secured the route to Australia via the
Cape, if the Spaniards had prevented us from using Gibraltar.*

Winston Churchill's Memoirs, Volume II

Abstract

This paper focuses on the defence of the island of Gran Canaria within the context of the larger military defence plans for the Canary Islands during the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of France in June 1940, and the declaration of non-belligerency by General Franco's regime, it was thought that Spain's entry into the war would be imminent alongside Germany and Italy. For this reason, the United Kingdom feared the loss of Gibraltar and designed a military operation to seize the port of La Luz in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria as an alternative site for future military operations.

Spain prepared the islands for defence, particularly Gran Canaria and its capital and port, Las Palmas. Although this port was armed, defended and prepared to resist an Allied attack, the landing operation, codenamed Pilgrim and Tonic, eventually did not take place.

Keywords: World War II, military defence, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Gibraltar, landings.

Introduction: The Defense of the Canary Islands Since The Castilian Conquest (15th Century)

The city of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, (*el Real*) the Real de Las Palmas, was founded in 24 June 1478 by Captain Juan Rejón, who had disembarked in what would be the port of refuge of La Luz. He advanced approximately 3 kms along the sandy beaches until he reached a ravine with fresh water, the Guinguada river, where he built a palisade in view of three palms and gave the city its name.

This description informs us that the city, at that time, extended along the seaside from the isthmus to the interior, leaving the mass of the *Isleta* (small island) as a guardian of the North (See Map 1 Appendix 1). The city would be seriously assaulted in 1595 by the Englishmen Drake and Hawkings, and in 1599 by the formidable squadron of Dutch Admiral Van der Does, with 72 ships and 8000 men of battle. On both occasions, with great hardships, the island protected its independence for the Hispanic Monarchy but it was evident that future danger, as well as its wealth, would always come from the sea.

At that time, for its defence, King Philip II created the *Tercio de Milicias de Canarias* (1573) with companies in Telde, Gáldar (or Guía, as they are close) and Las Palmas (a deliberate decision as these locations represent the defensive triangle of the island), including a detachment of Cavalry and a small unit of Artillery on the royal payroll in the Castillo de la Luz, to defend the port. The total number of men at that time was limited to 1,500.

Throughout the centuries, the island of Gran Canaria based its military strength in the form of a *militia* and it was not until the end of the 18th century that, in addition to the militia, His Majesty Charles III constituted the Fixed Battalion of the Canary Islands, with three infantry companies in Tenerife and a fourth one in Las Palmas, to give greater strength to the Island's defence. These companies made up of Regular Forces not only defended the island, as on the occasion of the heroic deeds of 25 July 1797 in Tenerife (General Gutiérrez) against Nelson's squadron, but they had already been hardened in peninsular campaigns such as that of Roussillon (1795).

During the 19th century, the militia transformed into Reserve battalions and the Fixed Battalion into those called *Cazadores* (hunters), two in number,

one per main island. Towards the end of the century, due to the danger of the war with the United States (1898), some Island defence regiments of Regular infantry were formed. During the 1930s, a formula of defence in the archipelago had already been established, with a very similar distribution of the Force between the two provinces (Las Palmas and Tenerife) based on one Infantry Regiment per island, with forces deployed on each and every one of the islands (seven) of the archipelago as a permanent military presence.

Along with the Garrison, the island of Gran Canaria developed its fortification plans, collected by Alvarez¹ (2022) whose research details nine plans between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, some which did not come to fruition. According to plans, the defence of the Island is centred in its capital, with the basic plan, extending to Gando (Riviere, 1740), or in the more elaborated ones to Agaete in the North and Melenara-Maspalomas-Arguineguín in the South (Hermosilla, 1780).

The Second World War and the Defence of the Canary Islands

The Spanish Civil War (1936-39) found the archipelago in the rear-guard zone of the military uprising and the so-called National Army, of General Franco's forces. The Garrison at that time numbered around 5,000 men in total.

When the Civil War ended in April 1939, the winds of war immediately arose in Europe. The Spain of Franco's regime, which had received the support of Italy and Germany during the Civil War, did not hide its sympathies towards Mussolini and Hitler but with reservations. Spain declared its neutrality in the conflict from the start but, by July 1940, due to the defeat of France and Italy's entry into war on the side of Germany, the Spanish government adopted a non-belligerence status. The same language used by Mussolini at the beginning of the war, which was understood in real terms as pre-belligerence. The Spanish Government's conditions for entering the war were to receive economic and military support from Germany, to get Gibraltar back and the possibility of extending its zone of influence in the Oran (Northwest Algeria) and French Morocco.

¹ See bibliography.

With regards to the Canaries, both Germany and the United Kingdom had shown their interest for this strategic archipelago located one hundred kilometres off the African coast, on the South Atlantic routes around the Cape to the Middle East, India and Australia. Germany identified its appetite for an island to manoeuvre in the desired Atlantic zone (Morocco, Cameroon, Namibia) and the UK coveted it as a stopover in the South Atlantic as an alternative harbour in the case of losing Gibraltar.

Of course, the Canaries were not alone as key assets in this great maritime space that needed protection. Other interests were related and linked to the rest of Macaronesia: Portuguese Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde, also considered as Atlantic anchorages. The Azores, in fact, would be used by the Americans under Portuguese authorization. In addition, the situation of *non-occupied France* or the collaborationist France ruled by Vichy (Marshal Petain's Regime), was a complete unknown for the Allies. The British and Free French (De Gaulle) forces raid on Dakar in 1940 had been resoundingly repulsed and was a failure. Consequently, the UK had sunk part of the French fleet at Mazalquivir, near Oran. The Gibraltar Strait has been heavily militarized by Spain which had fortified a defensive line (Javenois) around Gibraltar as a potential assault position where it had placed two reinforced Army Corp (100,000 men) in the Spanish Moroccan Protectorate. The Balearic Islands, like the Straits, was also fortified (Tamarit Line) and both areas were equipped with powerful coastal artillery (Artillery Plan 1926).

This summary shows a geographical strip: Baleares-Gibraltar Strait-Canary Islands, which traditionally had a strategic interest for Spain, an interest that still exists today. In addition to current maritime interests, a new Army Canary Islands Command partly comprises those territories.

The Military Defense of Gran Canaria

In 1943, the Canary Islands, commanded by Captain General Ricardo Serrador, received precise instructions to organize a military defence of the archipelago in case of a potential (without specifications) enemy landing. He was also provided with the economic command of the Isles due to the autocratic system imposed by the isolation of the Franco Regime and for the goal of

unifying the economic and military defensive elements within the same command, particularly given the distance to the Iberian Peninsula.

General Serrador has already issued a first directive (1940) that left no doubt as to his intention: "to defend all the Islands at all costs".

The defence of the archipelago up to that point then had been very precarious. It was based, as has been described, on two infantry regiments, some artillery groups, with no Navy units (the maritime zone depended on Cadiz) and without assigned military aviation. With only 10,000 men, little could be done against the potential threat of a British landing on the islands. Franco, who was aware of the situation and the risk of losing the Isles, ordered the Captain General to provide the archipelago with a real defensive system.

Each Island was, and still is different, and so were its defence requirements. Nevertheless, and although the Spanish command never had precise knowledge of possible British amphibious operation details, it did correctly identify the main objective as that of Puerto de la Luz, which could have served as an alternative port to Gibraltar. Even so, the port alone would not be enough, and the entire archipelago would have to be dominated otherwise it would allow the Germans or the Spaniards to use one or any part of the Isles as military bases against the UK.

The Island of Gran Canaria, round-shaped, mountainous, and with a 60 km diameter, had its coasts arranged in such a way that, due to the difficulty for landing, its defence was oriented in three zones: passive zones of resistance, those dedicated merely for surveillance, and those areas that needed to be defended (See MAP 2 Appendix 2).

The city of Las Palmas is open to the North, with a beach to the East (Alcaravenaras) located in the port area, and another beach to the West (Las Canteras). It is protected by a reef that makes access from the sea very difficult, except at a far-right location, called El Confital. The isthmus is topped by its imposing *Isleta* that was dedicated as a military zone. The population of the

island was 320,500 inhabitants², while the capital itself was inhabited by 119,500 people.

There is debate whether the capital and the port of La Luz were the objective, but the conclusion we can draw is that both, capital and port, needed be defended, and as well by extension the entire Island. This hypothesis can be seen in the plans of attack: what at first had been planned to be a direct amphibious assault by commando type units at Puerto de la Luz, was dismissed by the British joint planning committee and shifted to a series of landings in the Eastern part of the Isle, with a plan to take the city of Las Palmas by indirect approach.

Therefore, not only the Island of Gran Canaria, but the entire archipelago had to be defended, and an overall defence plan had to be implemented by all available means incorporating new measures to improve it. In addition, the system had to be symmetrical between the two provinces, for which both capitals (Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria) had to deploy a Jefatura or Regional Headquarters to carry out the plan and instructions issued by the Capitanía (Supreme Regional Command).

The most urgent requirements were to provide Air and Naval power, given the remoteness of the archipelago from the Peninsula and the requirement for mutual support among the islands (if possible) and from the islands of the nearby African coast where Spain held the Sahara, Villa Bens (Cape Yubi), Ifni and Guinea. These were garrisoned by minimal forces, basically the *Tiradores de Ifni* (Ifni Group of Marksmen) with six *tabores* (battalions), four nomadic groups (since 1939) and the territorial police to control the entire territory.

The choice for the permanent operational airfield in Gran Canaria was Gando, where a detachment was deployed in February 1939. In August 1940, the so-called 22nd Expeditionary Fighter Group arrived with 24 Fiat-CR32, known as *Chirris* in the Civil War, from Getafe and the 22nd Mixed Air Regiment from Tablada, Seville. Subsequently, the Canary Islands and Spanish West Africa Air Zone was established with Colonel Alejandro Mas de Gaminde as its first

² Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE, 1940.

commander and all the forces below were grouped into the Air Mixed Regiment No 4³ with:

- the aforementioned fighter group (n°22) and the 112th Group,
- the 11th Transport Squadron of 5 Junkers JU52 (Cape Juby),
- the 54th Reconnaissance Squadron with two Dornier Wall seaplanes for Puerto de la Luz (March 1941), thereafter the Canary Islands Naval Base (Arsenal),
- the 49th Aviation Troop Battalion (Lazareto de Gando) and various support units.

The Arsenal also was established in 1940, as the Naval Command of the Canary Islands. The units assigned were the gunboat *Marte*, the patrol boat, *Xauen*, and the old gunboat *Lauria*, prior to its scrapping, that was used as a pontoon. In addition, A-2 and A-4 cisterns, essential for the assistance to the smaller islands were added. The Arsenal was also equipped with torpedoes and underwater weapons.⁴

The Tercio de la Armada, the Marine Infantry, was reorganized in 1940 and in 1942 (October), into five Tercios: three departmental and two for Naval bases (Balearic and Canary Islands). In the Canary Islands, only one company was deployed in Las Palmas (September 1941) as the garrison of the naval base at that time was under construction.

This was a modest contribution, since the main surface ships were in Ferrol, under repair after the Civil War; including the three Republican cruisers recovered in Bizerta (Tunicia), and the two National ones (Canarias and Cervera). Additionally, the Aviation Forces did not have access to the latest technological improvements developed during WWII and they only received the acquisition of German armament through the Bär Program, including 15 ME BF 109 F4 fighters and 10 JU 88 A4 bombers. Insufficient resources for the mission, nevertheless, the qualitative leap in capability had been important.

³ Manuel RAMOS, *Alas Portectoras* (Las Palmas de G.C., RSEAP, 2010), 124-126.

⁴ Mari Carmen CASTILLO and V. BROZ, *Arsenal de las Palmas (1940-2011)*, (Madrid, Publicaciones de Defensa, 2016), 25.

Regarding the Army, the Captain General requested a surge for the Garrison, which increased from 5,000 men in 1936 to almost 40,000 in 1943, thanks to partial mobilizations (17,000 additional men were authorized in the Islands in 1940) and due to peninsular reinforcements, both in individual replacements and in complete units deploying to overseas.

This sustained rhythm of increase in personnel indicates that the defence for the entire archipelago reached its zenith, as it will be explained, in 1943.

Summer 1939	July 1940	February 1941	1942	1943
12,000	23,500	26,800	34,000	40,000

Table 1: Canary Islands garrison through WWII

The increase in sheer numbers was important; however, interestingly the UK identified even higher potential defenders. According to Díaz Benítez (see bibliography), British intelligence reports from 1943 indicated 45,000 defenders, 19,000 of them in Gran Canaria.

It is noted that by 1943, two thirds of the defence was provided by non-local born personnel. Regarding the infantry reinforcement units, we note that the Infantry Regiment (R.I.) No. 73 (later renamed R.I. España 18th), with its HQ and three battalions, deployed entirely in Fuerteventura, the R.I. N°18 (later renamed Mallorca 13th), with two battalions to Lanzarote, and two Ifni Tabors (Battalion size) were provided, one for each capital island.

That said, the greatest defensive effort was made on the island of Gran Canaria, with the garrisoned R.I. 39th, which, following the lessons learned in the Spanish Civil War, was split into a twin, 139th, with a corresponding increase in the number of battalions. The third battalion had already been added to the 39th at the beginning of the campaign. Consequently, the defence of Gran Canaria was provided by the R.I. 39th and its five battalions, and the new 139th with 3 battalions, plus a mobilization plan to creating the 200th and 300th series to constitute twelve battalions in all. In addition, as we know, the IV *Tabor de Tiradores de Ifni* (battalion size) was added to the Garrison, as a reserve unit.

Isla de Gran Canaria. 1943

Estado de Fuerza. Noubr 1944
3º de Enero 1943.

Arma	Unidad	Plantilla				Revista				Presentes.				Situación
		Jefes	Ofic.	Clases	Tropa	Jefes	Ofic.	Clases	Tropa	Jefes	Ofic.	Clases	Tropa	
Infantería	Prº Comº Regº 39	3	3	5	83	5	24	59	850					Isleto
	1º Bº Regº 39	1	28	45	706	1	22	39	1302					Isleto
	2º Bº Regº 39	1	28	45	706		10	27	448					Maspalomas
	3º Bº Regº 39	1	28	45	706	1	22	46	371					Guía
	4º Bº Regº 39	1	21	28	661		16	23	750	79	169	859	4631	Guaymote
	5º Bº Regº 39	1	31	28	661	1	29	44	1595					Los Pinos
	1º Bº Regº 139	1	38	45	706	1	21	38	663					Monte de Betula
	2º Bº Regº 139	1	28	45	706	19	41	722						Betula
3º Bº Regº 139	1	28	45	706	18	40	707						Carrizal-Vigentes	
Tabor Tiradores		1	26	51	727	1	20	26	989	1	17	41	815	ROQUES
Artillería	Prº 1º Agrº Compañía	INCLUIDOS EN LOS SERVICIOS.												
	Prº 2º Agrº Compañía	INCLUIDOS EN LOS SERVICIOS.												
	Prº 3º Agrº Compañía	INCLUIDOS EN LOS SERVICIOS.												
	P.M. Mando	2	12	35	319	6	15	26	395	2	14	18	254	Los Pinos.
Grupo Compañías ta.	Agrº Costa Norte	1	17	49	434						12	18	317	Los Pinos
	" Centro	2	21	53	473	3	44	60	1194	2	18	14	370	Los Pinos.
	" Sur	1	11	29	271						7	13	212	Distancado.
	1º Grupo Compañía	1	15	25	252	1	12	15	177	1	6	11	155	Los Pinos (6 Batº)
COJO	2º Grupo Compañía					13	19	410		1	6	17	324	Carrizal (6 Batº)
	3º Grupo Compañía	1	14	17	268		7	11	243	7	5	208	Isleto. (No hay)	
	Parque	1	10	34	130	1	6	8	220	6	26	162	Los Pinos.	
Infantería	Secº Delº Sub Mitr	1	1	41		1	1	40					Los Pinos.	
Ingenieros	Subo Ingenº. 4	2	13	22	511	4	9	16	302	2	10	15	675	Los Pinos.
	Delº Automóviles	1	3	9	116	2	7	132		2	9	177	Los PALMAS.	
Intendencia	Compañía		3	3	91		3	6	280		3	1	88	Los Pinos.
Sanidad	Compañía	1	19	5	262		3	7	319	2	15	3	159	Los Pinos
Delº Química	Sección						1	-	56		1	1	48	Los Pinos.
Veterinaria	Sección.		1		17				91		1	1	15	Isleto.
Artillería	Grupo A.B.	2	14	24	309	2	16	21	433	2	15	24	267	Los Pinos.

(1) Grupo Batall. en: 1 Melamu, 1 Gaud, 1 Arriaga y otra en Puerto Camuelo.

Table 2: Roster of military units in Gran Canaria as 1 January 1943.

In the province of Las Palmas (Gran Canaria, Fuerteventura, and Lanzarote), Fuerteventura had a new Independent Battalion No. 32, and Lanzarote the No. 33, from which they would also organize their 100 series and plan for the 200 and 300 (furthermore, according to documentation, the 400). The first aim, achieved in 1943, was to have 5 battalions in arms and 4 for mobilization shared between the two islands, through an organization of a "grouping of battalions", very much to the liking of General Serrador (who died in January 1943, being replaced by García Escámez). This grouping would come out as a new regiment (1 January 1944), the R.I. Ceriñola 51st.

We can surmise that the number, and the decision to have twelve battalions was not accidental. The Spanish divisions of the 1930s (organic divisions) and those that fought in the Civil War, normally had twelve Infantry battalions, grouped into two brigades, and these in turn in half brigades or groupings of three or four battalions. Thus, the Island of Gran Canaria was actually provided with a complete reinforced division with powerful combat support and services. The battalions, elementary tactical units, were of two types, mobile or defensive (fixed), the latter being more powerful in fire support, designed for coastal defence, while the former were designed to provide local counterattacks.

In fact, the traditional administrative division (territorial split) of the two provinces of the Canary Islands had been made on a divisional basis, with Las Palmas constituting Division No. 1 and Tenerife Division No. 2. The current arrangement, practically symmetrical between the provinces, provided the whole archipelago with an Army Corps level of resources with the aspiration of having 40 battalions in arms.

In addition to the detailed Infantry units and the support elements that can be seen in the attached table, the fact is that the artillery of the islands was vital to repel a hypothetical landing. Each province had a mixed artillery regiment, No. 7 for Tenerife, and No. 8 for Las Palmas. Each regiment formed a coastal grouping, a field grouping, and several batteries of Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), with its own integral means and those received in support (four German Krupp batteries and the peninsular ones). In addition, there were the expeditionary units of the peninsular Artillery (See MAP 3 Appendix 3).

Most of the elements were concentrated on the Island of Gran Canaria. In brief, Gran Canaria deployed 15 coastal batteries (50 pieces), and almost as many field batteries, with 62 pieces. The graphic shows the deployment, type and range of the pieces. The coastal artillery was mostly obsolete with many first 20th century Ordóñez of various calibres, while the Krupp 15 and 17, the Vickers 15.24, and the Munáiz-Argüelles 15 cms, were the only ones that could be relied on for defence. The field guns were believed to positioned for either littoral support or for local counterattacks.

A fifth element, in addition to the deployment of infantry units, artillery, air and naval power, was the fortification and destruction plan.

As Castro (2014) reports in his book⁵, a defensive *castramental* (castle/fortress) system was devised based on the defence of the coastline, with many single and double machine gun nests and artillery settlements. Of the former, almost 400 elements were built on the islands, 100 of them in Gran Canaria, following the defensive line of the East Coast, from La Isleta to Arguineguín. All this work was mainly carried out in 1943, under the direction of the Mixed Engineer Group No. 4, with its companies of Sappers, along with Infantry units, workers units (disciplinary battalion of penalized working soldiers No. 91) and contracted personnel. A communication company provided services to the whole island (an appropriate entity for a division level).

The plan also included the distribution of some 20,000 mines and a destruction section, with 51 targets (1943), mainly docks, roads, and (surprisingly) the vital inland dams.

To launch a powerful counterattack, the deployment of a tank battalion (the Ciudad Universitaria No. 28), with almost 60 tanks, was planned, but it was never carried out.

Finally, the whole defence system, prioritizing Gran Canaria and Tenerife, and then Fuerteventura, was designed to make each island an *alcazar* (a fortress), as Minister Serrano Suñer said, and the use of the civilian population,

⁵ See bibliography.

Civil Guard and the Falange cadres would be called upon for the defence at all costs, if necessary.

The Threat Ssessment

Now that we have a sense of the plans for a defence of Gran Canaria, we must ask what the actual scope of the threat and its possibility for success was.

The subject has been well researched by recent studies by Canarian professors such as Morales Lezcano and Díaz Benítez, using British and Canadian sources added to our understanding. Everything indicates that the initial plan, called *Chutney* and *Puma*, was formulated in 1940, when Spain changed its position to non-belligerence. The plan consisted, basically, in taking the Port of La Luz by surprise and direct assault, using commandos (Marines). After the British intelligence estimated that the defence was significant enough to spoil a direct attack (with the experience of Dieppe, 1942), these plans were adapted to the situation and renamed *Pilgrim* and *Tonic*, extending both the front of the landing and the number of participant units. It went from a contingent of approximately 5,000 men to that above 25,000, including Canadian participation, and extended from the beaches of the bay of Gando and Arinaga, 25 and 35 kms from the city, allowing for diversionary actions.

This planning extended beyond 1943 and forced the UK to reserve a division level contingent, prepared, trained, and with its own means of transport, at the north of the UK, in the Bay of Clyde, for an operation that was believed to be imminent for months.

The British contingent estimated that a reinforced division was necessary for this operation, a division comprising three brigades with six commando units, the support of at least one battleship, an aircraft carrier (if possible), three cruisers and seven destroyers, and about 150 aircraft.⁶

A turning of the tide in the conflict took place in November 1942 when the USA entered the war in North Africa, precisely in front of the Canary Islands,

⁶ Juan José DÍAZ, *Canary Islands defenseless: the allied projects of occupation of the Islands during World War II*. (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Idea, 2008), 159-161.

with the landings of the operation codenamed *Torch*. Landings were set in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. Although the Vichy put up little resistance, its effects were still worrying for the Allied command, particularly along the Moroccan coast. The UK had to employ its elements, even those earmarked for *Pilgrim*, and used them in Algiers. Canada then took the lead of the force that would have landed on the Island of Gran Canaria, should the operation take place. For this purpose, Canada constituted the land component: two divisions, the 1st and 3rd, and the 1st Canadian Corp HQ, commanded by General Crerar, with the UK providing the air and naval components.⁷

The USA was very worried about Spanish resistance, being so powerful in the Strait of Gibraltar area and with significant forces in the Protectorate and the Canary Islands. Accordingly, President Roosevelt offered guarantees to Franco that the operation would not be intended against the Spanish territories or the Spanish protectorate. Another fear came from the German reaction to *Torch*, leading to the occupation of metropolitan France and the forcing of the French to sink their own fleet in Toulon. It was feared that this pattern could be replicated in the Spanish mainland and Gibraltar by the Germans.

After all the planning and preparation from many of the actors, the operation on Gran Canaria did not happen, nor did Spain enter the war, which was a key priority for Franco's Regime.

Conclusions

Certainly, as Díaz Benítez confirms, the lack of defence and vulnerability of the Canary Islands was a fact at that time. The resistance that Spain could provide against the allies, especially in 1943 and thereafter, was not promising. Despite combat experience, with a strong morale and command attitude, its limited combat means confronted by a very powerful allied force with modern doctrine and resources of every kind, along with unified command direction and significant landing capabilities, meant that an actual defence would be difficult if not impossible.

⁷ STACEY, C.P. (1955): *Official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War*, (Ottawa, E. Cloutier, CA, 1955, 410-411.

Nevertheless, the will to resist and the Spanish military's willingness to put in place battle-hardened troops, with a well-structured chain of command, along with a well identified objective to defend, were strong factors that had to be taken into consideration by the Allies. The demanding Allied operation, (risky by definition as they are), the time needed for the planning and execution, the fact that using key combat elements there would have prevented them to be used elsewhere probably in other more useful fronts, was an important factor to be considered in the Allied decision to postpone and eventually cancel the operation.

The city-port of Las Palmas-La Luz still stands, as it always has. Then, in the 17th century, protected by a line of defensive towers, castles and redoubts that reached from the castle of La Luz to the tower of San Cristobal, passing by those of Santa Catalina (site of the Arsenal), Santa Ana (next to the old wall of the city), redoubt of Santa Isabel and tower of San Cristobal, about 8 kms of northeast fortified coastline. In 1943, the Isleta was protected by artillery with the powerful 15.24 Vickers (four pieces) on the Montaña del Vigia (well-chosen name) and the whole island militarized with a good number of battalions, artillery units, bunkers, and support troops.

The history and the facts were clear. The conquest of the city and the port could not be done without storming the whole island in its entirety.

In summary, the military uncertainty, the expenditure of combat resources (always scarce), the inevitable entry of Spain in war that this operation would have meant, and the evolution of the war fronts in World War II, would be decisive factors that led to the cancellation of the British-Canadian operation.


In short, the UK (the Allies) had been deterred, based on to some extent Spanish planning and preparations, from attempting a formidable task: the seizure of Gran Canaria and its capital-port.

Appendix 1



MAP 1: Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 19th century, *Isleta* on the top of the city.

Appendix 2



MAP 2: Defence of Gran Canaria, 1943: blue arrows as potential landings; red lines as fortifications and artillery sites; green area as passive zone; yellow area as surveillance zone; blue area as zone to defend.

Appendix 3



MAP 3: Artillery Regiment n°8, Gran Canaria, deployment and range.

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War and the City – What can be learned?

Kristian Lindhardt (Denmark)

Introduction

It is nothing new. As long as civilisations have existed, people have been living in towns and cities. Indeed, cities became the centres of governance and wealth and that made them attractive and obvious targets for military attacks.

The Sack of Magdeburg in 1631 left a lasting mark on the Western World, as the Catholic slaughter of Protestants was incredibly excessive and showed that both soldiers and civilians are likely to suffer during FIBUA. The sheer mentioning of cities like Nanking, Stalingrad, Grozny and more contemporarily Aleppo and Melitopol leave pictures on one's mind of buildings on fire, infrastructure demolished and human suffering.

Because FIBUA exposes civilians as well as soldiers, it has a number of characteristics that are not necessarily found in other types of combat. Not only is the actual fighting different, as it has more dimensions than normal terrain, but the psychological consequences of FIBUA are often considerable. Casualties amongst civilians, destroyed infrastructure, destroyed cultural objects, perhaps the loss of one's capital all have significant impact on a nation's ability to fight.

I have searched for these characteristics amongst more modern conflicts. I have found examples of FIBUA that may give us some insight in how modern urban combat is fought and what lessons we can bring with us in the current situation where major combat is once again sadly relevant to study.

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Americans and Iraqis fought a number of battles in build-up areas. They were not against a peer-enemy as we see it in the war in Ukraine, but the insurgents were well enough organized and armed for us to use them as examples of how a modern military force might approach FIBUA.

In Fallujah in 2004 and again in Mosul in 2016, American and Iraqi forces faced an enemy that had set themselves up for a prolonged defence of the cities they held. My presentation will show you examples of how adapting to the particular circumstances can lead to success on the battlefield. However, you will also see how FIBUA can be a prolonged process where the attacker needs to reorganise over time, despite having a numerical advantage. My conclusion is made by comparing the two battles and make observations from either success or failure on the battlefield.

Fallujah 2004

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Allied administration of the country was busy establishing an Iraqi central administration. This was a most demanding task as the country had slowly started splitting amongst sectarian lines. Shia and Sunni Muslims, Kurds and other fractions within the Iraqi society had taken the opportunity to establish themselves with some kind of autonomy.

In the city of Fallujah, the Sunni population had fallen from the grace it had enjoyed under the reign of Saddam Hussein. There was fear amongst the population that a new central government wouldn't be able to secure them and that they would come under pressure if the government was able to take control of their region.

A radical Islamic organisation named Black Banner, had established itself in the Sunni part of Iraq and had made Fallujah the centre of its activities. It was a heavily armed organisation, which was organised along military lines and had prepared parts of the city for defence. Its armament was mostly light and made up of assault rifles, machine guns, antitank and aircraft weapons and mortars. The fighters were a mix of locals, many with military experience and armed with weapons originally from the Allied Administration, and foreign fighters that had come to join the fight against the Shia government and the American forces. By late spring 2004 the city had become a safe haven for the insurgents from BB and Allied and government forces were practically denied from the eastern part of it.

Fallujah was a city of some 350.000 inhabitants, many trying to leave the city before and during the battle, despite BB demand for them to stay in their

homes. The city has different parts, with different characteristics. One major feature is the Euphrates River running through it, making three bridges a vital part of its infrastructure. The eastern part of it, which was recognised as a BB stronghold, was made up of different parts, including, modern buildings of three to four storeys, industrial areas of large buildings and production facilities and an old part made up of smaller houses in densely packed street. This part of the city also had the former administrative area and several open spaces used as parks.

The American forces chosen to attack the city, in what was called Operation Phantom Fury, were a motley crew of Marines, Army and Air Force assets. However, the unit tasked with taking the city, 1 USMC Division, made a thorough Staff- and Planning Process which led to the division standing up to Task Forces, TF 2-7 and TF 2-2. Both Army tanks and armoured Marine infantry were organised in battalion-sized mixed battle groups, giving them a very flexible array of tools in each BG. There was a clear unity of command from 1 USMC Div which made Command and Control (C2) measures easy. Furthermore, the division had C2 over a number of other units used to cordon of the city prior to the operation commencing on the 8 November 2004.

By cordoning of the city, they did warned the insurgents they were coming. However, the isolation of the insurgents gave the attacking force freedom of manoeuvre to choose any direction for their assault. They chose to attack from the north and they chose to attack with penetration on multiple avenues. They did this in order not to be bogged down if the insurgents were able to mass on a narrow front opposite a single point of penetration.

Prior to the attack 1 USMC Div used available Air and indirect fire assets to destroy identified enemy C2 installations, gathering places, ammunition dumps, etc. When the attack commenced the two TF used their armour to breach into the city itself and kept the armour as mobile fire platforms. By moving in combat groups where Armour and Infantry provided mutual support, they were able keep momentum and advance rapidly. Speed became a weapon in itself as the insurgents had less chance to move along their pre-planned routes when the mobile combat groups overran these.

The insurgents fought a vicious fight and used every tool at their disposal, including IEDs in all shapes and forms, civilians as shields and they used their intensive knowledge of the city to the best of their abilities. They continuously tried to move along the pre-planned routes, often through holes between building complexes, which made it necessary for the attacking infantry to clear and destroy any structure prepared by the insurgents.

Upon reaching their objectives, the combat groups made full use of the massive firepower the tanks provided and were able to hold on to their gains and inflict massive casualties when the insurgents counter-attacked. The Iraqi follow-on forces in each of the two TF were used to consolidate the gains made and were effective in searching and selecting amongst the local population in order to distinguish friend from foe. Combat engineers were used to great effect as they brought explosives and armoured bulldozers with them. When attacking fixed insurgent positions they were used to make unexpected breaches in a compound, making it possible for the infantry to avoid some of the massive Improvised Explosive Devices, which were a vital part of the insurgents defence plans.

By the 13 November, after 6 days of intensive combat, the city was taken and mostly cleared of insurgents. What remained was the task of sorting out the civilian population in different ways. They had to be housed, feed, screened, organized and reintroduced into Iraqi society. This task fell on the Iraqi Armed Forces, the Iraqi Government and US aid agencies.

Studies after the battle show that unity of command, speed, heavy armour combined with infantry, engineer assets and the encirclement of Fallujah were decisive factors in the successful and rapid conclusion of the battle. It also shows that civilians in the urban battle zone will be casualties and that the insurgents will try to blend in with them or otherwise use them to their advantage.

Mosul 2016-2017

After years of unrest in Iraq and the events widely known as the “Arab Spring” in 2011, the powerful and fanatical movement of ISIL had by 2015 taken large swaths of land in Syria and Iraq. Mosul was identified as the de-facto capital of the ISIL in Iraq. It had to be taken in order to break the back of ISIL and regain control within Iraq’s own borders.

When the ISIL forces took Mosul in 2014 they had gained large stocks of military ordnance of all sorts. Enough to properly equip their forces and they had spent the following two years training their fighters and fighting the Iraqi and Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq. By October 2016 Mosul was a heavily entrenched city with belts of defence layered in it and vast underground tunnels dug for ISIL to move hidden and fast. The insurgents at the height of the battle in Mosul numbered some 8.000-12.000 fighters pending on the various sources. They were well armed with all kinds of infantry weapons as well as rockets, vehicle born IEDs and off-the-shelf drones.

Mosul was a city of some 1.4 million inhabitants, during the fighting some 40% or 560.000 people fled or were driven out of the city. The city, as with Fallujah, has different parts, with different characteristics. The Tigris River, with five bridges that connect the two parts of it, divides the city. The eastern part of it was mostly made up of more modern buildings of three to four storeys, build by concrete in the 1970's. The western part of the city had some modern parts but was dominated by the old city made up of smaller houses in densely packed streets.

The Coalition Forces assembled for the attack were drawn from across the spectre of forces available. The Iraqi Security Forces, included Army, Air Force, SOF and Counter Terrorism Forces, and were drawn in to clear and hold the city so the Iraqi authorities could regain control of it and wet insurgents from the ordinary population. The Iraqi Security Forces had received years of training, but their western mentors often found both men and officers wanting. The American Army played a significant role as mentors and advisors and later in the battle as force multipliers when and where the Iraqi forces were unable to muster the necessary strength. The US Air Force played an absolutely vital role in providing the fast air support needed to precision strike the entrenched insurgents. Militias, predominantly the Kurdish Peshmerga, played an important role in the preliminary stages of the fight as they helped secure the outer areas of Mosul, especially northeast of the city. However, they were much less involved in taking the city itself, as this was outside their immediate area of interest. The Iraqi Government, the various militia forces and the Allied forces amassed for the attack numbered some 94.000 troops.

On October the 16 2016 the Coalition initiated a number of coordinated operations in which they during the following two weeks approached Mosul from South, East and North. The Western approach however, was not part of the operations. The opposition was strong and it wasn't until 24 January that they were able to complete the conquest of Eastern Mosul.

The Iraqi Security Forces made an operational pause, which was used to regroup and further train the men, before they began the assault on the Western part of Mosul. During the operational pause, the Allied forces had kept up the pressure by targeting ISIL with precision strikes from the air and artillery. The Iraqi forces commenced the attack on 19 February and reached parts of the Old City. By 19 March they finally managed to encircle ISIL, by cutting their supply line to the town of Raqqa in Syria. On 24 March the Iraqi forces took another operational pause, before they commenced with the final part of the attack which was brought to a successful end by 10 July. It had taken the Coalition forces some 9 months to liberate Mosul. As in Fallujah what remained was the task of sorting out the civilian population in different ways. They had to be housed, feed, screened, organized and reintroduced into Iraqi society. This time the task fell on the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Iraqi Government alone.

Studies after the battle a slightly divided. Especially American military professionals have debated what the real outcomes of the battle of Mosul were. However, there are general lessons that I would like to emphasize: - The size and density of Mosul favoured the defender and the battle ground down to one of attrition. - The defenders made extensive use of tunnel systems. This made it possible for them to move men and materiel without being exposed to the overwhelming firepower of the coalition. - Precision strikes were effective, perhaps too effective. As Allied forces were very good and effective in the delivery of indirect fire, the Iraqi forces were hesitant to move without them, which made them lose momentum. - C2 is dependent on accurate and live information being feed to decision makers and the troops on the ground. Because the chain of command was divided between the Iraqi Security Forces, the militias and the Coalition forces, momentum was difficult to keep up without mentors, despite Combined Command Posts. - Engineer assets are essential. If they are not readily available, the risks are troops will become bogged down or lured into traps by the defenders. - The population can be used to the defenders advantage

in several ways. ISIL made liberal use of civilians as human shields, both directly and indirectly. Furthermore, they were also able to put the population to work in various ways, which aided their defence.

Conclusion

When comparing the battles for Fallujah in 2004 and Mosul in 2016-2017, a number of relevant observations can be made. These are the lessons I draw from the comparison of the two battles:

Unity of command makes coordination of operations and units better and faster. When coordination doesn't work things easily come to a halt, leaving the initiative to the enemy.

Combined arms approach to battle saves time and time is of the essence. A prolonged battle will grind down to one of attrition and will favour the defender. In Fallujah the Americans used speed to achieve surprise and a quick conclusion. In Mosul, a bigger city and with an enemy capable of fighting a truly three-dimensional battle, the attacking force wasn't as coordinated and able to use speed as a tool in the battle.

Follow-up troops are needed to consolidate ones gains. What has been won at a great cost easily slips away if the enemy re-infiltrates or if the local populations doesn't see a change for the better when an area changes hands.

Engineer assets must be readily available. The very nature of FIBUA, with three-dimensional fighting and the constraints of buildings, infrastructure and man-made obstacles are a limiting factor, unless engineer assets are at hand. If so, one may surprise and out-manoeuve the enemy when FIBUA.

Fighting in Urban Areas where civilians are present is intense and costly, to both the civilians, the attacker and the defender. The terrain does favour the defender but ultimately they will be forced to surrender or die, if the city has been surrounded.

If possible, the attacker must encircle the city as this helps both tactically and operationally and makes the attacker able to choose time and place for the next attack and the defender cannot be reinforced during the battle.

If possible, an attacker is well advised to allow or even encourage civilians to leave the city. Partly because they suffer greatly during the fighting and partly because the defender is able to use for their own purposes.

All of the above lessons have been identified with the attackers' perspective in mind. Some of them hold universal value, but some of them only represents the attackers view. This we have to remember, if someday we find ourselves on the defending side during FIBUA.

The destruction of Dublin from 1916-22

Lar Joye (Ireland)

In my paper and lecture I look at 2 themes of this year's conference: battles in residential areas and their effects on the City during modern industrial period and Civil Wars, Revolution and Urban Warfare. From 1912 to 1922 Ireland experienced a World War, an insurrection, a war of independence and finally a Civil War. Dublin the capital city of Ireland took the brunt of these wars During the 1916 Rising the British Army destroyed the city centre with artillery including the General Post Office In the War of Independence, the Irish Republican Army burnt down government buildings including the Custom House and the British Army destroyed houses, villages and much of Cork City. Finally, the Irish Civil War started with the destruction of the Law Courts and Public Record Office pro government army attacked the anti-government forces who opposed the peace treaty with the British Government.

During the 18th Century Dublin was a city of contrasts, the beautiful buildings and squares of Dublin have been described as “gorgeous Mask of Irelands Distress”, where a powerful wealthy Protestant aristocracy protected British interests in their own local parliament. The contrast with the poor and mainly Catholic population was significant with over 1,000 licensed beggars the Hibernian Journal newspaper noting “Humanity must shudder at the crowds of the petitioning wretches to be met with in every corner of the city”. As historian Conor Lucey has described these buildings were unequalled in London in the late 1700’s and where a “display by the Anglo-Irish Elite of the prosperity and national pride”. During the time 3 grand and beautiful buildings were built, the Custom House (1791) the Four Courts (1802) and General post Office (1815). Despite a Rebellion in 1798, Dublin in 1800 was the second largest city in the British Empire and 6th largest in Europe. However, after the British Government decided to take direct control of Ireland in 1801 and Ireland saw an economic decline throughout the 19th Century as Anglo-Irish Elite moved to London.

By 1900 Ireland had become a reluctant part of the British Empire but a Cultural Revolution (Gaelic revival) inspired to a new generation of revolutionaries. The outbreak of WWI changed everything as it paused any

plans for any form of self-government or Home Rule which was placed on hold for the duration of the war. While over 200,000 Irish men volunteered to join the British Army, a small and secret organisation called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) decide to hold a rebellion. The IRB followed the principal that the enemy of my enemy is my friend and looked for weapons from Germany. The Rising started with an attempt to smuggle 20,000 Rifles from Germany but they are captured by the Royal Navy, ending the hope of country wide rebellion does. However the rebellion goes ahead in Dublin with 840 rebels on Monday 24th April. The revolutionaries carry out a surprise attack on several historic buildings including the General Post Office but were quickly surrounded by the mainly Irish Regiments of the British Army. After 6 days the rebels were forced to surrender while the General Post Office, is destroyed by four British Army 18pdr field artillery guns along with 200 buildings costing £2 million. A week of urban warfare had left 450 people dead and 2,614 wounded, the majority killed being civilians. The citizens of Dublin were shocked that the British Army would destroy the second city of the Empire. The leadership of the Rising are executed leading to public opposition to the British government and more demands for full Independence and the creation of a Republic.

The War of Independence (January 1919 to July 1921) remained essentially a guerrilla war that followed a format that we saw throughout the 20th Century. From 1918 to 1919 small-scale attacks on the police with the destruction of minor outposts and sporadic assassinations of policemen. January 1920 till October 1920 larger scale attacks and the arrival of the Black & Tans and the Auxiliaries. Final period began in November 1920 with the establishment of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) active service units or flying columns. In this final phase the conflict entered its most brutal stage and more destruction for the cities of Dublin and Cork. Throughout the war the IRA attacked telegraph lines, dug trenches to restrict British Army movement and burnt police stations and tax offices. The aim was to make Ireland ungovernable. The Police also attack the local economy by burning creameries, this started in North Tipperary on 9th April at Rearcross with another 18 creameries destroyed during the war in that county and 48 overall in Ireland. As the British Army become more involved in the war in late 1920 they attack the towns where they are based and a policy of official reprisals is introduced.

In Dublin during January 1921 the IRA decided to move away from small attacks to a large -scale attacks to grab world attention to Ireland. The Custom House was the headquarters of the Local Government Board for Ireland and held historically important tax information on Ireland. The attack happened on 25th May 1921 with over 100 IRA volunteers attacking the building with pistols, capturing the staff and setting it alight. The British Army & Police responded very quickly and a gun battle began while the building burned. Outgunned over 80 IRA volunteers were captured, 5 killed and 5 civilians killed.

During the Summer of 1921 a Truce is agreed and peace breaks out in Ireland. In the autumn of 1921 negotiations begin on a Treaty between Britain and Ireland. When a Treaty is finally signed it causes a split in the IRA with two groups pro treaty and anti-treaty groups being formed. Over 70% of the IRA still wanted to fight for full independence and like in 1916 historical buildings in Dublin are taken over by Anti-Treaty forces in May 1922 including the Four Courts. Eventually Pro-Treaty forces now forming a provisional government borrow four 18pdr field artillery guns from the British Army to open fire on the Four Courts beginning the Civil War. Over 3 days, from 28th -30th June, the buildings are destroyed including the National Archives of Ireland. The 1860's Public Records Act (Ireland) created an Archive to collect admin, court, probate and census records and a new building opened with enormous 6 storey building with 100,000 sq feet of shelving covering 700 years of history. During the bombardment Anti-Treaty forces stored ammunition there and since then a debate has raged over who was responsible for the explosion. We do know that on 30th June 1922 explosions destroyed the Four Courts and archive building wiping out 1000 years of Irish history.

The Civil War ends in April 1923 with over 1150 deaths including over 77 Anti treaty volunteers executed under the Emergency Powers Bill. It divided the Nation and until the 1990's the two leading political parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, represented the opposing sides of the Civil War.

In conclusion the destruction of such a large part of Dublin City over 6 years of war left a large 2 km area of destroyed street scape. Debates occurred in 1920's about how the buildings should be rebuilt and the city remodeled however in the end and for mainly financial reasons it was decided to rebuild modern if cheaper versions of the GPO, Customs House and Four Courts. In

many ways the citizens of Dublin wanted their city to look like it did before 1916 and not to have a new city to represent the ambitions of a new nation state.

Over the last 10 years Ireland has had a Decade of Centenaries Programme which is ending this year. The focus has been on the different traditions on the island of Ireland and the initiative provides opportunities to focus on the everyday experience of ordinary people living in extraordinary times, as well as on the leaders and key actors in these events. It also aims to offer fresh insights and constructive dialogue, and to foster deeper mutual understanding among people from the different traditions. In 2018 Ireland finally signed the Hague Convention committing to protect historical buildings, libraries, museums and archives in time of war. The destruction of the GPO, Custom House and Four Courts would now be treated as a crime. In 2022 the National Archives launched with Trinity College Dublin “Dublin Beyond 2022: Irelands virtual record treasury”¹ which aims to create a virtual reconstruction of the archive that was destroyed in 2022. This year after 7 years of research and restoration work, the 18pdr field artillery gun that fired the first shot of the Civil War, located in a field outside Washington DC in 2016, has now been placed on display at the National Museum of Ireland as a permanent reminder of the Destruction of Dublin from 1916 to 1922.²

¹ <https://www.nationalarchives.ie/our-archives/collaborative-projects/beyond-2022-irelands-virtual-record-treasury/>

² Return of 18pdr guns used in the Bombardment of Four Courts. <https://www.museum.ie/en-IE/Press-and-Media-Information/Latest-Media-Releases/09-February,-2023-The-18pdr-Field-Gun-9168-Lost-an>

The 1944 Vyborg Drama

Lasse Laaksonen (Finland)

A well-known Finnish military historian, Lieutenant Colonel Wolf Halsti, described afterword the problems of defenders in Vyborg, on June 1944:

On paper and on the map, everything may look great – a new troop, a praised commander, positions drawn in red lines – although in the battle – it is the details that make the difference. You should see them with your own eyes.

Vyborg had a significant role in the Finnish history. For centuries it had been a strong hold against the East. Soon after Finland gained independence in 1917, Vyborg, the second largest city of Finland, played a particularly significant role in an urban warfare and in the military history of independent Finland. Its supremacy was fought first in the Civil War in spring 1918 and later in the Winter War 1939-1940 and the Continuation War 1941-1944.

The Finns lost the Karelian Isthmus in the Moscow Peace Treaty of 1940. The Treaty ended the Winter War and meant also losing of Vyborg. The city had to be surrendered, even though the Red Army had not been able to capture the city in battle. When the Continuation War began, the Finns quickly captured Vyborg and the Karelian Isthmus. However, the offensive was ceased near the old border. Mannerheim, Commander-in-Chief, no longer wanted to attack Leningrad.

The Karelian Isthmus has been described as the Gate of Finland. At front of that gate began the large-scale Soviet offensive on 9 June 1944. Massive artillery fire and aerial bombardment broke the first lines of the Finnish defense. The Russians also used their armored troops in their offensive. On the first day of the main offensive the Soviet troops were able to advance more than ten kilometers on their main attack direction. Russians had also planned the massive bombing of Vyborg. Luckily, at the last minute, for the Finns, the weather prevented the massive bombing of Vyborg on the first day of the offensive.

The Russian offensive towards Vyborg was unexpectedly rapid. The Finns had not, at that point, time to strengthen the defense of the city. Although the arrangements had not been completed, the absolute order was to keep the city. The Finnish high command had to keep their appearance; they had not afforded to compromise its credibility. The psychological significance of Vyborg was unlimited for Finns. The loss had been a nationwide shock.

For Finns, the value of keeping the city in mind has been great, especially mentally. On the other hand, the military significance of Vyborg was fewer. The city was located in a planned defensive position, within the Vyborg–Kuparsaari–Taipale line. Keeping the line of defense would have required a strong military force. The operational advantage of Vyborg was not absolute. Strategic battles took place behind the city on the Tienhaara peninsula. If the Russians would reach from Tienhaara to the mainland, they, in the worst case, could turn their attack directly towards Helsinki via the main roads.

When the Russians launched their main offensive on the Karelian Isthmus in June 1944, the front retreated to near Vyborg in just ten days. The Finnish battle positions in front of the city were still underwork. There were no unified trenches dug and barbed wire barriers were missing. As the main line of defense ran in the suburbs, as previously in the Winter War. The defense line was stiff and it based on masses of soldiers. But there were no extra forces or reserves which could be used. Example the IV Corps under command of Lieutenant General Taavetti Laatikainen were tight to the fighting and did not have reserves for the defense of Vyborg.

The biggest problems in the defense of Vyborg were caused by last-minute improvisations. The High Command finally ordered troops to defend the city, but transportation took time. The 20th Brigade, commanded by Colonel Armas Kemppe, was transferred from the East Karelia to the Karelian Isthmus. Heist and limited transport capacity meant that maintenance was left behind. Last but not least the destination was changed on the way. The troops under Kemppe were concentrated in a hurry directly in the city. It was believed that when he arrived, he would have time to prepare his troops for urban warfare by building stronger defense positions.

The troops concentrated in Vyborg had to go directly to combat and unfinished positions. The men were completely unaccustomed to defending the city – they had been on different terrain in the Eastern Karelia. Some of them had only been engaged in fortification work behind the frontline in forested terrain. Before the Soviet attack, men from other units still flowed into Vyborg. They were from broken units and they decrease morale by spreading fear with their stories to the fresh troops of the 20th Brigade. Disobedient soldiers plundered buildings which had been evacuated. Either were soldiers of Colonel Kemppi not immune for robbing.

From the beginning troops of Colonel Kemppi had suffered from shortage of ammunition. There were no relief for the shortage of ammunition. One reason for shortage was bureaucratic system. North of Vyborg was the Rautakorpi ammunition depot, but without a written order ammunition were not handed over from there. The brigade got their grenades only after the headquarters had intervened. There were short of time, when ammunition depot handed over grenades, it was far too late.

The Russians attack reached to Vyborg around noon on June 20, 1944. It is not known for certain what kind of the artillery preparations were, but the Soviet troops were apparently able to storm the city quit easily with support of tanks. When the Finnish assault guns in the Centre of the defenders were damaged and the close-range anti-tank weapons and heavy artillery could not be used properly, the morale of the troops was eroded. Troops unaccustomed to urban battles were nervous, even though there was still a long way to go before the house-to-house combat took place.

The incorrect situational awareness picture significantly hampered command. Colonel Kemppi had no telephone connection with the commander of the Army Corps, Lieutenant General Taavetti Laatikainen. Lieutenant General had only little knowledge of the events in Vyborg. The messages were delivered via couriers or even via Mikkeli, where the headquarters was located. Delay of messages was inevitable. Even the battalion commanders of the 20th Brigade did not have direct contacts with each other. When one company in the center of the defenders misinterpreted order and retreated, others followed.

The troops of the scattered brigade quickly sought to leave Vyborg. First, the men packed into the bottleneck of the Linnansilta bridge, after which they retreated to the inland via bridges and straits. This happened although the Russians had not even had time to properly harass the fleeing troops. The Finnish officers no longer managed to organize the defense of the city. Already in the afternoon, only two or three hours after the beginning of the offensive, more than two thousand men left the city. Colonel Kemppe was so shocked by the collapse of his brigade that he first wanted to be left alone at his command post on the city.

The news of the loss of Vyborg was transmitted via complicated communication lines to the upper military command. After five o'clock Kemppe was in a car heading to the headquarters of the IV Army Corps. Kemppe had to explain the situation to Lieutenant General Laatikainen personally. Bad news and Kemppe arrived about same time to the knowledge of Laatikainen. When the news of the catastrophe reached headquarters in Mikkeli, a short time later, Commander-in-Chief Marshal Mannerheim did not even believe it to be true!

Only a couple of minutes later, Commander of the Army Corps Laatikainen gave Kemppe an order on behalf of the commander-in-chief not to give up the main line of defense, even though the troops were in fact already on the mainland. The remaining bridges in the city had been blown up. When the headquarters tried to contact the brigade, it was reported that lines of connection had been cut off. There were many different rumors about the fate of the city. One rumor was that the Russians had gained control of Vyborg.

The commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, considered the leaving of Vyborg a "scandal". He had given an absolute order to hold the city. The credibility of the military high command suffered a blow and was strongly reflected in the mood on the home front. The commander-in-chief demanded a thorough investigation and punishment of the guilty. Mannerheim directed the initial pace of the process himself and appointed his own general, Major General Väinö Palojärvi, from headquarters to find the felons for the collapse of the defense and the shameful flight from the city. In order to preserve the credibility of the military command, it was necessary, if nothing else, to appoint scapegoats for the rapid loss of Vyborg.

As usual, Marshal Mannerheim was extremely impatient. He saw any reason not to charge. At the same time Mannerheim completely forgot to investigate the leadership activities of the IV Army Corps. Lieutenant General Laatikainen was his personal favorite. From a legal point of view, Mannerheim's dogmatic view was inverted. Undoubtedly, the investigation team had a strong tendency to quickly find the culprits. The most favorable target and scapegoat was undoubtedly, the leadership of the 20th Brigade and its commander Kemppi. Its responsibility had been the defense of Vyborg.

Later, only Brigade Commander Colonel Armas Kemppi and Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Bäckman, commander of the first battalion to leave his position, were brought to court. The former eventually received a mild sentence, the latter committed suicide in the middle of the legal process. Although more detailed information about the battles in Vyborg and the command of the army corps was later obtained, the case was not reopened. From the point of view of the military high command, the matter was embarrassing. It was easier that the scandal of Vyborg was quickly buried in the twilight of history.

**Oran and Mazalquivir: From the Reconquest to the Peace Treaty
(1732-1792), Military Aspects of the Second Presence
of Spain in the Double Prison**

Manuel Casas Santero (Spain)



Introduction

The second Spanish presence in Oran and Mazalquivir took sixty years to add to the two hundred years of the first, but it has certain characteristics that made different from the previous one: the new Bourbon dynasty reigns in the Spanish possessions. It is a new dynasty which is trying to restore old laurels, to

demonstrate to its subditos and to the world that the new reigning blood comes with the idea and the spirit of making this tired and impoverished homeland greater, ruined and, to a large extent, humiliated by the emergence of other powers that dispute the Hispanic hegemony of the 16th and 17th centuries.

King Philip V commissioned the Count of Montemar, José Carrillo de Albornoz y Montiel, to prepare a large military contingent to recover the double presidio (as those cities were known). On 16 June, the fleet set sail from the port of Alicante in Spain, arriving on 29 June at the beach of Las Aguadas, west of Mazalquivir, where the troops disembarked.

This paper focuses on the study of the military forces and elements involved in the defence of the double presidio. The military structure, mainly (but not only) defensive, on which the double presidio was based, can be divided into three main elements.

- The organic military units
- Other military elements
- The fortifications

The particular study of each of them will lead to an understanding of the interaction of the three. The definition of this defensive ensemble is the subject of this work.


LAND-ENEMY INTEGRATION

The second occupation of Oran-Mazalquivir was a permanent military operation that lasted sixty years, as I have already said. As such a military operation, it seems interesting to put oneself in the minds of the Spanish military commanders of those times in order to understand their decisions by studying the factors involved.

The Terrain

The towns of Oran and Mazalquivir (see map below) are located at the ends of a wide bay approximately 5.5 kilometers long and facing north-north-east on the Mediterranean Sea at the western end of present-day Algeria. In


general, the bay is dominated by high elevations that end in a broad plateau to the south. The coastline is cliffy at the ends of the gulf and beachy in the center. The western end forms a steep ledge where the town and fortress of Mazalquivir is located. To the east, behind a line of heights that run down to the sea, lies Oran on a plain formed at the mouth of a small river called Nacimiento or de Los Molinos. Oran faces a roadstead with limited port capacity. To the east of Oran lies a wide plain that offers great ease of movement.



General plan of the towns of Oran and Mazalquivir (1775).

The map above is highly raised, i.e. the heights or elevations increase proportionally more with respect to the horizontal distances; to get an idea, at a distance of only 700 meters from the coast, there are elevations of 300 meters, it is more than 40% slope. It can be understood that, in general, the terrain makes an enemy attack on Oran from the west or south extremely difficult, while access from the east is relatively easy. It can also be seen that only an attack from the sea is feasible for Mazalquivir.

Due to the orography, the main direction of communications from Oran has to be towards the east, specifically the roads from Tremecén, towards the southeast, and from Mostagan and Canastel towards the northeast. There is also a coastal road linking Oran to Mazalquivir.



Previous map modified with the terrain-enemy integration study

Last map summarizes this study by marking in red the terrain that was difficult for military units of a certain size to access, marking it as a "NO GO zone". On the other hand, possible avenues or areas easily accessible to the enemy are marked in green and marked as "GO zone". Sensitive areas that are easily accessible but limited in the amount of force that can be deployed are marked in yellow. The possible objectives to defend remain unmarked: two main ones (Oran and Mazalquivir) and three secondary or intermediate ones (source of the river, Mount Sillaor Santacruz and Mount Santo).

The Enemy

The conquest of the territory in 1732 was relatively easy. A large expeditionary army was formed in Alicante and reached the Algerian coast at the end of June. The action was swift: only minor skirmishes in the landing on the beach of Las Aguadas (west of Mazalquivir), occupation of the Monte del Santo mountain to dominate Mazalquivir and transfer of the bulk of the land contingent across the plateau to occupy positions east of Oran, the only possible avenue of attack on a large scale as we have already seen. From there the siege of the town began, a town that was already empty. Indeed, faced with the enormous attacking

force, the bey Hasan and governor of Mascara decided to abandon the city on 1 July. Having completed his mission, Montemar left for the mainland on 1st August, leaving a garrison of 8,000 men in the town. The Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado remained as military commander and governor of Oran. Shortly afterwards, a strong contingent of 12,000 Algerians surrounded the city in November, forcing the Spaniards to make a forceful sortie in an attempt to disrupt the enemy siege fortifications. The Marquis of Santa Cruz was killed in this sortie along with 1,500 of his soldiers. A new counterattack under the command of Bartolomé Ladrón de Guevara, his successor in command, was necessary to complete the conquest with much effort and bloodshed, as can be seen.

This was the military tone of the double presidio during the Spanish presence. The enemy regularly harassed the town with different contingents of varying numbers. In return, punitive operations on the Spanish side, which usually resulted in the confiscation of goods, cattle and slaves in the nearby customs houses.

Spain's own forces

- Fixed Infantry Regiment of Oran.
- Line Infantry Regiments.
- Armed Prisoners.
- Mogataces.
- Moors of Peace.

It is necessary to explain the concept of "**presidarios**" and its relation to defence. Presidarios were individuals sentenced by final judgement to be "banished" (as they were called) in this case in the double prison of Oran-Mazalquivir. But not all the exiles performed the same functions: there were some, selected for their loyalty and for having less serious court ruling, who formed part of the Fixed Regiment, and in a significant proportion of them. A second group of presidarios, less trustworthy than the previous ones and with more serious court ruling, formed a specific corps called "Armed Presidarios" with military functions of surveillance and support for the withdrawal of other

units. Finally, those sentenced to longer court ruling or who had demonstrated their disloyalty in other posts worked on the construction sites.

The Fixed Regiment of Oran consisted of two battalions with thirteen rifle companies each, plus an elite grenadier company.

The Line Infantry Regiments were usually two in number, which rotated between those garrisoned on the peninsula with varying frequency.

The armed presidarios: six squads of armed exiles will be formed, each composed of two officers, a sergeant, two corporals and forty-seven soldiers.

Mogataces: "Company of indigenous mogataces" was created as an organic unit of the Spanish Army with a captain, a lieutenant, four sergeants, four corporals and ninety-four mogataces soldiers. They were local troops.

The Moors of peace were individuals belonging to tribes neighboring the plazas and who were considered friends, although this status varied frequently.

It is estimated that the military contingent defending the towns in this second period ranged from 6,000 to 8,000 individuals. This seems, in principle, a small contingent so it is clear that the defence must be based on another component that provides robustness to the whole.

The Fortifications

The importance of this enclave lies in the great port capacity of "El Marsa El Kebir" (the great port), Mazalquivir, which provides great maritime control of this area of the Mediterranean. Its defence must be based on fortresses.


Three defensive belts or lines can be defined as follows:

- Internal defences of the city
- Perimeter defences of the city.
- Defensive belt outside the city

The Alcazaba

This is the internal defensive element of the city, to the south of the city, inside the walled enclosure and, due to its position closer to the mountain, it dominates the rest of the town. Although the Alcazaba was a military element that housed part of the military garrison, it also housed civilian bodies such as the governor's residence, the finance inspectorate, the treasury..... It was the civil and military command and control post of the city.

Its most important defensive elements can be shown in the next map:



General map of the town of Oran with its citadel or Alcazaba

The walled enclosure and gates

The walled enclosure can be seen in the previous map. Other key elements of the walled enclosure were the gates. Oran had three entrances and four gates: the Tremecén gate leading to the citadel, the Canastel gate leading to the north of the city, close to the sea (it was also called the Sea Gate) and the Mallorca gate to the west, which connected with Mazalquivir along the coastal path described above. The fourth gate gives access to the city through the Tremecén gate, the so-called “Puerta de España”, a beautiful construction from the beginning of the 17th century that reflects the enduring Spanish presence in the magnificent coat of arms that presides over it.

The outer defensive belt

Rosalcázar Fortress

The oldest is the fortress of Rosalcázar, which defends the city from the avenues to the northeast and from the sea.

Other fortresses on the eastern flank

As we have already seen, this is the flank most exposed to enemy attack, and it was therefore necessary to extend the fortress of Rosalcázar to the south:

- Fort of San Andrés, centered on the deployment.
- Fort of San Felipe, which closed the passage to the upper basin of the river Nacimiento.

As can be seen, a formidable defensive network is formed that will block the most easily accessible avenue.



Outer defences on the eastern flank

Western flank fortresses

We know that Oran's western flank had much more favorable terrain for defence. Its defence, based on the fortress of Santa Cruz, became essential.

The defensive system was completed to the west by the fort of San Gregorio, halfway up the mountainous spur that joins the plateau with the sea. At the end of the spur, practically reaching the sea, was the fort of La Mona, which served as a lookout post, closing off the small bay of Oran to the west.



Panoramic view of separation of the plateau and Santa Cruz

Mazalquivir

Mazalquivir, the "Great Port", must be studied within the defensive system of the double presidio as a whole.

This town was unbeatably defended and was considered to be the last refuge in the event of an enemy conquest of Oran.



View of the bay and harbor of Mazalquivir from the Santa Cruz fort.

The Earthquake. the Beginning of the end of the Spanish Presence

All this ingenuity, all the effort, the money invested and, above all, the blood spilt were lost by a force of nature far superior to any human effort. On 9th October 1790, the Marquis of Cumbre Hermosa wrote to the Marquis of Casa Tilly, Captain General of the Navy of the Department of Cartagena: *"It is with terrible sorrow that I inform you of the terrible catastrophe that occurred in this town on the night of the 8th of this month. At 1 ¼ o'clock in the morning a dreadful earthquake was felt, which was repeated for a short period of time up to 20 times, collapsing the city at its impulse, pressing under its ruins many of*

the people and its garrison whose number cannot yet be told to you. Almost all the forts that cover this town have opened up and collapsed without being able to resist the impulse of the cannon. The inner enclosure is ruined in several places, the warehouses have been destroyed and there is no help for the multitude of wounded caused by this misfortune...” All the efforts seemed useless “...and will be so unless we come to our aid with the most prompt and effective measures... having been one of the first, Acting General Basilio Gascón, the command of these walls and the few troops within them has fallen to me, and I do not know how long it will last, as the same tremors are constantly repeated”. In this way the new governor desperately asked for help.



Oran after the 1790 earthquake. This image can be compared with an earlier one of the town.

That same night, enemy skirmishes took place, which increased throughout the following days of October.

To understand the enemy's attitude, it is clear the following passage from a diary wrote by a witness: "*During the night of the 31st to the 1st of November there were three tremors, one strong and two light, and a Moor from the enemy camp, son-in-law of the captain of our Mogataces, came by and said, among many other things, that according to his camp there were no more deaths than 150 or 160, but that the number of wounded was infinite, that the Bey (of Mascara) had set his mind on taking the town believing that we would surrender in 24 hours and had established a daily wage for the workers, up to 50 zequis for the head of any Christian and 500 for the first to enter the town, and having achieved nothing but expenses, he withdrew very angry, protesting that he would return for the Spring, but his people were in very low moral*". It seems that the enemy sold the bear's skin before hunting it.

The performance of the Asturias regiment, garrisoned in Oran together with the Navarra, is particularly noteworthy. Of the two regiments on duty, the older one was housed in the more comfortable barracks of the Alcazaba, while the other was located in barracks outside the walls at the northwest end of the city, by the sea. On the night of 8-9 October 1790, the Asturias had the honor of being in the Alcazaba, next to the Command. Honor and misfortune... "*The two barracks of the Asturias collapsed, taking underneath the two companies of grenadiers and troops that were housed there*". The disaster was terrible in its ranks: in addition to the colonel, 11 officers, a chaplain, a surgeon and more than 400 men were killed and wounded, including the two full companies of grenadiers, the most distinguished in the regiment. The account is continued in the Historians section of the Spanish Institute of Military History as follows: "*there remained as a result, so little strength, that the general who commanded wanted to add it to the regiment of Navarra to do service, but this disposition was energetically opposed by the chiefs and officers saying: "We have not lost our flags, sir General; therefore we must continue to form Corps"*". There was no reply to these words, and so it was carried out".

The history of the regiment refers to its distinguished participation in different attacks that the town suffered during the year of the earthquake. In particular, on 21st October 1790, which was particularly violent.

Once the siege of October 1790 was over, the enemy raised another one in April of the following year. On the 3rd of that month the regiment made a sortie that succeeded in dismantling the enemy positions. No further attacks were recorded.

The Retirement

It is clear that, no matter how much desire there was to maintain the presidios, all the indicators pointed to abandonment. Almost always, but especially during the second presence, practically all the supplies from Oran-Mazalquivir had to be brought from the Peninsula. The hostile attitude of many of the natives made large-scale trade with the local populations difficult or impossible. From the military point of view, the same thing happened: armaments, ammunition, construction materials, tools, troops... everything came from Spain. The expense was enormous.

The continuous aggression of the Algerian forces was wearing down not only the military units, but also the entire population, which lived in constant anxiety.

And finally, the great earthquake, and without being able to mourn the dead, without even being able to count them, Oran defended against the furious enemy encirclement.

Everything pointed to abandonment. By the end of 1791, it was too much to bear.

So His Majesty King Charles IV was obliged to attend to his Secretary of State's Office and order the two towns to be vacated by means of a decree signed on 16th December 1791 with a broad statement of reasons for the abandonment.

Conclusion

Perhaps they cannot be considered as causes of the abandonment of the double prison, but there are two transcendental events, in addition to the earthquake, which are very close in time to this misfortune. On the one hand, the death of Charles III and the accession to the throne of his son Charles IV in 1788; on the other hand, the following year saw the French Revolution, which disrupted the relative European peace that had been so difficult and precariously woven in the 18th century.

Charles IV did not have the strength of his father, nor his advisors. It seems as if fate had decided on the future of the double presidio, justifying its abandonment in anticipation of a weaker power less willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain it.

The French Revolution changed the conception of the world, the immediate Napoleonic wars put an end to a period of certain tranquility in Europe, especially in Spain with the War of Independence in 1808.

The earthquake of 1790 might seem a frightening warning of the future. Indeed, so much effort in the 18th century to maintain an enclave that provided little, if any, glory, and under national conditions of relative solvency and freedom of action, what would become of the presidios with a weaker government and a war so close and so bloody?

**War over Romania. Aerial Bombardments of
Bucharest, 1941-1944**

Manuel Stănescu (Romania)

During the Second World War, the city of Bucharest was the only European capital that was bombed by the Soviet, American, British and German aviation. Through the loss of human lives, mostly civilians, and through the material destruction caused, the aerial bombardments of 1941-1944 represent the greatest tragedy in the history of the city in the 20th century.

On June 24, 1941, just three days after Romania's entry into the war, there was also the first attempt of the Soviet aviation to bomb Bucharest. Three Soviet planes approached the capital, but withdrew when the Romanian-German fighter aircraft scrambled into the air. The first bombardment of the city came two days later, on June 26, when Soviet aircraft attacked in two successive waves. The authorities have confirmed four dead, 12 injured, 6 buildings destroyed and three damaged. The Soviet air force also lost two planes, shot down by fighter aircraft.

After several other unsuccessful attempts, the second attack of the Soviet aviation on Bucharest took place on the night of July 14/15. Firebombs were thrown, which caused several fires in the central area. There was only one civilian casualty, a citizen who "preferred to watch the spectacle of our artillery, instead of taking shelter." The authorities also reported that an enemy plane had crashed and the crew had been taken prisoner.

With the advance of German and Romanian troops on the Eastern Front, the Soviet aviation ceased to represent a danger to Romania. In the capital, life went on as normal, and until 1943, although in the midst of war, the city retained the charm and relaxation of a great metropolis. A memorialist of the time noted: "Even in the early years of the war, 1941-1943, the capital followed its bohemian rhythm, naturally integrating the German military presence that was part of everyday life. The cultural and artistic life followed your rhythm, ignoring the war that was still going on far away from us."

Romania fully entered the turmoil of the global conflict after Britain's declaration of war of December 6, 1941. This was followed by the declarations of war by Canada and New Zealand (December 8), Australia (December 10) and the South African Union (December 11). Also on December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. The next day, the plenipotentiary ministers of Germany and Italy requested an audience with Mihai Antonescu, the Romanian foreign minister, and recommended that, based on the provisions of the Tripartite Pact (which Romania had joined in November 1940), our country should consider itself at war with the US. The request was immediately put into practice, the declaration of war being handed to the United States chargé d'affaires in Bucharest.

It took the United States almost half a year to give an official response, declaring a state of war with Romania on June 6, 1942. A week later, on June 12, 1942, 13 bombers taking off from Egypt bombed Romania for the first time, targeting the oil region of Ploiesti. The next raid took place only after more than a year, on August 1, 1943, when 178 B-24 bombers took off from northern Libya, also targeting the petrol extraction industry. Operation Tidal Wave proved extremely costly: only 162 bombers reached the Romanian border, 35 being shot down over the national territory, others, badly damaged, falling on the way back. Only 88 bombers returned to bases in Africa. Exceptionally, the United States Congress awarded five Medals of Honour to five American pilots, three of which were awarded posthumously

As a component part of the Axis system, Romania and its oil resources, but also the communication routes and the industry in our country, represented objectives of great importance in the bombing strategy of the Allies. As the war approached Romania's borders, the chosen targets were not only limited to oil, but to a wide range of objectives, such as transport and communications, the war industry, the aeronautical industry, and also the urban centres that played a role in the war efforts. Incidentally, it was the British who insisted on "bombing [Germany's – author's note] satellites to take them out of the war or at least force the Germans to occupy them."

At the beginning of 1944, in terms of anti-aircraft protection, Bucharest was the best defended city in Romania after Ploiești. However, the authorities were aware of the insufficiency of AA batteries. In Bucharest, there were 124

pieces of medium calibre (88mm, 76.2mm and 75mm), but double was needed. As for small-calibre pieces (40mm, 37mm and 20mm), there were 216 guns, but a 50% increase would have been required. Worse, there were no large-calibre parts and, although 36 105mm guns had been expected, but never arrived from Germany.

As for fighter aircraft, from October 1943 the defences of Bucharest were divided into three sectors of action for the best possible cooperation in case of an attack by air. At the beginning of 1944, the Aviation Groups around Bucharest had 112 planes, of which only 56 could be scrambled, so the number of fighter planes was rather small. Most of the planes were IAR-81 C, of domestic production, along the much more efficient Me-109G.

On March 19, 1944, the Red Army reached Romania's border of 1939. The "London" radio station warned the Romanian authorities about the front's approach to the country's borders: "This means that the hour of defeat has arrived for Romania. The myth of German protection was destroyed, as was the myth of German invincibility. If it does not break off relations immediately, Romania will lose the power to act as an independent nation. The Romanian people must, without wasting a moment, face the reality of the situation they are in". An overseas station this time, "The Voice of America", reminded Romanians the words of the great politician Take Ionescu, the craftsman of the Little Entente during the interwar period, spoken in 1917, when the German armies had occupied most of Romania: "I believe in the victory of the Allies just as I believe in daylight."

On March 22, 1944, British General Maitland Wilson, the commander of the Allied forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, sent an ultimatum letter to Bucharest, intended to determine Romania's exit from the alliance with Germany. As until March 28, 1944, the date of the last radiogram, the Romanian authorities had not offered any response, the green light was given to the launch of massive aerial bombardments on the territory of Romania, with the aim of supporting the expected Soviet offensive that had envisioned the partial or total occupation of Romania

The first bombardment of the allied aviation was also the most devastating for Bucharest. On Tuesday, April 4, 1944, a formation of 350 B-24

Liberator and B-17 Flying Fortress aircraft, belonging to the 15th Air Force of the United States, took off from northern Italy with the capital of Romania as its target, preferably the largest railway station – Bucharest North. Anti-aircraft defence was ineffective due to the high altitude at which the bombers flew (6500-7000 meters), the projectiles exploding far below them. From the Romanian military documents, it appears that the tactics used was “carpet bombing”. Bucharest North Railway Station area was extremely affected, hundreds of buildings and about 1000 train carriages being destroyed and/or set on fire. The official loss figure was 2,942 dead and 2,416 wounded.

American aviation returned on April 15, 21 and 24. On the night of 3/4 May, 1944, the capital was attacked for the first time by British aviation. The next attack was also carried out by British aviation, on the night of 6/7 May. The Allied bombing followed one another at the same pace: the British air force on the night of 7/8 May, the American on 28 June, the British again on the night of 2/3 July, followed in just a few hours by the Americans on 3 July. The British followed again on the night of 23/24 July and the Americans on 31 July and then the British on the night of 9/10 August, 1944. It was the last Allied bombing before August 23, 1944, when Romania decided, unilaterally, to leave the alliance with Germany and join the United Nations.

In the afternoon of August 23, 1944, Marshal Ion Antonescu was arrested at the Royal Palace, and Romania left the alliance with Germany and switched sides. In the same evening, King Mihai’s proclamation to the country was broadcasted on the radio, through which the population was informed of the new political situation created. A few hours later, the King left the capital, fearing the German reprisals would be swift.

In the morning of August 24, the Germans went into action, Stuka bombers attacked the city centre, targeting the Royal Palace with predilection, many buildings being hit. During the night of 24/25 August, the German air force continued its attacks, using isolated groups of planes that bombed targets in the centre of Bucharest at intervals of 30-40 minutes, leaving behind dozens of dead and wounded.

During the day of August 25, the German aviation bombarded the capital again, in several rounds, also in the city centre. An emergency hospital was also

hit, despite specific signs on the roof, many doctors, nurses and patients losing their lives. The bombardments continued throughout the night and throughout the next day, the main central artery – Calea Victoriei – being the most affected.

During the three days of bombing, the German aviation dropped more than 800 bombs over the Capital, which hit 514 buildings and homes, causing 383 deaths (272 civilians and 111 soldiers) and 478 wounded, mostly soldiers. 43 state institutions and 21 businesses were hit, and the city centre, already affected by the Allied attacks, was badly damaged.

The new geopolitical arrangements at the end of the Second World War brought Romania, a defeated country, into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The regime of Soviet origin installed in the country – followed by the Ceaușescu regime, which tried to offer a national dimension of the “construction of socialism” – waged war on the past. The equally complicated and tragic history of Romania’s participation in the war until August 23 remained unknown for almost half a century. The traumas experienced then began to be known only after the revolution of 1989, and the inhabitants and buildings of Bucharest still bear the scars of the tragedy of the war years.

1527: The Pillage of Rome. A Siege in the Renaissance Crisis*Marco Ciampini (Italy)*

The year is 1516: Italy is at the centre of a dispute between Francis I, King of France, and Charles V, King of Spain, who were competing for the title of Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Charles V won the title thanks to his contacts with the German bankers Fuggger of Augsburg and their intervention. They financed the seven German electoral princes to the tune of 850,000 florins in order to decide who would become emperor. By this time, for dynastic reasons, Charles V ruled an empire that included vast territories: from Spain to Germany, the Netherlands, southern and island Italy, and even the newly discovered Americas. He was right to say that on his empire the sun never set. Francis I is a warrior ruler, with a proud and elegant bearing, very attached to Italy: he lost his father as a child and had an Italian for a tutor. Related to the Visconti of Milan, he occupied the Dukedom of Milan as his normal inheritance. Francis I felt very threatened and encircled by the possessions of his rival Charles V. The Duchy of Milan, newly conquered by Francis I, served Charles V to unite his possessions in Germany with those in Spain and Italy, effectively encircling his rival. The Emperor managed to wrest Milan from the King of France, who invaded with his army, but was defeated at Pavia. Francis I was imprisoned in Madrid and, in order to be freed, accepted a peace on humiliating terms. To guarantee the agreement, he was forced to hand over his two sons, who remained prisoners in Madrid. Back in France, however, he could not bear the humiliation of defeat and formed an alliance with Florence, Milan, and Venice and, after much hesitation, the Pope: the League of Cognac.

The Pope was now Julius de Medici, called Clement VII, a close relative of the other de Medici Pope, Leo X, who initiated a rebirth of Rome in terms of urban planning, art, and literature. The clash between Francis I and Charles V also took place in the context of the spread of the Protestant Reformation, which had damaged the sanctity of Rome as the capital of Christianity. The Duchy of Milan was at stake, as were the other territories of Burgundy and Navarre. After the Battle of Pavia, Charles V occupied it, thus uniting his southern territories with those of the north. Pope Clement VII vacillated between the two contenders,

attempting an impossible mediation. He sided with one and then the other with sudden reversals. By 1527, Clement VII had moved closer to Francis I and Emperor Charles V decided to punish him for good by raising an army in the southern regions of the Holy Roman Empire to march on Rome and punish the Pope. The force consisted of 12,000 Lansquenets – i.e., Lutheran mercenaries recruited in the Tyrol – 6,000 Spaniards and 12,000 Italian mercenaries under the command of Ferrante Gonzaga. The army of the League of Cognac – which included troops from France, the Papal States, Florence and Venice – was supposed to confront them. Inexplicably, perhaps because of internal divisions in the command structure or old quarrels between some of the League's military leaders – such as the Duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria della Rovere, at the head of the Venetian troops – and the current Pope, it chose to defend some territories but not to decisively oppose the descent of the notorious Lansquenets towards Rome. The only one who can save Italy from the invasion is Giovanni de Medici, a charismatic *condottiero* loved by the soldiers and a relative of Pope Clement VII, in command of the so-called *Bande Nere* (the Black Bands) companies. However, he died in battle near the River Mincio, struck by a shot from a falconet, one of the deadly artillery pieces that Alfonso d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, had given to the Imperial forces after the Pope had refused an alliance with Ferrara. The Imperial army set out to sack Florence, but the League army pre-emptively occupied the city, leaving the Imperial forces with no choice but to march on Rome in search of plunder. Rome was left defenceless as Pope Clement VII dismissed the army in an attempt to secure a truce. On 25 March, an armistice was signed in the Vatican for eight months: the Pope was obliged to pay 60,000 ducats to the Imperial army, which undertook to leave Italy after payment. The allies of the League thundered against the armistice, accusing the Pope of treason. But the agreement proved difficult to enforce. When the envoy of the viceroy of Naples, who had been sent to negotiate the truce, arrived at the Imperial camp, he found the situation extremely tense. The soldiers had been in revolt for several days because they had not been paid for some time. The ambassador watched in horror as the protests spread, overpowering the commander-in-chief himself, Georg Frundsberg, who the lansquenets almost killed and forced to leave the scene. Charles of Borbone, who had succeeded the German general at the head of the army, struggled to keep the companies together and tame the attempts at sedition. When the military learned that the agreement with the Vatican provided

for the payment of 60,000 ducats, they were reluctant to go back on a sum that was clearly considered too low. On 29 March, the Duke of Borbone sent messages to both the Viceroy and the Pope that he was unable to honour the truce. The army of the League stalled and did not move. When news that the Imperial army had resumed its march south reached Rome, panic spread, not least because Pope Clement, relying on the truce he had just signed, had dismissed the Bande Nere companies, the last remaining bulwark that could hope to defend Rome with any chance of success. To reopen negotiations and under pressure from his soldiers, the Duke of Borbone demanded 150,000 ducats, and later 240,000. When the new terms arrived on the Pope's table on 25 April, it became clear that for the Imperial forces the negotiations were merely a strategic manoeuvre to gain time and advance undisturbed. The Pope, who had now reached the end of his tether, decided to break off the dialogue and immediately restore the alliance with Venice, France and England. The Lansquenets and the Imperial forces considered it too risky to attack Florence. The League army defended it and so they decided to go on marching towards defenceless Rome. The League army moved very slowly and could not keep up with the Imperial army. On the night of 5 May 1527, the Imperial army encamped on the Janiculum Hill, ready to attack the Holy City. Against the 30,000 Imperial soldiers massed there, about 200 Swiss Guards and a hastily recruited civilian militia of about 3,000 defended Rome.

On the evening of 5 May, the 30,000 Imperial soldiers were still encamped on the Janiculum. Hungry, cold and hungry for booty, they were eager to teach the Pope a lesson. The attack began at 4am on the morning of 6 May, in a thick fog, with the Pope locked in the Apostolic Palace praying. The Imperial army split in two: the Spaniards reached Porta Torriane undisturbed, and the Pope's cannons could not fire because of the fog. The Spaniards began their attack. The battle with the Romans on the walls was fierce and the Spaniards faltered, so Charles of Borbone threw himself into the attack on the walls and was hit by an arquebus shot. At the Porta di Santo Spirito, the Lansquenets opened a second front. After hearing the news of the death of Charles of Borbone, the Imperial commander, they resumed their attack with greater fury instead of withdrawing. Climbing the walls, they stumbled upon a window ill-concealed by the defenders and entered the Borgo district, breaking through the gate in the walls and the Imperial army swept in. The Lansquenets carried out terrible

massacres, killing all the sick in the Santo Spirito hospital and throwing the orphans housed in the same building into the river. The Imperial troops arrived in St Peter's Square through a maze of alleys. Around the Obelisk, then on the left side of the square, the Swiss Guards and the Romans tried to stop the invaders, but were annihilated. The Lansquenets bursted into the Basilica, killing everyone who had taken refuge there, even those near the altars and Peter's tomb. The Pope heard the cries, but thought the Romans were rejoicing for the death of Charled and that they had already won. The Lansquenets came within a few metres of the Pope, who realised what is happening and, with a large retinue of cardinals and servants of all ranks, fled through the 'Passetto', a fortified elevated corridor connecting the Pope's Palace and St Peter's with Castel Sant'Angelo, and takes refuge in the fortress. However, the first section of the Passetto had collapsed and was now exposed. The Pope and his entourage decided to run through it, which they did, despite the harquebus fire of the Lansquenets. The bullet holes are still visible today. The Borgo district was occupied after a fierce battle with the Romans, and the Lansquenets lost about 1,000 men. All the Romans in Borgo then sought refuge through the gate of Castel Sant'Angelo, which was eventually closed. Many of the Romans stayed outside and tried to escape in boats on the Tiber, but they were overloaded and sank, drowning everyone. The cannons of the Castel Sant'Angelo did not fire because the gunners were afraid of killing their families, who were being persecuted by the Imperial troops and used as human shields. However, the goldsmith and sculptor Benvenuto Cellini, who was in charge of the artillery, managed to fire a few shots. The Imperial forces unsuccessfully attacked Castel Sant'Angelo and tried to cross the Ponte Sant'Angelo into Rome, but could not because the fog has lifted and the bridge was now under fire from the Papal cannons. By late morning, the situation was a stalemate, the Imperial forces had already made a huge haul in the Borgo, but the biggest prize was missing. It was Rome, the city across the Tiber. The Imperial forces were still divided at this point: the Italians, under the command of Ferrante Gonzaga, remained to garrison the Castel Sant'Angelo area, while the Lansquenets and Spaniards attacked and easily conquered Trastevere, and then converged on Ponte Sisto to enter Rome. It was about 5.30pm. The Romans did not destroy the bridges, perhaps because they underestimated the danger, or perhaps to save money in case they had to be rebuilt. We still do not know why. Despite the heroism of a group of noble

knights led by Giulio Vailati, who attacked their opponents on the bridge in vain, the Imperial troops overwhelmed the defences of the Sisto bridge. The Imperial forces spread out, no longer obeying their superiors, having lost their commander. The actual sacking had not yet begun. Who was charge of preparing the defence of Rome? After the fall of Borgo, Renzo Orsini, the nobleman in charge, was criticised for failing to deploy his men where the Imperial soldiers were strongest, instead spreading them uselessly across a long front. He neglected to reinforce the weak points of the walls, allowing the Spaniards to enter Borgo through a gap in the Porta Torrione. He did prevent the commission of Roman nobles formed at the beginning of the battle from opening negotiations with the leaders of Charles V's army, which might have resolved the situation with a few concessions. He did not prevent too many Romans from abandoning their positions to celebrate after Charles of Borbone was wounded and, above all, he turned his back on the enemy and fled without a fight during the battle of Borgo. Not everyone, particularly the French ambassador, who gave a completely different version of the defeat at Borgo, shared these very serious accusations: the Romans fled, leaving only Renzo Orsini behind, not the other way round. Undoubtedly, however, Renzo Orsini, already a brave *condottiero*, underestimated the enemy and relied too much on his vast experience in defending cities. Even his proposal to blow up the bridges over the Tiber to prevent the Imperial troops from crossing and invading Rome was not supported, especially by the people from Trastevere, who would have been abandoned to their fate. Many others also pointed out that blowing up the bridges would give the Imperial forces a sign of weakness. However, the Imperial forces took Rome. Only a few palaces of pro-Imperial cardinals, such as Colonna's and Farnese's, were not attacked. They became shelters for hundreds of Romans who found refuge there, but were later also forced to pay some sort of ransom. The German Lutheran mercenaries unleashed their fury, fuelled by religious fanaticism: they desecrated churches and monasteries, destroyed everything, raped women and nuns, and tortured priests. They plundered every available good. The acute phase of the looting lasted eight days, but the occupation lasted for months, and in the end, the toll was impressive. The Lansquenets, who had taken up residence in the Vatican, burned everything to keep warm, destroyed marble, columns and friezes, smashed precious stained-glass windows to make shots for their arquebuses, and devastated furniture and libraries. Many relics and works of art

were also looted or destroyed, such as the Shroud of Veronica, on which the face of Jesus is said to have been imprinted. The Lansquenets also destroyed fountains, leaving Rome without water and contributing to the spread of plague and epidemics. Of the 53,000 people counted in the census of 1526/1527 after the sack, there were only about 33,000, 20,000 dead, one in three. The Pope, who had fled to Orvieto, returned in 1528 and reached an agreement with Emperor Charles V, but it cost him dearly: he was forced to have many sacred and precious objects melted down to make gold to pay the price of the surrender. Finally, in 1530, he crowned Charles V Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in the Cathedral of San Petronio in Bologna. The echo of the Sack of Rome reverberated throughout Europe, arousing feelings of hatred and indignation. In the Villa Farnesina in Trastevere, which was used as a camp by the Lansquenets, inscriptions were left that still exist today, one of which reads in particular

"Why should I, the writer, not laugh? We Lansquenets made the Pope run".

Also the date of the retreat from Rome, 1528, was engraved with a drawing, probably by the soldier himself. The Sack of Rome marked the end of an era, the inviolability of the Holy City and the beginning of the decline of its cultural supremacy. The Sack of Rome highlighted the weakness of Italian and papal policy towards the two powers that had come to the fore, France and Spain, and marked the beginning of Iberian domination over many Italian territories. The Sack of Rome was a turning point for the entire Catholic world. The questionable customs of the Catholic Church, the logic of power between families and the sale of indulgences had led to violent Lutheran criticism and the birth of Lutheranism. The event of 1527, with the raid of an Imperial army made up of proudly Protestant Lansquenets, just ten years after the publication of Luther's 95 theses in 1517, led the Church to react. Pope Paul III, successor to Clement VII, convened the Council of Trent in 1545 and the Counter-Reformation was born. For Protestants who opposed the Catholic Church, the sacking was divine punishment. For those who supported the Church and Catholicism, it was a terrible crime for which, they would have to answer, eventually. It was with this in mind that, a few years later, Pope Clement VII commissioned the great artist Michelangelo to paint the fresco of the Last Judgement in the Sistine Chapel. It was a reminder that, in the end, we will all

face God's judgement. Bertrand Russell and other scholars point to 6 May 1527 as the symbolic date of the end of the Renaissance.

**Les Conséquences Économiques, Politiques et Sociales de «La
Bataille de Dakar 23-25 Septembre 1940»**

Mor Ndao (Senegal)

Vers la fin des années 1930, Dakar constituait un enjeu géostratégique de premier ordre dans le dispositif colonial français. En effet, la ville avait ses caractères spéciaux : chef-lieu du gouvernement général, port militaire et marchand, port d'escale d'importance mondiale et premier port de transit de l'AOF, troisième port de commerce français à trafic intense après Marseille et le Havre, dépôt de combustibles, centre de lignes aériennes françaises et internationales à mi-chemin entre l'Amérique et l'Europe, point d'appui de la flotte de guerre, centre de défense terrestre. Tout cela faisait de Dakar un point tant convoité par les différents protagonistes. Aussi, la colonie constituait-elle un enjeu dès l'éclatement des hostilités et plus particulièrement après l'armistice qui divisa la métropole entre Gaullistes et Vichystes. Alors que pour Vichy, la loyauté des colonies s'avérait nécessaire notamment dans le cadre des négociations éventuelles avec les Allemands, pour la France Libre et De Gaulle, le contrôle d'une partie de l'Empire donnerait une souveraineté effective à son régime.

C'est dans ces conditions que De Gaulle se présenta au large de Dakar le 23 Septembre 1940. Ce que Jacques Mordal appelle « la bataille de Dakar » venait de commencer. Les hostilités vont durer deux jours, mais Dakar résista farouchement, persuadant De Gaulle de battre en retraite pour regagner Freetown au soir du 25 Septembre 1940. Les pertes matérielles et humaines furent lourdes : le bilan officiel, rapporté par le journal *Paris Dakar*, dans sa livraison du 26 septembre 1940, s'élevait à 175 morts et 350 blessés, alors que les sources officielles faisaient cas de centaines de morts.

La bataille de Dakar entraîna des conséquences politiques (restriction des libertés, répressions, exécution des opposants), économiques (rationnement, blocus des Alliés, effort de guerre) et sociales (paupérisation, épidémies).

Le travail est structuré en deux grandes parties. La première analyse d'abord la « bataille de Dakar » (23, 24, 25 septembre 1940), ses enjeux,

implications. La deuxième étudie les conséquences économiques, politiques et sociales de la « la bataille de Dakar ».

1. La bataille de Dakar Enjeux et Forces impliquées dans la bataille

A l'orée des années 1940, Dakar constituait un enjeu géostratégique de premier ordre dans le dispositif colonial français. En effet, la ville avait ses caractères spéciaux : chef-lieu du gouvernement général, port d'escale d'importance mondiale et premier port de transit de l'AOF, troisième port de commerce français à trafic intense après Marseille et le Havre, dépôt de combustibles, centre de lignes aériennes françaises et internationales à mi-chemin entre l'Amérique et l'Europe, point d'appui de la flotte de guerre, centre de défense terrestre. Tout cela faisait de Dakar un point tant convoité par les différents protagonistes.

La signature de l'armistice (25 Juin) et l'appel de Londres le 18 Juin 1940 du Général de Gaulle allaient diviser les milieux coloniaux entre partisans du Maréchal Pétain, collaborateur de l'occupant allemand et gaullistes adversaires de la capitulation. A Dakar, nombreux étaient les partisans de la Résistance.

Pour De Gaulle, la lutte de libération nationale dépassait le cadre métropolitain pour s'étendre jusqu'aux colonies qu'il fallait empêcher, coûte que coûte, d'être récupérées par Vichy et c'est précisément dans ce cadre que Dakar fut impliquée militairement dans la deuxième guerre.

Ainsi, dès le 7 Juillet 1940, un contre-torpilleur pro gaulliste fut refoulé à Dakar tandis que, le lendemain, le "Richelieu" fut attaqué et immobilisé dans le port de Dakar. Or, en ces moments, l'A.E.F, par la voix de Félix Eboué, rejoignait la résistance alors que Cayla, soupçonné d'être pro gaulliste, fut muté à Madagascar et remplacé par Pierre Boisson qui, bien que versatile et hésitant au début, finit par rejoindre Vichy.

Pour De Gaulle, le ralliement de Dakar à sa cause permettrait à la France Libre d'avoir des moyens matériels et humains pour continuer la lutte, mais aussi une assise territoriale et politique pour un Etat virtuel qui n'existait que sur du papier. Or le ralliement de l'AEF poussa les autorités de l'AOF à prendre des mesures préventives pour protéger ses bases contre toute attaque anglo-gaulliste.

C'est dans ces conditions que De Gaulle se présenta au large de Dakar le 23 Septembre 1940 avec une coalition FNFL-anglaise face aux forces pro vichystes basées à Dakar.

France (forces alliées à Vichy)

Cuirassés :	Richelieu (ne pouvant appareiller)
Croiseurs :	Georges Leygues Montcalm
contre-torpilleur :	Fantasque Malin l'Audacieux
Torpilleur :	le Hardi
sous-marin :	Persée Ajax Béziers
Avisos :	Calais d'Entrecasteaux d'Iberville Commandant Rivière Gazelle la Surprise
Patrouilleur :	Air france I Air france III Air france IV

Forces anglaises

Cuirassés :	Barham Resolution
Porte- Avion	Ark Royal
Croiseurs	Devonshire Cumberland Australia Delhi Dragon
Destroyers	Inglefield Faulknor Fortune Foresight Greyhound Fury
Patrouilleurs dragueurs de mines	Milford Bridgewater
Transports de troupes et de matériels:	Westernland (transportant le général De Gaulle) Pennland Ettrick Kenya


	Karanja Sobieski Anadyr Fort-lamy Neveda Casamance Belgravian pétrolier Ocean Coast
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Forces Nationales de la France Libre (FNFL)

Avisos :	Savorgnan de Brazza Commandant Duboc Commandant Dominé
Patrouilleurs :	Président Houduce

Au petit matin, des avions britanniques survolèrent Dakar, jetant des tracts de sympathie et souhaitant le ralliement de l'AOF aux côtés des Alliés, de la France Combattante dans quatre heures, auquel cas serait exclu l'usage de la force matérialisée par cette importante flotte anglaise prête à entrer en action. Peu après, une corvette portant le drapeau blanc, conduite par le capitaine Thierry d'Argenlieu, se détacha de l'escadre aux fins de parlementer et, ce faisant, convaincre Boisson à se rallier. A peine arrivée, elle fut mitraillée, blessant le parlementaire qui se retira à la sauvette. Vers treize heures et devant le mutisme du gouverneur général après l'ultimatum, Dakar fut violemment bombardée par la flotte anglo-gaulliste commandée par le vice-amiral John Gunningham. Ce que Jacques Mordal appelle "la bataille de Dakar" venait de commencer. Les

hostilités vont durer trois jours, mais Dakar résista farouchement, persuadant De Gaulle de battre en retraite pour regagner Freetown au soir du 25 Septembre 1940




Salves britanniques sur le Richelieu



Des obus de 380 anglais tombent dans le port

Sous marin le Bevéziers rentrant au port après avoir torpillé le Resolution





Charognards sur les ruines




Ruines de l'imprimerie du gouvernement général, à Gorée

Les pertes matérielles et humaines furent lourdes : le bilan officiel, rapporté par le journal Paris Dakar, dans sa livraison du 26 septembre 1940, s'élevait à 175 morts et 350 blessés, alors que les sources officieuses faisaient cas de centaines de morts.



Exode de la population



Retour de réfugiés à la gare de Rufisque



Sauve qui peut de la population

2. Les conséquences

2,1 Les conséquences économiques La Crise alimentaire

2.1 La consommation indigène

Le régime africain se réduit, pour l'essentiel, en nourritures céréalières toujours monotones. En fait, le riz et le mil tiennent une place centrale dans la consommation indigène. Toutefois, avec la pénurie chronique de céréales principales, les autorités eurent recours aux céréales de secours (orge blé concassé,...) auxquelles devaient difficilement s'adapter les indigènes.


A- Les céréales principales

1- Le riz

La ration fut réduite à 4,5 kg par mois en octobre et novembre 1941 (soit 150 g/jour) pour chuter davantage à 3 kg au mois de décembre. La tendance à la baisse va se maintenir en 1942. La ration, de 3 kg au mois de janvier fléchit à 2 kg en février, mars et avril. Le creux de la vague fut atteint à partir de mai 1942 jusqu'en juillet quand la ration fut fixée à 0,5 kg par mois. Un redressement est observé à partir d'août avec 1,5 kg, puis 3 kg de septembre à novembre avant de fléchir le mois suivant avec 2 kg.

L'année 1943 fut marquée par des variations incessantes : 2 kg en janvier, 1,5 kg en février jusqu'en juin, 3 kg en juillet et août. A partir de septembre, la pénurie devint chronique et l'administration dut supprimer les rations, le blé concassé étant substitué au riz à raison de 5 kg par mois. Un léger mieux fut enregistré en 1944 avec le retour aux rations de riz qui restèrent faibles, voire insignifiantes. Le retour effectif à la normale en 1946, maintint les rations entre 0,5 et 0,4 kg par personne et par jour.

Graphique Consommation mensuelle de riz à Dakar 1941-1943 (kg)



L'évolution de la consommation globale laisse apparaître un pic en 1941 avec 9 500 t ; c'est un record qui ne sera plus atteint. La courbe avec un pic en 1941 descend vite avant de s'écraser en 1942 pour atteindre son niveau plancher. En fait, la chute fut vertigineuse en 1942 avec environ le tiers de la consommation de l'année précédente avec 2 258,5 t. Un léger redressement s'opéra l'année suivante avec 3 600 t. La tendance, qui se poursuivra, certainement à cause de la levée du blocus, fut compromise par la croissance de la population. Celle-ci, de 138 154 hts (population civile) en 1942, atteindra 198 114 hts en 1943 du fait du renforcement des effectifs militaires. Les consommations mensuelles connurent des hausses à partir de 1944 (graphique 13). Dans tous les cas, la sous-consommation de riz fut largement compensée par une forte consommation de mil.

2- Le mil

Le rationnement du mil débuta en 1941. La ration mensuelle, de 1 kg/mois, de janvier à avril 1942, fut portée à 3 kg/mois de septembre à novembre, période durant laquelle fut supprimée la ration de riz. De 1205 t en 1941 avec une moyenne mensuelle de 100,4 t, la consommation de mil passa à 8 600 t l'année suivante, soit une augmentation de 613 %. Après un fléchissement notable en 1943 avec 1599 t, s'amorça une nette remontée l'année suivante suivie d'une autre chute à partir de 1945. La consommation monte vite à partir de 1941 et culmine en 1942 avec une pointe vive ; puis elle descend vite avant de s'écraser en 1943 pour atteindre son niveau d'étiage. Toutefois, dès 1944, les bonnes récoltes au niveau du Sénégal et de la fédération font augmenter sensiblement les consommations comme du reste l'illustre le graphique ci -dessous.

D'une manière générale, le mil constitue une céréale de substitution au riz. Sa consommation devient importante en période de pénurie, ce que traduit l'allure de leurs courbes qui ont des évolutions inverses. En 1941, la forte consommation de riz occasionna une chute sensible de la consommation de mil. L'année d'après la surconsommation de mil fut consécutive à la pénurie de riz devenu introuvable au dernier trimestre de 1942. D'ailleurs, la persistance de la pénurie poussa les autorités responsables à recourir aux céréales de secours.


La consommation de mil

D'une manière générale, le mil constitue une céréale de substitution au riz. Sa consommation devient importante en période de pénurie, ce que traduit l'allure de leurs courbes qui ont des évolutions inverses. En 1941, la forte consommation de riz occasionna une chute sensible de la consommation de mil. L'année d'après la surconsommation de mil fut consécutive à la pénurie de riz devenu introuvable au dernier trimestre de 1942. D'ailleurs, la persistance de la pénurie poussa les autorités responsables à recourir aux céréales de secours.

Graphique Consommation mensuelle de mil à Dakar 1941-1943(kg)


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


consommation européenne

Graphique Consommation mensuelle de farine à Dakar 1941-1943 (kg)



Graphique Quantité de viande consommée à Dakar de 1938 à 1944 (kg)



D'une manière générale, deux périodes se dégagent. De 1938 à 1942 s'amorce une augmentation continue de la quantité de viande consommée à Dakar : 26,53 % entre 1938 et 1939, 26,79 % de 1939 à 1940, 26,98 % entre

1940 et 1941, 4,18 % de 1941 à 1942. Ainsi, de 1938 à 1942, la consommation de viande nette a plus que doublé. Par contre, à partir de 1942, la quantité de viande consommée enregistre une baisse en dépit de l'augmentation du nombre d'animaux abattus qui passe entre 1942 et 1943, de 83856 unités à 86301, soit une augmentation en valeur relative de 2,9 %.

Tableau Mouvements aux abattoirs de Dakar de 1938 à 1944 (A.N.S. FDDD. Dossier 107).

Années	Nombre d'animaux abattus	Quantité viande nette
1938	39.537	1.901.815 kg
1939	48.259	2.406.554 kg
1940	62.714	3.051.486 kg
1941	82.947	3.874.774 kg
1942	83.856	4.036.738 kg
1943	86.301	3.616.923 kg
1944	68.505	2.828.724 kg

Tableau Consommation de sucre à Dakar 1941-1945 (en tonnes).


Années	Cons. Totale	Moy. mensuelle	Cons. maximale	Cons. minimale
1941	1760	146,6	Septembre : 172	
1942	1544	128,6	Août : 263	Avril : 98
1943	2 211	184	Août : 199,7	Février : 132,61
1944	1 512,7	126	Juillet : 198,5	Mai : 77,6
1945	1443	131		Janvier : 100,4 t

La consommation totale, de 1 760 t en 1941, enregistre une baisse de 12,27 % l'année suivante avant que ne s'amorce une nette remontée en 1943 vite remise en cause en 1944 et 1945. En fait, ni le ralliement, ni l'arrivée du sucre américain n'ont pu juguler la pénurie. D'ailleurs, jusqu'à la fin de l'année 1945,

des arrêtés locaux vont procéder à la suspension sur tout le territoire de la Circonscription de Dakar et Dépendances, de la fabrication de sirops, bonbons, confiserie et de tout produit nécessitant l'emploi du sucre.

La courbe glisse en pente douce entre 1941 et 1942 avant de culminer l'année suivante du fait du ralliement à la France Libre qui va diminuer la tension au niveau des marchés. A partir de 1943, la courbe s'effondre pour atteindre son niveau plancher en 1944 avant de s'étaler sans ondulations jusqu'en 1945. Les périodes de consommation maximale enregistrées en septembre 1942, en août 1943, août 1944 et juillet 1945 résultent des rations supplémentaires de 500 g attribuées pendant les mois de ramadan qui se singularisent par une forte demande de sucre.

Graphique Consommation mensuelle de sucre à Dakar 1941-1943 (kg).



Le lait Tableau Consommation de lait en 1942 -1943

Années	Concentré sucré	Lait évap. non sucré	Lait poudre	Moy. mensuelle	Totaux
1942	109.943	46.726	1452	13.177	158.121
1943	72.511	272.293	3736	29.045	348.540

Source : A.N.S, Fonds Délégation Dakar et Dép : Dossier 107 bis.

Le doublement de la consommation en 1943 résulte de la contribution des forces alliées avec les arrivages de lait américain. D'ailleurs à partir de septembre 1943, une détente s'amorce au niveau du rationnement. Dans ces conditions, les quantités de lait évaporé américain allouées mensuellement aux enfants d'origine où de souche métropolitaine étaient fixées à 30 boîtes pour les moins de 3 ans, 20 boîtes pour les enfants de 3 à 5 ans et 15 boîtes de 5 à 13 ans.

Toutefois, un fléchissement notable est observé en 1943 pour le lait concentré avec une baisse de 34 %.

L'huile Tableau : Consommation d'huile d'arachide (en t) Dakar

Années	Cons. totale	Moy. mensuelle	Cons. maximale	Cons. minimale
1942	1978	247	Août : 286 t	Mai : 205,5 t
1943	3388	282	Juillet : 311	Novembre : 251
1944	3687	307	Mai : 338	Février : 250
1945	34.03	309*	Août : 345	Juin : 278

Source : ANS, FDDD, Dossier 107 bis.

La consommation globale, après une progression de 71,2 % entre 1942 et 1943 se stabilise autour de 3 500 t environ jusqu'à la fin des hostilités. Ce qui est mis en exergue par l'allure de la courbe qui s'étale sur un long plateau à légères ondulations s'étirant jusqu'en 1945.

Graphique 19 Consommation d'huile d'arachide à Dakar 1941-1943 (kg)

3. Les conséquences politiques

a. Blocus des Alliés et la répression

Le blocus de la Royal Navy sur l'AOF eurent des répercussions fâcheuses sur l'approvisionnement de la Fédération en produits alimentaires et industriels

L'insécurité des océans du fait de l'état de guerre et le blocus de la Royal Navy sur l'AOF eurent des répercussions fâcheuses sur l'approvisionnement de la Fédération en produits alimentaires et industriels. Pourrait-il en être autrement pour une ville qui, comme Dakar, reste le symbole du gouvernement de Vichy en Afrique noire. Or, depuis la signature de l'armistice, le gouvernement britannique considérait le régime de Vichy et les colonies sous sa tutelle comme des territoires sous le contrôle de l'ennemi allemand. Dans ces conditions, les colonies, compte tenu de l'extrême précarité des transports maritimes aggravée

par le blocus, devaient compter sur leurs propres ressources locales et ménager au maximum les stocks existants.

Il faudra attendre l'échec des anglo-gaullistes à Dakar pour se rendre à l'évidence des effets du blocus. Nous en trouvons d'ailleurs la confirmation dans une correspondance du président de la chambre de commerce de Dakar adressée au directeur des Services Economiques et dans laquelle il déplorait la rupture des relations maritimes avec Saïgon¹. De toute évidence, les importations de riz indochinois vont enregistrer un fléchissement considérable avec 117 377 t en 1937 pour chuter à 36 741 t en 1938 avant de se redresser en 1939 avec 62 103 t.² La situation empira l'année suivante puisque aucune commande ne sera passée avec l'Indochine. Dans les faits, la guerre sous-marine, le blocus, l'élévation du fret désormais payé en dollars conjuguèrent leurs effets pour dissuader plusieurs navires. D'ailleurs, les arraisonnements et les captures vont se multiplier. C'est le cas notamment lorsque le 10 février 1941 le s/s Eridan en direction de Dakar fut capturé par les Anglais avec un chargement de 750 t; le s/s Desirade subira le même sort avec un chargement de 987 t le 20 août de la même année³.

Devant cette nouvelle situation, les autorités coloniales préconisèrent un repli dans la fédération et la relance du cabotage intercontinental afin de ravitailler Dakar à partir du Togo, de la Guinée, du Dahomey et de la Côte d'Ivoire. Dans tous les cas, la rupture de plusieurs sources d'approvisionnement entraîna un amenuisement des stocks et hypothéqua les possibilités de réapprovisionnement extérieur. En 1941, le blocus s'aggrava à telle enseigne que le Bureau Economique ne put s'empêcher de mettre en garde les autorités de la gravité de la situation. Il souligna en effet dans un de ses rapports que les « captures successives engagent à ne guère compter sur un nouvel approvisionnement en riz d'Indochine ou de Madagascar tant que durera la situation internationale actuelle »⁴.

Aux niveaux politique et syndical, tous les acquis démocratiques sont mis entre parenthèse : dissolution des partis politiques, des syndicats, des conseils municipaux, arrestation de juifs et des partisans de Cheikh Hamalla, d'opposants

1 ANS, FDDD, Dossier 555 : Ravitaillement.

2 ANS, FDDD, Dossier 8 : Ravitaillement.

3 ANS, 2G 41/37, CDD : Rapport sur l'activité du Bureau Economique 19941.

4 Ibidem.

(Alfred Goux, maire de Dakar, le président de la Chambre de Commerce de Dakar, etc.). Ceux qui sont soupçonnés de résistants sont arrêtés et incarcérés, s'ils ne sont pas exécutés. Parmi les résistants fusillés à Dakar, on peut citer : Ngagne Diba, Idohou Albert, Wabi, Derwole Aloysinos

b. Les conséquences sociales

Tableau: Évolution des prix à Dakar de 1941 à 1942⁵

Désignation des produits	1er trimestre 1941	3e trimestre 1942	Pourcentage d'augmentation
Pain	4,50 F	5F	11,11 %
Vin	4,35	11,35	160,91 %
Sucre	7,75	11,65	50,32 %
Riz ordinaire	2,80	4,50	60,71 %
MU (le kg)	2	3,35	67,5%
Percalé	6	20,70	245%
Sandales	45	157	248,88 %
Chaussures indigènes (fabrication locale)	27,50	125	354,52 %

Si la hausse a été moindre pour le pain, elle a été plus sensible pour le sucre, le riz et le mil avec des pourcentages d'augmentation oscillant entre 50 et 70 %. Le litre de vin a enregistré une hausse vertigineuse de 162 % du fait de l'occupation de la métropole, principal fournisseur. Les augmentations record sont notées au niveau du mètre de percale et des sandales qui ont vu leur prix plus que tripler alors que les chaussures locales ont failli quintupler. Pourtant, les salaires ne suivirent guère la flambée des prix. Les salaires s'écrasent pendant la montée des prix.

⁵ ANS, FDDD, Dossier 107.

Tableau : Coût normal de la vie à Dakar (Européens)

Années	Célibataire	Ménage sans enfant	Ménage avec 1 enfant	Ménage avec 2 enfants
1938	20 220 F	27 410 F	32 525 F	35 640 F
1944	74 150 F	102 360 F	124 000 F	138 435 F
Augmentation de 1938 à 1944	256%	273,44 %	281%	288,4 %

Tableau : 47 Coût normal de la vie à Dakar (indigènes).

Années	Célibataire (A)	Couple (B)	Couple+1*(C)	Couple+2(D)	SMO (E)
1938	100	100	100	100	100
1939	125	126	127	128	114
1940	165	167	169	171	129
1941	197	202	206	209	143
1942	243	252	257	260	214
1943	306	314	321	326	171
1944	358	360	367	372	254

NB * Couple avec un enfant; SMO : Salaire minimum obligatoire

Tableau 48 : Salaire minimum obligatoire à Dakar 1938 -1943

Années	E/A	E/B	E/C	E/D
1938	100	100	100	100
1939	91	90	90	89

1940	78	77	76	75
1941	73	71	69	68
1942	88	85	83	82
1943	56	54	53	52
1944	71	71	69	68

Sources: 2 G44 /19; I. Thioub, op cit

Le coût de la vie a été établi sur la base de la formule recommandée par le Bureau du Travail, à savoir les denrées, le chauffage, l'éclairage, l'eau, la glace, le logement, les divers (personnel domestique, entretien, soins corporels, distraction, impôts). Entre 1938 et 1944, le coût de la vie augmenté de 274 % chez les Européens contre 264 % chez les indigènes (258,43 % chez les célibataires, 259,75 % pour les ménages sans enfant, 267,39 % pour les ménages avec un enfant et 271,49 % pour le couple de deux enfants soit en moyenne 269 % pour les deux groupes confondus. D'une manière générale, le décrochement du coût de la vie par rapport aux salaires des indigènes dakarois allait entretenir une sous-alimentation et une malnutrition qui concourent à péjorer davantage leurs conditions de vie.

Conclusion

La principale conséquence de l'échec des anglo-gaullistes à Dakar fut le renforcement du blocus et la généralisation des mesures de rationnement tandis que sur le plan politique le régime de Vichy se durcit avec la suppression de toutes les libertés acquises sous le Front Populaire. En fait, alors que le blocus des Anglais s'exerçait sur Dakar (multiplication des arraisonnements et des captures de navires), les réserves constituées par les commerçants s'épuisèrent et les possibilités de réapprovisionnement, résultant des relations autrefois fréquentes avec la métropole, devinrent quasi inexistantes.

Aux niveaux politique et syndical, tous les acquis démocratiques sont mis entre parenthèse : dissolution des partis politiques, des syndicats, des conseils municipaux, arrestation de juifs et des partisans de Cheikh Hamalla, d'opposants (Alfred Goux, maire de Dakar, le président de la Chambre de Commerce de Dakar, etc.). Ceux qui sont soupçonnés de résistants sont arrêtés et incarcérés,

s'ils ne sont pas exécutés. Parmi les résistants fusillés à Dakar, on peut citer : Ngagne Diba, Idohou Albert, Wabi, Derwole Aloysinos, etc. La reprise des activités politiques ne fut effective qu'en 1943 suite au ralliement de l'AOF aux Forces Alliées et l'arrivée massive de militaires américains à Dakar qui améliorèrent la situation alimentaire sans pour autant endiguer la pénurie qui, d'ailleurs, se poursuivra à bien au-delà du second conflit mondial.

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**Kaleidoscope of War and Peace: City of Valetta and the
Mediterranean in the 20th Century**

Nobuyoshi ITO (Japan)

Abstract

Throughout the course of history, every city has witnessed various human activities, including wars and conflicts. Taking it into account that the human history is, to a considerable extent, the history of military affairs, the city, where large numbers of people gather to lead their social lives, has become the arena and even targets of wars and conflicts. In particular, with the progress of urbanization in the modern world, battles over the city have seriously influenced the consequence of war. At the same time, however, the existence of the city has also been linked to the dynamism for peace, such as diplomatic negotiations and civil movements. In this way, through the perspective of the city, historians can extract the human and social aspects of war and peace.

Keeping the above context in mind, this paper focuses on Valletta, capital of Malta, and examines the history of the 20th century through the perspective of the city. As an island nation in the Mediterranean, Malta has been inextricably linked to the history of warfare and statecraft in the broader region. After the reign of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, in the 19th century Malta came under the rule of the British Empire. Valletta had its natural port, the Grand Harbour, and the usefulness of the port for the Royal Navy made the city positioned as the headquarters of the Mediterranean Fleet. Therefore, centred to Valletta, Malta obtained its strategic importance for the British Empire in the Mediterranean.

This paper also argues that the experience of Valletta and Malta in the 20th century typically overlaps with the history of war and peace. Malta played an important role in the First World War, in which the Imperial Japanese Navy was also heavily involved. During the interwar period, the island was the subject of power struggles between the imperial powers, mainly the British Empire and Fascist Italy. In the Second World War, the severe siege and heavy air raids against Malta by the Axis powers caused great casualties, mainly in Valletta, but

the heroic resistance of the islanders led to the winning through the Great Siege and victory in the Mediterranean Theatre. The post-war era was engulfed in a torrent of the Cold War and decolonisation, with Malta becoming one of the focal points. Valletta has also been the arena for diplomacy and peace negotiations, witnessing non-aligned movements, meetings in relation to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and the US-Soviet summit that led to the end of the Cold War. In that sense, this historic city and island in the central Mediterranean, which went through the most tempestuous periods in history, can be symbolised as a kaleidoscope of the 20th century.

Introduction

In all times and places, human beings have performed their activities more or less concentratedly. Development of every city has been deeply affected by these human activities, ranging over political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Above all, the human history has been inseparable from sanguinary elements of war, with the situation surrounding the city no exception. In addition, to a considerable extent, it can be said, the history of military affairs has been centre of world history.

Therefore, as large numbers of people have gathered to lead their social lives, the city has become the arena of fighting and conflicts, and it has even been one of the major targets of warfare. The progress of urbanisation in the modern world has made battles over the city vitally influence the course of war. However, the existence of the city has also been connected to the dynamism for peace: we can find lots of diplomatic negotiations and civil movements named after the specific city. Through the perspective of the city, historians can extract richer human and social aspects of war and peace.

With the above context in mind, this paper focuses on the city of Valletta, capital of Malta,¹ and tries to examine the brief history of the 20th century from the lens of the city. The characteristic of Malta as an island nation in the Mediterranean has inextricably connected it to the history of warfare and statecraft in the broader region. In the 19th century, Malta came under the rule of

¹ For the basic information of the city, see Lino Bianco, "Valletta: A city in history," *Melita Theologica*, vol. 60, no. 2 (2009).

Britain, and the national port of Valletta, the Grand Harbour, brought about the unique role of the city as a strategic base of the British naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. So, the city of Valletta embraced its vital importance to maintain the British imperial defence in the broader region.

This paper then argues the experience of Valletta and Malta in the 20th century, which overlaps with the history of war and peace. Malta played its important role during the two world wars. During the First World War, the Imperial Japanese Navy was also heavily involved in the Mediterranean affairs. The interwar period witnessed the imperial power struggle over Malta, mainly between the British Empire and Fascist Italy. And in the Second World War, while the Axis powers executed heavy air raids against Malta, which caused great casualties especially in Valletta, the islanders developed their heroic resistance, leading to victory in the Mediterranean Theatre.

Besides, the post-war era highlighted Valletta's unique characteristics more and more. Worldwide development of the Cold War and decolonisation inevitably affected Malta. These circumstances made Valletta the arena of not only tough negotiations over conflicting issues but also of peace activities, which in turn resulted in the end of the Cold War. Thus, it would be meaningful to survey the course of history of Valletta in the modern world, especially from the perspective of war and peace. This paper, relying on the broader preceding works on the modern history referring to Valletta and Malta,² attempts to shed new light on this historic city at the centre of the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, since the central area of the city is at just 0.61 square kilometres and the Functional Urban Area covers the whole island, this paper will deal with Valletta and Malta interchangeably within the context.

1. Valletta and the Mediterranean in the Modern Age

Throughout the European history, the Mediterranean has been an arena of human activities, including many wars and conflicts. Located in the centre of

² See such as Peter Elliot, *The Cross and the Ensign: A Naval History of Malta 1798-1979* (London: Granada Publishing, 1982); Robert Holland, *Blue-Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

this Great Sea,³ the island of Malta has also shared these historical events. As the later capital of Malta, *la Citta Valletta* was named after Jean de Valette, the Grand Master of the Order of Malta, who succeeded in defending the island against the invasion by Ottoman Empire during the Great Siege in 1565.⁴ The Order of Malta also sent their ships to the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and continued to reign the island until the end of the 18th century.

In July 1798, the French headed by Napoleon Bonaparte landed Malta and occupied the island until 1800, but they were soon ousted by the revolutionaries supported by Britain. Then Malta was incorporated into the British Empire and became the Crown Colony in 1813, which determined the course of events surrounding the island in the subsequent centuries.⁵

In the 19th century, the British Empire reached its climax known as *Pax Britannica* and enjoyed its naval hegemony.⁶ Especially, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the establishment of the Empire Route to India, largest and most important colony, gave the Mediterranean an even greater strategic importance. Besides, the role of the Royal Navy in supporting imperial interests in the region connected bases laying the foundation for Britain's military interests.⁷

It was in this context that Malta obtained the decisive position in the Mediterranean. The naval arsenal on Malta symbolised the British military presence in the region. Throughout the British colonial rule, the Grand Harbour functioned as a strategic point for the Royal Navy and as the home port of the

³ David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

⁴ Definitely, a masterpiece that discusses the theme from the broader perspective would be Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2^e éd. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966).

⁵ Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, esp. chaps. 1-2.

⁶ As a classic work on the British naval hegemony, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Penguin, 2017). See also Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

⁷ Paul Caruana-Galizia, "Strategic colonies and economic development: real wages in Cyprus, Gibraltar, and Malta, 1836-1913," *The Economic History Review*, vol. 68, no. 4 (2015), pp. 1250-1276.

Mediterranean Fleet.⁸ The fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet was a particularly prestigious post in the Royal Navy suggested the overwhelming importance of Malta above all.⁹

At that time, Britain was also a central actor in the European international relations.¹⁰ In the Mediterranean, the historic rivalry unfolded between Britain and its long-time opponent, France. Political and military tensions with Russia also arose frequently within the context of the Eastern Question concerning the Ottoman Empire. In addition, especially from the latter half of the 19th century, the growth of emerging powers such as Germany and Italy could not be overlooked. Even though its national power gradually declined, Britain continued to view the Mediterranean as a cornerstone of its imperial presence. Thus, the city of Valletta and the island of Malta remained the core of the British interests in the region, which would last the era of world wars in the following century.

2. Valletta and Two World Wars

(1) The First World War

During the First World War, the Mediterranean deservedly became one of the most crucial foci in the European naval warfare. As a base of Anglo-French allies in the region, Valletta and the Grand Harbour acquired particular importance.¹¹ At the same time, off the coast of Malta frequently broke out the naval battles and the large number of wounded so which made the island known as “the Nurse of the Mediterranean,” due to the large number of wounded soldiers who were accommodated in Malta.¹²

Within the context, the Imperial Japanese Navy also took part in the Mediterranean theatre of operations. The basis of Japanese entry into the theatre

⁸ Carmel Vassallo, “Servants of Empire: The Maltese in the Royal Navy,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, vol.16, no. 1-2 (2006), pp. 273-289.

⁹ Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 334.

¹⁰ In respect to European international affairs and British diplomacy in the 19th century, see A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch (eds.), *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, Three Volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1923).

¹¹ Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, pp. 147-148.

¹² “Malta earns the title ‘nurse of the Mediterranean’,” *Times of Malta*, 16 November 2014.

was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, originally signed in 1902. After the Russo-Japanese War, the focus of the renewed treaty shifted towards Germany, and the outbreak of the Great War had a great influence on the alliance.¹³ Britain repeatedly requested that Japan should send its naval units to counter the threat of Central Powers in the Mediterranean. Japan finally decided to comply the British request in February 1917, and the newly created *Dai-ni Tokumu Kantai* (2nd Special Squadron) departed to the Mediterranean on 18 February.¹⁴

The Squadron arrived at Malta on 16 April, when the Central Powers practiced their unrestricted submarine warfare most aggressively. Thus, based on Malta, the squadron commended by Admiral Kozo Sato was charged with the important and severe task of escorting Allied shipping in the theatre.¹⁵ Ships belonging to the unit carried out their mission very well, accompanying nearly 800 Allied ships and transporting 70,000 troops. One of the highlights of their operations was the rescue of the passengers of British transport SS *Transylvania*, torpedoed off the Gulf of Genoa, saving almost 3,000 people.¹⁶ The British War Cabinet concluded that “the escort of two Japanese torpedo-boat destroyers” was “handled with great skill and gallantry,” to succeed in picking up the majority of the survivors.¹⁷ On 11 June 1917, one of the unit, destroyer *Sakaki*, was torpedoed and badly damaged by Austro-Hungarian submarine off the coast of Crete, resulting in 59 deaths and 15 injuries.¹⁸ For all these heavy casualties, the

¹³ On Anglo-Japanese military cooperation including the Mediterranean during the First World War, see Timothy D. Saxon, “Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation 1914-1918,” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 53, no. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 62-92.

¹⁴ Yoichi Hiram, “Rising Sun in the Mediterranean: The Second Special Squadron, 1917-1918,” *Il Mediterraneo quale Elemento del Potere Marittimo* (Roma: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1998), pp. 43-45.

¹⁵ “Chichu-kai, Indo-yo, Taisei-yo ni okeru Jokyo, Taisho 6 nen (3) [Situation in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean (3), 1917],” Kaigun Gunrei-bu/Dai 2 Tokumu Kantai Shirei-kan [Naval General Staff Office/Commander, 2nd Special Squadron], 1 February 1917 to 22 May 1917, in *Kobun Biko* [Notes of the Official Documents], Kaigun-sho [Ministry of the Navy], Kaigunsho-Nichidoku-T3-284, National Institute for Defense Studies [NIDS], available at Japan Center for Asian Historical Records [JACAR], Ref. C10080598300.

¹⁶ Hiram, “Rising Sun in the Mediterranean,” p. 46; Saxon, “Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation 1914-1918,” p. 80.

¹⁷ WC 133, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, 7 May 1917, CAB 23/2, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, London [TNA].

¹⁸ “Taisho 6 nen 6 gatsu 11 nichi Dai 11 Kuchiku-tai Dai 1 Shotai (*Matsu, Sakaki*) Sento Shoho [11th Destroyer Flotilla, 1st Platoon (*Matsu, Sakaki*), Detailed Battle Report, June 11, 1917],” Dai

2nd Special Squadron accomplished their mission until July 1919. This achievement led to the improvement of the Japanese reputation, which also influenced Japan's position in the international relations after the war.

Over 100 years later, the memory of the Japanese Imperial Navy which played its active role in the Mediterranean during the Great War remains in Malta. The Japanese sailors who died in the Mediterranean — most of the entombed were killed in the attack on *Sakaki* — lay buried at the Kalkara Naval Cemetery, overlooking the Grand Harbour, and there can be found the cenotaph of them. Therefore, the historical tie between the Mediterranean and the Far East, however restrictive, lies in the experience of Imperial Japanese Navy during the Great War.¹⁹

(2) From the Interbellum to the Second World War

After the First World War, Britain still managed to retain its power to deal with both Europe and the empire, although its politico-military capacity declined visibly. Since the imperial defence had vital significance for the defence of Britain itself, especially in the 1920s, successive British governments pursued active diplomacy toward the European continent and sought effective commitment.²⁰ Despite these measures, the European international order was seriously shaken in the 1930s by the rise of Nazi Germany. Besides, inter-state disputes over colonies also intensified, forcing Britain to take difficult decisions. In the Mediterranean, the expansionist policies of Fascist Italy were directed not only at North Africa but also at Britain's strategic positions, namely Malta.²¹

2 Tokumu Kantai Shirei-bu [Headquarter, 2nd Special Squadron], 27 June 1917, in *Kobun Biko*, Kaigun-sho, Kaigunsho-Nichidoku-T3-34, NIDS, available at JACAR, Ref. C10080080400.

¹⁹ "Malta and the Imperial Japanese Navy's Second Special Squadron in WWI," *Times of Malta*, 21 May 2017. In addition, the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Malta and offered a wreath at a memorial monument in the cemetery in May 2017. "Visit to Malta," May 27, 2017, Prime Minister's Office of Japan.

<https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201705/27article2.html> [accessed 20 July 2023]

²⁰ John W. Young, *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century* (London: Arnold, 1997), chap. 4; David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 2000), chap. 5; John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System 1830-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chap. 10.

²¹ Douglas Austin, *Malta and British Strategic Policy 1925-43* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Henry Frendo, *Europe and Empire: Culture, Politics and Identity in Malta and the Mediterranean (1912-1946)* (Santa Venera: Midsea Books, 2012). See also Alexis Rappas, "The Transnational

Furthermore, Germany dictated by Adolf Hitler, whose ambitions spanned globally, would ultimately clash with Britain. Therefore, during the Second World War, the Mediterranean inevitably became critical for the British imperial defence as a key area on the Empire Route.

In the fierce battles that followed, Britain confronted the Axis powers in the Mediterranean Theatre, which was essential to connect the European and North African fronts. Situated in the centre of the Mediterranean, the presence of Malta was extremely vital by both the Allied and Axis powers, partly because it was in a strategic place for maritime transport. Malta was in a prime location for the Allies to interrupt the Axis powers' supplies to North Africa; the latter sought to take control of Malta to deter from the former's intention. Under these circumstances, the island became the focal point of the Mediterranean Theatre.²²

Wary of the war, the Royal Navy had already moved the base of the Mediterranean Fleet from Malta to Alexandria in the latter half of the 1930s. But after the war had broken out, as the German Luftwaffe was sent to Sicily, the city of Valletta and its main port, the Grand Harbour, became targets of heavy air raids. The local forces fought back bravely, and in London, the Prime Minister Winston Churchill stressed the need to maintain a strong air defence posture.²³ Unique to Malta, the locals cooperated resolutely with the British forces: some kind of solidarity was formed, sharing a sense of crisis that transcended the ruler-ruled relationships of the colonial empire. This strong unity between the two sides further highlighted the standing of Malta during the war.²⁴

Formation of Imperial Rule on the Margins of Europe: British Cyprus and the Italian Dodecanese in the Interwar Period," *European History Quarterly*, vol. 45, no. 3 (July 2015), pp. 467-505. On the origin of the Second World War in the Mediterranean, Reynolds M. Salerno, *Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-1940* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

²² Much of the following section is based on the author's preceding article. Nobuyoshi Ito, "British Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean during the Second World War: Focusing on the Battle of Crete and the Siege of Malta," *Security & Strategy*, vol. 3 (January 2023), esp. pp. 136-140.

²³ WM (41) 8th Conclusions, 20 January 1941, CAB 65/17, TNA.

²⁴ The Catholic Church played a large role in mobilising people and many residents reportedly participated in the dangerous work of repairing the airfield runway. Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, pp. 217-218, 253-254; Anastasia Yiangou, "The Political Impact of World War II on Cyprus and Malta," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2014), pp. 106-107.

Nevertheless, as the Siege of Malta by the Axis powers intensified, the island faced increasingly serious fuel and supply shortages which hampered aircraft reinforcements.²⁵ After the fall of Crete in June 1941,²⁶ air raids on Malta as the next target became much fiercer. Coinciding with the intensification of the offensive on the North African front, the battle on Malta entered a critical phase that would determine the course of the Mediterranean Theatre. In 1942, the Axis strengthened their offensive campaign, creating an even more dire situation for Malta. Land forces and submarines based on Malta were no longer able to withstand the intense bombardment by the Axis and were forced to retreat to Gibraltar and other places.²⁷ The Allied powers had a growing concern regarding the defence capabilities of Malta, and the British War Cabinet struggled to address them.²⁸

Whether Malta could be adequately resupplied and readied for the offensive was regarded as affecting no less the island's survival than Britain's position in the Mediterranean Theatre and, by extension, the fate of the Allies.²⁹ On 15 April 1942, King George VI of Britain conferred the Award of the George Cross on people of Malta in recognition of their sustained struggle and endurance. As the most pressing issue, several supply operations to Malta were carried out, but they failed miserably in June 1942. This meant that the success or failure of the subsequent operation was vital to the fate of the island. The Royal Navy planned the largest transport operation from Gibraltar to Malta, named

²⁵ From Foreign Office [FO] to Cairo, Telegram No. 722, 14 March 1941, CAB 65/22, TNA.

²⁶ As for the battle of Crete, Stephen Prince, "Air power and evacuations: Crete 1941," in Ian Speller (ed.), *The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 67-87; David Stubbs, "Reappraising the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Defense of Crete, 1941," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 84, no. 2 (April 2020), pp. 459-486. Also see Heinz A. Richter, *Operation Merkur: Die Eroberung der Insel Kreta im Mai 1941* (Ruhpolding: Verlag Franz Phillip Rutzen, 2011).

²⁷ I.S.O. Playfair, *The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III (September 1941 to September 1942): British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb* (London: HMSO, 1960), chap. 7.

²⁸ Minute from Eden (Foreign Secretary) to Attlee (Lord Privy Seal), 13 January 1942, B/651, FO 954/14, TNA.

²⁹ Confidential Annex, WM (42) 24th Conclusions, Minute 1, 25 February 1942, CAB 65/29, TNA. See also Greg Kennedy, "Sea denial, interdiction and diplomacy: The Royal Navy and the role of Malta, 1939-1943," in Ian Speller (ed.), *The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 58-59.

Operation Pedestal, in July 1942.³⁰ At that time, the most urgent commodity apart from food was oil, but the Royal Navy was unable to furnish tankers large enough to meet Malta's needs and fast enough to sail with the convoy. It was therefore decided that the United States would provide the tanker SS *Ohio* owned by Texaco. Although an intense Axis attack was fully expected, the Chiefs of Staff acknowledged the exceptional urgency of the operation and Churchill asked the War Cabinet members to firmly support whatever decision was taken.³¹

A convoy of transport ships escorted by the support fleet of the Royal Navy, under heavy Axis attacks, sought to enter a port on Malta from 11 to 13 August.³² Though the convoy suffered significant losses, four transport ships succeeded in delivering valuable supplies to Malta and the tanker *Ohio* also managed to arrive in the Grand Harbour on the morning of 15 August. Crowds that gathered in the harbour waved and cheered, and a brass band played the patriotic song "Rule, Britannia" to welcome the ship. For the Maltese people, the arrival of *Ohio* was truly the "Miracle of Santa Maria".³³

The successful operation provided a foothold for turning the situation around in the Mediterranean Theatre. The report submitted shortly after the completion of the operation emphasised that many lives were lost in the operation but the memory of their conduct "will remain an inspiration to all who were privileged to sail with them".³⁴ In this way, the Operation Pedestal was remembered as a symbolic event in the Mediterranean Theatre and the history of Malta during the war.

³⁰ For more information on the operation, Milan Vego, "Major Convoy Operation to Malta, 10-15 August 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL)," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 63, no. 1 (Winter 2010), pp. 107-153.

³¹ Minutes of COS (42) 223rd Meeting, 31 July 1942, CAB 79/22, TNA; Confidential Annex, WM (48) 101st Conclusions, Minute 1, 1 August 1942, CAB 65/31, TNA.

³² Regarding the overview of the operation and the evolution of the battles, see WP (42) 360 (Also COS (42) 373), Weekly Résumé (No. 154) of the Naval, Military and Air Situation, 13 August 1942, CAB 66/27, TNA.

³³ Vego, "Major Convoy Operation to Malta, 10-15 August 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL)," pp. 137-142; Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, pp. 259-260.

³⁴ Report on Operation "Pedestal" by Vice-Admiral E.N. Syfret, August 25, 1942, *The London Gazette*, Supplement, No. 38377, 10 August 1948, p. 4505.

3. Valletta in the Post-war Era

(1) Under the Shadow of the Cold War

The post-war world soon witnessed a new significant antagonism of the Cold War, mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, especially in the early stage, the British imperial interests also played a considerable role. Although its politico-military capability and presence were seriously decreased due to the two world wars, Britain still retained its dependent territories, colonies, and sphere of influence around the world. Particularly, the Eastern Mediterranean was one of the focal points: the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which led to the entry of Greece and Turkey into the Western alliance in 1952 and set out the Cold War confrontation in the region, originated from the British request, that the US should assume the burden to defend Greece against the Soviet aggression.³⁵

The stability of the Mediterranean was also vital to the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the allies sought to control the security in the region, and Britain recognised this issue as a matter of national prestige. When NATO discussed the creation of a naval force in charge of the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy found its new role for the Mediterranean Fleet. In December 1952, an agreement was reached to establish the NATO Mediterranean Command, commanded by the officer of the Royal Navy, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. The headquarter of the Command was based on Malta, and thus the British naval and air bases in the Mediterranean were made available to the allies.³⁶ This meant that Valletta and the Grand Harbour had significant and symbolic importance for

³⁵ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 121-127, 142-146; Svetozar Rajak, "The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 203-208.

³⁶ However, the US Navy's Sixth Fleet was outside the jurisdiction of the headquarter. MC 0038/3, Report by the Standing Group to the North Atlantic Military Committee, "Command Organization for the Mediterranean," 5 December 1952, NATO Archives, Brussels. Also see Dionysios Chourchoulis, "High Hopes, Bold Aims, Limited Results: Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950-1953," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. 20, no. 3 (2009), pp. 434-452.

the geographic and functional consideration, and the facility in the island also gained the new role for the Western alliance within the context of the Cold War. Malta continued to be the focus on the strategic competition in the southern region of the European continent, but the expectation that the island would keep its stability under the Western superiority did not last long – another factor in the post-war international order would soon influence Valletta.

(2) The Impact of Decolonisation

Another major trend of the latter half of the 20th century was the end of the European colonial empires. In many cases, the process of decolonisation followed the intense anti-colonial movements, insurgencies, and independence wars. At first, European states regarded these phenomena as the challenge against their interests and often adopted the measures of counterinsurgency. The rise of worldwide anti-colonialism, however, deprived them of the legitimacy and morality to maintain their colonies, finally resulting in the eventual decolonisation in Asia and Africa.

Naturally, as the largest colonial empire in the modern world, Britain was not extraneous to the stream of decolonisation.³⁷ Within this context, the city of Valletta and the island of Malta also experienced the cataclysmic post-colonial period.³⁸ Although the British and Maltese people survived the siege during the Second World War, the subsequent rush towards decolonisation reached the island as well. The confusion surrounding reconstruction of the socio-political order led to the declaration of a state of emergency, deprivation of autonomy, and a reversal to direct rule.³⁹ Under these circumstances, in the 1950s the local authority tried to achieve Malta's "integration" with Britain, but this initiative

³⁷ The author once argued the issue in relation to decolonisation. Nobuyoshi Ito, "Beyond the "master-narrative" of decolonisation: Reconsidering the end of empires in the 20th century," *ACTA 2021, Independence Wars since the XVIII Century: XLVI International Congress of Military History (29 August-3 September 2021, Athens), Volume 2* (Athens: Hellenic National Defense General Staff, Hellenic Commission of Military History, 2022), pp. 319-335.

³⁸ There are only a few works that deal with Malta's road to independence, such classic contributions as Dennis Austin, *Malta and the End of Empire* (London: Frank Cass, 1971); Victor Mallia-Milanes (ed.), *The British Colonial Experience 1800-1964: The Impact on Maltese Society* (Msida: Mireva Publications, 1988).

³⁹ *British Documents on the End of Empire [BDEE], Series B, Volume 11: Malta*, pp. xxxv-xxxix.

mercilessly failed.⁴⁰ After that, the momentum to independence rose more and more in the Maltese people, and Britain was forced to deal with difficulties.⁴¹

Finally, Malta gained independence in 1964, but Britain continued to hold its military presence on the island such as the dockyard at the Grand Harbour and concluded mutual defence and economic agreements, which would persistently enable the British and NATO forces to use facilities on Malta.⁴² On the other hand, since Britain also sought to reduce its military presence stationed in Malta due to the financial consideration, the newly independent Maltese government fiercely resisted this movement. The conflict over the British military commitment to Malta, at that stage, resulted in the former's successive concessions which prioritised not deteriorating relations with the latter.⁴³

In the 1960s, however, the decline of Britain's global politico-military influence proved to be inevitable. Gradual reduction of forces in the Mediterranean was also irreversible within the British government.⁴⁴ As a symbolic event, permanent station of the Royal Navy on Malta finally departed from the region: the Mediterranean Fleet was to be dismantled.⁴⁵ Despite the

⁴⁰ Simon C. Smith, "Integration and Disintegration: The Attempted Incorporation of Malta into the United Kingdom in the 1950s," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol. 35, no. 1 (March 2007), pp. 49-71.

⁴¹ On the issues concerning Malta's independence and its aftermath, see Simon C. Smith, "Conflict and Co-operation: Dom Mintoff, Giorgio Borg Olivier and the End of Empire in Malta," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1 (2007), pp. 115-134; Simon C. Smith, "Dependence and Independence: Malta and the End of Empire," *Journal of Maltese History*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2008), pp. 33-47.

⁴² Parliamentary Command Paper, Cmnd. 3110, *Agreement on Mutual Defence and Assistance between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Malta*, 21 September 1964; Cmnd. 3111, *Agreement on Financial Assistance between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Malta*, 21 September 1964.

⁴³ For example, *BDEE, Series B, Volume 11*, nos. 239, 240. See also Smith, "Dependence and Independence," p. 45.

⁴⁴ Letter from Hohler (Assistant Under-Secretary, FO) to Murray (Athens), "Britain and the Eastern Mediterranean," 23 February 1967, FCO 9/5, TNA.

⁴⁵ On this, see also Nobuyoshi Ito, "Britain and the Dissolution of the Mediterranean Fleet: Convergence of the End of Empire and Alliance Management," *Briefing Memo*, NIDS, January 2021.

strong opposition by the Maltese side,⁴⁶ the process was carried out steadily. On 5 June 1967, Admiral Sir John Hamilton hauled down his naval ensign as the last Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. The fleet, which had a decorated history in the Royal Navy for centuries, ended its role here.⁴⁷ The Admiralty House, the residence of successive Commander-in-Chiefs, located in Valletta, would later be remodeled into the National Museum of Fine Arts.⁴⁸ The main force of the Royal Navy quietly disappeared from the Mediterranean which had supported the British naval mastery.

The concurrent British decision to withdraw from east of Suez in January 1968 had a further impact on the deployment of British forces on Malta. The island then began to shed the remnants of British colonial rule in the 1970s. For Britain, the early abandonment of military facilities was not envisioned, and thus the Conservative government headed by Edward Heath offered Malta a new financial aid of £5 million annually.⁴⁹ However, as a result of the general election in June 1971, the Maltese Labour Party won by one seat, and its leader Dom Mintoff was inaugurated as the new Prime Minister. Mintoff had experienced the disastrous failure of “integration” in 1950s, making him proselytised to the formidable anti-British politician. He insisted on the eliminating NATO facilities and increasing the British financial aid, which was just “compensation” for military installations on the island.⁵⁰

Suddenly, Valletta became the scene of tough negotiation between Britain and Malta. Initial talks ended up exposing the conflict between the two governments. The British defence secretary, 6th Baron Carrington, reported as follows:

⁴⁶ DP 23/67 (Final), Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, “Command Structure in the Mediterranean Area,” 9 May 1967, DEFE 25/243, TNA.

⁴⁷ Afterwards, the position of Commander-in-Chief was changed to a two-star ranking in which the Flag Officer Malta served as Commander of NATO’s Southeast Mediterranean Command, under the Allied Forces Southern Europe based in Naples, with the position subordinate to a commander of the US Navy.

⁴⁸ Elliot, *The Cross and the Ensign*, pp. 224-225.

⁴⁹ Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life: My Autobiography* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), p. 498.

⁵⁰ For Mintoff, what Britain had paid to Malta was nothing more than “charity.” DOP (71) 35, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, “Malta,” 23 June 1971, CAB 148/116, TNA.

I pointed out that it was illogical to ask for more money and at the same time to say that our facilities should be reduced or restricted. At this Mintoff became angry, saying that the amount was peanuts compared with our expenditure on such things as nuclear weapons.⁵¹

Likewise, the British High Commissioner in Valletta despatched a telegram saying “the first 40 minutes consisted only of sparring” at the bilateral talk on the next morning.⁵² Britain had to deal with Mintoff’s repeated unreasonable demands ever since so that it asked for moral and financial support from its NATO and Western allies. However, the response to the British requirement was generally negative.⁵³ Thus, without allied active assistance, Britain was forced to carry out a series of barren negotiation with Mintoff.

Heath government became annoyed at Mintoff’s incoherent and unpredictable arguments and gradually began considering that the British military presence and facilities on Malta should be abandoned rather than submission to the unreasonable demands.⁵⁴ Raucous controversy continued over 9 months, and in March 1972, as a result of the belated US mediation,⁵⁵ the new Anglo-Maltese defence agreement was just barely concluded. The renewed agreement provided that Britain and NATO would pay total £20 million to Malta annually, and all military facilities and troops would be withdrawn from the island 7 years later.⁵⁶ It meant that the British imperial and post-colonial presence in Malta would be lost by 1979, which would inevitably and directly affect NATO’s strategy in the Mediterranean due to the loss of military arsenal in the

⁵¹ Watson (Valletta) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO], Telno 498, 20 July 1971, PREM 15/521, TNA.

⁵² Watson to FCO, Telno 501, 20 July 1971, FCO 9/1426, TNA.

⁵³ For example, *Documents diplomatiques français 1971, tome II, 1^{er} juillet - 31 décembre, n° 38; Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1971, Band III: 1. Oktober bis 31. Dezember 1971*, Dok. 387.

⁵⁴ See such as CP (72) 4, Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, “Malta: Draft White Paper,” 10 January 1972, CAB 129/161, TNA; CM (72) 1st Conclusions, 11 January 1972, CAB 128/50, TNA.

⁵⁵ Note for the Record, “Malta: Defence Secretary’s Meeting,” 14 February 1972, FCO 9/1548, TNA; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Volume XLI: Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972*, doc. 246.

⁵⁶ Cmnd. 4943, *Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Malta with respect to the Use of Military Facilities in Malta*, 26 March 1972. See also Smith, “Dependence and Independence,” p. 47.

region. In this way, the remnants of the British Empire were to fade away from Valletta and the Grand Harbour at the end of the 1970s.

(3) Arena for Peace: Valletta from Détente to the Malta Summit

After the confounded conflict between Britain and Malta, the latter developed more independent and multi-layered diplomacy, mainly within the non-aligned strategy.⁵⁷ Mintoff tried to find a new way to become a neutral actor for Malta's survival as a nation-state. At the same period, in Europe had come an opportunity for rapprochement between the Western and Eastern Europe, namely European détente, simultaneously with the US-Soviet relations.⁵⁸ Under these circumstances, Mintoff advanced his peculiar style of diplomacy, which also largely disturbed the European international relations in the era of détente.

With regard to the multilateral diplomatic efforts on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Malta played a critical role as well.⁵⁹ As the question of security in the Mediterranean were raised since 1973, the Maltese delegation stuck to the full participation of Arab Mediterranean states, because their "security was closely dependent on the security of these countries." Coincidentally, there occurred a number of conflicts and confusing situations in the broader region ranging from North Africa to Near East, mainly due to the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the claim of Valletta obtained a certain degree of persuasion.⁶⁰ Malta also asserted that some kind of solidarity among the former colonies existed. The Maltese ambassador then threatened that unless his claims were accepted, he would "block consensus on all the Helsinki recommendations," which meant one of the CSCE's basic principles might never be achieved. Eventually, the issue on the Mediterranean highlighted the

⁵⁷ Paul Caruana Galizia, *The Economy of Modern Malta: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 251-253.

⁵⁸ As for the brief history of détente, especially from the perspective of American Cold War strategy, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013).

⁵⁹ The following description on the CSCE negotiations mainly relies on Nicolas Badalassi, "Sea and Détente in Helsinki: The Mediterranean Stake of the CSCE, 1972-1975," in Elena Calandri, Daniele Caviglia and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), esp. pp. 64-66.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

negotiations toward the final accord of the CSCE by the ultimatum by Valletta.

While Malta finally agreed to the Helsinki recommendations, Mintoff again assumed his demands during the negotiations in Geneva from September 1973 to July 1975. On 11 September 1973, he indicated that Malta would withdraw from the military structure of NATO, which clarified his tendency to reduce Western presence in Malta and to approach the non-aligned world more and more. The Cyprus crisis in summer 1974 further enhanced the gravity of the Mediterranean security,⁶¹ which deeply related to confidence-building measures as one of the CSCE's main principles. For Valletta, a series of events proved that "the only ways to reinforce confidence were dissolution of the military bloc, disarmament, and independence of Europe from both superpowers" and measures should be complemented by a Euro-Arab organisation. This brought about the US and Soviet embarrassment, and both tried to let the European Community take the initiative in the issue of the Mediterranean. Accidentally, the Mediterranean became the region where the integrated Europe could "demonstrate their ability to ease tensions," which was the contingent result of the irregular actions by Valletta.

In the Helsinki Final Act concluded in August 1975, the Mediterranean was specially referred to as the independent section, known as the "Mediterranean Declaration."⁶² Still, Mintoff strongly asserted that the Mediterranean should be the frontline of détente, and he actively repeated his claim on the peace in the region. From February to March 1979, the CSCE's expert meeting on the Mediterranean, was held in Valletta within the follow-up process, and Malta played an influential role as a host nation. For other participants, the outcome in Valletta would be important for the continuity of the CSCE, especially relating to the ongoing meeting in Belgrade and to the future

⁶¹ On the 1974 Cyprus crisis, large numbers of works have been accumulated. For example, Jan Asmussen, *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008); Andreas Constandinos, *The Cyprus Crisis: Examining the Role of the British and American Governments during 1974* (Drakes Circus: University of Plymouth Press, 2012).

⁶² Conference on Security Co-operation in Europe [CSCE], "Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean," *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act* (Helsinki, 1 August 1975), pp. 36-37.

meeting in Madrid.⁶³ At the meeting of experts in Valletta, the Maltese delegation mentioned that “for centuries the Mediterranean region has been the scene of successive hostilities” fought by varying protagonists and asserted the importance of broader cooperation in the region.⁶⁴ Economic, social, and cultural dimensions were primarily concluded, and the meeting as a whole went safely and sound. Confidence-building measures of the CSCE also favourably functioned, as far as the above issues concerned.⁶⁵

After that, Belgrade follow-up meeting from 1977 to 1979 would bear little fruits due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On the other hand, successive Madrid follow-up meeting in the early 1980s, faced with the Polish crisis and many difficulties, would manage to succeed in keeping the channels between the East and West.⁶⁶ Within these contexts, the expert meeting in Valletta was placed in the peculiar precedent of the CSCE process after Helsinki.

Then, in the end of the 1980s, Malta was to symbolise another epoch in the 20th century. The US-Soviet summit of 1989 was held in Malta,⁶⁷ and leaders of two superpowers, the US President George H.W. Bush and the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, declared the end of the Cold War lasted over 40 years on the island.⁶⁸ Malta summit constituted the memorial moment of the contemporary world, and thus Malta inscribed its name in the history of war and peace.

⁶³ Letter from Tait (Head of CSCE Unit, FCO) to Sands Smith (European Department, Ministry of Overseas Development), “CSCE: Valletta Meeting on Mediterranean Cooperation,” 3 January 1979, FCO 28/3962, TNA.

⁶⁴ Background Paper, “Outline of Current Action on the Protection of the Mediterranean Environment and the Need for Collaborative European Involvement,” Annex to Proposal by the Delegation of Malta, “Co-operation in the Protection of the Mediterranean Environment,” CSCE Meeting of Experts on the Mediterranean, Valletta, 13 February 1979, FCO 28/3964, TNA.

⁶⁵ Letter from Eldred (Floriana, Malta) to Tait, “CSCE Valletta Meeting,” 18 April 1979, FCO 9/3967, TNA.

⁶⁶ CSCE, *Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Co-operation in the Mediterranean* (Valletta, 26 March 1979).

⁶⁷ The Main venue was Birżebbuġa, 13 kilometres from Valletta.

⁶⁸ “Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta,” December 3, 1989, Public Papers, George Bush Presidential Library and Museum.

<<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/1291>> [accessed 30 July 2023]

Conclusion

This paper has briefly overviewed the modern history of Valletta, the island of Malta, as a Mediterranean city, mainly from the perspective of politico-military affairs surrounding the city, the island, and the region. Valletta's unique position, both historic and geographic, has provided the city with plenty of experiences concerning the modern warfare and international relations. In this paper, it has been expressed that Valletta has often been the centre of main epochs in the 20th century. The city happened to be present at the critical moments of war and peace, which might cover almost all topics on the international history in the modern times. Due to its importance located at the centre of the Mediterranean, Valletta was inevitably regarded as a strategic target in both the Great War and the Second World War, and not least in the interwar power struggles. Furthermore, in the post-war era, the city experienced the dynamic torrent of major topics that fully covered the globe. Progress of the Cold War doubtlessly affected Valletta's position as a strategic focal point in the Mediterranean, and at the same period, Malta's road to decolonisation and post-independence friction with Britain as its former suzerain state raised complicated issues, in which many stakeholders in Western Europe and the Atlantic alliance were involved. In the meantime, Valletta also conducted its unique foreign policy as a non-aligned state, leading to peace talks and finally providing the two superpowers with a place of the end of the Cold War. To a greater or lesser extent, of course, every city shares some kind of similar experiences in the modern history.⁶⁹ Even so, Valletta has distinctively shown a cataclysm of politico-military affairs and international relations in the 20th century.⁷⁰ The city has every dimension of humanity, like a kaleidoscope, which certainly distinguishes its uniqueness. Thus, the modern history of Valletta, a historic city on the Mediterranean island, teaches us polymorphous viewpoints of war and peace, which can enrich our understanding of the world.

⁶⁹ The comparison to such other islandic nation in the Mediterranean as Cyprus would be valuable. In this paper, Yiangou, "The Political Impact of World War II on Cyprus and Malta," shares the comparative viewpoint. Furthermore, see also Robert Holland, "Cyprus and Malta: Two Colonial Experiences," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2014), pp. 9-20.

⁷⁰ One can otherwise describe a course of the 20th century to be a "roller-coaster," as an eminent historian portrayed the European post-war history. Ian Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster: Europe, 1950-2017* (London: Allen Lane, 2018).

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**Waiting for Douhet. Italian Cities and Bombing
War in 2nd World War**

Paolo Formiconi (Italy)

The Italian air defence was equipped by a heterogeneous endowment. The aerophones, a sort of gigantic acoustic receivers, at whom were employed many blind, was the most part of the allarma system, joint with simple watchtowers.

Only until the 1841 Germany has given a short number of his first radiodector, named "Freya" like the pagan divinity who see in the night.

The allarm net were jointed with the airport command, under the Regia Aeronautica control, and with the command of Maca, the counter airplane artillery, under command of militia. At the same time were alerted the organization of civil protection, under the joint control of the War Ministry and the Internal affairs Minister.

Italian artillery had many models of gun, of unequal value. Some of these were from the Great War, many others were reduced in the following years and only a minor quote were modern.

Also in this context, the German contribution was not so bad, with eighteen modern guns of 88 mm.

All this complex system were coordinated by the "Sottocapo di Stato maggiore per la difesa territoriale" or Deputy Chief of General Staff for the Territorial Defence".

The first bombing, by French and British airplanes were not very hard, but underlined the poor efficiency of Italian air defence.

We should consider, joint to the weakness of Italian organization and weapons, also some objective factors. For the first, au contraire than Germany, Italy is exposed on the sea for an extra-long coast line, and this reduced the possibility to discover the air menace on time. On second, on the north-side, the

presence of the Alpes, overfliable during spring and summer months, didn't consent the complete employ of the radio-detectors. In final, the principal instrument of visualization of airplnese during the night-bombing, the spotlights, was not so effective as in the northern Europe. The italian night, infact, were normally not cloaked like germans one, and so the power of reflection of the light on the night sky was quite insignificant. Although the real damnages were not heavy, the impression produced by the impunish enemy offense was strong and, joint with the news about the first defeats on the African, naval and Balkan front, give to Mussolini's power a rough strike. The fact that the Taranto's attack were gained by airplnes completed the impression of a failure by the two fascism military creatures: the fascist militia and the air force.

Following the displacement of the first german air, naval and ground forces in Italy, also some counterairplane assetts were sended in italy at the start of 1941.

This modern weapons, significantly, were dislocated along the railwais itanaray, from Brennero to Naples, and on the Sicily's airports gived to German Luftflote.

The confront with the allied's material and praxis, and the massive production of the good italian counter airplane gun of 90 mm emproved the italian efficence, and whe the most part of german forces went away on the spring, sended to russian front, the italian spirit in the cities was a bit better than some months before.

The organization also augmented his structure and enlarged his competence during the war.

In the following months, enemy activity in the Italian skies was rare. Some isolated British aircraft or squadron carrying out a raid on an airfield or a night attack on a major city, with the sole aim of breaking the prestige of the fascist regime rather than any real military achievement.

This aspect, according with the memories of some italian peoples, is important. In the anglosaxon perspective the liability of italian people was strictly joint with the fascist consense, and the consense was the most important basement of the fascist power.

Touching or even just challenging Italian territory was therefore considered, in the absence of other possibilities, an effective system for corroding Italian solidity. However, along the war's course was in Axis favour, the real achieve of this strategy is on doubt. Only the poor cost of the attacks justify his prosecution in a moment of success of italo-german war.

Also when the US power start to show himself in the mediterranean aerea, and the first heavy daytime bombing began, the italian moral, according with the fascist information service reports, didn't substantially not falter.

Citie's defence was in this period emproved, as far as possible, following the marks of german siystem. Another model of radiodetector were sent to italian forces, and also an italian prototype comed in service, making a first half-efficent network. Also the organization was strongly emproved, with the creation of the Center command of air defence, leadered from air force officials. In end, all the system was subjected to the War Ministry.

The civilian side, led by the UNPA and the Air Defense Bureau, has not improved to the same degree, mainly due to the rather modest quality of personnel, and the low level of economic resources.

Only with the end of 1942 and expecially in the 1943 summer the air offensive, by US air force and british air force, on the italian territory become destructive and achieved those objectives that theorists of indiscriminate bombing had foreseen some years before.

The attaks striekd on first the great cities of the nord of the country, following, with increasing strongness and intensity, the citis of the south, on prevision of the invasion of the Peninsula. Napoli and Palermo were almost destroyed, althought the opposition of the italian air defence.

In the summer of 1943 the air attacks striked a great numbers of small cities of all the west-south, expecially in Sicily, with the strategic target of destroy the logistic capacity of italian railways, street and naval dooks.

In this period the italian air defence organization was quite efficent, expecially in the proximity defence, thanks to the excellent Breda machine gun of 20 mm, and almost 2/3 af all the casualties of the allied air force in Italy

between June 1940 and September 1943 has been in the months of June and July. The island was put back at the “stone age”, like a fascist leader wrote to Mussolini.

When Sicilian airports fall under Allied control the menace against Italian territory becomes terrible, and at the same time the power of the Italian Air Force, burned in the Sicily's battle, went to the lowest level. The bombing campaign of the months of July and, especially, in the second half of August, claimed the highest point of intensity.

Now the Anglo-American bomber could knock two times a day the nearest targets, and one a day the farthest ones, the US in the day and the Britons in the night, with the strike-power of 400/500 airplanes. Also the capital, Rome, were included as targets. Causing before the fall of the fascist government and, in a second time, the call for armistice of the subsequent Italian government.

To understand the real condition by the Italian side, know that all the Lombardy, the Italian most important industrial region, had, in all and for all, nine hunter airplanes, the Tuscany four, Rome and her interlands twenty-one and the Campania, the nearest region to the Allied bases, twenty-four.

At the same time, when the General Staff decided to reinforce Rome's anti-aircraft defense, the only solution, quickly achievable, was to use the modern 65 mm cannon, which had just been installed on the Aquila aircraft carrier, which was about to be completed. All without considering the problems that the fact involved, such as the different pointing and movement system, between sea and land.

The impossibility to defend Rome, and all the rest of big Italian cities, had a great importance in the decision to ask an armistice by the Italian government. The own Mussolini probably was thinking something like this, but he but he retained great faith in the assets of the German ally, the secret weapons, but especially the conventional one.

On the 19 of July he tried, and failed, to obtain a consistent of new airplanes, radiodetector and counter-airplane gun from Germany, and his not-fact was the primary cause of his fall. In front of the country, the upper class and the monarch he wasn't capable to win the war, to stop the war, to fight the war. So

he musted leave. This, it's right to note, was not the result of the bombing campaign against the Italian cities, but the result of the specific offensive against Rome, jointed with the defeated in Egypt, Russia, Tunisia and Sicily, appned subsequentially in the previous months. So, far from the hypothetic decisive factor supposed in the twenties, by italian and stranger military theorists, the air bombing weapon was resolute only as adjunctive element at the defeated of the ground forces, and his force of push on the civil moral, has been decisive only after the turning point of the war.

**Forest fighters in Urban Terrain – the Finnish Army
Recapturing Sortavala and Vyborg in 1941**

Pasi Tuunainen (Finland)

All through the ages Finns have primarily been forest fighters. It is the most typical operational environment for them since over 70% of their country was – and still is – covered by forests. In World War II battles against the Soviet Red Army Finns tried to avoid fighting in urban terrain. It was not difficult because the battlefields along the Russo-Finnish border areas were sparsely populated and there were just a few small urban centers.

Finland remained an independent nation, but it lost about 10% of its territory to the Soviet Union as a result of the Winter War (1939–1940). The ceded area included the provincial town of Sortavala and the city of Vyborg, then the second largest city of the country. In the summer of 1941, the Finnish Army joined the German invasion of the Soviet Union in order to recover the land area that they had lost the previous year. In these offensive operations the Finnish forces recaptured both Sortavala and Vyborg. In doing so, they attacked over a large area to isolate both population centers. The operations also included water crossings. Even though they mainly employed outflanking maneuvers through the adjacent forests to cut off the defending Soviet troops, Finns were at times tangled up in small-scale street fighting of which they had very little experience.

In this paper I analyze the planning and conduct of the above mentioned two urban warfare operations in the early stages of the so-called Finno-Soviet Continuation War (1941-944). I use official military documents and research literature to draw conclusions about Finnish Army practices and fighting performance in urban terrain at the tactical and, to some extent, operational level of war.

Sortavala was a small provincial town of some 10,000 people. It was founded in 1632 when the Swedish realm was at its largest. Sortavala is located on the north-eastern shore of Lake Ladoga, the largest inland lake in Europe.

There was a small air force base there in the 1930s. Sortavala was basically a educational and commercial town and in no way any key terrain.

In contrast, Vyborg was a fortified medieval city founded in 1293. With a population of almost 100,000 inhabitants it was big in a predominantly agrarian country. It was a major harbor and the largest garrison in the country. It had a great strategic importance as all the roads and railroads of the Karelian Isthmus between the Baltic Sea and Lake Ladoga, the main area of operation, converged there. As a result of the lost war both cities were annexed by the Soviet Union and today they are part of the Russian Federation.

Based on the peace agreement ending the Winter War in March 1940, Finland had handed over Sortavala to the Soviet authorities despite there not having been any fighting for its ownership. However, there had been fighting in Vyborg in the Finnish civil war of 1918 and again in March 1940, during the final days of the Winter War, Finns managed to stop the Red Army on the hilly terrain just south-east of the town. Yet according to Soviet/Russian historiography, Soviet troops took the city by storm. In June of 1944, the city fell very quickly. Lasse Laaksonen speaks about that disaster in his presentation.

The Finnish military had studied urban warfare already in the early 1920s but it was considered as a special environment and also a marginal matter for them until the late 1940s. For example, writings on the topic in Finnish military professional magazines are hard to find from the interwar period. Instead, the Finnish officer trainers emphasized the differences in Finnish conditions as compared to those in other parts of Europe. The Finnish forests and harsh weather conditions called for special kind of materiel and tactics. Finns understood at the time that the main value of an urban area was that troops can find shelter and that they can be billeted in buildings. Moreover, they knew the three-dimensional nature of built areas, and that buildings offered good cover and concealment from enemy fire and observation. The Finns had learned from others' experiences that fighting in urban areas was demanding and that it turned out to be a kind of attritional warfare. There was a need for proper planning, artillery preparation and the use of storm troop detachments.

Yet mentions of urban combat were few or they were left out from the Finnish interwar and wartime manuals. If there were sections on urban warfare

in manual literature, they were translated and copied from foreign manuals, normally from German manuals.

Those rare sections instructed that when protecting an urban environment they were to organize defenses in consecutive lines, preferably in front of the built-up area. In offense, by-pass movements were to be conducted. Penetrations into the built-up areas were to be started from the flanks and from the rear. Follow-up troops were to be tasked with destroying the enemy staying behind. Frontal assaults were to be used only as a last resort. In such cases the troops were to advance in the midst of buildings in a straight-forward manner. Still there was no urban combat training in the Finnish defense forces before the war. Actually, before World War II, some of the Finnish military authors argued that similar tactical principles and fighting methods could be applied to both forest and urban environments.

On August 8, 1941, three Finnish divisions were transferred to the newly established I Army Corps. Army Corps received orders to conduct a double-envelopment movement and push the Soviet forces against the shore of Lake Ladoga. The 7th Division was assigned the mission to keep Sortavala isolated, destroy or defeat the enemy north of the town and continue to advance towards the direction of the south-west.

The Division commander, Colonel Antero Svensson, gave special instructions as to how the town was to be taken. According to him, it should be recovered with minimal casualties. In addition, the town, mainly consisting of low wooden buildings, was to be saved from destruction. For these reasons artillery fire was to be kept at a minimum. Curiously, the 168th Red Army Division commanded by Colonel A. Bondarev, a survivor of the Stalinist system, already had been encircled by Finns in the Winter War in the same approximate area.

In the case of Vyborg, on 23 August the Finnish High Command gave an order to IV Army Corps to cut all the roads that led to the south and south-east from Vyborg and then continue to advance towards the latter direction (Uusikirkko). Three Finnish divisions were to close in on the city from various sides. A special feature of the plan was that the 8th Division was to cross the Bay

of Vyborg in order to form the right pincer arm and cut the Soviet lines of communication and supply south of the city.

The fast-moving 12th division on the left flank was to squeeze the large ring around the city and get ready to prevent the encircled troops from escaping and destroy them. Most of the fighting was to take place in the vicinity of the city. Troops were to secure their flanks and prevent any reinforcements from coming to the rescue. Both captures were to be followed by pursuits.

The Finnish attackers could see their objectives from afar. They knew the terrain very well and Finnish intelligence had acquired information about the Soviet defense positions. As mentioned before, both Sortavala and Vyborg had been home to garrisons. Thus, the Finnish military had very good maps and local knowledge of these areas. In fact, most of the army officers had served in or near Vyborg and therefore they were able to lead operations in the area even without maps.

In both cases Finns took risks as they decided to cross water obstacles. In the case of Sortavala the crossing of the Karmalansalmi strait west of the city on 10 August was important. The Soviet engineers had blown up the bridge but they had not done a proper job as the vanguard of the Finns could use the ruins in their crossing that was supported by an artillery barrage and a smoke screen. The crossing of the strait was a prerequisite for successful encirclement and it also provided them with the element of surprise.

Later in town the Soviets had tried to blow up the major bridge but the Finnish engineers swam there during one night to cut cables and disarm explosives. The bridge was only partially destroyed. In Vyborg the advancing Finns encountered demolished bridges and strange explosions. They realized that the Soviets detonated the bridges and other targets within the city by using radio-controlled mines and so brought in a vehicle from the Finnish Broadcasting Company to transmit a program on the same frequency that was used for detonations. They played a favorite polka tune that had no pauses, thus giving them an opportunity to locate and disarm the mines and preventing further demolitions. Water crossings also took place over larger bodies of water. South of Vyborg a full Finnish division (8th) secretly crossed the Bay of Vyborg. It happened at the right moment as most of the Soviet troops had been committed

to counter-attacks. The Finnish command also decided not to use artillery, thus maintaining the element of surprise and accomplish a bridgehead on the eastern shore of the bay.

In both cases, the adjacent areas to Sortavala and Vyborg were forested. The Finnish light infantry was trained and equipped to move and fight in afforested terrain. Furthermore, their art of war emphasized the use of cover and concealment offered by the trees and other vegetation. As a matter of fact, the whole army had been trained in an offensive spirit and favored outflanking movements. On the other hand, Finnish troops had very little experience in fighting in built-up areas. Instead, they closed in on Sortavala and Vyborg by advancing through forested terrain simultaneously from various directions.

In neither case did much action take place in the streets or centers. Finns occupied railway stations, road junctions and high ground, as well as areas on the outskirts of populated centers. Around Sortavala there were many hills that offered good observations and fields of fire for heavy weapons. There were also many man-made features, such as railroads and fences, that provided them with cover against fire coming from the basements. However, in both cases the action on the outskirts was skirmishing.

The resistance of the Soviet troops ended soon in both cases. The Finnish 7th Division occupied Sortavala after a 6-day series of battles. It fell on 15 August. One factor behind the recapture was loudspeaker propaganda. Two weeks later Vyborg was taken after 7 days, but there the Soviet defenders left the actual city limits without putting up proper resistance. Sortavala was recaptured almost intact whereas Vyborg had been partly destroyed by the Soviet soldiers. On 31 August Finns organized a victory parade in Vyborg, while the recapture was mentioned in dispatches and the participants were decorated.

After losing Sortavala the Soviet troops commenced a counter-attack and conducted a fighting retreat. Thus, they managed to hold off Finnish troops and the bulk of their forces made it to a shallow bay of Lake Ladoga. From there they were evacuated by boats to a Soviet-held island. They had to abandon hundreds of their vehicles and other equipment on the shore.

Similar events followed the fall of Vyborg. The Soviet forces were encircled in the Ylä-Sommee–Porlammi area south of the city. The Finnish

artillery inflicted heavy casualties on the disorganized masses of the Red Army. Remnants broke through but left their heavy equipment behind. The war booty was significant: the spoils of war was abundant as Finns captured over 306 field guns, 246 mortars, 272 heavy machine guns, 55 tanks, 670 motor vehicles, etc.

In terms of casualties, the losses were relatively minor in Sortavala on both sides but 540 Soviet soldiers surrendered there. In Vyborg the situation was much more grim: the Red Army suffered 7000 killed, 15,000 wounded and 9000 prisoners. A total of 12,000 Soviet troops were eventually able to break out. Even though the Finns were the attackers, their total casualties during the Vyborg operation were just one tenth of those of their enemy, some 3000 men.

To conclude one can say that the two cases discussed above were extraordinary urban operations in which the Finnish commanders avoided fighting in the built-up areas. This was necessitated by the fact that the troops had not been trained for urban combat and that they did not have the needed resources. However, by advancing through the forested areas, which were the most familiar environments for them, and encircling their enemies Finns were able to effectively draw upon their own strengths. They scored successes by taking the two places. However, in these instances the retreating Red Army was able to save two of their divisions.

Both recaptures had a positive impact on the morale of the belligerent Finns. Sortavala was the first town to be recaptured during the offensive phase of the Continuation War. Vyborg had already had a huge symbolic importance to both sides in the Winter War. Later during late 1941 the Finnish Army advanced further east towards the Soviet north-west of the country occupying many population centers, including the major city of Petrozavodsk. Very little street fighting occurred elsewhere, except in the small town of Karhumäki (Medvezhegorsk in Russian).

Forest warfare was heavily stressed by the Finnish military before and during the second world war. The interest in urban terrain combat among the Finnish military remained at a low level from the early 1920s until the late 1940s. Although Finns had almost no experience of urban warfare, their first guidebook on fighting in built areas was published in 1951.

**Final Destination Slovakia. Activity of Western Allies
Air Forces over Slovakia (1944-1945)**

Peter Chorvát (Slovakia)

Even though the history of military air force operations over Slovakia in 1939-1945 is a topic relatively well processed in Slovak historiography, it continues to attract the attention of historians, archaeologists and amateur researchers. Nowadays, they are mainly interested in the questions related to the organisational development of the Slovak military aviation in 1939-1944, the personal data of its individual members (especially fighters), operational deployment on the Eastern Front or in the defence of the Slovak airspace. However, the same unrelenting attention is also paid to the air battles in the Slovak National Uprising (1944), the operations of the Soviet Air Force over the Slovak territory in the last two war years (1944-1945) or the combat participation of Czechs and Slovaks in the British Air Force units (RAF). Thus, the topic of the Western allies' air force operations over Slovakia in 1944-1945 basically fits into this spectrum.

This paper is aimed at analysing the latter phenomenon in more detail. In its presentation, we focused mainly on four sub-issues: the operations of the United States Army 15th Air Force, the operations of air units under the British Bomber Command, the air defence of Slovakia until the end of August 1944, and finally, briefly, the capabilities of the Axis Air Forces in the defence of the area under surveillance.

Ad hoc, we focused on the territory of Slovakia within its 1938 borders, i.e. the subject of our interest also included air operations over the areas occupied by Hungary.

Until 1944, the Slovak Republic, which was a satellite of Nazi Germany from 1939 to 1945, did not experience the negative aspects of the air war, including bombing. In that last war year, the illusion of a secure zone of interior, which included the perception of the air war only second-hand through radio or newspapers, was severely shattered.

It should be stressed in this context that a year earlier - at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 - the leaders of the Western Powers had already agreed on a combined air offensive against Germany with the aim of “destroying and disorganizing German military industry, production and research, and further breaking the morale of the German population by day and night bombing of important targets.” The air attack was also a preparation for the planned Allied landing in Normandy - Operation Overlord. The British Bomber Command and the American 8th Air Force were active in these intentions.

These objectives were gradually fulfilled during 1943. The successful landing of Allied troops on Italian territory in the summer of 1943 enabled the building of an extensive network of Allied air bases in its southern and south-eastern parts. Subsequently, powerful bomber formations could operate from these airfields. At the same time, in this strategically new situation, the 15th United States Army Air Force (USAAF) was established on 1 November 1943. This army air force was established as an element of the U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Forces in Europe. The very next day (2 November 1943) the air factory in Wiener Neustadt was bombed by its troops. The operations in which the staff of the 15th Air Force took part in the following months were aimed not only at bombing strategic targets in the so-called Third Reich, but also in Hungary, Romania, the Balkans and Slovakia. In particular, operations were directed against the petroleum processing industry, enemy air force, communications, and ground troops. In addition, on 10 December 1943, the Mediterranean Allied Air Force Command was established to coordinate Allied air activity in the area.

The aforementioned Allied air units (i.e., both American and British) were armed with modern strategic bombers with long range, high bomb load capacity, and effective airborne weapons. Their protection was provided by equally modern fighter machines. For example, the 15th Air Force specifically had B-17, B-24, and temporarily also B-25 and B-26 bombers, which were protected by P-38, P-47 or P-51 fighters.

In the second half of 1943, the potential danger of an air attack began to affect the Slovak Republic as well, as its main political and military leaders were convinced by the air raids in the so-called Eastern March, i.e. on the territory of Austria occupied by Nazi Germany. Slovakia's own means to repel such an

attack, carried out by massive American bombing raids, were basically inadequate. As far as the active defence is concerned, i.e. fighters in particular, the so-called scramble flight was established on 20 August 1943 to ensure the defence of the capital of the Slovak Republic. It was made up of four Messerschmidt Bf 109 fighter aircraft only. The first alert launch against the American bombers approaching Bratislava from Hainburg, took place only a few months later - 1 October 1943. There was no combat contact. Since the Americans did not attack Slovak targets, the fighters did not interfere in the battles. After the experience of the bombing of Wiener Neustadt on 2 November 1943, which was only 100 kilometres from Bratislava, the question of the defence of Slovak airspace became more urgent. Basically, it was only a matter of time before an American attack on strategic targets in Slovakia would take place. Not only the industrial agglomeration of the Slovak capital, but also the large armaments factories in the region of Považie, built in the Czechoslovak Republic, as well as other targets were in danger.

In Slovakia, the procedure for air attacks was as follows. If enemy activity was detected within 250 kilometres of Bratislava (in any direction), the radio interrupted broadcasting, the 200-kilometre limit meant airborne danger, and at 150 kilometres the means of ground anti-aircraft defence were activated. The latter was controlled by the headquarters of the artillery anti-aircraft regiment. Its units protected primarily the capital of Slovakia, refineries, armament factories as well as important military airfields in Slovakia.

The aforementioned critical situation had an impact on the strengthening of the fighter defence of the Slovak capital. The so-called scramble flight was replaced by Fighter Squadron 13. This unit was operationally deployed on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1943, where it achieved more than 200 victories in aerial combat. After returning to Slovakia, it began fulfilling its new assignment on 31 January 1944. At the same time, the Slovak government decided to purchase 15 modern Messerschmidt Bf 109 G fighters. These were delivered to Slovakia during February 1944 as part of the "Eiche" programme. The new equipment delivery has subsequently enabled to intensify the practice alarm launches. Squadron 13 was also included in the "Reich Air Defence" (Reichsluftverteidigung) system, its unofficial name being the Emergency Action Squadron. In particular, it was subordinated to the commander of the

fighter units stationed in the so-called Eastern March (JaFü Ostmark). This commander was responsible not only for his own - German - but also for Slovak and Hungarian fighter units.

In the period under review since the beginning of 1944, allied strategic bombing intensified. At the same time, the activities of the 8th and 15th USAAF also began to be coordinated by the US Strategic Air Command Staff in Europe. This Staff was established on 6 January 1944 and commanded by General Carl Spaatz.

On 17 February 1944, the “Combined Air Assault” directive was renegotiated and amended. This directive was originally valid from 10 June 1943 and envisaged “the achievement of total victory using air force”. According to a modified version of this document, the aim of the bombing strikes was to weaken the German air force overall, in the factories, on the ground and in the air. For example, the “Big Week” (20-25 February 1944) took place within the intentions of this modified directive, during which the planes of the 15th and 8th USAAF and British Bomber Command carried out 26 major air attacks on German aircraft industry plants. These were mainly factories producing aircraft and rolling bearings. For the duration of this operation, it became clear that the Luftwaffe was no longer capable of fighting against the powerful American bomber force.

The first tangible contact with the approaching air war was experienced by the inhabitants of Slovakia on 17 March 1944, when a group of 150 bombers of the 15th Air Force took part in the attack on Vienna. Around 1:20 PM, American bombers were flying over the area of Bratislava. Several dozen bombs landed in the vicinity of the Slovak capital. Even though these were not targeted attacks (the crews were only disposing of a certain number of bombs), the event caused unrest among the civilian population and was a prelude to more.

Starting on the following month, a massive Allied air attack was launched against 80 selected factories located on the territory of the “Third Reich” and its allies. In this offensive, the aforementioned 15th and 8th USAAF air units participated as well as the British Bomber Command. The aim of the operation was to paralyse the production of petroleum products.

The flight routes of the 15th USAAF, which were directed mainly against selected targets in Upper Silesia, were increasingly crossing the Slovak airspace. They started to become a real threat to all military, administrative and economic objects on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

These operations had the effect of intensifying alarm launches by Slovak fighters. For example, on 29 May 1944, six of them took off from the Piešťany airfield against the announced American bombing alliance. Again, there was no combat contact.

It was June 1944 that was decisive for the Slovak involvement in the air battles. In addition to the regular alarm launches, there were also casualties of Slovak fighter pilots. These events took place against the background of the reorganisation of German air defence in the Austrian area (JaFü Ostmark). On 15 June, the 8th Fighter Air Division (8th Jagddivision) was established. Colonel Gotthard Handrick, whose staff resided in Vienna, was appointed its commander.

On 16 June 1944, the first bombing of Bratislava took place after all. Sirens announcing the air raid alert were heard in the Slovak capital at 10:05 AM. A few minutes later, the port of Bratislava was hit. At about 10:30 AM, bombs also landed on the main target of the attack - the Apollo mineral oil refinery. This company was one of the ten largest Central European refineries under the management of the so-called Third Reich. The US attack put the factory out of operation for several months. In total, more than 1,500 bombs were dropped on Bratislava, killing 4 soldiers and 118 civilians - mostly employees of the Apollo company. On the American part, the results of the raid were viewed positively. Slovak anti-aircraft artillery only shot down 2 American bomber planes.

Along with this bombing, an air battle between the 15th USAAF and German, Slovak and Hungarian fighters took place in the area between the Hungarian Lake Balaton and Bratislava. At that time, the commander of the 8th Fighter Air Division (8. Jagddivision) sent all available fighters against the American bombers and fighters.

Six Slovak fighters were also in the air at the time, tracking a group of American bombers east of Bratislava. They learned about the bombing of the city during the flight. In spite of moving immediately into the bombing area, they did not encounter the American machines again. The events connected with the

bombing of Bratislava had their consequences. Shortly after the raid, the Minister of National Defence, General Ferdinand Čatloš, reproached the representative of Squadron 13, asking: “What is the point of Slovakia having a fighter air force if it can’t even defend Bratislava?!”. The members of the German Air Mission in Slovakia went even further and qualified the non-participation of Slovak fighters in the battle for Bratislava even as cowardice.

Ten days later - on 26 June 1944 - shortly after 8:00 AM, a strong American bomber force approached Bratislava from the south again. A total of 677 B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers, protected by some 260 fighters, had the objects around Vienna as their intended targets.

After assessing the situation, eight Slovak fighters were ordered to take off from the Piešťany airfield at 8:40 AM. The air combat taking place with American P-51 fighters ended in Slovak defeat. This was in spite of the fact that one American bomber was shot down, three fighters lost their lives in combat, and one was seriously wounded. After the battle, Squadron 13 - the Emergency Action Squadron - practically ceased to exist, three aircraft were irretrievably lost, another four seriously damaged. Further air battles over Slovakia took place without the participation of the Slovak fighter air force.

On Friday, 7 July 1944, the 15th Air Force made another concentrated attack on the refineries in Silesia. One of the secondary targets that was hit during this day was the arms factory in Dubnica nad Váhom. The factory was only partially damaged by the bombing because part of the production area was located underground. Again, there were casualties reported among civilians.

In connection with this attack, fierce air battles were also fought over Slovakia, with several American bombers landing on Slovak territory after being shot down. This was the time when the air war over Slovakia was reaching its climax.

On 20 August 1944, a group of 76 B-24 bombers attacked the mineral oil refinery in Dubová, built in 1938. The bombing took place visually from an altitude of approximately 6,000 metres, with 50-70 per cent damage to the refinery. There are still disputes ongoing about the necessity of the raid on Dubová. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London asked the American part not to include this enterprise in the list of targets of the air offensive. The

request was not granted. The fuel destroyed in Dubová was subsequently missing in the Slovak National Uprising, which broke out against the Germans and the domestic collaborator government just a few days later - on 29 August 1944.

American airmen captured in Slovakia by the Slovak security authorities were concentrated in the Grinava camp near Bratislava. There were 31 of them at the end of August 1944. After the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising, they were transported in groups to Banská Bystrica, later to be evacuated to Italy.

During the summer of 1944, the Luftwaffe had major material and personnel problems. Its units reported daily losses in battles with the 15th and 8th Air Forces. Several German fighters had as many as 5 parachute jumps after being shot down. The lifespan of the young airmen who joined the troops, averaged three to four take-offs against the enemy. Despite this critical situation, 77 fighters were sent into the air on 29 August 1944 to defend the Ostrava refinery complex and the industrial enterprises in its vicinity. During the battles over the White Carpathian Mountains on the Slovak-Czech border, several bombers were again shot down.

In spite of the military-political changes in Slovakia, the air war in its airspace continued.

The shot-down American airmen, who were concentrated in the Grinava camp, but also those who were in the mountains with the Slovak partisan units, were taken to the Sliáč (Tri Duby) airfield near Banská Bystrica on 17 September and 7 October, and from there flown to the Bari base. During the first landing of American airmen at Tri Duby, 12 airmen were evacuated. On 7 October 1944, a second group of 29 pilots was taken to Bari.

At the same time, an American OSS intelligence group, commanded by Navy Lieutenant James Holt Green, was moved to the insurgent airfield at Tri Duby. In addition to U.S. intelligence officers, a British SOE intelligence mission, dropped by parachute, started operating in the insurgent territory. In principle, the fate of both these missions was tragic. After the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising, most of their members were captured in the Slovak mountains and executed in Nazi concentration camps.

Whereas the attacks of the American air force were conducted on the territory of Slovakia as a German satellite until the end of August 1944, a qualitatively new situation arose in the course of September 1944. Two bombing actions were carried out for the benefit of the insurgent forces. The first operation was the bombing of the Vrútky railway junction on 13 September 1944, which slowed down the movements of the German Army deployed against the insurgents in this area. A week later - on 20 September 1944 - it was the bombing of the Malacky military airfield located in the so-called German Protection Zone. About 20 German aircraft were destroyed on the ground and the airfield area was unusable by the end of World War II. At the same time, Bratislava was bombed again on this day (20 September 1944). The Apollo refinery, the operation of which was partially restored after the first bombing in June, was destroyed for good. During 1944-1945, the city was eventually bombed six times by American aircraft.

Important railway junctions in southern Slovakia, occupied by Hungary back then, also became targets of American bombing in 1944-1945. Nové Zámky and Komárno were targeted repeatedly. These attacks took place specifically on 7 and 14 October 1944. The 205th Group of the British Royal Air Force, which was temporarily subordinated to the 15th US Army Air Force, also operated in the Danube area. Its subordinate bomber crews specialized in night bombing and dropping river mines in the Danube. The actual dropping of bombs on the Slovak section of the Danube river took place on 4 October 1944. On 8 March and 14 March 1945, Nové Zámky and Komárno were bombed repeatedly.

In Slovakia, 45 bombers and 8 fighters of the 15th US Army Air Force crashed during ten months of operational activity. Four aircraft were lost by the British RAF. 106 American airmen died, 370 were captured in Slovakia. Most of them ended up in the German prisoner-of-war camps. Only a minor part of them managed to be evacuated during rescue missions from the Tri Duby airport.

In the Forest or Towns? – An Appreciation on Finnish Military Thinking and Urban Warfare during the Early Cold War

Petteri Jouko (Finland)

1. Finnish Experience of Urban Warfare and Aerial Warfare Was Limited

The climax of the Second World War took place in the cities. The final defence of the Third Reich was broken by the massive Soviet attack in Berlin in early May 1945. Only three months later, the USA forced Japan into peace by destroying the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs. These events were not detached but a part of a more significant phenomenon as many engagements had taken place in urban environments earlier in the war, unlike during the Great War 20 years earlier. Kharkiv, for example, was captured and re-captured by Germans and Soviets several times. The desperate Polish uprising in Warsaw in 1944 caused the virtual destruction of an entire city, and the town of Arnheim in Holland saw a fierce battle between the British airborne forces and the German 2nd SS-Panzer Corps.

Due to the rapid evolution of military technology, a novel form of warfare, aerial attacks, extended to densely populated areas. Ruthless bombings of Britain, Germany and Japan were sinister yet realistic examples of the new character of warfare. The extension of indiscriminate violence against the civilian population was, without exaggeration, one of the features of the Second World War. The rationality and morality of annihilating civilian targets are questionable, but bombings indicated a new rationale. Cities and population were a part enemy's society and economic base, a part of the wholistic war machinery which enabled large-scale war. The war had become a total war.

The Finnish experience of the war differed radically from the mainstream of events taking place in central Europe. Between 1939–1945 the Finnish forces took part in countless battles, minor engagements and skirmishes but urban fighting in urban areas remained relatively low. Before the Second World War, the military manuals only mentioned fighting in built-up areas or urban warfare. Battle instructions made only a passing note of the built-up regions being

challenging environments for a battle. Although they provided cover against enemy surveillance and possibilities for bivouacking, the command and control of units and the employment of direct and fires were complex.¹

During the Winter War of 1939–1940, only limited fighting occurred in urban-like environments. In the famous double battle of Suomussalmi–Raate, the Finnish forces encircled the main elements of the Soviet 163. Division at the village center of Suomussalmi. In the main battle area – the Carelian Isthmus – the fighting stretched to the outskirts of Viipuri, the second-largest city in Finland. Still, the peace was signed before any serious street-fighting took place. Instead of taking advantage of villages during the withdrawal, the Finnish Forced avoided battle in even the smaller hamlets. Instead, withdrawing Finnish units conducted scorched earth tactics with variable success to deny the advancing Soviets protection against winter.²

The period between the Winter War and the onslaught to the Soviet Union in June 1941 saw several improvements within the Finnish Field Army. A large pool of untrained auxiliary forces was called to military service, and firepower within wartime formations was enhanced. A large pool of manpower was also trained but without any or very little training for the urban environment. The training instructions of 1940 did even mention fighting in the urban environment.³

The first phase of the Continuation War, the Finnish onslaught aimed to re-capture lost territory, involved some battles in the urban or semi-urban areas in the Eastern Carelia, such as city of Petrozavodsk or Medvezjegorsk but the Soviets evacuated the main prize, the city of Viipuri before any serious street-fighting took place – only to be partially encircled and losing all of its heavy equipment on the eastern side of the town.⁴

¹ *Jalkaväen ohjesääntö II* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otavan Kirjapaino, 1940), 21.

² Niilo Lappalainen, *Viipuri toisessa maailmansodassa*, (Helsinki: WSOY, 1991), s.74–78; Ari Raunio and Juri Kilin, *Talvisodan taisteluja*, (Helsinki: Karttakeskus, 2007), 126–134; Jarkko Koukkunen, *Hävitysten talvi* (diss.), (Joensuu: Itä-Suomen yliopisto, 2020), 284–291.

³ *Koulutuksen suuntaviivat maavoimissa vuonna 1940*, (Helsinki, 1940), passim, The Library of the National Defence University, Finland.

⁴ Niilo Lappalainen, *Sotiemme suurmotit*, (Helsinki: WSOY, 1990), 230–232.

The war against the Soviet Union ended in 1944. The initial phases of the large-scale Soviet attack in the summer of 1944 succeeded. Intensive fire preparations and the massing of superior combined assault forces collapsed the first two Finnish defence lines within a week. The Finnish troops stabilized the front only after the General Headquarters transferred the main body of the Field Army to the last defense line of the Carelian isthmus, which was the Soviet operational *Schwerpunkt* once more. The Finnish forces repulsed the Soviets on this line after fierce battles apart from the city of Viipuri, which was lost rapidly. The 20th Brigade, reinforced by totally obsolete armour, withdrew in panic, with hardly any fighting leaving the city to the Soviets. Reasons and consequences for the rapid collapse of the Finnish defenses in Viipuri are addressed elsewhere in this conference. However, one could expect that the lessons learned from the darkest day of the Finnish field army were thoroughly discussed after the war – they were not.⁵

The final phase of Finnish WW II took place in the northern part of Finland against the Germans after Finland had made an interim peace with the Soviet Union in early September 1944. Finnish forces fought against challenging circumstances. Wehrmacht was able to carry out a systematic and disciplined withdrawal. Apart from the town of Tornio, where the Finns carried out an *ad hoc* unopposed amphibious landing – untypical for the Finnish operations – no actual urban fighting took place. During the later stages of operations, *Wehrmacht* Germans burned any larger village or borough before the Finns entered them.⁶

Although the Finnish cities were not subjected to bombing like in Germany, the Soviets bombed Finnish cities several hundred times but with minimal results. The Soviet air offensive culminated in February 1944 when the

⁵ For a description on the battle of Viipuri, see. e.g. Niilo Lappalainen, *Viipuri toisessa maailmansodassa*, (Helsinki: WSOY, 1991), 167–273. For an analysis on the role of the Finnish converted BT-42 assault guns, see, Petteri Jouko and Aku Kangas, *BT-42 – maineensa ansainnut?* in *Sotahistoriallinen aikakauskirja* 42 eds. Riitta Blomberg & al, (Helsinki: Suomen Sotahistoriallinen Seura, 2022), 110–111.

⁶ Sampo Ahto, "Lapin hävitys" in *Suomi sodassa: Talvi- ja jatkosodan tärkeät taistelut*. (Helsinki: Valitut Palat – Readers Digest, 1983, 458–459; Pasi Tuunainen, *Sodan maantiede: maaston ja olosuhteiden vaikutus sodankäyntiin 1850-luvulta nykypäivään*, (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2023), 318–320.

Soviet Air Force concentrated the main body of the ADD, The Long-Range Aviation, against Helsinki to pace unofficial peace negotiations. Due to the efficient air defence and limited capabilities of the Soviet bomber force, which was by no means comparable with the British Bomber Command, damage to the city and its inhabitants was negligible by any contemporary standards.⁷

2. Collection of Tactical Lessons after the Second World War Was Difficult

Five years of warfighting produced a large amount of knowledge on warfare. The General Headquarters initiated a collection of tactical lessons in early 1945 while elements of the Defence Forces still operated against Wehrmacht at the upper parts of Lapland. The project proved to be problematic. The peacetime formations and units produced a plentiful amount of written evidence, but comparing testimony was problematic. The tactical lessons varied greatly depending on the time and place of the battle had taken place. As a result, the formulation of universal conclusions which could be incorporated into a new set of military manuals was complicated.⁸

Tactical assessments or lessons learned from urban fighting were limited since there was little to collect. The operations division of the General Headquarters hosted a two-day conference on tactical lessons of the war in the spring of 1945. Presentations and the following discussions concentrated mainly on defensive operations. Still, populated areas were simply neglected, although the infamous battle of Viipuri, referred to earlier in this paper, was well-known by every participant.⁹

The absence of lessons on urban warfare is evident in the post-war papers documenting the experience of the Finnish Field Army also on a larger scale. In addition to written evidence, the peacetime formations were encouraged to host small-scale seminars on the war experience. Tables of the content of the GHQ Training Divisions' files reveal that urban warfare was hardly touched on in the

⁷ Ohto Manninen, "Helsingin suurpommitukset" in *Jatkosodan taistelut*, ed. Mikko Karjalainen, (Helsinki: Gummeruksen Kirjapaino Oy, 2002), 111–117;

⁸ Vesa Tynkkynen, *Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen. Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa* (diss.), (Joutsa: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 1996), 284–285.

⁹ National Archives of Finland (NAF), T 24098/F 2, PvPE:n numeroimaton muistio, 24.5.1945.

seminars. For example, meetings arranged during the spring of 1945 focused on different aspects of defense against large-scale offensive – the trauma deeply experienced by the Finns in June 1944. Topics varied from the employment of anti-tank weapons to the control of panic within infantry units. Urban fighting, however, was not addressed at all.¹⁰

Documents collected from the formations only strengthen the aspect of overlooked urban warfare, for example, within 1. Division of the influence of terrain, forest especially, and weather conditions were analyzed repeatedly in several papers. Several papers discussed different tactical procedures in advance and attacks in the roadless forest. Still, an assault against the built-up area was discussed only in a single paper. Kevyt Prikaati – the only Finnish armored formation – is the ultimate example of ignorance as it did not consider tactical lessons of urban fighting at all.¹¹

If the experience of urban fighting was ignored in the post-war documents, it is also apparent that the subject was neither crucial within the training of higher echelons of officers corps. The curriculum of 1949 in the War College, responsible for the training of general staff officers, affirms that urban fighting was in a minor part in tactical instruction. The first term contained one brief map exercise devoted to urban warfare. The instruction of tactics during the second term concentrated on the operations at the army corps level, but not a single exercise was dedicated to urban warfare. However, it is worth noting that the corps' relatively large area of responsibility contained almost always, if not towns, smaller populated areas.¹²

In the syllabus of 1953, the single map exercise of urban warfare was excluded from the syllabus. Topics of that exercise were annexed to a larger scenario involving coastal defense. The adjustment, however, is not as

¹⁰ National Archives of Finland (NAF), T 18002/6, PvPE:n numeroimaton ja päiväämätön sisällysluettelo upseerien keskustelutilaisuuksien alustuksista ja monisteista.

¹¹ NAF, T 18002/Kansio 8, 1. Divisioonon sotakokemuksia (luettelo hyökkäystaistelua käsittelevistä sotakokemuksista); NAF, T 18002/Kansio 10, Kevyen Prikaatin sotakokemuksia (sisällysluettelo).

¹² NAF, T 21369/Db 5, Sotakorkeakoulun maasotalinjan (YO 18) opetussuunnitelman 1949 liite 5 (yleinen taktiikka); NAF, T 21369/Db 5, Sotakorkeakoulun maasotalinjan (YO 18) opetussuunnitelman 1950 liite 5 (yleinen taktiikka)

unreasonable as one might reason—the most important cities, including Helsinki, the capital, are located by the sea. Moreover, by the early 1950s, amphibious operations were essential in contemporary threat perceptions, as described elsewhere in this paper. It is also interesting to note that none of the compulsory theses produced by the student officers during the 1950s were allocated to the operations in urban environment.¹³

3. Fighting in the Built-Up Area Was an Exception in Tactical Guidance

The collection and appreciation of relevant war experience was a trying ordeal, but refining the lessons into training instructions and tactical manuals was even more difficult. It took some ten years to re-write the most important tactical manuals. The main reason for the delay was not only the compilation of relevant tactical lessons. The problem was more holistic. Finland could not restart military preparations until it had signed the peace treaty with the allies. The Paris Peace Treaty, signed in 1947, had a significant and long-lasting effect on the Finnish defense. Not only it disallowed various weapons systems, but it also limited the size of the Defense Forces to some 41 900 men. Therefore, the Finnish Defense Forces were in a profound transition at the turn of the 1940s and 50s. Both the peacetime and wartime establishments, including the mobilization system, were reorganized during the early 1950s. Their consolidation was a precondition for developing tactical doctrine.¹⁴

Odd enough, one of the first tactical instructions to be published in the early 1950s was a handbook for urban warfare in 1951. It is difficult to identify the author or origins of this handbook because, according to the list of manuals and guides under preparation in late 1948, the handbook on Urban warfare was not even planned. It is quite possible that the handbook was a translation because it was produced very fast. It included detailed information on urban fighting,

¹³ NAF, T 21369/Db 5, Sotakorkeakoulun maasotalinjan (MSL 20) opetussuunnitelman 1953 Liite 5 (yleinen taktiikka). A list of thesis produced in the Finnish War College between 1946–1997. Possessed by the author

¹⁴ Vesa Tynkkynen, *Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen. Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa* (diss.), (Joutsa :Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 1996), 306–315; Vesa Tynkkynen and Petteri Jouko, *Towards East or West? Defence Planning in Finland 1944–1966*. Finnish Defence Studies 17. (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2007), 10–19; 40–42.

which cannot be identified elsewhere. Although the instruction is detailed in some parts, the handbook was very generic in terminology.¹⁵

To fill the gap between obsolete pre-war manuals, a group of instructors belonging to the War College produced a set of handbooks for officers. The authors consisted of a pool of officers who were later to rise to the rank of general, and although providing general information on defense – such as principles of the territorial defense – the handbooks were, in reality, provisional semi-military manuals. As a result, many of the guidelines were almost literally copied to the formations-level Field Manual published in 1954 and other manuals published in the 1950s.¹⁶

The last handbooks published in 1953 introduced new organizations – an infantry brigade replacing division as the basic formation and its subunits – and the principles of their tactical employment. The handbook touched on fighting in the built-up areas only, superficially presenting broad guidelines on a few pages. The defense in built-up areas was defined as taking advantage of permanent infrastructure within a city or borough. Battle in built-up areas required a large amount of manpower. The defensive position of an infantry battalion consisted of company-sized defense perimeters subdivided into platoon-sized strongholds. A single stronghold would consist of a block of houses or a single large building. In practice, it meant that a company would man between 4–6 blocks of houses depending on their size. One of the features in the built-up areas was limited visibility. As a result, the defending force could not be deployed evenly, but some areas would be controlled only by observation, which, in turn, required relatively large local mobile reserves: 1/4–1/3 of the defending force should be reserved for counterattacks.¹⁷

Another peculiarity of fighting in the built-up areas was that engagements took place in short ranges; it did not differ from the dense forests. Special attention and effort should be made to create a network of fires for small-calibre

¹⁵ NAF, T 24167/F 21, PvPE:n kirjelmä nro 987/Koul.2/25, 1.3.1948; *Asutuskeskustaistelun opas (Asut ist opas)*, (Helsinki: Kauppalehti Oy:n Kirjapaino, 1951), passim.

¹⁶ *Upseerin käsikirja, III osa* (Joukkoja varten). (Helsinki: Topografikunnan rotaatiopaino, 1953), 3–9.

¹⁷ *Upseerin käsikirja, III osa* (Joukkoja varten). (Helsinki: Topografikunnan rotaatiopaino, 1953), 192–194.

weapons, preferably automatic weapons with a high rate of fire. Mortars were effective in providing fire support due to their ability to shoot at high angles, and their projectiles had a favorable angle of impact.¹⁸

Supporting artillery units could usually not deploy in densely built-up areas because of their ballistic features. Artillery battalions – the basic firing unit in the Finnish Defense Forces – should be deployed on the city's outskirts. As the buildings restricted surveillance and observation of fires, the appropriate positioning of fire observers was essential. Concentrated fires within build-up areas were not considered reasonable since most of the projectiles would hit the roofs of the buildings. Instead, concentrated defensive fires against the enemy marshalling for the attack would have better results. On rare occasions, single guns – preferably heavier than 122 millimeters – would be allocated for direct firing support.¹⁹

Defending the city would take special logistic arrangements. Because transportation of supplies would be hazardous during the action – if tunnels were not available – strongholds should be stocked with ammunition and other equipment before the battle because, according to estimates, the consumption of ammunition would rise deeply during the dense firefights taking place at close ranges. Any transportation during the action should be allocated to the evacuation of the wounded.²⁰

The battle itself should be conducted actively from the forward area of the battle zone by the artillery fires. The marshalling areas and positions of the fire support weapons, such as anti-tank guns or assault guns, should be brought under concentrated fire. The basic idea was to break up the enemy assault even before it had started – as had taken place during the battles of 1944 – and to prevent it from entering the city center and dense population.²¹

¹⁸ *Kenttäohjesääntö II osa (KO II)*. (Helsinki, 1954), 142–143.

¹⁹ *Upseerin käsikirja, III osa (Joukkoja varten)*. (Helsinki: Topografikunnan rotaatiopaino, 1953), 195; *Kenttätykistön taisteluohtesääntö, I osa (Tykistön käyttö ja johtaminen)* (Tykistön kovalaboratorio, 1949), 100.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 195.

²¹ On tactical employment and tactical evolution of concentrated fires during the summer of 1944, see, eg. Pasi Kesseli, *Tykistö taistelee tulellaan: tykistötaktiikan kehitys Suomessa*

If the enemy assault force could enter the main defensive positions, it was vital to start counterattacks at the earliest possible stage to prevent it from taking the initiative and start systematic mopping-up of the buildings. Since maintaining tactical communications was difficult and hampered more by smoke, extreme noise and lack of visual contact, leaders and commanders at every level were expected to be active and take the initiative.²²

If defensive operations in populated areas were a special occasion, an attack in the build-up area was even more a remote option. It was considered time-consuming and causing heavy casualties – one of the reasons the wartime supreme commander, Field Marshall Mannerheim, had declined to use Finnish forces to assault Leningrad to assist the German effort.²³

Assault in a built-up area required profound preparations and should be planned in depth. Frontal attacks from one direction were usually unsuccessful; instead, the target area should be attacked from several directions to tie down mobile reserves. Due to the fighting conditions, the standard order of battle was unsuitable. The infantry units should be divided into smaller task units reinforced by other arms, especially by engineers trained to use explosives. Because the break-in phase would be made against strongly fortified positions in buildings, task units should be equipped with extra equipment and hardware, especially explosives or flame throwers. As in defense, sectors allocated for the units should be very limited; the maximum width of attack for a reinforced infantry company would be only a few hundred meters.²⁴

Arrangements for fire support were complex because indirect artillery fires had only a limited effect. In addition to standard fire preparation, artillery fires should be used for interdiction on the flanks and rear to prevent the enemy from deploying its reserves. Furthermore, because the heaviest direct-firing

itsenäisyytemme aikana, (Helsinki: Edita Oy, 2017), 148-149; and 165–171; *Upseerin käsikirja, III osa* (Joukkoja varten). (Helsinki: Topografikunnan rotaatiopaino, 1953), 196.

²² *Upseerin käsikirja, III osa* (Joukkoja varten). (Helsinki: Topografikunnan rotaatiopaino, 1953), 197.

²³ Mikko Karjalainen and Toni Mononen, *Mannerheimin sotataito*, (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 2022), 208.

²⁴ *Kenttäohjesääntö II osa (KO II)*. (Helsinki, 1954), 69–71.

weapons, such as heavy machine guns, could not be deployed in fighting inside the buildings, they should be used for concentrated fire support.²⁵

The tactical manual for the infantry battalion, introduced in 1955, did not introduce anything new. Fighting in the built-up area was still considered secondary to fighting in forests. The principles presented in earlier manuals and handbooks were confirmed in short chapters describing the conduct of defense and attack. Guidelines for the tactical employment of land forces produced in 1957 did not change aspects of urban warfare. Instead of urban warfare, the guidelines promoted guerrilla warfare, deep defense and exploitation of darkness, heavy terrain and weather as balancing factors against the mechanized enemy. Urban fighting was not even mentioned in this secret document which laid the foundations for the tactical doctrine of the 1960s.²⁶

4. A Medicine for Total War? Introduction of Territorial Defense and Urban Warfare

The operations against the Germans were still raging when the government nominated a special Parliamentary Defense Revision Committee to review the foundations of the national defense. The committee worked for four tedious years before publishing its memorandum and recommendations. In hindsight, it was fortunate that the seemingly endless committee work lasted this long for the committee could incorporate the effects of the Paris Peace Treaty and the Soviet-Finnish Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance into its three-volume review.²⁷

The Defence Revision Committee allocated a substantial number of pages to assess the Finnish military-political situation and the nature of total war and battlefield. The review promoted the Finnish will to maintain neutrality during any crisis. However, due to the evolution of atomic weapons and their carriers and the political division between the East and the West, the territory of

²⁵ *Upseerin käsikirja, III osa* (Joukkoja varten). (Helsinki: Topografikunnan rotaatiopaino, 1953), 140–141.

²⁶ *Jalkaväen taisteluohjesääntö II osa* (JvO II. Pataljoonan taistelu), Mikkeli, 1955), 228–233 and 158–164; NAF, T 21442/7B sal, PE:n ohje nro 136/Ohjetsto/8 b sal, 16.5.1957.

²⁷ Pekka Visuri, *Puolustusvoimat kylmässä sodassa: Suomen puolustuspolitiikka 1945–1961*, (Helsinki: WSOY, 1994), 56–62.

Finland would interest both power blocks. Although Finland and the Arctic region remained secondary during any conflict, the Finnish territory – especially the airspace – would offer operational opportunities for the West, especially if it remained undefended.²⁸

The review also addressed lessons from the Second World War. The war had become total as whole societies and resources were mobilized for the struggle of industrial scale. Even remote areas could be affected by the air power and rockets enabled by rapid technological evolution, which had only accelerated after the war. The battlefield had become more mobile. The Allies had opened new fronts through vast amphibious operations. Motorization of the land forces and the introduction of airborne operations had created a new pace and dimension for land operations.²⁹

What did this all mean to the defense? Because Finland was a large country with a small population. The conscription producing large reserves was the only feasible basis for the defense system. According to the experience of the Second World War, there was no division between the battlefield and the home front. The defence system had to be designed to meet deep attacks by organizing it on a territorial basis. Instead of organizing the defence on the battlefield and home front, as during the Second World War, there should be unified commands integrating all defense measures.³⁰

5. On the Outskirts – Defense of Helsinki in the Early 1950s

The defense review did not name the aggressor but noted that Finland could be dragged into the conflict between the West and East. Finland per se was not interesting, but its territory offered opportunities for operations against the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Hostilities against the Soviet Union were not likely due to the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. A conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland was a political absurdity which could not be publicly discussed. Subsequently, the Soviet

²⁸ *Puolustusrevision mietintö, I Osa* (Helsinki 1949), 13–17.

²⁹ *Puolustusrevision mietintö, I Osa* (Helsinki 1949), 45–50.

³⁰ *Puolustusrevision mietintö, I Osa* (Helsinki 1949), 26–27, 76. Before the war the Field Manual addressing principals of war divided the territory of Finland into theatres of war and home front, *Kenttäohjesääntö, yleinen osa* (Helsinki, 1931), 19–20.

military base in Porkkala, capable of not only controlling the narrowest part of the Gulf of Finland but also the capital, was not considered a threat. Yet, the Finnish defense was aware of the Soviet capabilities in the base. Central Helsinki was literally within gun range of the capital. The garrison consisted of an infantry division supported by armor, and worse, and the Finnish were not able to control sea traffic to the base. The Soviets could reinforce their forces in the base in secrecy. How did the Finnish defense forces prepare to defend the capital with minimal experience in urban warfare?³¹

The Finnish threat perception in the early fifties consisted of three scenarios designed to meet the political demands of the FCMA treaty. Scenario B's basic assumption was that the large-scale war had extended to the Baltic. Due to their ability to create new fronts during the Second World, the Western powers would make amphibious landing at the southwestern part of Finland to create a solid base for further operations against Leningrad. The concept of Western invasion had been established as early as 1945 when the future of Finland was anything but straightforward. Threat from the West was not, however, realistic. Rapidly developing operations extending to the Baltic was not probable, as noted in contemporary documents, due to the Natos' limited capabilities. On the other hand, if the war turned out to be a long and exhaustive repetition of the Second World with fully mobilized nations, almost anything was within possibility.³²

The Finnish Defense Forces conducted the first round of operational planning between 1950–1953. They were – as the threat perception – designed to meet the eventualities of carrying out the FCMA treaty. The first of the plans involved only forces within the limitations of the Paris Peace Treaty. The second plan was more comprehensive since it integrated plans for various stages of mobilization and readiness. In this context, it is impossible to analyze these plans

³¹ Jari Leskinen, "Porkkalan tukikohta 1944–1956" in *Porkkala – Tapahtumien keskellä* eds. Jyrki Iivonen & al, (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 2007), 49–53; Tapio Koskimies, *Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello: Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan asiantuntija-arvioissa* (diss.), (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2010), 126–126.

³² Vesa Tynkkynen and Petteri Jouko, "Uhkalähtöinen puolustus suunnittelu" in *Suomen puolustusvoimat 100 vuotta*, ed. Mikko Karjalainen (Helsinki: Edita 2018), 140–142; Mika Jääskeläinen, *Suunnitelmat pääkaupunkiseudun puolustamiseksi jatkosodan lopulta 1960-luvun alkuun* (diss.), (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2021), 48–49.

comprehensively. However, it is essential to note that the capital, Helsinki, played an important role in both plans.³³

If the operations took place before the mobilization, the defenses of Helsinki relied on the units of the Helsinki garrison. The coastal artillery regiment was tasked to guard and cover islands in the vicinity of Helsinki. Of the two available mobile units, one protected military and administrative infrastructure within central Helsinki. The other one was deployed outside central Helsinki and reserved for counterattacks to potential airborne landing zones to assist local police forces against any uprisings and to support, if necessary, the frontier guard responsible for guarding the Soviet base.³⁴

According to OpPlan-52, large-scale Western operations against Helsinki were very unlikely because of the Soviet base on the western side of the capital. Nonetheless, Helsingin linnoitusalue (a unique fortified region of Helsinki), the wartime establishment responsible for the defense of the capital, based its planning on three different threat scenarios.³⁵

The enemy would make amphibious landings either on the eastern or western side of central Helsinki or, in an optimal situation, directly into the principal harbors within central Helsinki. The east side was considered the most optimal for landings due to the channels leading to the mainland. The main elements of a divisional assault force could be transported to the area which nowadays contains the main harbor for commercial vessels. The western side of the city offered opportunities only for a regimental assault.³⁶

In the light of threat perception, it is interesting to note that although the defense perimeter was prepared to meet an attack from all directions, the majority of the forces were deployed on the western side of the city facing the Soviet base. Apart from one battalion – the reserve preparing to counter airborne landings – the units of the infantry brigade allocated to the defense were deployed to cover western approaches to the city. According to the plan, the main battle would take

³³ Jääskeläinen (2021), 89–91.

³⁴ NAF, T 20184/F 5 OT-sal, HelSpE:n käsky nro 133/Järjtsto/OT/11 a sal, 25.7.1953.

³⁵ NAF, T 26862/F 3 OT-sal, PvPE:n käsky nro 80/Op.1/11 b /OT/sal, 13.6.1952.

³⁶ Petteri Jouko, ”Porkkalan sotilasstrateginen asema” in *Porkkala – Tapahtumien keskellä* eds. Jyrki Iivonen & al, (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 2007), 67–69.

place on the outskirts of the town after the nimble units of the Frontier Guard responsible for guarding the base had taken delaying action. The forces would take advantage of the WW1 era fortifications, which were part of more extensive defenses of Helsinki built to protect not only Helsinki itself but the contemporary capital of imperial Russia, Saint Petersburg. Inside the city, civilian and military installations would be covered by the Guards Battalion and Anti-Aircraft units.³⁷

The larger operational framework also supports the idea of fighting the main battle on the outer perimeter of the city. The GHQ planned to deploy the general reserves consisting of several brigades in the vicinity of Helsinki to reinforce the defenses or conduct counterattacks. In addition, the GHQ planned to direct both of the armored brigades to Helsinki after they had been brought to the wartime establishment during the mobilization.³⁸

Conclusions

The concept of conducting military operations in built-up areas remained vague, almost non-existent in the Finnish post-war military thinking and planning. The success of the Finnish arms during the Second World War relied heavily on victories that had taken place in dense forests. Rugged terrain had been the balancing factor against superior Soviet forces in various areas of operations. Also, the Soviet offensive operations in 1944 received substantial attention as the Finnish reasoned that deep attack could be countered only by the deep defence.

As a result, the tactical lessons addressed after the war concentrated on fighting outside cities – urban warfare received hardly any attention at any level. The military manuals written in the early 1950s introduced only some very general principles of urban warfare despite the cities in Southern Finland being in the danger zone of any future military operations. Forests had provided cover and opportunities for the Finnish forces during the war, and they were expected to do so in the future. It would take decades before tactics in urban warfare took significant steps forward.

³⁷ NAF, T 20184/F 4 OT-sal, HelSpE:n käsky nro 244/Järjtsto/OT 11 a sal, 2.9.1953; NAF T 20184/F 4 OT-sal, UudSIE:n käsky nro 373/OT/11 a sal, 30.9.1953, Liite 5.

³⁸ NAF, T 26862/F 3 OT-sal, PvPE:n käsky nro 80/Op.1/11 b/OT/sal, 13.6.1952.

Flak Towers and the Defense of Major Cities in the Second World War

Philipp Fraund (USA)

1. Introduction

Walking today through Berlin or Hamburg shows the scars of urban warfare. Although entire city districts have been rebuilt after the Second World War, the monstrous flak towers in these two German cities are still there and a constant reminder of a time when cities and the civil population were major targets. Their original purpose to protect the cities and its civilian population from Allied bombing raids, has long gone, but blowing them up was no option either due to the high risk of pressure waves. As a result, the flak towers are still part of Berlin and Hamburg's (but also other cities) architecture.

This paper examines the role of flak towers for the defence of cities in World War Two. First, I will show the planning for air defence in the period after World War I. Second, I will use the examples of Hamburg and Berlin to illustrate the building of the flak towers, its challenges, and the strategic thinking behind it. Third, I will discuss the effectiveness of the flak towers for the air defence of these two cities. Finally, I will explore of what happened to the flak towers after World War Two.

2. Planning for air-defence

The First World War had illustrated the potential of future air warfare. British and American military experts, like Billy Mitchell and Sir Hugh Trenchard to name but a few, drew the lesson from that war that trench warfare with its high casualty rates had to be avoided at all cost in a future war. Air warfare, they imagined, would drive the front back to enemy cities where armament factories and the civil population offered more effective targets in terms of bringing the enemy quickly to his knees. German military experts came to the same conclusion and therefore started to think about civilian air defense as part of their future war planning. Soon after Hitler came to power in Germany in

1933, they started to construct private and public air raid shelters as they thought it provided the most effective protection for the population from enemy air raids.

In August 1940, Berlin experienced its first regular British air raids, and the German Luftwaffe had little to counter these attacks. Germany's air defence was built on several pillars: first, the early warning radar system "Freya" was installed to detect approaching enemy aircrafts. This provided the key information for the second pillar: a successful flight interception. Here, the most modern fighter plane Messerschmidt BF 109 provided excellent fighting capabilities to counter those attacks. The third pillar, and literally the last line of defence, was the anti-aircraft artillery, of which the flak towers were part of it. In essence, German cities and other vital targets, such as armament factories, were protected by flak artillery from the beginning of the war. Despite of that, British bombers reached German cities from early on in the war although Germany held the air superiority over Western Europe after its successful western campaign in spring 1940. Another reason was that the Nazis had too few Messerschmitt planes available to effectively intercept enemy aircrafts.

On September 9, 1940, Hitler ordered the construction of flak towers in Berlin and accompanied his order with his personal sketches of the design and construction. The idea of a flak tower was to place anti-aircraft guns on artificially constructed hills in order to fight the enemy aircrafts from an elevated position. The elevated position of the guns significantly increased their range and, most importantly, avoided damages to the surrounding buildings that could be caused by the pressure waves from the guns fired.

Hitler's draft was immediately translated into more detailed plans for the implementation in Berlin, which proved to be more challenging than expected. First, the planners identified buildings in the city that were high enough to mount anti-aircraft guns. For instance, the corner towers of the Reichstag provided an excellent location but the plans were quickly discarded as the statics of the Reichstag did not allow for such a construction. As a result, the planners had to think about an artificial tower on which to mount the guns. Second, the planners realized that the command-and-control devices were too sensitive to be set up in the same tower as the pressure waves and the smoke from the guns would impair the devices. Therefore, the command-and-control devices had to be placed in a separate, second tower, at a safe distance, 300 – 400 meters, from the guns.

As a result, the flak towers always consisted of two towers as a pair: a control tower, which housed the technology, and a second tower, on which the guns were mounted. A radar device (“Würzburg Riese”) was installed on the control tower and a cable connection between the two towers allowed for secure communication between the control tower and the combat tower. Installed on the combat tower were four super-heavy 12.8 cm Flak-Zwilling twin mount systems. In addition, smaller anti-aircraft guns of 2 cm and 3 cm caliber were installed for the protection of the towers against low-flying aircrafts. In the following, I will use flak tower as a singular but I mean the pair of towers.

3. History of Construction

The construction of the first flak tower began in Berlin's Tiergarten in October 1940 – just under a month after Hitler’s order. The sheer size of the towers required a large area where the towers could be built. The Tiergarten fulfilled the criteria of a space in the city centre and offered a strategically and tactically ideal location. The greatest challenge, however, posed the structure itself. The towers were built like bunkers, requiring a wall thickness of up to 2 meters and the ceilings needed to be 3.5 meters thick to withstand air raids. A special concrete was used for the construction, which consisted almost entirely out of cement and water but contained no additives. This so-called "blue concrete" had the decisive advantage that it continued to harden over 5 decades, steadily increasing its endurance.

Enormous quantities of cement and reinforcing steel were needed. Since both materials were not readily available in the desired quantity, the Nazis prioritized the materials for the building of the flak tower. For example, the flak tower in Tiergarten required 120,000 tons of gravel sand, 78,000 tons of chippings, 35,000 tons of cement, 9,200 tons of round iron and 15,000 cubic meters of wood. Trucks alone could not transport such vast quantities of materials, so a light railway needed to be built first to secure the logistics of the construction site. In some cases, existing tram lines were used to transport the building materials, in other cases, railway tracks were specially laid. To ensure a rapid construction progress, formwork elements for the towers were delivered pre-assembled. Most importantly though was manpower. Many prisoners of war, inmates of concentration camps and forced laborers were used for the

construction of the flak tower. They had to work day and night, and thus the flak tower in Berlin's Tiergarten was completed in April 1941 – in a record time of 7 months only.

Berlin as the capital of the Third Reich was the target of frequent air raids and therefore two more flak towers were constructed shortly after the completion of the flak tower in Tiergarten. In October 1941, the flak tower in Friedrichshain was completed and a third flak tower in Humboldthain was completed in April 1942. Hamburg, as the second largest city in Germany and the most important port city of the Third Reich, was another target for Allied air raids. The geographic location of the port facilities between the rivers Alster and Elbe made orientation for the Allied pilots easy. By December 1941, Hamburg had experienced 162 Allied air raids, and thus, the Nazis decided in February 1942 to build a flak tower in Hamburg's Heiliggeistfeld, close to the port facilities. Construction for it began in April 1942 and was completed in October 1942. A second flak tower was built in the city district of Wilhelmsburg, again close to the port facilities, and was completed in April 1943. Although rationalization played an important part in speeding up the construction, each of the flak towers erected in Berlin and Hamburg was unique. Every flak tower was therefore improved and modified based on the experience gained during the construction of the previous tower.

While the location of the flak tower was chosen for tactical reasons, it was not only large enough to offer space for the military personnel and military command facilities but also contained armament factories or in some cases hospitals, was used as a civilian air raid shelter, or even served as an art depot.

4. Effectiveness

The task of the flak towers in Berlin and Hamburg was to minimize air attacks on the vital infrastructure of those cities. Ideally, the flak towers deterred Allied aircrafts from dropping bombs and thus defend the cities from Allied air raids. As the war went on, the Allies intensified the air raids over German cities, yet, there is hardly evidence of the prevention of dropping bombs, or of bombers having been shot down as a result of the flak towers. The Flak Towers in Berlin had in the timeframe between 1942 and 1945 34 accredited downing's of enemy planes. Statisticians calculated that depending on the caliber of the guns, between

3,000 and 16,000 grenades were necessary to shoot down an aircraft. This proved to be logistically challenging in terms of producing enough ammunition in order to resupply the flak batteries. Given that air raids were executed by large bomber' fleets of around 1000 aircraft, the flak towers were relatively ineffective in providing sufficient air defence for the cities. With an estimated pricetag of 363 Mio. Euro for each tower without artillery, radar, and ammunition, the Flak Towers were just too expensive for what they really archived: Accumulated 100 – 120 shot down enemy aircraft.

Moreover, the improvement of Allied bombers allowed them to fly on a higher altitude and still drop their bombs more precisely. As a result, the flak towers became increasingly inefficient for air defence, particularly due to their stationary position. In this respect, the flak towers – like the construction of the Atlantic Wall – were an anachronism cast in vast amounts of concrete, which was ultimately of little military value. On the other hand, the flak towers offered shelter to countless civilians, while the guns tried to stop the Allies from advancing in their cities. Once, the Allied troops reached the German cities, the flak towers proved to be unsuitable for house-to-house combat. They offered protection to ten thousands of civilians.

5. Memory and Flak Towers

The flak towers in Berlin and Hamburg still stood tall when World War Two came to an end. The planners of the flak towers had already developed plans for the towers after the war. It was planned to convert them into shrines for the fallen of the war. In Berlin, the enormous the flak towers should be redesigned to be part of Berlin as the “world capital Germania”. Drafts of how such a memorial should look like had existed since 1941. The architect Wilhelm Kreis who was general advisor for the German war cemeteries (Generalbaurat für die deutschen Kriegerfriedhöfe) had submitted drafts for such "castles of the dead". As a model for the modern stronghold served Castel del Monte in Apulia, Italy, erected by the Hohenstaufen Emperor Frederick II of the late twelfth century. With that reference to medieval architecture, the flak towers marked the climax as well as the end point of fortress construction.

The Allies in occupied Berlin were keen to get rid of the flak towers as a visible sign of the demilitarization and denazification as outlined in the Potsdam

Agreement of 1945. Since the flak towers were located in different Allied sectors, each occupying force wanted to show off how thoroughly they could remove the flak towers from their zone of occupation. By blowing them up, the Allies could easily demonstrate to each other how serious they were in terms of Denazification and Demilitarization. The Soviets blew up the flak tower in Friedrichshain in 1947, leaving two huge mountains of rubble, which still exists today. The French army successfully blew up the control tower of Humboldthain in December 1945 but faced serious issues when they wanted to get rid of the combat tower. As a result, a part of the combat tower still stands today, being used as a climbing wall. The flak tower in Tiergarten was in the British sector and the British pioneer battalion needed several attempts to blow up the combat tower, and damaged parts of the Berlin Zoo. In the 1950ies, that mountain of rubble was integrated into the Berlin Zoo – as a rock inside the monkey areal. Similarly difficult was the removal of the flak towers in Hamburg, and thus, they still exist today, converted into a hotel and a solar power station.

In conclusion, the flak towers of the Nazis never quite fulfilled the expectations of their planners in terms of providing effective air defence for the cities in World War Two. Moreover, they provide a difficult legacy for the cities as simply blowing them up in the immediate post-war period, did not prove successful in removing such monstrous structures. Subsequent generations had to think creatively of how to make use of them, integrating them into the urban landscape. Yet, the flak towers tower still stand tall as reminders of the past.

The Reintroduction of Russian Storm Detachments

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Abstract

On February 26, a Ukrainian reserve officer serving at the front near Vuhledar reported the capture of a Russian military manual on Twitter, describing the organization and tactics of a new kind of Russian formation called “assault detachments”. During urban warfare and fighting in entrenched positions, limited situational awareness often leads to dispersed small-scale fighting, resulting in isolated battles at the lower tactical levels. Reducing the higher commander’s ability to command and control the overall battle and as a consequence, making it necessary for smaller formations and their commanders to be able to operate independently. By organizing their units into specialized storm detachments, the Russians have tried to create units that function optimally in such an environment, by distributing the necessary heavy support weapons down to lower tactical formations, as well as delegating the decision-making authority for their deployment down to lower tactical commanders. The use of storm detachments, however, is a revival of a much older concept, initially developed during the battle of Stalingrad and initially revived during the Chechen Wars. This article aims to trace their historical lineage and to describe what circumstances and limitations gave rise to the establishment of these specialized assault formations and how their organization, equipment and tactics have developed over time.

Keywords: Assault detachments, storm groups, urban warfare, Russian, command and control.

Introduction

Over the course of January 2023, Russian Armed Forces (AF), belonging to the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, began stepping up their attacks against the

Ukrainian town of Vuhledar.¹ Without many gains to show for initially, they tried again in the beginning of February, with several other Russian formations, notably the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, suffering heavy losses in a number of failed assaults against the entrenched Ukrainian troops defending the town. Leaving the battlefield scattered with dozens of blackened and burning wreckages and supposedly hundreds of Russian soldiers ending up getting killed.² Besides being an indication of newly mobilized Russian military personnel's poor level of training, these costly assaults also demonstrated faulty Russian tactics and led to severe criticism against a number of Russian commanders for repeatedly making the same mistakes.³

Just a few weeks later, on February 26, a Ukrainian reserve officer serving at the front near Vuhledar reported the capture of a Russian military manual on Twitter, describing the organization and tactics of a new kind of Russian formation called "assault detachments".⁴ Indicating that the unsuccessful attack against Vuhledar and other failures have probably led the Russians to revise their assault tactics and accompanying organizational structures. Also called "storm" units, these are dedicated assault formations, organized, trained and equipped specifically in order to carry out assault operations in urban terrain and heavily fortified wooded areas. Although not all have proven equally competent and quality differs from one unit to another, in general, they have shown to be a major improvement.⁵

¹ Mike Eckel, "Russia's New Offensive Grinds Into Action As Ukraine Punches Back Hard," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, February 11, 2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-new-offensive-winter-war-bakhmut-vuhledar/32266536.html>

² Mike Eckel, "What Happened In Vuhledar? A Battle Points To Major Russian Military Problems," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, February 17, 2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-battle-vuhledar/32276547.html>

³ Institute for the Study of War, *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2023*, <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2023>

⁴ Tatarigami_UA(@Tatarigami_UA) "Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure. The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment," Twitter, February 26, 2023, 06:56 a.m., https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1629722073487613953

⁵ Tanmay Kadam, "Russia's STORM Assault Unit, Armed With "Alpine Quest" Tech, Launch Deadly Attacks To Recapture Lost Positions," *The Eurasian Times*, April 29, 2023, <https://www.eurasiantimes.com/russian-storm-assault-unit-armed-with-alpine-quest-tech/>

During urban warfare and fighting in entrenched positions, limited situational awareness often leads to dispersed small-scale fighting, resulting in isolated battles at the lower tactical levels. Reducing the higher commander's ability to command and control the overall battle and as a consequence, making it necessary for smaller formations and their commanders to be able to operate independently. It also leads to a fragmentation of combat power, changing the combat power ratios already favoring the defender even further. Meaning that a limited number of defenders can tie up a much stronger opponent. Limited situational awareness also increases the risk of fratricide between friendly units. Additionally, the ability to turn buildings into fortifications, often combined with the absence of large open spaces, lacking clear observation and fields of fire, necessitates the ability to generate firepower at much shorter distances.

Assault detachments are basically designed to be more flexible and self-supporting in their role as breakthrough formations and to operate within this complex environment. The current transition towards specialized assault units, however, is actually a revival of a much older concept. As they were initially developed and employed in the Battle of Stalingrad, as well as during a number of other World War II battles, including Berlin. Many decades later, fighting in the Chechen capital of Grozny during the First and Second Chechen Wars, the concept was again revived by necessity. And now, in Ukraine, it again reappears, although in slightly different form. This article therefore aims to trace the historical lineage of Russian Storm Detachments, from their initial development during the Battles of Stalingrad and Berlin, through both Battles of Grozny and onto the current fighting in Donbas. The objective is to answer what circumstances and limitations gave rise to the establishment of these specialized assault formations and how their organization, equipment and tactics have developed over time.

World War II

Before the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Red Army had paid little to no attention to the specific characteristics and requirements of urban warfare. With the exception of a short entry describing the employment of storm groups, it's 1929 field manual and 1936 provisional field manual offered little guidance to Soviet commanders. Although the Red Army

defended several cities over the course of 1941-42, most fighting on these occasions occurred outside the built-up areas. Stalingrad, on the other hand, would be the first time that large-scale fighting would be conducted inside the city proper.⁶ Between September 10 and November 17, 1942, the German 6th Army under General von Paulus conducted four consecutive attacks in Stalingrad. While German troops initially progressed rapidly, their advance slowed down considerably once they entered the inner city. Becoming entangled in costly house-to-house fighting, resulting in massive casualties.⁷

On the Soviet side, General Vasili Chuikov took command of the Red Army's 62nd Army, defending the city center, on September 12, 1942. He would be the chief responsible for the defense of the city, publishing a first-hand account of the battle after the war, while being the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces in 1959. He was also responsible for reinvigorating the use of storm groups, as their use had already been described in the Red Army's 1929 field manual.⁸ According to Chuikov, the use of storm groups and buildings turned into defensive strongpoints were the primary elements in his army's ultimate successful defense of the city. Where fighting usually took place inside buildings, rather than on the streets. Together, they formed the elements necessary to conduct what the Soviets referred to as an active defense, in which fixed and fortified strongholds were used to break up German attacks, while the Germans themselves were kept under continuous pressure by constantly counterattacking, often forcing them to give up positions taken shortly before.⁹

A strongpoint usually consisted of one or a number of buildings which were reinforced and set up for an all-round defense. Depending on its size, these were defended by anything ranging from a section to an entire battalion. More

⁶ David R. Stone, "Stalingrad and the Evolution of Soviet Urban Warfare," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* vol. 22, no. 2 (June 11, 2009): 196-197 and 204, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13518040902918089>

⁷ S. J. Lewis, "The Battle of Stalingrad," in *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 37, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/BlockByBlock_TheChallengesOfUrbanOperations.pdf

⁸ Stone, "Stalingrad and the Evolution of Soviet Urban Warfare," 204.

⁹ Vasili Ivanovich Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad: The Story of World War II's Greatest Battle as Told by the Russian Commander at Stalingrad*, trans. Harold Silver (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 314-315.

importantly, these strongpoints were expected to fight independently for multiple days, operating as part of a unified defensive network of multiple strongpoints with interlocking fields of fire.¹⁰ As such, their garrisons usually had their own heavy support weapons and specialists, like heavy machineguns, anti-tank weapons, light or medium artillery pieces and even tanks or self-propelled guns. But also, snipers, engineers and medical personnel for the treatment of wounded soldiers, along with the necessary supplies.¹¹ In turn, the men of the 62nd Army were also faced with the German use of strongpoints, which eventually gave rise to the development of storm groups. Chuikov cites two reasons for the need that arose for developing storm groups. First, infantry by itself was not strong enough to overcome enemy obstacles and capture strongpoints, lacking the necessary firepower to achieve this. Indirect fire through artillery and mortars had little or no effect on well-prepared enemy strongpoints. Second, large infantry formations proved to be too cumbersome to be able to operate effectively in such a complex environment. Storm groups were therefore usually built around existing infantry platoons. Although sizes could vary significantly, based on the nature of the assignment and strength of the objective. In order to overcome the lack of firepower, a number of artillery pieces or even tanks were added in support, using their firepower to destroy enemy fire positions at point blank range. Specialists, like engineers and chemical troops, the latter in Russian often indicating flamethrowers, were used to breach walls and clear strongpoints of enemy soldiers.¹²

Storm groups were divided into three different sub-groups; assault groups, reinforcement groups and reserve groups. The assault groups, eight to ten men strong each and operating under a single commander, were tasked with breaking into the enemy strongpoint and independently engage the enemy troops inside. For this purpose, they were primarily armed with submachine guns and hand grenades. Immediately after the initial assault groups had entered the strongpoint, the reinforcement groups would follow and take up firing positions and set up defenses, in order to prevent enemy reinforcements to come to the aid of their beleaguered comrades. For that reason, they were armed with heavier

¹⁰ Stone, "Stalingrad and the Evolution of Soviet Urban Warfare," 202.

¹¹ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 306-307.

¹² Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 314, 316 and 318.

weapons, such as machine guns, and were led by the storm group commander. Lastly, reserve groups had the task of replenishing initial losses and, if necessary, forming additional assault groups.¹³

The size and composition of the storm group was determined by the object of the assault and the particular resources available. Assaults against enemy strongpoints were always thoroughly planned, prepared and extensively reconnoitered in advance.¹⁴ The assault itself was carried out with or without artillery preparation, depending on the locations of the enemy's firing positions. However, in most cases individual artillery pieces would be used in a direct fire role in support of the assault.¹⁵ The assault groups dash towards the breaching locations or entry points would take place immediately after the preliminary artillery shelling ended. Otherwise, the approach would be conducted as stealthy as possible. The aim of both approaches was to achieve a maximum amount of surprise, which was considered as being one of the principal requirement for success.¹⁶ Not surprisingly, this demanded a significant amount of boldness and individual initiative at every level, the latter of which, according to Chuikov, was no easy job to teach Red Army soldiers.¹⁷

Seeking to avoid costly and time-consuming urban warfare during their westward advance later in the war, the Soviets basically distinguished between two different ways of taking cities. One option was for a forward detachment to try and capture an enemy city from the march, before it could be properly organized for defense and quickly capture its city center and key infrastructure.¹⁸ If this was not possible, cities would be encircled and attacked across multiple axes using storm groups and storm detachments. These would then disrupt the enemy's defense by isolating and destroying enemy strongpoints.

¹³ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 314 and 317.

¹⁴ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 317 and 319.

¹⁵ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 321-322.

¹⁶ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 318.

¹⁷ Chuikov, *The Battle for Stalingrad*, 322-323

¹⁸ Lester Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny," *Foreign Militaries Studies Office Fort Leavenworth*, 1 July, 1995, <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/244590>

By that time, storm detachments consisted of three to six storm groups, ranging in size from a platoon to company, with tanks, engineers and (self-propelled) artillery grouped together into a fire support group and a reserve and were usually tasked with capturing multiple strongpoints.¹⁹ Chuikov, in command of 62nd Army now redesignated as 8th Guards Army, was regarded as somewhat as an authority on urban warfare following the victory at Stalingrad. So, in the run-up towards the Battle of Berlin he produced a pamphlet that was distributed throughout the 1st Belorussian Front regarding the use of storm groups and storm detachments, which were again used to great effect.²⁰

Chechen Wars

During the Cold War the Soviets initially continued to study and refine their urban warfare concepts and acknowledged that in the European theater, as part of a large-scale conflict against NATO, fighting in cities would be unavoidable. As part of a deep operation, their approach remained centered around the two options of capturing a city from the march by a forwardly deployed detachment, or, if this was not possible, to bypass the city and let follow-on echelons conduct a more deliberate approach through encirclement and systematic destruction and capture of enemy defensive positions.

During the latter option, they would employ task organized combined arms battalion sized “assault detachments” and company sized “assault groups” retaining the same three-tiered layout as described above. They also recognized that due to the limited scope of command and control of the assault detachment’s commander in an urban environment, company assault groups had to operate more or less independently. Artillery was therefore employed in a decentralized manner, with up to half of an assault detachments artillery, including tanks and anti-tank guns, supplemented by combat engineers and flamethrowers, being attached to assault groups in a direct fire role. At the level of assault detachment,

¹⁹ Charles Knight, “Analyzing the Urban Attack: Insights from Soviet doctrine as a ‘model checklist’,” Australian Army Research Centre, March 4, 2020, <https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/analysing-urban-attack-insights-soviet-doctrine-model-checklist>

²⁰ David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Kansas: University Press, 2015), 329 and 338.

the remaining artillery was employed in an indirect fire role, in order to support the assault group's advance or thwart enemy counterattacks.²¹

Between the fall of Berlin and the First Battle of Grozny, fifty years later, the Red Army was militarily engaged in a number of major cities, such as Budapest (1956), Prague (1968), Kabul (1979) and Baku (1990). However, on all occasions, with varying degrees of success, these were conducted as a *coup de main*. Meaning that in all cases, before the arrival of the main Soviet ground forces, certain military elements had already been present beforehand, and an extensive reconnaissance had been conducted. Identifying important locations that needed to be captured quickly by using Spetsnaz, paratroopers or forward detachments in order to quickly gain control over the city's communications and key infrastructure. Especially in Afghanistan this method turned out to be very successful, enabling the Soviets to rapidly install a new government.²² However, when these requirements are not met and the enemy has had time to properly set up defenses, taking a city from the march is not the best option. As the Russians learned on December 31st, 1994.

Inspired by the successful *coup de main* against Kabul, Russian planners decided to opt for a similar approach against Grozny.²³ Time constraints as a result of political pressure prevented an extensive reconnaissance, so a well-prepared deliberate attack on the city was ruled out as a viable option.²⁴ The operations plan which was finally decided upon resulted in three Russian columns converging on the capital. However, numerous delays meant that the element of surprise was lost, and Grozny was not adequately surrounded and sealed off once Russian troops entered the city. Due to a lack of intelligence, the

²¹ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support* (Washington D.C: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1984), 10-1-10-5, <https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-2.pdf>

²² Lester Grau, "The Takedown of Kabul: An Effective Coup de Main," in *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 320.

²³ Richard D. Wallwork, "Artillery in Urban Operations: Reflections on Experiences in Chechnya" (Master Thesis of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2004), 35, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA429031>

²⁴ Timothy L. Thomas, "The Battle for Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," *The U.S. Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1999), <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol29/iss2/10/>

Russians were thus unaware of the extent of Chechen defensive preparations.²⁵ To make matters worse, urban warfare had all but disappeared from Soviet Russian textbooks and training manuals during the Cold War. As a result, most Russian troops assembled for the assault had had little to no training in urban warfare.²⁶

Nevertheless, on 31st December 1994, expecting to face little Chechen opposition, four Russian columns entered the city with the aim of rapidly seizing the city's key infrastructure and capture the seat of government. Trusting that a show of force would be sufficient to withhold the Chechens from entering the fray.²⁷ However, after some initial progress, they ran into well-prepared Chechen ambushes and the whole operation turned into a disaster. Unable to support each other, while lacking sufficient infantry, Russian armored vehicles were knocked out one after another by mobile and lightly armed Chechen fighters, using machine guns and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). At least one of the columns was totally destroyed, while the others ended up taking massive casualties, forcing the Russians to seriously reconsider their plan of assault.²⁸

Following the debacle on New Year's Eve, a quick change of leadership occurred, replacing some of the top generals involved. Those who took over were more mindful of the lessons of the past. In particular general Lev Rokhlin, who acknowledged that he adapted his tactics based on lessons from WWII, in particular the Battle of Berlin. Better trained reinforcements helped the Russians to come closer towards the numerical and qualitative superiority that was deemed necessary during an offensive in an urban environment.²⁹ They began employing a more deliberate approach, beginning at the outskirts of the city and then working their way inwards using multiple axes of advance.³⁰ They also quickly

²⁵ Wallwork, "Artillery in Urban Operations," 35-40.

²⁶ Olga Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat* (RAND, 2001), 8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1289.html

²⁷ Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, 5.

²⁸ Timothy L. Thomas, "The 31 December 1994 – 8 February 1995 Battle for Grozny," in *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 169-170.

²⁹ Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, 23.

³⁰ Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics".

relearned that after capture, a building had to be prepared for defense in order to prevent the Chechens from recapturing it.

Mechanized anti-aircraft artillery was brought in, which, due to the elevation of their guns, were exceptionally well-suited to support assaults and combat Chechen positioned in the upper floors of buildings.³¹ They also resorted back to creating task organized storm groups and storm detachments, which they assembled by scrambling together personnel from other formations. However, many of these units were necessarily already composed out of several other units prior to the invasion, and by doing so, they destroyed what little cohesion these units had left.³² Besides this, company and battalion commanders were not sufficiently trained in order to command and control the large number of support assets that were assigned to them.³³ Effective command was further complicated by the fact that, like their predecessors in World War II, as Chuikov already emphasized, the necessary level of initiative and independent action by lower-level commanders and soldiers was not commonplace within Russian military culture.³⁴

Nonetheless, these changes meant a significant improvement, resulting in Russian troops advancing much more methodically.³⁵ Resorting to tanks and artillery clustered into a fire support group to provide direct cover fire during the initial assault. Using smoke to cover the approach, combat engineers to create breaches in order to enter enemy strongpoints and employing smaller tactical formations to clear buildings of enemy troops, largely relying on hand grenades. Once a building was captured by a so-called seizure group, it was immediately prepared for defense by the consolidation group, employing all sorts of grenade launchers as well as mines and boobytraps.³⁶ And a dedicated reserve standing by to support or supplement either one. Of particular interest was the extensive use of RPO-A *Shmel* flamethrowers by Russian troops, which differed from the traditional flamethrowers of World War II in that this was a single-shot shoulder

³¹ Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, 24.

³² Thomas, "The Battle for Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat."

³³ Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics".

³⁴ Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, 26-27.

³⁵ Thomas, "The Battle for Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat."

³⁶ Wallwork, "Artillery in Urban Operations," 42. Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics".

launched projectile carrying a thermobaric warhead. Creating a fuel air explosion with a blast comparable to that of an 152mm artillery grenade.³⁷

Surprisingly enough, although the Russian were able to draw on a number of lessons from the fighting in Grozny, this did not result in additional training in urban warfare during exercises. What did increase was training in the use of artillery for company and battalion commanders. It appears that in urban combat, the extensive use of artillery for destroying enemy held positions was seen as a workable alternative for costly infantry assaults, despite leading to massive collateral damage and loss of civilian life.³⁸ So when Russian troops returned to Grozny in 1999, they took a much more deliberate approach. Unlike in 1994, this time they first encircled the city, trapping the Chechen forces inside. Important buildings and infrastructure on the outskirts of the city were captured and used to cover the approaches, sealing off the city. This was then followed by a period of sustained artillery bombardments and airstrikes against Chechen positions. Meanwhile, intelligence and reconnaissance preparation for the upcoming assault was much more thorough, as had been the practice during World War II.³⁹

When main assault finally began in late January, the city was divided into several sectors and sub-sectors and assigned to various units. Company sized assault groups now received artillery- or mortar batteries as a whole in direct support. Artillery fire therefore became much more decentralized, with battalion and company commanders each in charge of fires within their own established zones of operations. Shortening the time between reconnaissance and destruction of targets, making Russian fires much more responsive and effective. Another difference, compared to 1994-1995, was that storm groups were now assembled on the basis of existing units, rather than from multiple units scraped together and that more responsibility was allocated towards junior officers.⁴⁰

Much more use was made of trained snipers, who were now capable of serving as artillery spotters. Instead of tanks leading the charge, like they did in

³⁷ Thomas, "The Battle for Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat."

³⁸ Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, 38 and 46.

³⁹ Timothy L. Thomas, "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned," *Military Review* vol. 80, no. 4 (July-August 2000), 50-51 and 54, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA512069.pdf>

⁴⁰ Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, 60.

1994, these were now deployed behind the advancing infantry and used to provide direct fire support. Within the storm groups themselves, fire support was organized into so-called “troikas,” consisting of a sniper, grenade launcher (RPG) and a machine gunner. Last and not least, Russian troops were given proper time for rest and recuperation in between assignments.⁴¹ As a result of these improvements, although not perfect, the 1999-2000 attack proved much more successful than that of 1994-1995. Meanwhile, however, the city had been reduced to ashes. Strangely enough, these experiences again did not result in significant adaptations in urban warfare doctrine and training schedules after the war. With the exception of some of the more elite formations, like Spetsnaz and airborne (VDV), or specialized anti-terror components, Russian soldiers continued to receive little to no urban warfare training.⁴² As a consequence, Russian troops would go into the next war just as unprepared as they had done during the last.

Russo-Ukrainian War

The war in Ukraine has shown numerous parallels thus far, from the stretched-out columns of burned-out Russian armored vehicles littering the roads leading towards the capital of Kiev, to cities like Bakhmut and Mariupol being leveled to the ground by massive employment of artillery. As these urban battles have also demonstrated, capturing enemy strongpoints or seizing important urban infrastructure remains a key element of fighting in major cities and necessitate the employment of combined arms warfare. It also means that formations must be capable of defending strongpoints once they have been captured, quickly switching between offense and defense.⁴³ As the manual captured in Vuhledar shows, following numerous failures, the Russians have again resorted to their proven recipe of creating specialized assault detachments, who, by their

⁴¹ Thomas, Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned, 51-54.

⁴² John Spencer and Michael Kofman, “Russia, Ukraine, And Urban Warfare,” Urban Warfare Project, August 19, 2022, accessed, August 9, 2023, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/russia-ukraine-and-urban-warfare/>

⁴³ John Spencer and Liam Collins, “Twelve Months of War in Ukraine have Revealed Four Fundamental lessons on Urban Warfare,” *Modern War Institute at West Point*, 2 February, 2023, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/twelve-months-of-war-in-ukraine-have-revealed-four-fundamental-lessons-on-urban-warfare/>

organization, training and equipment are optimized to fight in this type of environment.

Its current basic features remain the same as they have been in Stalingrad initially and Grozny later on, with higher-echelon support assets and more freedom of action being delegated down to lower tactical levels. However, compared to regular companies and battalions, assault groups and detachments now have a somewhat simplified structure and smaller subunits, making them more manageable during the complex and often fragmented urban fighting. Possibly to compensate for handling the ever-growing number of support assets at the same time. Assault Detachments are now made up of two or three assault companies, a fire support group, including an artillery- and a mortar battery, a reconnaissance group, a reserve group, a separate tank group, dedicated air defense, recovery equipment, mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), medevac and of course flamethrowers and combat engineers.⁴⁴

The assault companies themselves are made up of only two platoons instead of the usual three, each numbering just 12-15 in personnel. They also have their own fire support platoon, armored fighting vehicles (AFV), artillery support platoon, reserve section, medevac section and UAV team. These include anything from mortars and individual artillery pieces, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), automatic grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and sniper teams. Even at the lowest level, each platoon has its own machine gunner, grenade launcher, combat engineers, combat medic and UAV- and radio operators. Although the exact composition can vary according to mission requirements.⁴⁵

Although the Twitter thread mainly discusses attacking fortified positions in wooded areas, it is possible to derive from this certain general characteristics of how they are intended to operate in urban environments. With regard to the tactics employed, UAVs are used primarily for reconnaissance prior to the assault. Although some Ukrainian sources report that they are also used by

⁴⁴ Tatarigami_UA(@Tatarigami_UA) “Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure.

⁴⁵ Tatarigami_UA(@Tatarigami_UA) “Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure.

Russian commanders to adjust artillery fire and command and control.⁴⁶ The pause between the preliminary artillery bombardment and the actual assault is kept as short as possible. As soon as the artillery stops firing, lighter fire support assets, like automatic grenade launchers, take over in order to suppress the enemy and enable the assault teams to advance unopposed. In terms of decision-making authority for the deployment of fire support, the platoon commander controls automatic grenade launchers and mortar fire, employment of artillery usually remains at the level of company commander and air support is provided at battalion level. During an assault, commanders should avoid moving through open spaces and instead make use of the available cover.⁴⁷ Tanks and other AFVs operate typically as mobile fire platforms, individually or grouped together in so-called “*bronegruppas*.”

In another thread posted on March 12, the Ukrainian officer describes the difference between temporary and permanent Russian assault formations. The former are assembled for a specific mission without receiving additional training and are dispersed once the mission has been accomplished. The latter, in this particular thread referred to as “storm” units, are incorporated into the regular military structure, ranging in size from reinforced companies to battalions and receive additional training and equipment, as described above. Although the quality between these formations varies greatly, particularly some of the permanent assault formations have proven themselves to be highly adaptable and formidable in carrying out breakthrough missions.⁴⁸ Even colonel general Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces, recently acknowledged that by forming specialized assault formations, the Russians have significantly improved their offensive capabilities.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Kadam, Russia’s STORM Assault Unit, Armed With “Alpine Quest” Tech, Launch Deadly Attacks To Recapture Lost Positions.

⁴⁷ Tatarigami_UA(@Tatarigami_UA) “Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure.

⁴⁸ Tatarigami_UA(@Tatarigami_UA) “In my previous analysis, I explored the armament and role of assault units. However, their actual effectiveness and structure often differs from what is written in manuals,” Twitter, March 12, 2023, 07:13 a.m., https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502

⁴⁹ Kadam, Russia’s STORM Assault Unit, Armed With “Alpine Quest” Tech, Launch Deadly Attacks To Recapture Lost Positions.

Conclusion

Combined arms warfare necessitates the employment of combined arms formations, but the level at which this occurs depends on the particular circumstances. Because battles in urban surroundings and heavily fortified wooded areas tend to result in fragmented fighting conducted by smaller tactical units, distributing the necessary heavy support weapons down to lower tactical formations, as well as delegating the decision-making authority for their deployment down to lower tactical commanders, is a logical consequence. Chuikov understood this when he first decided to organize his men into specialized storm groups, intended to overcome German defenses. Composing units that were small enough to remain manageable, while carrying enough firepower to offset the limited effectiveness of indirect fire against fortified strongpoints.

Prior to World War II, except for a reference to the employment of storm groups, tactical directions on how to fight in urban areas were all but absent in the Soviet's 1929- and 1936 provisional field manuals. Following the successful employment of storm groups and storm detachments in particularly Stalingrad and Berlin, it again, due to various reasons, disappeared into the background. Only to be revived during the Chechen Wars, with varying degrees of success. This situation did not improve thereafter, which in time would cause Russian forces to enter the current war equally unprepared. Consequently, the Russians have developed an over reliance on artillery in order to compensate for a lack of well-trained infantry, with all its visible consequences and resort to forming specialized assault troops, every time basic training proves insufficient.

Except for some minor modifications, mainly due to the developments in weapons technology, the organization of storm detachments has remained relatively unchanged over the years. Assault detachments and groups are ideally built around existing infantry battalions and companies, supplemented by a number of (fire) support assets. Although infantry formations have become somewhat smaller using a simplified structure, making them more manageable, this is partly negated by the increase in support elements at the lower levels. For that reason, as the Russians have learned the hard way, (sub-)units must have a habitual training relationship and commanders need additional training to be able to manage all the different assets to their disposal. The sub-division of storm

groups into dedicated assault- or seizure groups, fire support groups, consolidation groups and reserve groups, has also remained unchanged over the years. The same can be said of most of the tactics employed. One of the first lessons Chuikov identified, was that independent thinking and initiative at lower tactical levels, as well as boldness in action, are necessary characteristics for troops making up assault formations. Although little can be said about the latter, the former has never been a core component of Russian military culture. Artillery is primarily used in a direct fire role, because this is much more effective against fortified positions, especially in an environment lacking large fields of fire. The deployment of which, over the years, has therefore become much more decentralized. Finally, elements such as and extensive reconnaissance and intelligence preparation and achieving surprise, continue to be viewed as crucial prerequisites for a successful assault.

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**The Long Lasting Impact of the Bombing of Dresden
in February 1945**

Reiner Pommerin (Germany)

“What we used to know as Dresden no longer exists. Walking through it is like a dream walk through Sodom and Gomorrah. There is nothing for any human being in this stony wasteland. Fifteen square kilometres of the town have been mown down and blown away. What would otherwise take entire geological ages to achieve, namely the transformation of rock – has happened here in a single night". This "single night" was that of 13 February 1945. I was motivated to give this paper by the touching photo which our colleagues of the Turkish Commission for Military History appropriately have chosen for the website of this Congress.

In the course of the Italo – Turkish War the Italian pilot Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti tossed on 1 November 1911 four bombs on the Taguira Oasis south of Tripoli on a Turkish military camp at Ain Zara. The grenades he threw out of his monoplane Etrich Taube had, however, only the size of a grapefruit weighting about 2 kilograms and caused no damage. But the Italians were convinced that these bombs had produced a moral effect. Due to the *Gazzetta del Popolo* the bombs had allegedly scattered the “terrorized Turks”. Articles in the *Scientific American* reported 1913 about the bombing and stated that “the importance of the aeroplane bombs lay more in their moral than in their material effect”.

All strategic planners of the 1920s and 1930s had come to the conclusion that future wars between great powers would be "total" wars. In other words: all resources of a state would be drawn into the war effort. The logical consequence was that all citizens, not just the armed forces, would be involved in a war. Out of this point of view destroying the economy and moral of an enemy people became legitimate war aims. In 1921 Italian Army MG Giulio Douhet published a book with the title: “Il Domino dell’ aria”. He believed that terror and annihilation tactics against the civilian population could in a “total war” play a decisive role. The moral of the civilian population would be weakened by the

possibility of death from the skies and sudden attacks from the air force the enemy to submit to the opponents will.

In order to understand the decision to bomb Dresden it is essential to grasp the principles which determined the Anglo-American air war strategy of the Second World War. The United States, with no potential enemy in sight and, for a long time to come, protected from air attacks by 2.000 miles of sea around its coasts, had no air force as such, only an army air fleet. During the First World War the US Army Air Service had only been used occasionally in Europe to support American ground troops. Colonel William Mitchell was one of the few American Army officers who saw air warfare as an important factor in a future war. He proposed bombing of enemy territory and believed that attacking the enemy's vital centres was the quickest way to break the will to resist. But his constant advances for greater investment in air power received neither support nor recognition in the Army and Mitchell was forced to retire.

The US Army Air Force was eventually formed in June 1941 and General Henry H. Arnold retained command over it until the end of the Second World War. He wrote in 1941 that the most economical way of bringing a big city to its knees was to destroy the power stations supplying electric light, the water supply and the sewerage system. He came to the conclusion: "that bombing raids on the civilian population are uneconomical and ill-advised".

Fateful for the city of Dresden became the development of air war strategy in Great Britain. During the course of the First World War German Zeppelins and German "Giant Bombers" had dropped bombs on London. The fear of bombardment amongst the population, the "air scare" became soon sort of trauma. In July 1917 the British War Cabinet appointed a commission under General Jan Smuts, to view the situation. As a result of Smuts suggestions the government established on 1 July 1918 the independent Royal Air Force.

In 1928 Air Marshal Lord Hugh Trenchard drafted the RAF War Manual. He firmly believed that air raids: "owing to its crushing moral effect on a Nation, may impress the public opinion to a point of disarming the government and thus becoming decisive". The main aim of air raids was therefore to destroy willpower and national moral. "A nation is defeated once the people or the government no longer have the will to pursue its war aims". What remained open to question,

however, was whether the population of a totalitarian regime like Nazi Germany, would be either willing or able to influence their political leader. Group Captain Arthur T. Harris wrote in 1936 a paper on "The Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War against Germany". Here one could read: "Moreover, a military dictatorship is likely to be less susceptible to popular outcry than a democratic one government".

When Hitler unleashed the Second World War on 1 September 1939 no internationally recognised settlement existed restricting the bombing of a city. This loophole in international law was what President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had in mind when he sent on the same day a note to the warring countries. He urged them to make a public declaration that they would not bomb any civilian population or unfortified town from the air. Hitler answered Roosevelt: "For my part I have already made it clear in my speech to the Reichstag today that the German Luftwaffe has been given orders to restrict hostilities to military targets".

That was a blatant lie, because the Second World War did not start at Danzig at 5:45, but already at 4:40 a German Stuka Wing had bombed the small Polish town Wielun. This first area bombardment of the Second World War destroyed 70 Percent of the town and killed 1.200 of its inhabitants. Wielun was not at all a tactical or strategic target; the Stuka Wing was just testing its new engines and different new fire bombs. On the following day both France and Britain complied with Roosevelt's request, though given Britain's approach to air war strategy, this can hardly have been meant seriously.

The RAF's initial attacks on German ships over the Heligoland Bight in December 1939 incurred heavy British losses and led to a drastic rethinking. In the years that followed British strategic bombing was carried out almost exclusively at night. The original idea of also carrying out precision bombing at night turned out to be impossible, even though the means of identification for target spotting at night continually improved.

The first Luftwaffe attack on British territory took place on 16 March 1940 and aimed at the British Fleet at Scapa Flow and RAF bases. The answer was an RAF attack on the naval air base at Hörnum on the island of Sylt. The reason for reticence about bombing important industrial cities in the area along the river Ruhr, even though it would have been of great military advantage, was

of concern within the British War Cabinet. But the opinion prevailed: "The possibility that the British could be accused of being the first to begin indiscriminate bombing and that this would probably lead to German retaliatory attacks against England".

It was the dramatic deterioration of Britain's and France's position on the ground due to the German occupation of the French Channel coast, and not, as has often mistakenly been assumed, the German bombing of Rotterdam, that ultimately provoked the British decision to start area bombing. The decision was therefore "not a reaction to the way the Germans had been conducting the war, but the realisation of a concept long-since formulated for the event of a war [...]. The British War Cabinet resolution of 15 May 1940 made Britain the first to embark on air war, which was not directly related to land or sea operations". However, the attack on the industrial cities along the river Ruhr on 15 May 1940 was not particularly successful and unable to prevent the military defeat of France. But it was all Hitler needed to give the order "to attack the English homeland in the fullest manner" and to open the air war with an "annihilating reprisal for British attacks on the Ruhr".

By July 1940 Prime Minister Churchill was convinced that: "Nothing will bring the German to his senses or to his knees except an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by over-heavy bombs from this country against the Nazis' home territory". Two months ago the retired Lord Trenchard had already suggested in a "Memorandum on the Present War Situation" to attack the German moral by bombing German civilians: "This, then is their weak point compared with ourselves, and it is at this weak point, that we should strike and strike again".

During the night of August 24th 1940 accidentally the Luftwaffe bombed London. This led to a RAF counterattack on Berlin the next night, soon to be followed by more such airstrikes. On 7 September 1940 Hitler ordered targets in London to be attacked. Until then neither the RAF nor the Luftwaffe had indulged in indiscriminate bombing. In fact, where British bombers had been unable to make out their targets they even had brought back their bombs. However, there was no technical means of preventing bombs from dispersing, particularly at night. This meant that henceforth all bombing attacks, be it in Germany or in England, seemed like a sort of an act of terror, even before they

were actually intended as such. Several bombs had already hit cities in western and northern Germany by the time the British War Cabinet approved in December 1940 the first deliberate "area raid" of the war by Bomber Command on a German city the city of Mannheim. This attack was part of "Operation Abigail", justified in British eyes by the German air raid on Coventry a month ago which had destroyed 80 Percent of the city. Action was taken after Bomber Command realized that bombs tended to disperse. A certain number of planes were now concentrated into a "bomber stream" over the target and target identification improved by marking it in advance with special luminous colouring.

Many more such attacks on German cities followed, for example on Cologne, Essen, Bremen, and Berlin. After Bomber Command had realised that precision bombing was not possible it concentrated on area bombing instead. It became much more productive to aim at city centres, which tended to be the most developed and the most inhabited areas. These British air raids were answered by the Luftwaffe with the so-called "Baedeker Raids" named after the famous German Baedeker travel guides, on historic cities like Bath, Canterbury and York.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 Churchill and President Roosevelt wanted to deflect the complaints from Stalin about the postponement of an invasion across the Channel until 1944. Both statesmen tried to relieve the Soviet Union in their battle against Nazi Germany and make their support more visible. They therefore agreed on a joint Anglo-American bombing offensive of Germany.

American air raids on Germany should be high altitude precision attacks, made in close formation with fighter escorts. Since effectiveness was an important consideration, the killing of defenceless civilians was rejected by the United States also on moral grounds. While the U.S. Army Air Force could not be persuaded to adopt the RAF tactic of night bombing, the Americans had to live with the fact that even their day time precision attacks would cause collateral damage and hit German civilian population, particularly when the bombs had due to weather been dropped blind from above the cloud cover.

According to a resolution of April 1942, the British War Cabinet now felt it vitally important "to bring home to the majority of German civilians the worst horrors of war". On the night of 30 May 1942 as part of the operation "Millennium" the first "thousand bomber raid" of Bomber Command was launched on Cologne. The chief of Bomber Command Air Marshal Harris believed that with 4.000 heavy bombers Bomber Command could win the war on its own. Air raids on cities like Hamburg causing a death rate of 30.000 civilians, on Leipzig, Braunschweig, Augsburg and Schweinfurt followed. Harris also wanted to destroy completely the German capital Berlin. But Berlin was strongly defended and attacks against it caused heavy casualties. In fact the losses incurred by Bomber Command were quite high. In total it lost 55,000 men, proportionally greater losses than in any other of the British armed services.

In summer of 1944 Nazi Germany embarked with the V-1 and the V-2 rockets on an indeed indiscriminate bombing campaign, designed purely to cause terror. After the landings in Normandy, the British response in summer and autumn of 1944 was the bombing of many more German cities. On 7 October 1944 the town Emmerich was attacked. 97 Percent of the buildings were razed to the ground so was my parents' house. Also on Bomber Command's list of targets were now cities of Chemnitz, Dresden and Leipzig in the more remote state of Saxony.

At the beginning of 1945 Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, and the British representative at the HQ of the Western Allies, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, wanted the bombardments to be concentrated on refineries and traffic intersections. Harris, still keen to continue bombing cities, offered his resignation but Portal refused to accept it. The bombing of the hydro plants at the cities of Leuna, Brüx, Zeitz und Pölitz followed. But on 16 January a fire storm destroyed again a city, the city of Magdeburg. The cities of Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and Chemnitz now moved up to second place on the target list, behind fuel plants.

To support the operations of the Red Army the Soviet Union repeatedly requested the Allies to bomb German traffic intersections in Saxony. On 10 January 1945 Air Marshall Tedder had talks with Stalin in Moscow about coordinating the activities of the allied armies on German soil. They also discussed strategic bombing targets in Germany, so that Soviet preferences could

also be taken into account. The unfortunately inaccessible files of this meeting may well already contain the name of the city of Dresden.

On 21 January 1945 the Soviet Army had reached the Oder to the north and south of the Breslau. Before leaving for Yalta to meet Roosevelt, Churchill asked Air Minister Archibald Sinclair how he proposed to obstruct the German retreat from the besieged city of Breslau. Sinclair informed Churchill that the idea was to use the heavy bombers to attack German fuel supplies. However, if weather conditions made this impossible Berlin or other German cities like Leipzig, Dresden and Chemnitz could also be bombed. These cities, Sinclair said, were administrative centres for military and civilian liaison, through which most of the traffic flowed. Churchill, however, was not particularly interested in disrupting the German retreat from Breslau. What he really wanted to know was whether Berlin and other cities in the more easterly part of Germany were now being considered as viable targets. On the same day Air Marshal Portal had proposed that, although priority should still be given to destroying fuel supplies, any other available forces should be used for major attacks on Berlin or cities like Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz. This would, as he said, prevent a possible transfer of German troops from West to the East.

At this time strong parts of the Wehrmacht – some 2.5 million battle-hardened troops – were still positioned outside German territory, for example in Norway and Yugoslavia, and could have been deployed to defend Germany. Harris now received the order to carry out the air attacks Portal wanted. But Harris was still hesitant about Dresden since Intelligence had been unable to provide satisfactory information regarding the status of this target. Enquiries at the Air Ministry confirmed, however, that the order included Dresden and that the city should be attacked at the first available opportunity. The Eighth American Air Fleet also should take part in these attacks. But U.S. Army Air Force General Carl A. Spaatz made it clear to the British Air Staff that he would only order his wings to target transport and communication lines. His personal view was that the shunting yards were important targets.

At the Conference at Yalta from 4 till 11 February 1945 General Alexei Antonow expressly demanded Anglo-American air raids on German lines of transportation. He feared the Germans could use those lines to transfer troops to the Soviet front from the Western front. Antonow specifically mentioned the

traffic intersections at Berlin and Leipzig, his priority being the shunting yards. The Allies agreed to engage in concerted strategic bombing raids. They also agreed to set a boundary line for bombing, to not endanger advancing Soviet ground troops. This boundary ran from Stettin, via Berlin, east of Dresden and the river Elbe to Brünn, Vienna and on to Zagreb. Up as far as this line, American and British air raids were possible without restriction; but to the east of it, closer to the Soviet front, only by arrangement with the Soviet Supreme Command 24 hours in advance.

On 8 February the Soviet Supreme Command received the US Eighth Air Fleet's list of targets, which consisted of hydrogenation plants, refineries and oil depots. Second priority had traffic intersections in Berlin, Dresden and Chemnitz. Those targets became more feasible due to the growing air superiority over Germany of the Allies. The Soviet military leaders had no objection against these targets. Nor did they express any reservations when they were informed of the plan of the US Eighth Air Fleet to bomb Dresden and the shunting yards on 13 February. The Soviet Supreme Command was also informed in time when the American attack had to be postponed to the following day due to bad weather. Actually there was no need for the US to inform the Red Army about this attack since it was west of the boundary which had been set for bombardments. Willingness to bomb the shunting yards at Dresden was above all totally in line with the American President's policy, not only to support the advancing Soviet Union's troops, but especially to set up, at least indirectly, a visible sign of support to the eastern partner of the Anti-Hitler Coalition. Especially Roosevelt considered the Soviet Union to be an important great power that would help to decide the future of the world. It should therefore be given every support and he offered anything that would gain its friendship. The British do not appear to have informed the Soviet Supreme Command of their intention to bomb the city of Dresden, although the possibility certainly cannot be ruled out.

On 13 February first "visual marker" aircraft set flares and fire target markers. Over 800 hundred heavy bombers of Bomber Command bombed the city. The next day followed the air raid of the Eighth U.S. Army Air Force, which destroyed the Dresden marshaling yards with lots of "collateral damage". In total British and American aircraft, accompanied by fighter planes, dropped nearly 4.000 tons of high explosive bombs and incendiary on Dresden. The

bombs and the following firestorms destroyed 6,5 Square kilometres of the city centre and killed quite indiscriminately, Nazis, fellow travellers, and innocent citizens. Most of the dead were women, small children and the elderly. The few hospitals still standing could not help the numbers of injured and burned people. Mass burials were necessary. The centre of Dresden was completely destroyed.

The Nazi Propaganda reacted only two days after the bombardment with statements for a few foreign correspondents which were still remaining at Berlin. The German News Agency sent press releases to the German legations in neutral States and the German long wave broadcast system reported about the bombing in different foreign languages. The main arguments of the propaganda were that the bombing of the city was an Anglo-American militarily useless act of air terror, because at Dresden had been no war industry, which by the way was actually not true. The propaganda underlined further that Dresden, the “Florence on the Elbe”, had only been a unique beautiful city of art and culture with a famous panorama and magnificent buildings. The propaganda underlined that an innocent city had become a victim of a unique and pointless destruction, a premediated war crime and a campaign of annihilation of the Germans. While the local police had reported a number of 25.000 victims the Nazi propaganda counted 200.000. The aim of the propaganda was to create criticism in the international public against the Allied air war. Newspapers in neutral states like Sweden and Switzerland were fed with apocalyptic numbers of dead. The questions Richard Stokes, Member of the Labour Party, asked in the House of Commons citing a press release of the German Press Agency signalled the beginning of change of public opinion in Great Britain about area bombing and air raids against cities.

After the war the Soviet Military Administration in Germany’s Soviet Zone of Occupation had no interest in a day of mourning at Dresden on 13 February 1946. At that time the still working close cooperation with the Western Allies should not be disturbed. But right after the Soviet Union had left the Allied High Commission, a first demonstration at Dresden on 13 February 1949 aimed at “American warmongers”.

In the time of the Cold War the communist regime of the German Democratic Republic fell back on the terms of the Nazis propaganda and called the bombing of Dresden again an Anglo-American terror attack and a war crime.

Especially after the Vietnam War had started in 1955 it blamed unrightfully only American bombers for the destruction of the city centre. In the fifties and sixties the Socialist Party organized rallies at Dresden on each February 13th. The speeches given at those rallies attacked the “American warmongers” which together with the West German Imperialism were planning a war against the countries of the Warsaw Pact. After the GDR could join the UN in 1970 the rallies stopped for a decade.

The propaganda of the GDR was supported by the British author David Irving, a proponent of Holocaust denial. He published in 1963 a book on the bombing of Dresden. It contained sentences like “The most devastating air attack in the history of war was not on Hiroshima, nor on Nagasaki.” And he came to the conclusion that the bombing of the city had been “the biggest single Massacre in European History” Irving estimated 150.000 to 200.000 dead, more than in the whole of the war had been caused by Luftwaffe air raids in Great Britain. In addition he also, in accordance with the Nazis, reported that the fighter planes which had accompanied the bombers had allegedly strafed randomly citizens of the city. These fighter plane attacks soon became part of oral history and GDR’s propaganda. It should take until 2000 when these propaganda attacks were finally questioned by serious research. They had had actually been impossible due to lack of time and most of all of fuel of those fighter planes. The local bomb disposal services of Dresden could not find bullets or fragments of strafing. But for parts of the population of Dresden, ignoring the facts, the strafing is still a fact.

Since the unification of Germany in 1990 the far-right movement tries to threaten the official commemoration and organizes marches through Dresden on 13 February. It tries to capitalize on the tragedy, calling it like the Nazis a wanton and senseless killing of innocent civilians. While the citizens of Dresden focus on mourning and reconciliation, the neo-Nazis call the Anglo-American air raid “a bombing Holocaust” and shout their usual xenophobic and revisionist messages. The City of Dresden felt obliged to prevent right-wing ideologues from using allegedly high numbers of dead and appointed an independent commission of historians. The commission produced accurate data using historical, military, forensic and archaeological research. The result published in 2010 estimated 22,700 to 25.000 dead. This year on 13 February only a small

group of Germany's right-wing movement marched through the city still shouting the slogans Dresden is familiar with since the Nazi and GDR period. In the evening thousands of citizens met in silence to form a human chain. This chain surrounded the city centre as a sign against war and destruction. Traditionally at 21:45, at the time when the air raid in 1945 had started, all church bells of Dresden started ringing.

**The Japanese Empire and Vatican City State
in World War II**

Ryotaro Shimizu (Japan)

Introduction

In the very final stages of World War II, Japan asked the Soviet Union to broker a peace with the Allies. There was still effective Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union since April 1941. However, the Soviet Union had promised the United States and Britain at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that it would enter the war against Japan two or three months after the German surrender. After the war, this diplomacy toward the Soviet Union has been severely criticized as “illusionary diplomacy.”

Although it is believed that the "secret agreement at Yalta" was promptly conveyed to Japan by the military attaché Makoto Onodera from Stockholm, Sweden, a neutral country, according to recent studies, the report was not a definite report on the Soviet Union's participation in the war. On the other hand, recent studies have revealed that more accurate intelligence on Soviet entry into the war was conveyed to the General Staff headquarters in Tokyo from Bern, Switzerland, and Lisbon, Portugal. In this presentation, I would like to examine what kind of battles were being fought in the neutral Vatican over the intelligence concerning the Yalta secret agreement.

1. OSS and the Yalta Conference

The U.S. wartime intelligence agency, the OSS, was the point of contact for peace negotiations in Switzerland. As is well known, the OSS and the Japanese side had various discussions regarding the conditions for surrender.

Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the war, worked primarily on peace negotiations with anti-Nazi forces in Germany. By the end of January 1945, Dulles, based at the OSS Bern branch, made contacts in Switzerland with anti-Nazi resistance groups and with German military personnel who were critical of Hitler. In a report explaining about the military

personnel who took part in the failed assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944, Dulles concluded that he was convinced an affirmative program along the following lines would make the German military submit to the Americans and British before the Soviet Union created chaos in East Germany.

(1) Unconditional surrender remains an unaltered policy, but German military leaders are seriously concerned about the future of its country.

(2) All cities in Germany are on the verge of being able to spare unnecessary destruction and achieve a resumption of economic life through proper distribution of food and supplies.

(3) Officers of Wehrmacht who contribute to constructive policy should facilitate the liquidation of the Nazi regime.

This report was submitted by the OSS deputy director to the JCS.

By at least the end of 1944, there was a clear understanding, both at the OSS headquarters in Washington and in the European theater, that the goal should be to achieve an early end to the war, without strictly adhering to the literal interpretation of “unconditional surrender” vis-à-vis preventing the expansion of Soviet influence and minimizing the sacrifices of U.S. military personnel.

2. Undercover Warfare in the Vatican

Emperor Showa had a sense of affinity with the Vatican ever since he visited it as a crown prince. Even before the Japan-U.S. war, the Emperor valued the Holy See as a channel for peace negotiations to bring the war to an end. After its outbreak, due to the convenience of intelligence gathering and the immense spiritual influence it wielded worldwide, as well as the necessity of governing the predominantly Catholic population in the Philippines, the Emperor ordered Prime Minister Tojo Hideki to establish a legation in Vatican City in April 1942. Harada Ken presented his credentials to the Pope as the first Japanese ambassador to the Holy See.

Similarly, in December 1939, the United States, although it did not have official diplomatic relations with the Vatican due to concerns about public anti-

Catholic sentiments, sent Myron Taylor, a wealthy magnate in the steel industry, as a personal envoy of President Roosevelt. Furthermore, the OSS had used the Vatican as a base for intelligence activities from early on, and it is known that “Vessel” was the codename for the information.

On January 26, 1945, OSS Assistant Director Charles Cheston noted that Ambassador Harada conveyed the following to the Pope, as reported by Vessel.

The Japanese government is confident that Stalin will unconditionally agree to renew the Japan-Soviet neutrality pact. The Kremlin explicitly stated to Japan’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union that they are prepared to mediate peace with the United States and Great Britain, on the condition that Japan agrees to the peace conference participated by the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan.

Through the Department of the Army, information that the Soviet Union promised Japan to renew the neutrality pact and made an appeasement proposal regarding peace in the Far East reached Brigadier General Andrew McFarland who participated as staff in the Yalta Conference.

An OSS report to the JCS on January 24 contains information from the OSS branches in Bern and Rome that anti-Hitler groups in Italy and Switzerland led by Ernst von Weizsäcker, German ambassador to the Holy See (former foreign under secretary and father of Richard von Weizsäcker, president of West Germany from 1984 to 1994), were calling on the Vatican to mediate peace. It also included a detailed report regarding the activities and statements of Kanayama Masahide, counselor at the Japanese legation in the Vatican.

According to the report, when Counselor Kanayama held a meeting on January 17 with the two acting secretary of state of Vatican, Giovanni Montini and Domenico Tardini, Kanayama stated as follows.

The Far East problems will be discussed when the Big Three meet. The United States, supported by Churchill, will ask for Russian help to crush Japan completely. The Anglo-Americans will ask that Russia denounce the pact of non-aggression with Japan and that Russia passively participate in the Pacific War and permit Anglo-American use of Russian air bases. Our Government also understands that, before Stalin will agree to this, he will request a wholehearted

attempt on the part of the Anglo-Americans to mediate, and that he will even offer to act as mediator. Our Government also understands that the Big Three will discuss European problems first, and that if they are not settled to Russia's satisfaction, especially the Polish question, then Stalin will not discuss the Far East.

Kanayama then expressed hope that the Pope would help with the peace mediation before the Far East issues were discussed at the Yalta Conference. Acting Secretary of State Montini asked whether the Japanese government can offer terms for peace that would be closer to those of the Anglo-American to enable the Holy See to begin mediation. Kanayama responded that he would communicate Montini's request to the Japanese government and reiterated that the Holy See commence mediation immediately if possible.

If Kanayama's statements are true, he had a remarkably accurate understanding of the Yalta Conference. He was no doubt the first Japanese person to know the details of the Yalta secret agreement, before the conference was even held. This information was communicated not only from the OSS to the JCS but also to the State Department and the White House.

If Harada and Kanayama at the Japanese legation in the Vatican had made completely different statements to Holy See officials, what can we understand from this? It is conceivable that they had received different information from different sources. The information conveyed by Kanayama was genuine information that covered actual topics to be discussed at the Yalta Conference. The inclusion of items that the United States later requested to the Soviet Union, especially the invasion of Manchuria and the establishment of air bases in the Far East Siberia, suggests that the information was sourced from the United States.

In fact, Giovanni Battista Montini, who later became Pope Paul VI (1963-1978), is believed to have cooperated with the OSS through Earl Brennan, a former diplomat who had been stationed in Italy and headed the Italy desk in the Secret Intelligence (SI) division at the OSS's Washington headquarters. If Kanayama had accurate information regarding the detailed agenda of the Yalta Conference, he may have received this information from the OSS.

On the other hand, Ambassador Harada's pro-Japan conciliatory information was implausible and can be assumed as disinformation. At the Yalta

Conference, it served as information to raise the worth of the secret agreement vis-à-vis Roosevelt, who requested the Soviet's participation in the war against Japan.

At around this time, Vessel information was handled by Captain James Angleton, who was then with the SI division in Italy and later became a senior official at the CIA and the model for the main character of the film "The Good Shepherd." Vessel's Sub-sources included individuals connected to German, Soviet, and British intelligence services. Although information on European matters was full of errors, that on Japan was for whatever reason highly valued and trusted by key figures in the U.S. administration including Roosevelt himself. Vessel information was a mix of both valuable and questionable intelligence.

The Soviet Union had recognized and resumed diplomatic relations with the Badoglio government, which was established after the Allied invasion of Sicily and the arrest of Mussolini, in March 1944, before the United States and Britain did so. Although the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations with the Vatican, it may have utilized the Holy See as a channel to input information favorable to itself amid a war with Germany.

The above suggests that an international, i.e., a U.S.-Soviet, intelligence warfare was taking place over the Yalta secret agreement in the Vatican, a neutral country. Regrettably, records of the telegram exchanges between the Japanese legation in the Vatican and Foreign Ministry in Tokyo from January to June 1945 have not been preserved or made public. Therefore, it is impossible to know what information Harada or Kanayama had sent (or did not send).

Meanwhile, from late May to June 1945, after the collapse of Germany, the OSS conducted peace negotiations through a different channel. Records of these negotiations are preserved both in the United States' intercepted and decrypted records called MAGIC and in Japan's diplomatic documents. There are also memoirs of OSS operatives. In a report to Tokyo on June 3, Ambassador Harada speculated as follows regarding the intentions of the United States that proposed peace negotiations to Japan:

Although the European war is expected to end, there may be further deterioration in the political situation depending on the subsequent attitude of the Soviet Union. Conversely, in the Far East, it is likely that the Soviet Union will enter into the war in the final stage and take control of Manchuria, while also inciting the Chinese Communist government to secure its foothold.

It is noteworthy that this report, too, mentions the Yalta secret agreement to involve the Soviet Union in the war.

According to Martin Quigley, who was involved in these activities, William Donovan, director of OSS, instructed Quigley to find a way to bring a peace proposal directly to Tokyo and to negotiate Japan's surrender. After Rome fell in 1944, Donovan held audiences with the Pope and with Ambassador Weizsäcker of Germany. He regarded the Vatican as an important base for peace negotiations with the Axis powers, particularly Germany.

In line with U.S. intentions, the negotiations with the Japanese side were conducted by Egidio Vagnozzi, a Vatican diplomat (State Department official) who had spent ten years in the United States as a member of the apostolic delegation in Washington.

As mentioned earlier, Eugenio Pacelli, later Pius XII, had extensive diplomatic experience and maintained a close relationship with the United States, including direct exchanges of letters with Roosevelt. Nevertheless, he was quick to express concerns over Roosevelt's view of the Soviet Union as a guarantor of the post-war European order. In particular, he severely criticized Roosevelt's demand for Japan and Germany's "unconditional surrender," which was announced during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

Furthermore, between late 1944 and early 1945, the Pope became increasingly concerned about the dangers posed by the advancement of Soviet forces into Eastern and Central Europe. In particular, he conveyed to Taylor his concerns that the Soviet occupation of Poland and the Baltic countries, which had significant Catholic populations, went against the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The agreement reached at the Yalta Conference among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to establish communist control over Poland and divide Germany must have been the worst outcome for the Pope, Montini, Tardini, and others.

An estimated six million Catholics lived in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries, and Poland, including the Uniates who followed the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox liturgies. Following the Russian Revolution, Pacelli, as papal nuncio in Berlin, held negotiations with the Soviet ambassador in Berlin to guarantee the activities of Catholic bishops in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the negotiations continued with the aim of granting the Holy See's approval of the Soviet Union in exchange for the Pope's right to appoint bishops. However, the Soviet government imposed a complete ban on activities of the Catholic Church, and illegally operating priests were sent to concentration camps. These negotiations with the Soviet Union during the interwar period decisively influenced Pius XII's perception of the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

As has been examined, information about the Yalta secret agreement may have been communicated to the Japanese side in the Vatican in mid-January 1945, shortly before the Yalta Conference. There is no definitive evidence confirming whether this information was transmitted to the Japanese side during this period or if it reached Tokyo. However, there is no mistake that such attempts were motivated by the Holy See and U.S. intelligence services' clear intention to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in the post-war world and promote peace negotiations between Japan and the United States.

This presentation concludes that an intelligence warfare was underway over the Yalta secret agreement before the Yalta Conference was held in the neutral Vatican. Intelligence about the Yalta secret agreement was utilized as a lever to promote peace negotiations between Japan and the United States. Furthermore, amid this intelligence warfare, the OSS began to function as a somewhat independent actor from U.S. politics and the military, i.e., to operate as an intelligence agency.

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**Les Français à l'assaut de l'imprenable Berg op Zoom (septembre 1747)
(The assault of the Impregnable Bergen op Zoom by the French
(September 1747)**

Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat (France)

Introduction

Berg op Zoom : de la petite ville du XXI^e siècle à la forteresse de 1747 – traces de mémoire.

[diapositive : cartes]

- La ville de Berg op Zoom est aujourd'hui une petite ville côtière des Pays-Bas méridionaux, peu connue des Européens. Or, si elle mérite notre attention, c'est parce qu'elle était au milieu du XVIII^e siècle l'une des places fortifiées les plus puissantes d'Europe. Et parce qu'elle fut, malgré cela, prise d'assaut par les Français en septembre 1747, lors de la guerre de Succession d'Autriche (1740-1748).

[diapo : vues extérieures du ravelin]

- Il reste aujourd'hui à Berg op Zoom quelques vestiges de cette époque ; notamment un élément de l'ancienne enceinte fortifiée, « le ravelin », au nord-est de la ville. Un ravelin était un ouvrage en maçonnerie de forme grossièrement triangulaire, construit en avant du mur d'enceinte et entouré d'un fossé. Contrairement au reste de l'enceinte, ce ravelin n'a jamais été détruit, parce qu'il est sur le chemin de la rivière qui traverse la ville, le Zoom.

[diapo : la maquette]

- Il y a aussi à Berg op Zoom une très grande maquette de la place fortifiée, réalisée entre 1748 et 1751 sur l'ordre du roi de France, donc juste après le siège. Cette maquette, de plus de dix mètres sur six, s'inscrit dans la tradition des nombreux « plans-reliefs », comme on disait à l'époque, réalisés aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles pour instruire l'état-major militaire français sur la façon de défendre ou d'attaquer les places concernées.

[diapo : le Markiezenhof et l'accès à la salle de la maquette]

Cette maquette est actuellement exposée dans l'une des salles du palais-musée appelé « Markiezenhof » - Ce palais était justement en 1747 le quartier général du baron de Cronström, officier général qui défendait la place contre les Français.

Après ce détour touristique introductif, il s'agit de comprendre pourquoi cette ville était réputée imprenable ; pourquoi les Français en tentèrent malgré tout le siège, qui fut long et difficile ; et dans quelles circonstances ils prirent finalement la ville.

I. Une place réputée imprenable,... que l'on veut pourtant prendre

A. La Pucelle

- Le chef d'œuvre de Coehoorn.

[diapo : la place fortifiée au XVIIe siècle et au XVIIIe siècle]

Les défenses de la ville avaient été entièrement reprises et complexifiées au début du XVIIIe siècle par un ingénieur militaire hollandais réputé, Menno van Coehoorn, selon ce qui se faisait de mieux à l'époque ; avec un plan en étoile ; avec des fortifications basses et un glacis en pente douce, de façon à éviter au maximum les destructions par boulets de canon. Une réalisation bien plus forte que l'ancienne enceinte du XVIIe siècle. Coehoorn est resté dans l'histoire comme l'équivalent du célèbre ingénieur militaire français Vauban. Et l'enceinte de Berg op Zoom fut considérée comme le chef d'œuvre de Coehoorn. La place était réputée « imprenable ».

- Une place ne pouvant être investie

[diapo : extrait de carte du XVIIIe siècle montrant le site géographique de Berg op Zoom]

L'autre raison accréditant l'idée d'une ville imprenable était que le site géographique protégeait la ville. En effet, elle est bordée à l'ouest par la mer, ou plus exactement par l'estuaire de l'Escaut. Et cet estuaire était de plus, à cette époque, un delta compliqué, encombré de nombreuses îles. Donc la ville ne

pouvait être « investie », comme on disait en poliorcétique. C'est-à-dire qu'une armée ne pouvait en faire le tour, pour l'isoler et empêcher son ravitaillement.

De fait, la ville avait déjà été assiégée deux fois, en 1588 et en 1622. A chaque fois, ce fut un échec, le siège avait dû être levé. La ville y gagna son surnom : « La Pucelle. »

B. Le siège de Berg op Zoom : diversion ou objet principal ?

- Entamer les Provinces-Unies : un moyen de pression

[diapo : contexte de la guerre de Succession d'Autriche en Europe]

Au printemps de 1747, les Français s'apprêtent à entamer le territoire des Provinces-Unies, après avoir conquis les Pays-Bas autrichiens durant les années précédentes.

Pourquoi ? Dans l'esprit de Louis XV, il s'agissait par-là d'accélérer les négociations en vue de la fin de la guerre. Cette guerre, la guerre de Succession d'Autriche, avait d'abord vu pour théâtre d'opérations principal la Bavière et la Bohême, où l'Autriche avait combattu les Prussiens, et les Impériaux soutenus par les Français. Entre 1744 et 1748, le théâtre d'opérations principal s'était déplacé dans ce que l'on appelait « la Flandre », c'est-à-dire les Pays-Bas autrichiens. Une coalition des Autrichiens, des Anglais et des Hollandais, appelés « les Alliés », y combattit les Français, commandés en chef par le maréchal de Saxe à partir de 1745.

Des négociations secrètes en vue de la paix avaient commencé, mais elles n'étaient pas satisfaisantes. Les Français jugèrent qu'il était temps d'essayer fermement de détacher les Hollandais de leur alliance avec l'Angleterre, pour affaiblir cette dernière et la forcer à des négociations dans un sens favorable à la France. Le moyen d'arriver à cet objectif était militaire : il s'agissait de menacer les Provinces-Unies d'une invasion.

- Deux sièges possibles : Maastricht ou Berg op Zoom

[diapo : principauté de Liège et sud des Provinces-Unies]

A cet effet, deux forteresses néerlandaises pouvaient être assiégées : d'une part, Maastricht, à l'est. Cette ville, qui était détachée du territoire des

Provinces-Unies proprement dit, en faisait tout de même partie, avec un statut particulier, lié à des héritages dynastiques. La deuxième forteresse était Berg op Zoom, à l'ouest.

- Assiéger des places : moyen privilégié de la conquête

[diapo : conquête des Pays-Bas autrichiens par les Français, 1744-1748]

Pourquoi assiéger l'une de ces deux places ? D'abord, il faut dire que la manière la plus commune de faire la guerre à cette époque était une conquête méthodique du territoire, par des sièges successifs, qui étaient autant de points d'appui. Il n'y a pas eu plus d'une bataille par campagne militaire ; en 1744, il n'y en a pas eu du tout. Car les batailles étaient coûteuses en hommes, et peu décisives.

[diapo : la ligne de défense par les inondations]

Or il n'était pas possible d'attaquer entre ces deux places, à l'est de Berg op Zoom. En effet, une zone sur plusieurs centaines de kilomètres était impraticable par des troupes d'invasion, car les Hollandais avaient établi une ligne de défense par les inondations, ou « ligne d'eau » ; on appelle cette ligne-ci en Néerlandais la *Zuidwaterlinie*. Dans cette zone, si la frontière du pays était menacée, les Hollandais inondaient leur territoire par un savant système de canaux et d'écluses, jalonnés de forts. Il était impossible de faire progresser ou vivre une armée dans ce terrain.

- Assiéger Berg op Zoom, à défaut de Maastricht

Maurice de Saxe décida en juin d'attaquer Maastricht. Les Alliés essayèrent d'empêcher cela par la bataille de Lawfeld, près de Maastricht, le 2 juillet 1747. Les Français en sortirent victorieux, mais comme les Alliés se retirèrent en bon ordre et masquèrent Maastricht, le siège de cette place devint impossible. Le siège de Berg op Zoom fut donc décidé.

II. L'été 1747, autour de la ville et dans la ville

A. Un très long siège

- Le commandement et les forces en présence

[diapo : portraits de Löwendal et Cronström + les forts]

A la tête de 20 000 à 25 000 hommes, c'est le comte de Löwendal, 47 ans, lieutenant-général, qui fut chargé d'attaquer Berg op Zoom. C'était un ami de longue date de Maurice de Saxe, comme lui un étranger venu au service de France ; comme lui de lignée royale par le biais de la bâtardise ; et un homme de guerre de valeur, qui avait combattu dans toutes les guerres de l'Europe dans les années 1720 et 1730.

En face, c'est le général-baron Isaac Cronström, d'origine suédoise, et déjà âgé de 86 ans, qui fut chargé de la défense de la ville, avec une garnison de 4000 hommes. C'est pour sa fonction pendant ce siège qu'il est resté le plus connu dans l'Histoire. Cronström jouissait d'une longue expérience militaire, mais en 1747, il n'était pas pris au sérieux par le gouvernement de Londres, proche allié des Hollandais, qui le jugeait gâteux.

La défense de la ville était renforcée par un camp retranché de 16 000 hommes, en arrière d'une ligne de trois forts, au nord, appuyés à Berg op Zoom : les forts de Moermont, Pinsen et Rovere ; ce camp retranché et ces forts formaient un ensemble connu sous le nom de « lignes de Steenberg ». Les Français attaquèrent logiquement Berg op Zoom par le côté le moins fort, le sud-est.

- Des étapes classiques, pour une durée inhabituelle

[diapo : carte du siège]

Dans la nuit du 14 au 15 juillet, les Français ouvrirent la tranchée et commencèrent à construire la première parallèle.

Les étapes de ce siège ont été classiques, à l'égal des autres sièges conduits par les Français en Flandre depuis 1744. Après avoir investi la place au mieux, on s'en approche en creusant des tranchées successives, parallèles au point des remparts choisi pour l'attaque. Entre les parallèles, on creuse de petites tranchées de communication, en lignes brisées (zig-zag), pour avancer en évitant un tir en enfilade venu des remparts. Un siège était un énorme chantier.

[diapo : tranchée et batterie de canons]

Au niveau des parallèles sont positionnées les batteries de canons (chacune à trois ou quatre canons), pour entamer le mur d'enceinte de la place ;...

[diapo : la ville de Berg op Zoom incendiée par les bombes]

...et des batteries de mortiers, à tir courbe, qui projettent des bombes et des boulets rouges pour incendier la ville.

De part et d'autre, cet été là, on se canonne sévèrement. On fait également sauter des mines, pour détruire, selon le cas, les ouvrages extérieurs de la ville, ou les tranchées des assiégeants. On subit de lourdes pertes, plusieurs centaines d'hommes chaque semaine. Les assiégés font des sorties nocturnes, en vue de détruire les travaux d'approche et les batteries de canons des Français.

[diapo : les principaux ouvrages fortifiés]

A partir de la mi-août, après plusieurs tentatives meurtrières, les troupes de Löwendal réussirent à s'emparer successivement de quatre « lunettes » du chemin couvert, au sommet du glacis, en avant des bastions Coehoorn et Pucelle.

B. Les raisons de la durée inhabituelle du siège

[Diapo : le port de Berg op Zoom]

- De chaque côté, des espoirs de renforts déçus

Chacun des belligérants espérait que l'autre allait se porter en force du côté de Berg op Zoom. Ce ne fut pas le cas. Ni le duc de Cumberland, qui commandait en chef les Alliés cette année-là, ni Maurice de Saxe ne voulaient dégarnir de troupes le secteur de la Meuse, à l'est, pour ne pas se mettre en mauvaise posture du côté de Maastricht, objectif stratégique principal.

Donc les assiégés purent bénéficier seulement d'une petite armée de renfort, qui se garda de vouloir livrer bataille. Les Français, de leur côté, n'obtinrent pas non plus des renforts aussi importants que ceux demandés par Löwendal, qui leur auraient permis d'accélérer les opérations. Donc le siège traîna en longueur.

- Approvisionnement facilité des assiégés

Il traîna d'autant plus en longueur que les assiégés pouvaient être ravitaillés par le port en hommes, en munitions de guerre et en marchandises, depuis les autres provinces du pays. On lit dans l'une des principales gazettes britanniques de cette époque, le *Gentleman's Magazine* (dans le numéro du mois d'août), qu'une riche dame âgée envoya à Berg op Zoom 1000 livres en argent et en provisions, et promit de répéter son cadeau chaque semaine, tant que la garnison défendrait la place.

[Diapo : marais autour de Berg op Zoom]

- Environnement géographique insalubre

La progression des troupes françaises était difficile, car le terrain était défavorable, empli de marécages, et de polders facilement inondables. Un terrain propice aux fièvres, et à la forte mortalité des soldats. Voltaire s'en fait l'écho, dans son histoire du règne de Louis XV : « Les maladies des assiégeants, campés dans un terrain malsain, écrit-il, secondaient encore la résistance de la ville. Ces maladies contagieuses mirent plus de vingt mille hommes hors d'état de servir. »

III. La prise de Berg op Zoom et ses conséquences

A. Les Français à l'assaut, et les excès de la soldatesque

- Après que l'artillerie eut fait des brèches dans les bastions Pucelle et Coehoorn, et dans le ravelin Dedem, et même si ces brèches n'étaient pas encore jugées praticables pour un assaut, Löwendal décida d'un assaut pour le 16 septembre, de grand matin, à 4h30, simultanément sur ces trois objectifs. Parce qu'il redoutait qu'avec la lenteur des opérations en cours, il fût obligé de lever le siège.

- L'effet de surprise joua un rôle décisif, et les trois ouvrages fortifiés visés offrirent peu de résistance, alors que chacun d'eux était théoriquement bien défendu, par un capitaine et une centaine d'hommes... Les soldats commandés pour l'assaut (notamment des compagnies de grenadiers, que l'on utilisait toujours en première ligne pour ces vives escalades), se ruèrent dans le fossé, puis à l'attaque des trois forts, tuant tous ceux qui résistaient ; ils franchirent le rempart et, une fois dans la ville, ouvrirent les portes. Les Français se rendirent maîtres de la place en ayant perdu seulement environ 500 hommes.

Ils firent plus de mille prisonniers de guerre ; une partie de la garnison s'enfuit vers le camp des lignes de Steenberg. Cronström lui-même, tout aussi surpris par l'attaque que ses hommes, n'en attendit pas le dénouement mais se sauva vers les lignes, et l'on dit qu'il s'y sauva en bonnet de nuit et en robe de chambre !...

- Dans le sillage de l'assaut : déprédations, butin et marchandages.

De façon inattendue, une fois maîtres de la ville, les soldats français quittent toute discipline militaire et entrent dans une espèce de furie : ils pillent, volent, s'enivrent, tuent et violent. En quelques heures, 2000 habitants sont tués, 1000 autres sont blessés. L'opinion publique est choquée. L'Histoire a retenu d'une part ce saccage.

Elle a retenu aussi l'immensité du butin des soldats et des officiers. Les soldats de Löwendal, nantis de leurs prises, transformèrent leur camp en un vaste marché, où vinrent se fournir un grand nombre d'habitants, de marchands et de fripiers d'Anvers. On y vendait des porcelaines, des tapis et tentures, de riches vêtements, de l'orfèvrerie, des tableaux, et même de petits meubles portatifs, comme le raconte un soldat du régiment de Limousin dans ses mémoires.

B. L'assaut, le droit et la stratégie

[Diapo : page de titre intérieure du livre de Réal]

- La rareté des assauts

A cette époque, en principe, si une place assiégée ne pouvait obtenir un secours extérieur, elle capitulait après une défense honorable, sans attendre l'assaut. Une défense honorable impliquait d'avoir utilisé toutes les ressources possibles pour la défense et, par exemple, qu'une brèche ait déjà été faite dans l'enceinte de la ville. Toutes les villes assiégées par les Français en Flandre entre 1744 et 1746, soit 21 villes, capitulèrent, entre quelques jours et trois semaines après l'ouverture de la première tranchée. Dans le cas de Berg op Zoom, vu la force de la place, on comptait que le siège durerait environ trois semaines. Mais par exception, après plus de deux mois de tranchée ouverte (64 jours exactement), la ville n'avait toujours pas capitulé !

- Le sort d'une ville en cas d'assaut

Si le général-baron de Cronström, commandant de la place, s'était douté de l'assaut à venir, il aurait sans aucun doute capitulé sans attendre. Parce qu'il était admis que, si les assiégés d'une ville forçaient les assiégeants à donner l'assaut, on ne pouvait répondre du sort de la garnison et des habitants, qui s'exposaient ainsi à être passés au fil de l'épée..

Les traités juridiques de l'époque qui traitent du « droit des gens » en cas de guerre (ce que l'on appellerait aujourd'hui le « droit international des conflits armés ») exposent cette règle coutumière.

- La tolérance des Français

On lit aussi dans ces traités que celui qui est habilité à juger si le gouverneur d'une place assiégée a bien défendu sa place, ou s'il a exagéré en ne capitulant pas assez vite, c'est le général des assiégeants. Dans notre cas donc, c'était le comte de Löwendal.

A cet égard, les choses ne furent pas claires. Le comte de Löwendal exprima rapidement ses regrets, quand à la perte du contrôle de la discipline des soldats dans la ville. Mais l'avocat parisien Barbier, qui comme beaucoup de Parisiens, avait suivi les opérations du siège, et lisait les gazettes, et parlait avec des officiers revenus de l'armée,... écrit plutôt dans son journal que les officiers ont fait semblant de maintenir l'ordre et ont laissé faire la soldatesque pendant quelques heures, tant pour punir les Hollandais que pour récompenser les soldats des fatigues et des risques de ce long siège.

Löwendal lui-même toucha manifestement une part du butin ; il paraît que ce n'est pas par hasard qu'il put s'acheter six mois plus tard le château de La Ferté Saint-Aubin, en Sologne, non loin du château de Chambord (ce dernier étant le château de Maurice de Saxe).

Japan's Policy of Dealing with Air Raids as a Form of National Protection during World War II

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Summary

During World War II, Japan was subjected to thorough air raids by U.S. B-29 strategic bombers and carrier-borne aircraft. Japan prepared for and responded to these raids based on a law called the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO). The purpose of the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) was "to prevent or mitigate the damage caused by aircraft attacks in time of war or other incidents," and was enforced by persons other than the Army and Navy.

The results tell the story of a thoroughly bombed and devastated Japanese city that was fighting a losing battle. However, very few quantitative studies have been done to determine where the problems were and how effective they were.

Although the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) should be recognized as the first concrete example of Japan's national protection, the scale of the air raids was so great that it is common practice in Japan to place the blame for the spread of damage on the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO). As a result, Japan's current national protection policy has a tortuous structure that dares not look at the lessons of the Pacific War. The purpose of this study was to fill this void, and the results concluded that the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) was Japan's prewar policy for national protection, and that its effectiveness was slight, but not zero.

Keywords: Air Raid, Air Defense Law, Neighborhood Group, Fire Prevention, Public Protection

Introduction

In 2003, the Act on Securing the Peace and Independence of Japan and the Safety of the Nation and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. (Act No. 79 of June 13, 2003) (hereinafter referred to as the "Situation Management

Act").¹ The Act on Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. (Act No. 112 of June 18, 2004) (hereinafter referred to as the "National Protection Act") was enacted in 2004 as a separate situation law to be developed based on the framework provided by Situation Management Act.² Based on this "National Protection Act," each local government has prepared a national protection plan and conducted drills.

One has the impression that measures for civil protection in Japan were first implemented with the passage of the "National Protection Act. However, prior to World War II, Japan had a policy of "civil air defense" in preparation for air raids from enemy aircraft. This policy centered on a law called the "Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO)" (Law No. 47 of April 5, 1937, amended in 1941 and 1943), which was passed in 1937, four years before the start of the Pacific War, in preparation for air raids on the mainland.³ This policy is also said to have been one of the National Mobilization Regime.⁴

The purpose of the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) is to "prevent or mitigate the damage that may be caused by aircraft attacks in time of war or incident," and the items to be carried out by "persons other than the Army and Navy in accordance with the defense conducted by the Army and Navy," that is, citizens, are "surveillance, communication, warning, light control, dispersion, conversion, camouflage, firefighting, fire prevention, bulletproofing protection, gas proofing, evacuation, first aids, quarantine, distribution of emergency supplies, emergency restoration, and other matters to be specified by royal decree" (Article 1, Air Defense Law(BOKU-HO) , 1943, as amended).⁵ The "Enforcement Ordinance (7 January, 1944) specified "cleanup of damaged sites and other cleanup (cleaning)," "blockage by balloons (blockage)," "supply of

¹ *Laws and Regulations Complete Book, June 2003* (National Printing Bureau, 2003), 106-109.

² *Laws and Regulations Complete Book, June 2004* (National Printing Bureau, 2004), 524-554.

³ *Showa Nenkan Hourei Zensho Showa 12 Nen Vol. 11-2* (Hara Shobo, 1997),62-65; *Showa Nenkan Hourei Zensho Showa 16 Nen Vol. 15-1* (Hara Shobo, 2001), 201-207; *Showa Nenkan Hourei Zensho Showa 18 Nen (Vol. 17-2)* (Hara Shobo, 2004),290-294.

⁴ Tetsuo Furuya, "Shaping and Developing the Popular Mobilization Policy, *Quarterly Journal of Contemporary History*, No. 6 (August 1975). Eiju Suzuki, "Bōkoku Dōuin to Sengi kokunai Taisei no saihen [Air Defense Mobilization and the Reorganization of the Wartime Domestic System]," *Ritsumeikan University Institute for Research in the Humanities Bulletin*, No. 52 (September 1991).

⁵ *The Showa Era: The Complete Book of Laws and Regulations, 1943 (Vol. 17-2)*,290-294.

drinking water (water supply)," "emergency transportation," and "coordination of emergency labor" as items to be specified by imperial ordinance, making a total of 21 items.⁶

The Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) is often criticized with regard to "firefighting" and "fire prevention," where it is discussed as a bad law. For example, in the "*Tokyo Great Air Raid and War Damage Report*" criticism of the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO), which stipulates fire prevention obligations, is described as follows.

The people of Tokyo had a legal obligation to prevent fire, from which they could never escape, drilled into their heads. The only means of fire protection was the bucket relay based on neighborhood groups and a fighting spirit...We must point to the unscientific air-raid mentality, air-raid system, and air-raid obligations that held the people of Tokyo in thrall as the cause of the horrific tragedy of 10 March.⁷

Nobuya Saka, who was Superintendent of Tokyo Metropolitan Police at the time of the Tokyo Great Air Raid of March 10, 1945 (over 100,000 people died and about one million were affected), wrote about the Tokyo Great Air Raid in his "*My Resume*" series in the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* after the war, "If they had abandoned fire prevention, and evacuated, there would not have been so many deaths. The long air-raid drills turned out to be a disaster."⁸ This sentence has been quoted in various documents, and is the reason why the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) has the image of a bad law. If one accepts the various criticisms as they are, it seems as if the BOKU-HO was not intended to protect the people but only to impose burdens on them.

"There was no proper air defense in Japan before the war. To prove its non-existence, it is enough to show its disastrous results. This is one of the

⁶ *Showa Nenkan Houhou Zensho, Showa 19Nen (Vol. 18-2)* (Hara Shobo, 2005),14-21.

⁷ Tokyo Dai Kushu Sensai-shi [Tokyo Great Air Raid, War Damage Report] Editorial Committee, *Tokyo Dai Kushu Sensai-shi [Tokyo Great Air Raid, War Damage Report Vol. 1]* (Society to Record Tokyo Great Air Raids, 1973),22, 23.

⁸ Nobuya Saka, *Watashi no Rirekisho [My Resume, Vol. 18]* (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 1963),167, 168.

reasons why research on 'Civil Defense' has made little progress."⁹ Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) has been cut off from researchers until now.

The Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) is designed to cover the entire air raid process, from pre-protection to post-air raid measures and even restoration, and it is not appropriate to evaluate only "firefighting" and "fire protection" failures. With this in mind, I have examined the results of all items and comprehensively evaluated them in my book, "Civil Protection in Civil Air Defense Policy."¹⁰ From this, I will draw out the main points, summarize them in a straightforward manner, and add some additional supplements to discuss Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO)'s performance.

History of Civil Defense and Japan's Air Defense Policy

Civil defense is considered a generic term for non-military activities that protect the general population from hostilities and provide the necessary conditions for survival.¹¹

In World War I, there were approximately 10 million military deaths and 500,000 civilian deaths, while in World War II, there were 24 million civilian deaths compared to approximately 26 million military deaths.¹² Under these circumstances, small-scale civilian protective operations in the United Kingdom during World War I are said to have been the beginning of civilian defense. In World War II, which became an all-out war, countermeasures against air raids under state guidance were systematically implemented.¹³ After World War II, it developed as an addition to wartime civil defense against the threat of nuclear weapons, a trend that continues today in the United Kingdom, Germany, and other countries.¹⁴

⁹ Hironari Tsuchida, *Kindai Nihon no "Kokumin Hozoku" seido [Modern Japan's "National Air Defense" System]* (Kanda University of Foreign Studies Press, 2010), 18, 19.

¹⁰ Yoshiyasu Ohi, *National Protection in Civil Air Defense Policy* (Kinseisha, 2016).

¹¹ Kunio Kawaki, "On the Historical Transition of Civil Defense," *National Defense Academy of Japan Bulletin, 100th Edition* (March 2010), 58.

¹² Yutaka Gouda, *Civil Defense in the World* (Japan Civil Defense Association, 1987), 11-16.

¹³ Kawaki, "On the Historical Transition of Civil Defense," 58.

¹⁴ Kawaki, "On the Historical Transition of Civil Defense," 81, 82.

Also, as a product of reflection on the 24 million civilian deaths during World War II, the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Civilian Persons in War of August 12, 1949 (hereafter referred to as the "Geneva Conventions") entered into force on October 21, 1950.¹⁵ Furthermore, in order to respond to modern conditions such as the diversification of forms of armed conflict since World War II, including the increase in national liberation wars and guerrilla warfare, and the development of military technology, the Geneva Conventions were supplemented and expanded, and new provisions were added as "Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, concerning the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts".¹⁶ Part IV, Chapter VI, Article 61, "Civil Defense," to protect the civilian population against the dangers, and to help it to recover from the immediate effects, of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the conditions necessary for its survival.¹⁷

On the other hand, Japan has recently enacted its national protection policy, but the origins and reasons for the long process of enactment have rarely been addressed.

World War II ended in August 1945 with Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were disbanded, and Japan was occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Allied nations. Under the occupation policy, all laws related to war, military affairs, civil defense, and national mobilization were abolished. Seven years later, in 1952, with the entry into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan became independent and the occupation policy ended, but little research was done on emergency response and contingency legislation, including civil defense, due to the allergy to war and defeat.

It was in this context that the study of contingency legislation began in 1978 with the creation of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. However, it was shelved with the end of the Cold War. Then, in August 1998, the launch of a ballistic missile (Taepodong) by North Korea over

¹⁵ Gouda, *Civil Defense in the World*, 19.

¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/k_jindo/giteisho.html (accessed July 14, 2023).

¹⁷ ICRC, *International Humanitarian Law Databases* <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-61>.

the Japanese mainland and other security needs arose, and as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the Contingency Law and the National Protection Law were enacted.¹⁸

Why has the enactment of the national protection law taken so long? Because for nearly 60 years after the war, academia and general public had believed that Japan was helpless in defending its cities, this belief was inculcated in their minds because of the sorrow memory of the allied massive air raids on the Japanese mainland at the end of the second world war. Japanese cities were built mostly of wooden houses, and they suffered heavy damages from incendiary bomb attacks. Ever since, people have thought that the Japanese wartime civil protection policy was ineffective. However, this report argues that there are other reasons for the extensive damages to the Japanese cities, and that the civil protection policy itself was not as inadequate previously thought.

Japan's Air Defense System before World War II

Japan's perception of air raids began when Hironori Mizuno (Commander of the Navy) studied in Europe at his own expense during World War I. After returning to Japan, he wrote a series of articles in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun about the German air raids on London that he had witnessed there. In the article, he pointed out the need for air defense in view of the future development of aircraft and the vulnerability of Japanese cities to fire.¹⁹

After the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923), the problem of wooden houses' vulnerability to fire was about to be solved by establishing an air defense system, advocating the construction of a noncombustible city. That is, in order to reconstruct Tokyo as a nonflammable city after the earthquake destroyed 300,000 houses, the city was to be rebuilt through fireproof construction by designating fire zones. Fireproof construction was costly, and the construction of modern nonflammable housing was promoted through subsidized programs, but was discontinued due to the Sino-Japanese War that began in 1937.²⁰

¹⁸ Kawaki, "On the Historical Transition of Civil Defense," 67-71.

¹⁹ Tsuchida, *Modern Japan's "National Air Defense" System*, 42.

²⁰ Kuroda, Yasuhiro, *Teikoku Nihon no Kukan no Hozoku [Air Defense Measures in Imperial Japan]* (Shinbunsha, 2010), 29-43.

According to the judgment of the General Staff, the number of Soviet aircraft in the Far East at the end of 1935 reached 950, including large bombers with a range that could make a round trip to and from the Japanese mainland.²¹ It was predicted that the main targets of air raids on the Japanese mainland would be Tokyo, Kanmon-Kitakyushu, and Keihanshin, in that order, and that 10 to 50 percent of the planes would break through the anti-air defenses and drop incendiary bombs in large numbers and over a wide area, disorient the civilian population with gas bombs, and destroy important facilities with bombs.²²

Recognizing and responding to this air raid from the Soviet forces in the Far East, Japan's air defense was structured in three tiers: offensive (attacks on enemy bases), air defense operations with interceptor fighters and anti-aircraft guns, and civil air defense under the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO).

Air raids suffered by Japan

On 16 June 1944, the U.S. military bombing of the Japanese mainland, known as the Matterhorn Plan, was initially intended to devastate Japan with state-of-the-art B-29 strategic bombers from Chengdu, deep in the heart of mainland China. However, it was not effective, and the distance was too great to target Tokyo. The U.S. military decided to establish a base for strategic bombing of Japan in the Mariana Islands, and ordered General Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to secure the Marianas by June 1944. In August 1944, the U.S. forces occupied the Japanese-administered islands of Saipan and Tinian in the Mariana Island, where Runways were constructed and full-scale air raids on the Japanese mainland began in earnest in November.

Air raids on the Japanese mainland by B-29s are generally referred to as high-altitude precision bombing before 10 March 1945 (Great Air Raid on Tokyo), and low-altitude indiscriminate bombing after that. There are several tactical reasons for the use of low-altitude indiscriminate bombing. First, if incendiary bombs are dropped to burn an area, precise targeting is not necessary, and to drop incendiary bombs on unburned areas, it is easier for B-29 bombers

²¹ Tsuchida, *Modern Japan's "National Air Defense" System*, 216.

²² Military History Office, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Agency, *Senshi Soshō: Hondo Boei Sakusen [Military History Series: Mainland Air Defense Operations]* (Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1968), 25-27.

to recognize the target (position or area) at night than during the day. At night, the risk of flying at low altitude is reduced because interception on the Japanese side, where searchlights and anti-aircraft guns are not synchronized, is not so severe²³. And for the B-29, the load to climb to high altitude is reduced, so the bomb load is increased²⁴. Furthermore, since each aircraft dropped incendiary bombs in separate, unburned areas, the need to form up was eliminated, and speed adjustments to maintain formation were no longer necessary, saving fuel.²⁵

This tactic is referred to as low-altitude incendiary attack, metropolitan incendiary attack, or saturation incendiary attack, because it targeted large cities at low altitude with large numbers of incendiary bombs to saturate firefighting operations. In this paper, this is referred to as "area attack".

In addition, B-29s were also flown when they conducted weather reconnaissance. Weather reconnaissance aircraft were sent out day and night, each with a specialist weather observer on board to transmit data to base every 30 minutes. Then they would go with five 500-pound bombs on board. With this, they found a favorable target somewhere in Japan and bombed it."²⁶

The table below summarizes the air raids based on these data. Precision bombings of military targets were carried out 198 times, of which 169 were during the day (34 in high altitude and 135 in low- medium) and 29 at night (5 in high altitude, 24 in low- medium altitude). Area attacks targeting urban areas were carried out 78 times, 9 during the day (1 high altitude, 8 low-medium altitude) and 69 at night (only low-mid altitude). In addition, weather reconnaissance aircraft dropped bombs 46 times (10 during the day and 36 at night), and attacks by shipboard aircraft were executed 23 times during the day, for an overall total of 345 attacks. In addition, mines were laid 46 times.

²³ Yoshishige Okuzumi and Toshio Hikasa, *Rumay's Incendiary Blitzkrieg: Analysis Report by the General Staff* (Okayama Air Raid Documentation Center, 2005), 28.

²⁴ History of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Vol. 5, "in *Tokyo Great Air Raid and War Damage Report*, Vol. 3, 752.

²⁵ Yoshishige Okuzumi and Katsumoto Saotome, *Bomb Tokyo* (Sansendo, 2007), 60.

²⁶ Chester Marshall (translated by Koji Takagi), *B-29 Tokyo Bombing 30 Times*, (Neko Publishing, 2001), 162.

Table Air Raid Aspects

	Daytime		Nights		Total
	High Altitude	Low-Medium Altitude	High Altitude	Low-Medium Altitude	
Precision Bombing	34	135	5	24	198
Area Attack	1	8	0	69	78
Weather Reconnaissance	10		36		46
Ship-Borne Plane	23		0		23
Total	211		134		345

Mines Laid in addition: 46 times

*We defined high altitude above 20,000 feet and low-medium altitude below that.

The most effective of these air raids for the U.S. forces, and the most severe for the Japanese, was the area attack. In addition to the weak air defense system, from around March-April 1945, the Japanese military adopted a policy of preserving military aircraft in preparation against the landing of U.S. forces to Japanese mainland, and abandoned air superiority. This meant that most of the air raids were dealt with by civil air defense based on the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO).

Air Raid Estimate

An air raid estimate published by the military in 1941, before the outbreak of the war between Japan and the United States, describes the reality of the air raids suffered, anticipating a war against the Soviet Union, the United States, and United Kingdom a few years later. It was estimated that the enemy

could hit our country from the eastern coastal regions of the Soviet Union in about two or three hours, and that the interest was Soviet forces.²⁷

In an estimate made on 9 March 1942, at a time when Japan was operating favorably after the outbreak of the war against the United States (8 December 1941), a major enemy counteroffensive was not expected until 1943, "Concentrating our sea and air forces in the Pacific, and using some of them to obstruct our sea traffic routes, surprise attacks on Japanese centers, and guerrilla warfare"²⁸.

About a month later, on 18 April the first U.S. bombing raid on the Japanese mainland, by the Doolittle Bomber Command, was carried out. The raid used the tactic of launching B-25s from the Navy's aircraft carrier *Hornet*, a land-based bomber that was particularly superior in terms of cruising capability. 16 B-25s were launched, and 13 bombed the Keihin area.²⁹

Estimates on 7 November 1942,³⁰ indicated that major air raids would not occur until after 1943, and air raids from the Aleutians and Midway were expected. As it was, after the Doolittle Air Raid, there were no air raids on the mainland in 1942 or 1943.

In an estimate on 15 January 1944, Japan predicted that "from mid-1944 onward, we will be subjected to intense air raids by formations of dozens or more aircraft due to the new large aircraft"³¹ As predicted, B-29s first appeared on the Japanese mainland (Kitakyushu) on 15 June of the same year. At that time, B-29s were launched from Chengdu, China, and in response, a landing operation was launched on the island of Saipan.³² In August of the same year, after the fall of Saipan, estimates stated, "Generally speaking, air raids were carried out

²⁷ Ministry of the Army, General Staff, "Guidelines for Guidance on National Air Defense," May 1940 (in the possession of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense).

²⁸ The "World Situation Assessment" (Important National Policy Decisions, Vol. 2, National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense of Japan).

²⁹ Takashi Shimamura, *Mainland Air Raids* (Book Publishers, 1971),45.

³⁰ National Institute for Defense Studies, *Civil Air Defense Policy in the Greater East Asia War*, (National Institute for Defense,1987) ,240.

³¹ Ministry of the Army and Ministry of the Navy, "Criteria for Setting Emergency Air Defense Plans" (National Archives of Japan, "Air Defense Related Matters (VI)")

³² E. Barlett Carr (translated by Isao Otani), *Strategy, The Great Tokyo Air Bombing* (Kohinsha, 1994),67, 68.

continuously and on a large scale from August onward, and the impact of the damage on Japan's ability to conduct the war cannot be underestimated.³³ Air raids on the mainland by B-29s launched from Saipan began in earnest, as generally expected, with the bombing of the Musashino Works of the Nakajima Aircraft Company on 24 November³⁴.

The "World Situation Assessment" of February 22, 1945, predicted intensified air raids on the Japanese mainland and air raids by the ships of the task force.³⁵ And the air raids by the ship-borne aircraft of the task force started around February³⁶ After the Tokyo air raid on March 10 of the same year, air raids on the Japanese mainland intensified, with Nagoya and Osaka becoming targets, and then expanding to other regional cities.

If the period of the Pacific War is viewed broadly in this way, it can be said that the air raids were conducted in the manner in which the Japanese side estimated them to be.

Dropping density

In preparing for the air raid, the Japanese had estimated the density of incendiary bombs to be dropped. It was one incendiary bomb per Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group).³⁷ Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group) was organized as a voluntary self-defense organization for air defense and supported civil air defense, and consisted of 10-15 houses.³⁸

³³ Documents kept by the Chief of the General Staff, Supreme War Guidance Council, August 19, 1944, Ministry of Defense, National Institute for Defense Studies.

³⁴ Hiratsuka Masao, *Beigun ga Kirokusha Nihon Kusuushuu [The U.S. Military Recorded the Air Raids on Japan]* (Soshisha, 1995),35.

³⁵ Ministry of Defense National Institute for Defense Studies, "Documents kept by the Chief of the General Staff, Supreme War Guidance Council, Part 1.

³⁶ Yozo Kudo and Yoshishige Okuzumi, *Photographs Tell the Story of Japan's Air Raids* (Gendai Shiryo Shuppan, 2008),113.

³⁷ Namba Satoshi, *Air Defense under the Current Situation* (Kodansha, 1941),48.

³⁸ Director-General of the Planning Bureau and Director-General of the Security Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, "Home Air Defense Neighborhood Security Organization Outline" (August 1939, Ministry of Home Affairs Bulletin No. 108) (National Diet Library, Electronic Resource Library, "Air Defense Related Laws and Regulations").

Meanwhile, the U.S. military conducted a demonstration test to investigate the appropriate density of incendiary bombs to burn down Japanese houses built of wood. Twelve two-story row houses were constructed in a test area spread out 112 km southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah. It was constructed and furnished the same as in Japan, using the same lumber, dimensions, thickness, angles, and paint.³⁹

The results of demonstration tests conducted over a four-month period beginning in May 1943 showed that the M69 incendiary bomb was the most suitable to burn down a house, even if the fire was extinguished for six minutes. The M69 was designed to drop 38 relatively small bombs weighing 6 pounds (2.7 kg)⁴⁰ together and scatter as the convergence zone was dislodged in the air⁴¹. The fuses were then triggered after landing, scattering the fiery napalm. And a scatter density of 10 tons per square mile was derived.⁴²

The aforementioned Japanese estimate of one incendiary device per (Tonari Gumi) neighborhood translates to 25 tons per square mile, so the Japanese estimate at the beginning of the war was appropriate. However, when the actual incendiary bombing began, the 20th Bomber Command dropped 250 tons per square mile, or 25 times more than in the demonstration tests, according to field assessments. That is 10 times the Japanese estimate.⁴³ The Japanese civil air defence was overwhelmed by the incendiary bombs, which far exceeded the initial estimate of the density of bombs dropped, and many casualties were inflicted. However, there were cases where the spread of fire was prevented in areas where the density of bombs dropped was low.

³⁹ E. Barlett Carr, *Strategic Tokyo Bombing*, 30, 31.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 16.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 40, 41.

⁴² *Ibid*, 30, 31.

⁴³ Integrated Attack Target Group, Physical Vulnerability Section, *Comparison of American, German and Japanese Incendiary Bombs, (Tokyo Great Air Raid, War Damage Report Vol..3)*, 774.

Actual situation of Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO)

As mentioned at the beginning, the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) has 21 items, which can be divided into three phases: “Pre-protection measures”, “air raid response” and “post-air raid measures”.

This paper describes "dispersal evacuation" and "evacuation" as pre-protection measures, "surveillance, communication, and warning", "camouflage", and "firefighting and fire prevention" as air raid response, and "emergency restoration" as post-air raid measures.

In investigating the actual state of BOKU-HO, I referred not only to Japanese records of the time, but also to the final report by the USSBS (THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY) after war. This survey mission, a joint US Army-Navy agency set up under the orders of President Roosevelt, conducted surveys in various parts of Japan to investigate the effects and impact of the strategic bombing carried out by US forces and to analyze the potential for air power, and issued its final report in July 1946.⁴⁴ The report is of high value as a historical document.

Dispersal Evacuation and Evacuation

The subject of "decentralized evacuation" were

- facilities or businesses related to the production, processing, repair, storage, or distribution of important mobilized materials
- facilities or businesses related to electricity, gas, or water supply
- facilities or businesses related to transportation and communications or traffic, and the competent minister could order "dispersal evacuation".⁴⁵

The USSBS report states the following in the section entitled Evacuation and

⁴⁴ U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of Japan, *White Paper on the Pacific War, Volume 1: Headquarters Report* (Japan Book Center, 1992), commentary.

⁴⁵ *Showa Nenkan Hourei Zensho, Showa 19 Nen (Vol. 18-2)* (Hara Shobo, 2005),14-21.

Voluntary precautionary evacuation, began early in 1944 and continued on the same voluntary basis even after the saturation raids. evacuation of primary school children was well conceived, integrated, and executed.⁴⁶

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government evacuated 140,000 schoolchildren (3th-6th grade), and 410,000 nationwide to the countryside. Despite some shortcomings, the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of schoolchildren to the countryside without the fear of air raids has been described as more effective and successful than expected.⁴⁷ The evacuation of school children was carried out in accordance with the "Guidelines for Facilitating the Evacuation of School Children" in view of air defense needs.⁴⁸

Surveillance, Communication and Warning

Surveillance, communication, and warning can be considered as an integral part. The USSBS report states the following in the section "Air-Raid Warning

"The air-raid-warning system of detection was effective; planes were spotted in time and warning centers were notified."⁴⁹

Furthermore, according to previous studies, from November 1944, when full-scale air raids on the Kanto region began, to the end of the war, air-raid warnings were issued 427 times in the Eastern Military District of Japan, 88 of which were accompanied by bombings, and according to analysis, 83% of these 88 times, either an air raid warning was issued before the bombing began or an alert was issued 30 minutes before the bombing.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, *FINAL REPORT Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subject in JAPAN* (Civilian Defense Division,1947),5-6.

⁴⁷ Asami Joboji, *Nihon Bōkū-ishi [History of Air Defense in Japan]* (Hara Shobo, 1981),273.

⁴⁸ The Cabinet decision on June 30, 1944, "Outline for the Promotion of Evacuation of School Children" (Digital Archive, National Archives of Japan).

⁴⁹ THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, *FINAL REPORT Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subject in JAPAN* (Civilian Defense Division,1947),6.

⁵⁰ Masanori Hattori, "Air Defense Warning System and Activities during the Greater East Asia War," *shin bouei ronssyu Vol.12, No.2*(October 1984),85, 86.

Camouflage

Camouflage is a measure to make it difficult for enemy aircraft to detect and impossible to precisely bomb properties that are likely to become targets of air raids, and is classified as camouflage (painting, tree planting) and shielding.⁵¹

With the cooperation and guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, the Metropolitan Police Department, the Headquarters of the Army Construction Department, and the Army Aviation Research Institute, the Architectural Institute of Japan compiled the "Guidelines for Building Camouflage" in February 1941.⁵² In the Guidelines, detailed guidelines were provided for each building in the hope of making it difficult to detect visually from a viewing distance of 10km(5.5nm) or more, or to create the illusion that it was a fake, even though it was not effective against photographic reconnaissance.⁵³

The USSBS report states. "Some techniques of camouflage, concealment, and deception which did not greatly confuse the interpreters may have been effective in confusing an attacking pilot or bombardiers."⁵⁴

For example, the shape of the gas tank is unique, so special consideration was required⁵⁵, and Tokyo Gas dispersed its plants and placed the gas tank in nine different locations to disguise them⁵⁶. It is recorded that the supply capacity of gas was reduced by half due to the air raid⁵⁷. and if we simply assume that half

⁵¹ Ministry of Home Affairs Planning Bureau, "Air Defense Disguise Guidance Guideline," August 18, 1941, Ministry of Home Affairs Bulletin No. 97 (in the possession of the National Archives of Japan, "Air Defense Nikansuru Koto (3)").

⁵² Shoichi Hoshino, "On the Guideline for Building Falsification," *Architectural Magazine*, Vol. 55, No. 671 (1941),24.

⁵³ Committee for the Study of Urban Air Defense, *Pamphlet on Urban Air Defense* (Architectural Institute of Japan, 1940-16).

⁵⁴ THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, *Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland PART FIVE CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND DECEPTION* (Photographic Intelligence Section, 1947), pp.5-01.

⁵⁵ Committee of Inquiry on Urban Airworthiness, "General Guidelines for Building Disguise," *Architectural Magazine*, Vol. 55, No. 671, (February 1941),113.

⁵⁶ Yutaka Iwamura, "Air Defense Measures for Factories in the Gas Business," *Imperial Gas Association Magazine*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (March 1942),97, 98.

⁵⁷ THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, *The Impact of Air Raids on Urban Complexes (Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama)*,"(Report 56 of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Team), (*Tokyo Great air Raid, War Damage Report Vol. 3.*), 821.

of the gas tanks, or about four, remained, we can assume that the camouflage was effective there.

Firefighting and Fire Prevention

The aforementioned Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group) was heavily involved in firefighting and fire prevention. The general public organizing that Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group) was obligated to respond to incendiary attacks in the following sequence.

When an air raid is being carried out and incendiary bombs are being dropped, the civilians wait at a shelter to avoid being directly hit by the bombs. When the incendiary bombs have been dropped and enemy aircraft have passed directly overhead, they will jump out of the shelters to prevent the incendiary bombs from igniting buildings and other structures and starting a fire. If this does not work and the fire spreads to buildings and other structures, then the initial firefighting measures should be taken. If the fire cannot be extinguished, then the assistance of a permanent firefighting organization (fire brigade or government fire brigade) should be requested. Once the fire brigade arrives, follow their instructions to prevent the fire from spreading and assist them. If the fire is so strong that it is impossible to extinguish and becomes dangerous, evacuate the area (under the direction of the fire brigade)⁵⁸.

The actual situation was overwhelming, as the incendiary attack was ten times denser than expected. In the midst of this situation, I calculated numerically how well they were able to cope with the situation.

The record of preventing the spread of fire is also the record of preventing many houses from burning down. There is no data on the number of houses prevented from burning down, but there is data on the number of half-burned houses. If the fire had not been prevented from spreading, the fire would have been totally destroyed. Since the U.S. military selected the targets of incendiary attacks after conducting weather reconnaissance, the possibility that the fire was extinguished by rainfall and the fire was only half extinguished is not worth considering.

⁵⁸ Yoshiyasu Ohi, *Civil Protection in Civil Air Defense Policy* (Kinseisha, 2016), 186.

The number of half-burned houses was considered as the performance of Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group), and to analyze this, an index called "fire extinguishing rate" was defined.

Fire extinguishing rate = half burned houses/(totally burned houses + half burned houses) x 100 (%)

**Table-1 Mixing of bombs and incendiaries
(extinguishing rate)**

Date	Target	Houses Burned Down	Half-Burnt House	Fire Extinguishing Rate %.	Type of Bombing
24 Nov 1944.	Nakajima Aircraft	29	9	23.68	precision bombing
27 Nov 1944	Nakajima Aircraft	20	7	25.93	precision bombing
3 Dec 1944	Nakajima Aircraft	20	10	33.33	precision bombing
27 Dec 1944.	Nakajima Aircraft	12	7	36.84	precision bombing
27 Jan 1945	Urban Industrial Jetty	508	95	15.75	precision bombing
19 Feb 1945	Pier District	570	41	6.71	precision bombing
4 Mar 1945	Nakajima Aircraft	2,365	810	25.51	precision bombing

This is analyzed for air raids against the city of Tokyo. Table 1 shows the case of precision bombing, with seven cases falling under this category and a higher percentage of bombs than incendiaries. The extinguishing rate in such

cases ranges from 6 to 60%, and in many cases the figure exceeds 20%. In other words, it can be assumed that Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group) would have been able to fight the fires if the raids had not been primarily incendiary.

Table-2 Incendiary only or primarily incendiary (extinguishing rate)

Date	Target	Houses Burned Down	Half-Burnt House	Fire Extinguishing Rate %.	Type of Bombing
29 Nov 1944.	Light industrial district	2,773	141	4.84	area attack
25 Feb 1945	urban area	19,927	368	1.81	area attack
10 Mar 1945	Urban area (Tokyo Great Air Raid)	267,171	971	0.36	area attack
13 Apr 1945	Arsenal District (Akabane)	168,350	138	0.08	area attack
15 Apr 1945	Southern Cities	61,847	563	0.90	area attack
24 May 1945	urban area	60,381	141	0.23	area attack
25 May 1945	urban area	165,103	339	0.20	area attack
29 May 1945	urban area	1,377	6	0.43	area attack

Totally burned houses total 746,929 Half burned houses total 2,667
Extinguish rate of total 0.36

Table-2 shows nine cases of area bombing, and since incendiary bombs were used mainly, the fire extinguishing rate was very poor, less than 1% in seven cases. All seven cases were after the Tokyo Great Air Raid (10 March 1945). After this Raid, the fire extinguishing rate rapidly worsened, and the calculated fire extinguishing rate was only 0.08-1.84% (0.36% in total). This is the performance of Tonari Gumi's (Neighborhood Group) activities mainly against area attacks, and by extension, the performance of "emergency fire prevention" and "firefighting," including government fire departments. In other words, the fire was beyond the capability of Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group) also permanent fire services.

The situation is believed to be similar in local cities, and records regarding area attacks were examined at⁵⁹. The number of area attacks believed to have targeted local cities was 81. Table 3 lists some of them for reference.

Table 3: Fire Extinguishing Rates for Area Attacks on Rural Cities (Selected)

City Name	Date 1945	Entirely Destroyed	Partial Destruction By Fire	Fire Extinguishing Ratio
Gifu City	9 Jul	20,303	29	0.14
Nishinomiya City	5 Jun	1,207	28	2.26
Nishinomiya City	15 Jul	308	32	9.41
Uwajima City	12 Jul	2,100	62	2.86
Uwajima City	28 Jul	3,900	40	1.01
Sendai City	10 Jul	11,645	293	2.45
Sakai City	13 March	158	38	19.38
Kochi City	4 Jul	12,031	169	1.38

⁵⁹ Ministry of Construction (ed.), *Journal of War Disaster Reconstruction, Volumes 4-9* (Urban Planning Association, 1957-1960).

Hamamatsu City	18 Jun	16,011	193	1.19
Sasebo City	28 Jul	12,037	69	0.56
Kofu City	6 Jul	17,864	230	1.27
Yokkaichi City	18 Jun	8,410	130	0.37
Okayama City	29 Jul	24,232	800	3.19
City of Yokohama	29 May	79,437	133	0.16

Fire extinguishing rate $320,411 \div 13,574 \times 100 = 4.06$

From these, we were able to extract war-damaged cities where half-burned houses were mentioned, and we were able to survey 32 times. The average fire extinguishing rate for these 32 raids was 4.06%, a higher rate than the 0.08-1.84% in Tokyo (0.36% in total). The reason for this may be that the density of houses is looser in rural areas. In addition, in most rural areas, there was only one large-scale incendiary attack, and it can be assumed that the firefighting preparedness Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group), etc., for that one attack, while overwhelmed, functioned in some areas.

Many researchers agree that Japan's air defense system was ineffective in the face of overwhelming air-raids by U.S forces. air strikes, as evidenced by the devastation of Tokyo and other cities. However, in the USSBS report under the heading of SPECIAL CIVILIAN DEFENSE AGENCIES, there is the following description of the "Neighborhood Group".

Here was the Japanese expression of "self-protection"-a group fighting for the protection of its homes before the arrival of larger and better-equipped forces. It offered the great advantage of having a working organization with a responsible leader on the scene of a bombing incident a few minutes after its inception, the time when prompt action was most valuable.

The number of simultaneous incidents, together with the casualties and confusion which were the natural results of the raids from March 1945 to the end

of the war, overtaxed the capabilities of these services, but it is logical to assume that, without this group, loss of life and property would have been far greater.⁶⁰

Clearly, the United States has recognized the effectiveness of Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group)'s fire prevention efforts. Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Group) dealt with many situations prior to March 1945, when bombing was not the primary means of burning down urban homes. Of the 345 bombings covered, it can be said to have responded to a total of 267 bombings, including 198 precision bombings (169 during the day and 29 at night), 46 bombs thrown by weather reconnaissance aircraft, and 23 attacks by shipboard aircraft.

In an air raid that primarily used incendiary bombs, the density of incendiary bombs dropped, which was more than 10 times greater than expected, was far beyond our ability to cope. As a result, there were many casualties and great confusion. The targeted bombings were 78 area attacks.

However, "fire prevention" and "firefighting" activities were not entirely absent. In response to the incendiary fires, several hundred half-burned houses were the result in Tokyo. The fire extinguishing rate of 0.082 to 1.84% (0.36% in total) of the total number of damaged houses, and 4.06% in regional cities, is the result of fire prevention, firefighting. This is a quantitative figure and is the result of fire prevention activities that were overwhelmed by incendiary bombs 10 times greater than expected. If this number is considered zero, Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) is totally negated. However, if 4% is not zero, we can consider measures to improve this figure. Japanese civilian air defense research has stalled here because of the strong tendency to regard this figure as zero.

Post-air raid Measures

"post-air raid measures" has not been the subject of much research until now, and for this reason there is no critical literature on post-air raid measures. According to the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO), post-air raid measures include "emergency restoration," "quarantine," "poison control," "water supply," "cleaning," "relief work," and "distribution of emergency supplies. There are records in local government histories that these items were carried out after the

⁶⁰ THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, *FINAL REPORT Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subject in JAPAN* (Civilian Defense Division, 1947), 32.

air raids. The following is a summary from the "Clearance and Repair" section of the USSBS report.⁶¹

Waterway: During the early stages of the air raids on the Japanese mainland, interruptions in the water supply mains due to precision bombing were repaired in a matter of hours. However, as the severity of the raids increased, water supply personnel were killed, wounded, and dispersed, and their efficiency was severely reduced by the lack of transportation. Auxiliary organizations, such as the police and the police brigade, attempted to make temporary repairs to the sometimes-damaged water mains, although they were not trained to do so. However, they were inefficient due to lack of technical training.

Electricity and Gas: Whether privately or publicly owned, utilities established wartime maintenance units, but they simply gave the original maintenance units the name "emergency". During wartime, private companies responded by calling on workers employed by the company or trained personnel from nearby cooperative groups.

Tram: Trams were organized most effectively for restoration in both public and private public institutions. The organization of the streetcar system was restored without requesting assistance from auxiliary organizations in case of emergency. Furthermore, they did not rely on the help of engineers from other nearby companies. Emergency repair teams were stationed at various locations, equipped with the necessary equipment, and specially trained to simulate bomb damage.

Thus, the USSBS report acknowledges that there were "emergency restoration" efforts for water, electricity, gas, and streetcars. However, since there are no specific items in the report, Following is introduced some of them from the descriptions in the municipal history.

⁶¹ THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, *FINAL REPORT Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subject in JAPAN* (Civilian Defense Division, 1947), 95-99.

Water supply:

About 20 days later, emergency restoration work was completed and temporary water taps were installed at key locations to start emergency water supply. (Honjo Village)

The water source was spared from the war damage, and water supply was started as early as the next morning. (Gifu City)

Emergency repairs at the water source were completed at 4:00 p.m. on the same day, and the water supply was restored. (Ichinomiya City)

It took nearly nine months to restore the water supply to the end of the city. (Hiroshima City)

Electricity:

On 6 August, the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima City. On the following day, 7 August, power was transmitted to a part of the city, and on 11 August, the line to the broadcasting station was restored, and by evening, temporary power was transmitted throughout the city. (Chugoku Electric Power Distribution Co.)

Tram:

After the air raid on 29 May, 1945, 35.6 km, or 73% of the entire line, was restored on July 1. (Yokohama City)

All lines were opened to traffic on 20 August 1945, 40 days after the air raid. (Sendai City)

The company was bombed on 20 June 1945, and on 8 July, the Higashida - Maehata line was restored, and work began on restoring the Maehata - Asabashi line; in the same month, that work was completed and the line began operation. (Toyohashi Railway)

Summary

Although what I have been able to present in this paper is only a part of the achievements made by the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO), I have extracted the effects of all the Air Defense Law (BOKU-HO) items in my research, which is summarized in my book, "Civil Protection in Civil Air Defense Policy". I believe that the results of this study fill a void in the history of civil protection in the book.

